2024 NATO Public Forum Day One 7/10/24

Ladies and gentlemen, please take your seats. The program is about to begin.

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Ladies and gentlemen, our program will begin in five minutes.

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Ladies and gentlemen, and please take your seats. The program is about to begin.

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Good morning, everybody. Good morning. Good morning. Welcome to Washington D.C., everyone, and welcome to the NATO Public Forum, the public event taking place during the NATO Summit. I’m Shannon Vavra, a national security reporter, and a CNAS Next Gen National Security Fellow.

And I’m Michal Baranowski. Michal Baranowski, managing director of GMF East and the director of our Warsaw office coming to you from the eastern flank. Wonderful to see you all. Many familiar faces, many friends and colleagues.

Exactly. Before we start, we would like to have your attention for a moment. We will have several interactive sessions where you’ll be able to address your questions. For those in the audience, there are microphones located on either side of the room, and if you have a question, please proceed to the back of the room where our audience team will be able to guide you.

And besides people in this room, there is many of our fellow citizens watching online. And for those watching online, you can register at the NATO’s Public Forum website to ask questions to interact with the forum throughout the day.

You are encouraged to communicate about the event on social media, follow up on the discussion and amplify the conversation online by using the hashtag #NATOSummit. Also, I want to mention that we have a couple of content creators who are conducting interviews in the YouTube studio backstage, Sam Ellis, Victoria Reichert, and Marvin Newman.

Wonderful. And this is, of course, a team effort. Working together with NATO, NATO Public Diplomacy division, and the US government was a team of co-organizers, which I want to recognize today, and right now. The Atlantic Council, CNAS, GLOBSEC, the Hudson Institute, and my home organization, the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

I would also like to acknowledge our corporate partners. We are truly grateful for their support. I’d like to thank our lead sponsors, Google, who is also supporting the YouTube studio on-site, AWS, Microsoft and Northrop Grumman. And our generous partners, Boeing, Data Miner, Leidos, Lockheed Martin, MBDA, Oracle, and Saab.

So as you can see, it takes a village to organize such an amazing forum. And I want to recognize also our institutional partners, those behind me, who reached out throughout the alliance to make this forum happen and to let everyone knows that this is great program. So please also reach out to our institutional partners.

And with that, to officially open the event, it is my great pleasure to invite on stage Marie-Doha Besancenot, Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy at NATO. And Amanda Mansour, Special Assistant to the U.S. President and Senior Director for Partnerships & Global Engagement.

Good morning.

Hey.

Hey.

Welcome to the NATO-

High five.

… Public Forum 2024. On behalf of our secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, and all our colleagues at the NATO headquarters, I’m very happy to welcome you to this very special anniversary forum in Washington for the first time since 1999. That was 25 years ago. After Vilnius last year, it is a great privilege to organize this event here in the United States with a very special host nation.

And on behalf of President and Dr. Biden, the entire U.S. government team and our consortium partners who, I’m going to say them again just because they’ve been absolutely invaluable. The Atlantic Council, German Marshall Fund, GLOBSEC, Hudson Institute, and Center for a New American Security. We are thrilled to kick off this historic event.

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This year’s public forum is larger and more diverse than ever before, featuring voices from across NATO, from across the United States. Voices of civil society, military, youth, industry, and government. Those on the front lines of today’s threats and on the threats of the future.

We have also partnered with institutions across the alliance to enable colleagues in all 32 allied nations and many partner nations, not only to follow the event, but also to engage with us live. So to all those attending the watch parties here in D.C., back in Belgium, in other locations across the Atlantic, welcome to you, too. And finally, a big welcome to the 4,000 followers who are already with us online. This event is indeed being live-streamed.

The United States is grateful for the opportunity to host the NATO Summit here in Washington D.C. for a few reasons. First, it’s NATO’s 75th birthday. So happy Diamond Jubilee. And congratulations to the 1 billion NATO citizens for this incredible milestone. For the investment, leadership and sacrifice that brought us here, and for the many accomplishments still ahead.

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Second, as you NATO nerds might already know, 75 years ago, the Washington Treaty was signed right here by the original 12 allies in Washington D.C. And I’ll note that last night, Secretary General Stoltenberg described the Washington Treaty by saying, “Never have so few words meant so much to so many.”

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Last, but certainly not least, we are grateful to be this year’s hosts because of the foundational role that alliances and partnerships play in U.S. foreign policy. And there is no better example than NATO, the standard-bearer for the world. Strengthening and modernizing our alliances has been one of the central projects of President Biden’s foreign policy since he took office. So you can imagine how happy we are to spend a whole week with single-minded focus on just that.

The Public forum is definitely NATO’s premier public event to connect friends and citizens across the globe to our alliance. So what to expect? What makes this edition exceptional? It will feature over 40 panels and conversations. That’s a lot of quality time with leaders and experts just over two days. We are proud to host 10 allied partner heads of state and governments. We are also very happy to host 21 ministers, 13 foreign affairs ministers, 11 from allied nations, two from partner nations, eight allied ministers of defense. And we are especially honored to welcome senior Ukrainian voices, like Minister Yermak and Stefanishyna.

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We’re also very grateful to the American senators and house representative who agreed to join us, as well as 10 U.S. government senior officials. We will also be joined by 13 senior NATO officials, including our three highest military leaders, general managers of our agency, NCIA and SPA, as well as our chief scientist.

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Because we want this forum to be inclusive and to be open to other geographies, we have prepared for you Vox Pop videos from the U.S. heartland and from NATO’s frontiers in the Arctic, in the east, in the south. We have also invited the youth to join, join from our very recent youth summit in Stockholm and Miami. So you will also hear their voices. And finally, you will also hear eight corporate voices because the industry matters and because we have great corporate partners.

As you know, the public forum is running concurrently with and right next door to the actual summit. Today, the North Atlantic Council, or the NAC, will meet to discuss NATO’s deterrence and defense, as well as how we will continue to support Ukraine. Tomorrow, the NAC will be joined first by the EU and its Indo-Pacific partners in the morning, then by Ukraine in the afternoon.

As you see, we have designed this event to be in close dialogue with the mostly closed-door event next door, mirroring it, tackling the very same questions that are being discussed and negotiated there. And we have added a forward look on NATO’s key trajectories for years to come. So let me say again, welcome and [foreign language 00:19:00] to the NATO Public Forum.

And now it’s time to kick off our first panel entitled NATO Looking Ahead, Defending our Future. It is my honor to welcome to the stage U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, and GMF president, Heather Conley.

Well, thank you so much, Amanda and Marie-Doha. Warmest of welcomes to you-

Thank you.

… Secretary Blinken. And good morning NATO Public Forum. You and I have an awesome responsibility here. You and I are sort of like the pace car for this two-day race of the public forum.

I’m counting on you, Heather.

Well, I’m counting on you. So I guess we have to say, let’s start our NATO engines and let’s get going. And we have a lot of news to talk about, a lot of the most pressing issues on the agenda. But I just want to take a moment. I want to take a moment and honor this historic moment.

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So I looked back at those transcripts from 1949 and I discovered what the 51st Secretary of State said at the signing, Secretary Dean Acheson. He said, “For those who participated in the drafting of this treaty, the Washington Treaty, must leave to others the judgment of the significance and the value of that act.” So I just want to ask you very personally, no talking points, from one Europeanist to another Europeanist, what does this moment mean to you very personally?

Well, first, good morning, everyone. It’s great to be with you today. I don’t think we’ve seen this kind of assemblage of… We heard referred as-

We heard the term. Use it.

NATO nerds, you’re all here.

We celebrate this. We celebrate it.

And I proudly count myself among you, and have for more than 30 years now.

Yes, sir.

The moment means a lot of things. The moment means 75 years. Jens Stoltenberg said it yesterday, this is now the longest enduring alliance in history. That in and of itself is remarkable. But I think it’s evidence that country after country, government after government representing now a billion people, has seen the extraordinary value of this alliance.

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And I think it really boils down to this when you think about it, because when Dean Acheson was here, when our predecessors were here, they were coming off two World Wars. And the absolute priority for them was trying to put in place the understandings, the arrangements, the structures to prevent another global conflagration. And NATO was at the heart of that. And what is at the heart of NATO? This extraordinary commitment that an attack on one is an attack on all is the strongest possible deterrent to conflict, the best possible way to avoid war. Because any would-be aggressor contemplating an attack, knows that if they take on one of us, they have to take on all of us.

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And what we’ve seen over 75 years is a defensive alliance that’s kept the peace for the citizens that it represents. And that in turn enables something else. Because, ultimately, NATO is not an end in itself. The end in itself is to make sure that the citizens of the countries that come together in NATO are able to lead their lives freely, securely, to try to make progress, to try to hand down a better life to their children than one they had. And it starts with the security. If you have that, everything else becomes possible.

Absolutely. Thank you. Well, one of the pressing priorities at this 75th year is, of course, Ukraine. Last evening we heard President Biden make some announcements about a new air defense package in Ukraine.

That’s right.

So Mr. Secretary, I actually want to start with that news. I hope you can help us unpack that and tell us a little bit more about the Ukraine package that we can expect at the summit.

Well, you heard the President yesterday talk about the work that we’ve done and other allies have done to put together more air defense systems for Ukraine, notably patriots, but also many other systems because we know that’s the key to so many things. It’s a key to defending Ukraine’s infrastructure. It’s a key to defending its people. It’s a key to defending its forces. It’s also key to making sure that we’re unlocking the private sector and economic investment in Ukraine that will also be essential to Ukraine’s success going forward. But people need to make investments in secure environments.

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So these air defense systems we know have been job number one for Ukraine, and as a result for the alliance that’s supporting it. But this is just part of a comprehensive package that we’re putting in place that we’ve actually put in place since before day one to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to defend itself, when it needs it. And I’m also pleased to announce that as we speak, the transfer of F-16 jets is underway, coming from Denmark, coming from the Netherlands. And those jets will be flying in the skies of Ukraine this summer to make sure that Ukraine can continue to effectively defend itself against the Russian aggression.

So we also understand, coming out of the summit, we’ll have announcements that there will be a new NATO command-

That’s right.

… in Wiesbaden that will be very focused building on the extraordinary work of the Ramstein Defense Contact Group to sustain capabilities for Ukraine operations maintenance. We’ll have a NATO liaison officer-

That’s right

In Kyiv. I mean, this is a pretty robust package that you’re talking about. You said something when you last were in Kyiv on, I believe, May 14th. And you said, “Our strategy is that Ukraine must win.” Is that package, and this is robust, but are the packages that NATO was putting forward, is it enough to fulfill that vision for Ukraine to win?

Yeah, I believe it is. And let’s talk about two things. Let’s talk about what winning means, what success is for Ukraine. And in my estimation, at least, success is a strong, independent Ukraine, increasingly integrated with Euro-Atlantic institutions like the European Union, like NATO. And that is able to stand on its own feet militarily, economically, democratically.

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And what we see is Ukraine on a trajectory to do just that. Militarily, we have an incredibly robust package that will be unveiled over the next couple of days at NATO, that builds a very clear, strong, robust, well-lit bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine. Including, as you mentioned the first time NATO has dedicated a command to helping an aspiring country join the alliance. This in and of itself is extraordinary.

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Just a few weeks ago, President Biden signed our bilateral security agreement with Ukraine. At the last NATO Summit on its margins, President Biden brought together more than 30 countries to negotiate and now sign these bilateral security agreements. What does that mean? It means that for the next decade, country after country has vowed to help Ukraine build its deterrent and defense capacity. That sends the strongest possible message to Vladimir Putin that he can’t outlast Ukraine, he can’t outlast Ukraine’s partners.

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So the military trajectory is clear. The economic trajectory is critical, making sure that private sector investment is being driven into Ukraine. Our former Secretary of Commerce, Penny Pritzker, has been leading our efforts with so many other allies and partners. We just had a very strong reconstruction conference in Germany.

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But all of this is about making sure that investment is driven to Ukraine. I’m convinced that Ukraine has tremendous capacity, first to develop a strong defense industrial base for itself and for other countries, but also because of the extraordinary innovation of Ukrainian entrepreneurs, the Ukrainian economy, to develop a strong, robust economy. Of course, the air defenses are critical to make sure, as I said before, that investments that are being made, physical investments that are being made, are protected.

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And then finally, democratic deepening. The fact that the EU opened a succession process with Ukraine, the fact that NATO also requires, as Ukraine moves irreversibly along the path to membership, that it continue reforms, that’s the strongest guarantee that the reforms that the Ukrainian people so strongly support will continue and we’ll deepen. And that results in a Ukraine that is strong, that is independent, and that is the best possible rebuke to Vladimir Putin.

Mr. Secretary, I’m so glad you talked about the well-lit bridge, because I think an enormous amount of energy is being expended upon verbal gymnastics in some ways, the irreversible path, the well- lit bridge, all of these terms. But what you’ve been talking about, the actions, the robustness, that speaks louder than words.

That’s exactly right.

That’s the relationship with NATO. But why are we so caught up? Why can’t there be greater simplicity and clarity about this incredibly close relationship that Ukraine will join NATO. Help me understand why we’re using all of these very creative words.

Well, we have a lot of very talented people who have to spend a lot of time writing NATO declarations. We want to make sure they’re fully employed.

So that’s the secret.

As someone who’s done that myself in the past…

Okay.

In all seriousness, by the way-

Please.

… our colleagues are doing extraordinary work. Because, look, we have 32 allies. This is a democratic alliance, an alliance of democratic countries. Different countries have slightly different views on some of these issues, and part of our responsibility is to proceed with consensus. The greatest strength that we have, the most valuable currency we have as an alliance is our unity. But that unity doesn’t just happen. It’s the product of conversation. It’s the product of listening. It’s the product of talking. It’s the product of building that consensus. And it gets reflected in these documents.

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But, Heather, you’re exactly right. I think it’s important to look at the words, but it’s even more important to look at the actions. As I said a moment ago, the first time, NATO’s had a dedicated command to helping an aspiring country join the alliance. And that has very practical components to it that will, I think, speed Ukraine’s accession to the alliance. And we talk about a bridge. It’s nice to have an image, a metaphor, as my colleague Jim O’Brien likes to say, it’s a bridge that’s going to be strong, well-lit, and with this command, I think it’ll be a short bridge too.

So I’m going to sprinkle another historical quote, and this was by President Truman. The year following the signing of the Washington Treaty at his inaugural address he said, and I thought this is a good definition, not quite that word salad that we were talking about, “The main objective of the North Atlantic Treaty is to erase any possible doubt and uncertainty that may be lurking in the minds of potential aggressors.” Is that package enough to deter Vladimir Putin on Ukraine? That’s the question. Does that provide sufficient certainty?

Well, first, President Truman had the remarkable gift of speaking clearly, speaking directly, and we’ll try to live up to that example as best we can. But, look, the proof will be in the pudding. I believe it should. But at the end of the day, what is so important is delivering these practical results, showing that Ukraine has the capacity, that its partners have the capacity.

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I mentioned a moment ago the fact that the F-16 are on their way. The transfer is happening as we speak. They’ll be flying in the skies of Ukraine this summer. That’s another very important proof point because, again, it concentrates Vladimir Putin’s mind on the fact that he will not outlast Ukraine, he will not outlast us. And if he persists, the damage that will continue to be done to Russia and its interests will only deepen. The fastest way, the quickest way to get to peace is through a strong Ukraine.

Absolutely. To sort of twist President Truman’s words a bit, I’m wondering if the aggressor is starting to put doubts in the mind of some NATO members. And what I’m speaking about is these brazen hybrid attacks. We’ve seen a series of them. In fact, quite extraordinarily U.S. bases across Europe had to go on high alert this last week. This is starting to be of greater concern. What does NATO have to do to try to get to that problem? Because that is undermining NATO unity.

It has to do, and it is doing what it’s always done, which is to adapt. When we came into office, one of the most important things to do from the outset, besides re-engaging the alliance, re-energizing it, and as necessary re-imagining it, was to put forward a new strategic concept, the first one in a decade, to take account for the fact that we’re in a dramatically changed security environment with not only new actors posing challenges, but also new means, new methods. That strategic concept reflects the fact that we have these hybrid threats.

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Since we put out the strategic concept, we’ve been working to turn it into real plans, real programs that demonstrate that NATO is capable and effective in dealing with exactly these kind of challenges. That’s going to be carried forward at this summit. More to be said about that in the next couple of days.

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But I can tell you from the meetings that we’ve had to prepare for this summit, every ally is acutely aware of this, every ally is acutely focused on this. The fact that we’ve seen attacks in recent months, arson attacks, sabotage, attacks, attempted assassinations, misinformation, disinformation, cyber threats, these are not one-offs. This is part of a deliberate strategy by Russia to try to undermine our security and undermine the cohesion of the alliance. It’s not going to work because we see it and we’re acting on it.

I think we need to start acting on it. It’s so concerning that these are increasing, for sure. Let me turn a little bit to the broader elements of the summit. And working with our Indo-Pacific partners, the largest land war in Europe since the Second World War is not simply a concern to the Euro-Atlantic community. We now, this week, have Chinese military exercising with the Belarusian military. We have reports of North Korean trainers coming into Russia. This is now a global alignment of our adversaries, from Russia to China, Iran and North Korea. Can NATO play that bridge between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic? This is the third summit where our four Indo-Pacific-

…

[inaudible 00:34:00].

That’s right.

Prime Ministers are here. Their commitment is getting stronger. Can NATO play that role?

Yes. And we are seeing it play exactly that role. You mentioned, this is the third summit in a row that we’ve had Indo-Pacific Partners here, at NATO, Australia, New Zealand, Japan Korea. And it’s a reflection of the fact of exactly what you said, that these challenges are linked, that our theaters of work together, are linked. And maybe this was crystallized by Ukraine, when Prime Minister Kishida of Japan, said that what’s happening in Europe today could be happening in East Asia tomorrow. When Russia committed its renewed aggression against Ukraine and Japan stood up, South Korea stood up, Australia, New Zealand. This was a reflection of that recognition, that these challenges are linked, and when democracies stand together, whether they’re in Europe, Asia or elsewhere, we’re going to be stronger and more effective.

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So as we’re gathering here, in Washington, with our Indo-Pacific partners, what this means is we are breaking down the silos between Europe, Asia and the United States. And this has been a very deliberate objective of President Biden, from day one. Not only building convergence with our allies, stronger convergence when it comes to how to approach Russia and in a different way, how to approach China. But also breaking down the barriers, the walls, between European partners and Asian partners. And of course, what’s happened just in the last year, year and a half, has only reinforced the imperative. Ukraine, we see, unfortunately, China not providing weapons to Russia to pursue its aggression, but being the major contributor to Russia’s defense industrial base. 70% of the machine tools that Russia’s importing are coming from China, 90% of the microelectronics that Russia’s importing, coming from China, that’s enabled it to sustain its aggression against Ukraine.

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We’ve seen a massive buildup of its weaponry over the last year and a half, tanks, missiles, munitions, that’s the product of a defense industrial base being fueled by China. As a result, European allies understand the challenge posed by China, to Europe’s security, and of course, China can’t have it both ways. It can’t be all at once or claim to be, for peace and want to have better relations with Europe, while at the same time fueling what is, arguably, the most significant threat to European security since the end of the Cold War. We see it in the relationship between Russia and North Korea, that’s abundantly clear. And in all of these areas, as well as some of the hybrid threats that you alluded to before, the connections are clearer and clearer, the Alliance is one place and maybe, I would argue, a central place, where we can bring everyone together, so that we’re acting together.

So Mr. Secretary, you’re talking about strengthening this global Alliance, which the United States has built over the last 75 years. You have some very vocal American national security analysts saying, “There’s one thing we have to focus on, China. Everything else is a waste, let our allies deal with everything else, we have to focus on China.” What is your answer to that criticism or critique, of what you’re trying to build here?

Well, my answer is, first of all, of course, we are focusing on China and we’re doing it in two ways. One, we are making the investments in ourselves, at home, to make sure that we’re approaching China from a position of domestic strength. When you look at everything that’s happened over the last three and a half years, with the incredible investments in our own infrastructure, in our roads, our bridges, our communications, through the infrastructure act. When you look at our commitment to make sure that we maintain our our world leadership on microelectronics and chips through the CHIPS and Science Act. When you look at the investments that have been made in climate technology, which is going to be a critical part of the 21st century economy, that puts the United States in a position of strength. European allies are doing exactly the same thing.

(37:55)
But the other aspect of this is, not only as we’ve done, re-energize our Alliances and partnerships, starting with Europe, but also make sure that there is greater and greater convergence in our approach, to some of the challenges posed by China. I think if you look at what NATO has said in the strategic concept, if you look at what key Europeans have said, what the European Union has said, it is abundantly clear that we have more convergence now when it comes to how to approach China than we’ve ever had. And that’s a source of tremendous strength, it means that, instead of having one country having to deal with the challenges alone, the United States, representing maybe 20% of world GDP, suddenly we’ve aligned 40, 50 and with our Asian partners, 60% of world GDP. That makes a huge difference. And so, precisely because these challenges are joined, dealing with some of the problems posed by China requires this work with, alignment with, convergence with Europe as well as with Asia.

I believe, I would say, maybe, using a little bit of that Truman simplicity, “The adversary has a vote and they are aligning, we have not the luxury of focusing on one.”

That’s correct. And I think, it’s a really important point. This is not simply a reflection of our choices, it’s the reflection of the choices, the policies that China has chosen to pursue, and of course, that Russia is pursuing in Ukraine right now.

And I think you’re right, it does pose, for all NATO members, a structural challenge of how do you work in those multiple theaters, when you’re dealing with their alignment versus how we are organizing our Alliances.

(39:31)
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to turn because you raised it and I’m really glad you did, talking about Alliance unity. We know that is the center of gravity, we know how important that is, and we also know that sacrifices sometimes have to be made to keep that unity. You hear mutterings of the least common denominator, “We’re not getting exactly what we want because we have to ensure that Alliance unity.” But I think over the last week, we are crossing a threshold, we’re accepting unity, we’re sacrificing or jeopardizing NATO security. You’ve had one NATO member who has now visited Moscow and Beijing, has talked about Beijing as being a strategic partner. Has received, by NATO and the EU, an opt-out of support for Ukraine. You had another member this week, suggest that they would like to be welcomed into a security organization that is also, it participated with Russia and China. NATO’s message has to be clear, does it not?

Well, I think NATO’s-

This is getting to a point of straining unity.

I think NATO’s message is very clear, it’s very clear in what’s happening here in Washington, over these couple of days. It’s very clear in the entire trajectory of the Alliance, over the last three and a half years, an Alliance that’s now 32 members strong, with Finland and Sweden, of course, joining. An Alliance that is better budgeted and resourced than it’s ever been. When we started out, nine members of the Alliance were meeting the 2% of GDP for defense, a threshold that was set at the Wales Summit. We’re now at 23 NATO allies, so NATO is speaking loudly and clearly with its actions.

(41:07)
As I mentioned before, we have a strategic concept agreed among all the allies, that very well reflects the challenges and threats that we face today and will be facing tomorrow. So I see NATO speaking, not only with unity, but unity that’s actually raising the floor. Raising the floor on what NATO partners are contributing, raising the floor on an understanding of the threats that we face, raising the floor on our commitment to take action together, to deal with those threats. So, far from a race to the bottom just for the sake of consensus or unity, what I’m seeing is a race to the top by this Alliance. Again, let’s be very simple about it, NATO is stronger than it’s ever been, it’s bigger than it’s ever been, it’s more fit for purpose than it’s ever been.

I think Mr. Secretary, it’s not about necessarily the 2%, and I think we’re going to be raising that bar-

Yes.

Don’t you think? It’s going to be the new 2.5, maybe even the new 3% if we’re heading into this era of tremendous instability. No, but I’m saying, even a NATO member can spend 2% but still be working to undermine the security of the Alliance itself, so it’s not just 2%. How do we get back to, again, that core of the Washington Treaty, the preamble, “We defend democracy, we defend a certain set of values,” when allies don’t profess, necessarily, to uphold those values? What’s the answer? I mean, this is about us, it’s not about the adversary, it’s-

Well-

About who we are.

Of course, allies, as we speak, for the last two and a half years now, have been defending those values, defending our democracy that’s at stake in Ukraine. They know that it’s not only about Ukraine, it’s not only about the Ukrainian people, it’s actually about the values that unite us and the basic principles that all of us have agreed on together, with so many other countries around the world, that were designed to try to keep the peace and protect against aggression. And NATO countries are standing up day after day, to defend those principles, to defend those values.

(43:06)
Now look, communicating with adversaries, with enemies, that’s fine, communications are important, you want to make sure that at least you’re not misunderstanding each other. But of course, what’s communicated is really important as well, I would hope that anyone, for example, going to Moscow now, makes very clear to Vladimir Putin, that NATO’s not going anywhere, Ukraine’s not going anywhere, the European Union’s not going anywhere. And that what we just saw the other day, a horrific attack on a children’s hospital, is totally, totally, totally unacceptable. And Russia will continue to be ostracized as long as it engages in those kinds of actions. I would hope and expect that anyone going to Beijing makes clear what I said a moment ago, that continuing to fuel Russia’s defense industrial base, continuing to allow the greatest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War to go forward, is something that is unacceptable to Europe.

(44:02)
And that means, unacceptable is a word, actions follow that, including as necessary, sanctions, including as necessary, not allowing relations that Beijing might seek to improve, to actually improve. So what we’re focused on is what allies and partners are doing. And I can tell you, as an Alliance, what we’re doing, is evidencing greater strength and commitment to the principles, the values that are at the heart of the Alliance, than I’ve seen.

Are you confident those messages are being sent?

I have confidence those messages are being sent.

Right.

But again, we come together as 32 countries, from the perspective of the United States, it’s so important that we listen to each other, that we communicate clearly with each other, and yes, we develop consensus. But what I’m seeing, again, is a consensus that is moving us up, not holding us back.

So we’ve welcomed, this is Sweden’s first-

That’s right.

NATO Summit, great to come in. We’ve added this bolt of energy, I feel it, with Sweden, Finland joining, there’s an energy in the Nordic-Baltic quadrant of NATO. How has it been to welcome those new mem? They’re seeing what’s behind the curtain, how have you introduced your two new colleagues now, into NATO? Tell us some good stories.

Well, of course, Sweden and Finland have been NATO partners for a long time. They’ve contributed tremendously to the Alliance, to our common endeavors, for a long time. But to have them at the table is something, I think, I suspect, most people in this room, three years ago, I doubt anyone really would’ve imagined that.

If you would’ve read a lot of Think Tank reports 15 years ago, you would’ve known this would’ve been the case, but that’s okay.

I might’ve written-

I’ll let it slide.

I might’ve written one or two of those reports back in the day, so.

Good, see.

But in all seriousness, you’re right, I think it has added a jolt of energy. They’re both remarkable partners, they bring so much to the Alliance. They changed the strategic equation in a very powerful way, but it’s also a reflection of new realities that the entire Alliance is facing. New aggression, new forms of aggression, a new determination to stand up together to combat it. But look, we have a little kept secret for the Alliances, there’s a pretty strong Nordic and Scandinavian component to this Alliance, as evidenced by Jens Stoltenberg. President Biden gave him the-

Yes, indeed.

Medal of freedom last night. And that was a very powerful reflection of the extraordinary leadership that he’s demonstrated over a decade. A decade of incredible change for NATO, but a decade that he’s managed with brilliance.

Well, he’s really had a unique talent of communicating with some of those allies that don’t see eye to eye always, with the consensus, was incredibly important in resolving some of the difficulties-

That’s right.

In the run-up to-

That’s right.

Welcoming Sweden and Finland. Any advice for his successor, about how to manage the diplomacy of maintaining Alliance unity?

Well, I know Mark Rutte, I think many in this room do as well. I have tremendous confidence in his abilities to take the torch from Jens and to do what Jens did so brilliantly.

Yeah.

Which was, actually, to listen to all of our partners, to build that consensus, to demonstrate through our actions that unity really is our most valuable currency and to build it every single day. But again, it doesn’t just happen, it’s the product of being engaged every single day, not pulling back, not isolating ourselves, actually leaning in, leaning forward. I know Mark is going to do that brilliantly, and I think the trajectory we’re on with all of our member states, is to continue to do exactly that.

So Mr. Secretary, I’m going to end, my last question is going to be a historical question, but moving forward. So as Dean Acheson asked, ” It is for others to judge,” and the 71st Secretary of State just rendered judgment on the 51st Secretary of State’s judgment. So let’s look forward, when NATO celebrates its 150th anniversary next 75 years-

Look forward to seeing you all there, by the way.

Yes, exactly. We’ll be in our wheelchairs, exactly. What judgment would you like your successor to render, about what you have done here on the 75th anniversary, to keep a billion people safe? Will they know that we’ve done enough to advance the cause of freedom?

The proof will be in the tests that are in front of us and how we meet them. But I hope that when we look back on this period in time, one of the conclusions that people will reach, is that the United States was leaning in. We re-engaged our Alliance, we helped to re-energize our Alliance, we helped to reimagine our Alliance. So that even as we celebrate 75 years of the most successful defensive Alliance in history, we were resolutely focused on the future and doing everything that we could, in our time, to make sure that that success for 75 years, would continue. And that the Alliance would be adapted, focused, fit for purpose for our time and for the years ahead.

(49:23)
Because again, I come back to what I started with, Heather, this Alliance is a reflection of a commitment that leaders, in all of our countries, make to the people we represent. A commitment that we do everything possible to keep them secure, to prevent wars, to deter of conflict, so that they can move on with their lives in freedom, in security. And so if we manage, as the result of the actions that we’ve taken over these last years and in this period, to do that in the years ahead, we will have succeeded.

We will know we will do enough if Ukraine wins.

That’s right.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, this has been a great kickoff. I hope we’ve started things off, we’ve revved up our engines. I know you’ve provided a lot of food for thought. Thank you so much, I know you have to get back to start your summit. But first, will everyone please join me in warm applause.

Thank you.

For the Secretary of State.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you Secretary Blinken, thank you Heather, for a great scene setter for our conversation throughout the day. Really answering the question, what is at stake for NATO, for close to a billion of our citizens? This was a news making session. F-16s are coming this summer, the bridge for Ukraine will be, not only well lit, but also short. And as Secretary Blinken pointed out at the very end, it’s all for us to lean in, both during this summit and in the next 75 years of NATO’s history. So with this political scene setter, let me now turn to our military dimension and let me welcome Peter Rough of Hudson Institute, who will lead a conversation with General Cavoli. Peter, the stage is yours.

Well, good morning. As mentioned, I’m Peter Rough, senior fellow and director of the Center on Europe and Eurasia at Hudson Institute. And it is my high honor to be joined today, by United States Army General, Chris Cavoli. General Cavoli was commissioned into the Infantry in 1987, he’s had a long and distinguished career, culminating in his appointment to EUCOM, a position he took up on July 1st, 2022. And three days later, on our nation’s birthday, July 4th-

That’s right.

He became Supreme Allied Commander Europe. General Cavoli, welcome to the Public Forum.

Thank you, Peter.

At public conferences like these, that focus on European security, we tend to talk a lot about deterrence, how to preserve the peace that the Alliance has forged for us over the decades.

Yeah.

But there tends to be less focus on war fighting capability, the ability to actually win a war, should deterrence fail. So to rectify that imbalance a little bit, let me ask you, how confident are you that the Alliance could be able to conduct high intensity combat 10, 20, 30 days into a war with Russia, should deterrence fail?

Oh, I’m quite confident. So we have, over the last couple of years, based on the work of my predecessors, one of whom is sitting right over there. Hi Scap, how are you sir?

(52:53)
We have been building out a strategic concept and then the enablement of that strategic concept for the deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area. So it started with the strategic approach and then it’s come down through a couple of major documents. In the last couple of years, what we’ve done is turn those into concrete plans, traditional, classical, operational plans, that describe how we’re going to defend specific areas of the Alliance and what we’re going to use to do it and what the sequence of events is. This is a big, big shift, the Alliance had gone for many years without plans, since the end of the Cold War, real significant plans to defend the territory of the Alliance.

(53:35)
That has produced a whole range of changes for us. As you know, after the end of the Cold War, the Alliance refocused on out-of-area operations and crisis management. These tended to be smaller scale operations done on a predictable basis, so it allowed for a cyclical force generation model. All of this gave us the opportunity to economize, especially in terms of higher headquarters and enabling organizations such as logistics brigades and long-range fires and things like that. All that’s coming back now, as a result of the plans, the plans have given us a four structure requirement that’s guiding the way we resource the plans and the way NATO’s militaries, the national militaries, compose themselves, what sort of forces they build for us. It is produced in a very short amount of time, instead of a cyclically available brigade or two, we suddenly now have 300 forces at the higher two levels of readiness, against the plans, 300,000, even more depending on how you count. That’s because we’ve been able to amalgamate and incorporate national defense plans into the NATO defense plan, so they complement each other.

(54:52)
And it’s produced an ability to be forward-postured, as you know, we’ve got eight battle groups on the ground forward-postured, that blend with National host nation forces in their Article III responsibilities. So it’s a very effective method, we have the right number of troops forward right now. We’ve been practicing at large scale, our ability to reinforce, as you know, those battle groups need to be reinforced when the time is needed, up to the brigade level, we’ve been rehearsing that. We’ve done extensive readiness checks to make sure they have the right amount of ammunition and so forth. And as we go forward, we’ve continued to do these large-scale exercises where we practice the subsequent reinforcement of specific areas. A Steadfast Defender this year, over 90,000 soldiers, so I’m very confident in our ability to do that. We have some weaknesses that we have to work on and we will.

Those DDA Family of Plans were, of course, ratified at the last NATO Summit, in Vilnius. How far along are the allies, in resourcing those plans.

Quite far along. So all of this reorientation from out-of-area operations onto large-scale collective defense of the territory of the Alliance, is a profound shift, right. It’s a very, very big shift. National militaries have to go through that shift on their own, the US military has been undergoing it for several years now, and for the Alliance, it’s a big shift. It’s challenged a lot of the ways we did business during the last 35 years.

(56:26)
One of those, is the way we generate force and the way we source our operational plans. The way we did it was, frankly, designed to put together very small organizations on a very predictable basis. Now, we’ve had to turn the system around, instead of, what will you make available? The question is, if we got into a large-scale fight-

Right.

What would you not make available? We assume you’ll make most of your military available. My deputy, Admiral Keith Blount, is the one who came up with this reformulation of the question, and it immediately refocused our allies in the way they contribute. So several allies have contributed their entire military force structure, saved just a tiniest amount, to NATO’s plans. As a result of this, for the most part, in capital platforms, in large ground units, we’re pretty much where we need to be. We have some gaps in specific places, especially at enablement and logistics-

Okay.

That sort of thing. And those, we’re working on through the NATO defense planning process, right now.

My colleagues at Hudson Institute, who track the war most closely, have suggested that Russia has shown some adaptability on the battlefield-

Yeah, sure.

And have learned some lessons along the way. Is NATO learning lessons from-

Everyday, yeah.

The war in Ukraine? And are you confident that our learning curve is ahead of the Russians?

Yeah. So I think the first thing to remember is that NATO consists of nations militaries, right. So those nations are studying, very intensely, the war in Ukraine and our member nations are developing and evolving new techniques and working on new technologies. But we as an Alliance, also study it very closely. We have a couple of different organizations that study the war in Ukraine, and we’re about to set one up with our Ukrainian colleagues in Poland, the JTAC, is going to come together. And that will really be an information exchange center for lessons learned, then we incorporate those into our future doctrine. My friend, Philippe Lavigne, who I hope is here someplace, the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, writes future concepts that are largely informed by what we’re seeing in Ukraine. And then of course, inside the Alliance, we use our exercise program to test new techniques and new technologies that, for the most part, nations bring forward into the exercise.

When did-

But it is quickly evolving. Your colleagues at Hudson are right, the Russians are very cleverly adapting, technologically and procedurally, to many of the challenges that they run into in Ukraine.

One thing that’s less discussed are SACEUR’s peacetime authorities-

Sure.

But that has evolved somewhat, since the-

Tremendously.

Onset of full-scale hostilities in Ukraine. Are your authorities commensurate and sufficient to prepare the Alliance in a period of high tension prior to full onset of hostilities? And perhaps for the audience, you could just lay out what those authorities are?

Yeah, so SACEUR’s authorities were pretty circumscribed during long periods of peace, which is fairly appropriate, right. At the beginning of this conflict, my predecessor, Tod Wolters, petitioned the NAC to activate the five Graduated Response Plans, which is a form of planning process that we had. When those were activated, general Wolters suddenly got significant authorities to move folks around. For example, he got the authority to deploy parts or all of the very high-readiness joint-

Yeah.

Task force, on his plan. He got the authority to perform specified enhanced vigilance activities throughout the AOR, so we could name an operation and then conduct it, defensive operations. As we came through the new family of plans, one part of the re-modernization of NATO’s collective defense, has been to change the way we grant authorities to SACEUR. And instead of going one by one through an incredibly arcane manual, like this thick, that gives one authority at a time-

Sounds fun.

What we’ve done is, we’ve bundled authorities together and we’ve attached those to certain alert states. And some amount of the alert state I’m allowed to declare, like up to alert state yellow and just inform the NAC, and that gives me certain authorities. And then for a higher levels of alert, the NAC has to grant that, in a deliberate political move. So I have the authority to do everything I need to do right now, I believe in the run-up to a period of conflict, to include deploying forces to deter the conflict, and then to be in position and be ready if the Alliance should invoke Article V. Yeah, I do think we’ve made a huge amount of progress in the past couple of years on that.

Because it’s so rare to have the opportunity to interview SACEUR, I-

Oh no.

I asked a few of my colleagues for a question, and so I’ve gotten one from them, which I’d [inaudible 01:01:37].

Can’t they just raise their hands?

They dare not show up given the question, I’m just kidding.

Oh no, no.

The NATO force model is replacing the NATO response force-

Yeah.

And at tier three, the new force structure is expected to field 500,000 troops in 30 to a hundred days. Such a large-scale deployment at high readiness will require a thorough inspection mechanism. Do you have any such measures in mind like SNAP exercises?

Yeah, we sure do. We’ve already got a readiness program inside the Alliance, the question is, how vigorously is it exercised? And is there any compliance mechanism inside it? Compliance in the Alliance is always up to nations, it’s-

Right.

It’s a political act, how high a level of readiness they want to maintain. But I do have the authority and the systems necessary to go inspect readiness. We’re changing some of the things we look at, right. So as we look in Ukraine, we’ve put in an increased emphasis on stockpiles and munitions and supplies on hand and readily available. We’ve extended some of the things we look at to the logistical systems necessary to deploy and to resupply to our troops. Instead of just looking at the sharp side of the sword, we’re looking at the whole sword now. And we’ve developed teams that will become active very soon, that will go out and check readiness based on my authorities to inspect the readiness of the forces under my command or that are to be under my command in a time of crisis, yeah.

We have a minute and a half left, so I’ll ask you one final question. You mentioned the battle groups earlier, the President last night, at the Mellon Auditorium-

Yeah.

Discussed the four that were in existence prior to the full-scale invasion, the four new ones that have been put in place in the southern eastern flank of the Alliance. We’ve seen what can happen under even short-term occupation by Russian forces in places like Bucha and Irpin. How confident are you that the Forward Land Forces concept can guard against such a contingency in, say, the Baltic states?

Well, the Forward Land Forces concept is not the totality of our plans to defend, right. It’s the beginning of it, it’s the stuff that’s in place, and it’s only one domain, those are just the land forces.

Right.

We have air forces, we have other forces, right. It’s just the beginning, all of that gets reinforced at time of crisis, and in the case of a conflict, all of that would become reinforced, and I’m very confident that it can defend forward. The plans are specifically designed, and the timetables are specifically designed to defend every inch of the Alliance’s territory. And I think when we look at what happened in Ukraine, in places like Bucha and Irpin, in places like that, Izyum, I have a moral responsibility to defend every inch of our territory and all the citizens on it.

General Cavoli, thank you for being here.

Thanks, Peter. It was great.

Thank you, sir.

Thank you General Cavoli, thank you Peter, for really, another fascinating conversation focused on the military aspect of readiness, of how we are learning from our Ukrainian brothers and sisters fighting brutal war with Russia. But also for emphasizing the need to defend every single inch of NATO territory, and believe me, coming from the Eastern flank, this is very real for us and very important. Now, let me welcome Frederick Kempe, CEO and President of the Atlantic Council, for a conversation with the Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin. Frederick, the stage is yours.

Well, what a great lineup to start the day, the Secretary of State, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Secretary of Defense.

Yes, just give me one second.

It’s really an honor to be here, and thanks to everyone in the room. Good morning to you all, and good afternoon to everyone joining from Europe. And hello to everyone joining from all over the world, virtually.

(01:05:51)
Since its founding in 1949, since NATO’s founding, the United States has played a pivotal role in safeguarding transatlantic security, and the Secretary of Defense has always been at the center of that. As one of NATO’s founding members, the US has proven to be a critical part of the Alliance’s collective defense, and its adaptability to deter evolving threats, and they have been evolving. America has always stood ready to defend and protect the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, continuing its commitments to the principles of the Washington Treaty. US leadership was pivotal, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, mobilizing tremendous support, and you’ve heard more about that today, new Air Force batteries, F-16s. To bolster collective defenses on NATO’s Eastern Flank, fortifying the commitment to NATO allies and extending that kind of critical assistance to Ukraine.

(01:06:44)
So it’s my privilege to introduce a leader who embodies this commitment to transatlantic and indeed global security, US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin. A graduate of West Point in 1975, Secretary Austin’s career in the US Army spanned more than 40 years. Throughout his years of service, he has led the command at the core division battalion and brigade levels, in the US Armed Forces. Secretary Austin was awarded the Silver Star for his leadership of the US Army’s third Infantry Division during the evasion of Iraq, in 2003. Before he concluded his uniformed service, Secretary Austin was the commander of the US Central Command from 2013 to 2016, one of our most challenging positions, where he was responsible for all the military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

(01:07:35)
Under his leadership, the US Department of Defense, has adapted national defense strategies to address the greatest global challenges of our time. And it’s reaffirmed the US’s commitment to allies, in its role as a champion of the rules-based order. In particular, and this is really important, secretary Austin’s late leadership in the Ukraine Defense contact group, has proven invaluable

… in uniting over 50 nations to provide critical military support and security assistance to Ukraine. We saw Vladimir Putin’s message to the NATO summit on Monday this week, with a barrage of more than 40 missiles on Ukraine, including hitting a children’s hospital. We’ve seen an answer in more air defenses, we’ve seen an answer in the F-16s, we’ve seen an answer in everything else that Secretary Austin and all the allies are doing. As President Biden has said, the world is at an inflection point with wars in the Middle East, Europe, rising challenge posed to China, biggest peaceful peacetime defense buildup in history from China. The secretary of defense is facing more simultaneous challenges than perhaps any predecessor, and we’re lucky to have a man of his pedigree and capability at this historic moment. So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming to the stage the 28th US secretary of defense, Lloyd Austin.

Well, good morning.

Good morning.

It’s really good to be here with all of you. And Fred, thanks for that kind introduction and for all that you’ve done for the Atlantic Council, and for bringing us together on a pretty big week. It’s a huge honor for the United States and President Biden to host this historic summit in Washington, just down the road from the site where the original 12 NATO allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty 75 years ago. And together we’re marking one of the great success stories that the world has ever known.

(01:10:07)
On April 4th, 1949 those 12 democracies came together in the wake of two world wars and at the dawn of a new Cold War. And they all remembered, as President Truman put it, the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression. And so they vowed to stand together for their collective defense and to safeguard freedom and democracy across Europe and North America. They made a solemn commitment declaring that an armed attack against one ally would be considered an attack against them all. Now, that commitment was enshrined in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was the foundation of NATO, and it still is.

(01:11:18)
And on that bedrock we have built the strongest and most successful defensive alliance in human history. Throughout the Cold War, NATO deterred Soviet aggression against Western Europe and prevented a third world war. In the 1990s, NATO used air power to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. And the day after September 11th, 2001, when Al-Qaeda terrorists attacked our country, including slamming a plane into the Pentagon, NATO invoked Article V for the first and only time in its history. So NATO has always stood by us, and we’re going to stand by NATO.

(01:12:16)
Without NATO, the past 75 years would’ve been far different and far more dangerous. I’m proud of the ways that NATO continues to strengthen our shared security. I’m proud of the way that NATO and America’s other alliances and partnerships have grown and strengthened under the leadership of President Biden. And I’m especially proud of the way that our allies and partners, including our NATO allies, have met the challenge of Putin’s increasingly aggressive Russia.

(01:12:56)
In 2014, Putin made an illegal land grab against Ukraine’s Crimea region in Eastern Ukraine, and since then NATO has undertaken the largest reinforcement of our collective defense in a generation with more forces, more capabilities, and more investment. Since 2014, our fellow allies have increased their defense spending by an average of 72%, accounting for inflation. In February 2022 the world again saw what President Truman called the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression as the Kremlin’s forces invaded the free and sovereign state of Ukraine.

(01:13:51)
As this administration has made very clear, we will not be dragged into Putin’s reckless war of choice, but we will stand by Ukraine as it fights for its sovereignty and security. We will defend every inch of NATO and we will continue to strengthen NATO’s collective defense and deterrence. In the wake of Putin’s imperial invasion of Ukraine, we’ve bolstered NATO’s forward defense posture, with more troops at high readiness, larger exercises, sharper vigilance, and multinational battle groups in eight countries. NATO is now larger than ever, and our new allies in Finland and Sweden have brought the alliance’s membership to 32. And make no mistake, Putin’s war is not the result of NATO enlargement. Putin’s war is the cause of NATO enlargement. Over the past three and a half years we’ve also seen an historic increase in annual defense spending across the alliance by almost $80 billion. All NATO allies have agreed to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense. In 2014, only three allies hit that target. In 2021, only six allies did so. But this year a record 23 NATO allies are meeting the 2% defense spending target. Now, our NATO allies are not just spending more on their own defense. They’re also spending more on America’s defense industrial base. That means platforms and munitions built in America, and that’s helping to revitalize production lines across our country and to create good jobs for American workers.

(01:16:09)
Now, all of that progress is a testament to US leadership and allied solidarity but it’s also a testament to the leadership of our outgoing secretary general, my good friend Jens Stoltenberg. Throughout a decade of challenge, Jens has guided the alliance with skill and steal, and we are all deeply, deeply grateful. Now, we’re going to keep building on our progress, and we’ve got an ambitious agenda this week. First, we’ll continue to implement NATO’s new family of plans, the most robust since the Cold War, and that will significantly improve our ability to deter and defend against any new threat.

(01:17:08)
Second, we’ll work to endorse a pledge to expand industrial capacity across the alliance, and this will help us scale up military production and send an important long-term signal to industry. Third, we’ll deepen cooperation in support of Ukraine’s self-defense. We’ll launch a new military effort to help coordinate some aspects of security assistance and training for Ukraine, and we’re poised to agree on a new financial pledge to Ukraine.

(01:17:46)
As another sign of our deep commitment to Ukraine’s self-defense, a coalition of countries has been working tirelessly to provide F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. And today, president Biden, alongside the Dutch and Danish prime ministers, is proud to announce the transfer of F-16s is officially underway and Ukraine will be flying F-16s this summer. And finally, we will continue to deepen ties with our global partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific.

(01:18:28)
I know that we’re all troubled by China’s support for Putin’s war against Ukraine, but that just reminds us of the profound links between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security, and it sends a message to the world that we are united in our values. So we have a lot to tackle together, but we’re also here to mark this moment. We’re here to strengthen an alliance that has kept millions of people safe for 75 years, and we’re here to reaffirm the ironclad commitment that those 12 leaders made on April 4th, 1949: an armed attack against one ally is an attack against us all.

(01:19:23)
As you heard Fred say, I had a brief 41-year career in uniform. I started working with NATO back in 1975 when I was Lieutenant Austin, and I’ve never seen NATO stronger or more united than it is today, and we are determined to keep it that way. I learned a lesson early on in my army career, and that lesson is that, as a soldier, the last thing that you want to do is to fight alone. So here’s the blunt military reality: America is stronger with our allies, America is safer with our allies, and America is more secure with our allies. Any attempt to undermine NATO only undermines American security.

(01:20:41)
So we are here this week to strengthen NATO and to strengthen American and allied security for the next 75 years. As President Biden has said, our foes and rivals have tried to shatter our unity, but our democracies have stood unwavering. Ladies and gentlemen, that is the legacy that we celebrate. That is the vow that we uphold, and that is the work that we will continue. Thank you very much.

Secretary Austin, thank you so much for the speech, for your thoughts, for your leadership as well. For really underpinning and emphasizing the message that the last thing that a soldier would want to do is fight alone. With that, for our guests online, please tune in for conversations with Doug Lute, US Ambassador to NATO, and Rachel Rizzo. And for all of us here, there is a coffee break. Please be back at 10:35 and enjoy the conversations. Thanks.

… of the alliance. I don’t imagine any of them could have thought of 12 becoming 32, and I think that they’d marvel at that. I think, with the Washington Treaty being signed in Washington, that they’d be shocked that the only time Article V has been invoked in these 75 years had nothing to do with an attack in Western Europe, had nothing to do with America responding to that attack and reinforcing our European allies, had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. But in fact, on the day, September 11th, it was actually the inverse of all that. It was Europe coming to the assistance of America to include, in part, because of an attack here in Washington. So they’d be surprised about Article V.

(01:35:19)
I’d also remark, though, these photos may clear that the 12 men who signed the Washington Treaty I think would be surprised today at the role of women in leadership positions in NATO at multiple levels. Head of state government, ministers, both foreign and defense ministers, the NATO staff, ambassadors, and so forth. I would add there that today perhaps we should be surprised that there aren’t more women in prominent roles in NATO. So I think there’s a lot to be surprised at. One thing that they would not be surprised at-

Yeah, that was my next question.

I’ll preempt your next question. They would not be surprised that NATO today is rallying in the face of Russian aggression.

Yeah.

That of course was the original forming cause of NATO, and today I think the founders would see a familiar Russia in terms of imperialist designs and aggression on its neighbors.

They probably wouldn’t be surprised. They probably would also be surprised that we’re trying to get Germany to spend more on defense and do more and be more forward-leaning as well.

Perhaps.

Perhaps.

Maybe even the Germans are a little surprised at that.

Yeah, yeah. There’s a lot of surprise that has happened to us since 1949. Finally, one of the main headlines at this specific summit is what the alliance is delivering for Ukraine. There’s a lot of talk about a bridge to membership that’s well-lit, that is short. But there’s also been criticism that the weapons that we’ve been giving them have so many caveats on them that we’re having Ukraine fight with one hand tied behind its back. What are your thoughts on the deliverables for Ukraine at the summit?

Well, I think that the military deliverables and the political deliverables, these two parallel tracks or lines of effort for Ukraine, are predictable and, quite candidly, quite modest.

Yeah.

I would have liked to have seen even more progress on military assistance and on fulfilling the commitment that Ukraine politically will eventually become a member. The bridge metaphor works in part, but I’m not sure it’s completely satisfactory. Look, I think everyone here at the summit this week was stunned by the blatant aggression of the recent, most recent Russian attack on Kyiv and other cities, to include the tragic attack on the children’s hospital. It’s important for us to remember two things.

(01:38:11)
First of all, that attack originated from inside Russia, and the base from which that attack was launched is essentially in sanctuary because it is beyond the ability of Ukrainian indigenous capacity to strike it and we have placed limits on the geographic range of the systems we’ve provided Ukraine. I know of no effective air defense program which focuses solely on defense of the target site, by way of air defense systems and so forth, and neglects the attack of the launch sites.

Yeah.

Air defense is a two-way street, offense and defense. So in particular you used the words caveat. I think that the restrictions, the caveats that we’ve placed, and others have placed on some of our systems, are not justifiable in legal terms. These are legitimate military targets, and they don’t make sense in terms of military science.

Thank you for that clear answer and for your support of NATO and your support of Ukraine as well, and for this interview, Ambassador Lute and to our audience watching online, tune in for another two days of programming here at the NATO Public Forum in Washington. Thank you so much.

Hello, everyone. Dear guests, before we resume our live conversations we will be viewing a short video. Over the next few days you will be viewing several videos created by the organizing partners of the forum, bringing in voices on the ground from across the alliance on a variety of issues. Please join me now in viewing the first such video: From the U.S. Heartland.

I view NATO as a global institution that is a vehicle for deterrence and collected funds. It is a defender of the free world and it is a defender of our shared democratic principles.

NATO as an organization means personally to me as a security cooperation between its member countries provides an environment where I’m able to feel safe and secure.

NATO means hope to me. Hope that through strength of unity we will no longer have world wars and have to send our young people to fight in them. Hopeful that a rogue leader or a rogue nation will no longer be emboldened to attack a NATO country, and hopeful that, into the future, NATO will create a more democratic and peaceful union in the world.

I feel admiration, I feel honor in that NATO was created after World War II. It means alliance among people, among nations who trust each other.

Apart from the obvious aim of peacekeeping and deterrence, it plays a crucial role in facilitating a coordinated effort to combat and counter terrorism, and cybersecurity. It is adapting to new threats, such as responding to disinformation campaigns and the weaponization of AI.

In its 75 year history, NATO has been successful in providing and guaranteeing the security of its countries

He’s from foreign intimidation.

I’m especially admiring the creation of NATO. Out of war came peace and there were ideals of peace and harmony for the world in 1949, 75 years ago.

NATO was created for establishing and promoting economic and political security against Soviet or another future demo of aggression. It’s unfortunate that 75 years later, we are standing more or less in the same predicament with modern day Russian military hostilities in Europe. What I hope for NATO, first and foremost is for NATO to gain an ally in the next American presidency and secondly, for nations in Europe to rise to the occasion and to meet the continued Russian aggression with the severity and seriousness of demands in order to protect Europe. Finally, a unified show of support in the future will demonstrate to other authoritarian leaders that NATO will not allow malicious leadership to trample on the will of the free world.

What I wish for in NATO’s future is to act as a bulwark of democracy in these trying times of uncertainty economically and politically.

As the future comes forward, we want that trust to be continued and if it is at all destroyed a little bit, we want it to come back. So I say to the NATO nations, thank you and keep peace for us in the world.

What a great way to bring in voices from across the United States heartland. For our next conversation, please join me in welcoming once again, Frederick Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council to the stage for a conversation with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. Join me in welcoming Frederick to the stage please.

Good morning. It still is the morning. It’s great to see you all here in person. It’s wonderful to have so many people here online from all over the world and of course across all of our allies in Europe as well. And so it’s my honor to introduce someone I’ve known a long time now, the NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, and I’m going to moderate a conversation with you in a moment, something you’ve called a pivotal moment for our alliance. I was going to start by saluting you on something I didn’t know about, which is your great arm because you threw out the first pitch of the Nationals game and it was an amazing… I was there in the heat sweating while I was watching you, but it was an amazing salute to NATO. But having been at Mellon Auditorium yesterday evening, one of the most moving events I’ve been at, I’ll instead quote President Biden, what he said to you as he gave you the presidential medal of freedom to a standing ovation, a really remarkable moment. He called you a man of integrity, a intellectual rigor, a calm temperament in moments of crisis, a consummate diplomat, and I think the consummate diplomat, a person who can engage with leaders across all spectrums and across all nationalities. And I just want to salute you on behalf of everyone in the audience for more than a decade of the most extraordinary leadership. So let’s start with that.

Thank you.

So we at the Atlantic Council gave you our highest honor, the Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Award in 2017, and I consider that visionary. We knew you’d already accomplished a lot in your life, and I won’t go through it all. Prime Minister of Norway, all the things you’ve done for NATO and at NATO in terms of strengthening defense, strengthening the defense spending, and I think it would take too long to go on that, and you’re a humble man and I don’t think you would even want that. So I’m going to go right into the questions. You laid out three goals for this summit, increasing support for Ukraine for the long haul, reinforcing collective defense and deepening global partnerships. I’m sure they’re all important, but for this week, what do you consider most crucial?

I’ll answer that in a moment, but let me first say that it’s great to be here to be at the public forum and many thanks to you, Fred, and also many times to all those who have organized and are making this event possible because this is an important part of the summit, the public outreach, which this public forum is a very important part of. Then thank you for your kind words. It has actually been a great privilege serving as secretary general NATO for 10 years and I see around in the audience here, there are many people who have helped me, supported me.

(01:47:34)
So many thanks to all of you for your advice to help and support throughout these years. Then on throwing the first pitch, that is the most difficult task I ever committed as general of NATO, not least because I’ve never been at the baseball match ever before. The first time I touched the baseball, actually when I started to exercise for this, I thought it was a tennis ball, but it’s not the case. So it was a very steep learning curve and I think my future is not in baseball. I think my future is in something else.

I was going to say in the introduction that it showed that NATO always sets lofty targets.

And we have to adapt to the challenges. Then of course, this summit, of course a summit where we’re going to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the strongest most successful lines in history, but the only way to truly celebrate that achievement, the 75th anniversary, is of course to demonstrate that NATO is adapting, that we are changing when the world is changing because we are the most successful lines industry because we have changed when the world is changing and now we live in a more dangerous, more challenging security environment and therefore NATO is changing again and therefore we will make important decisions at this summit for the future, not only celebrate the past, and there are three main issues is the [inaudible 01:49:07] and Defense is our partnership with our Asia Pacific partners. But of course the most urgent, the most critical task at this summit will be everything we will do and decide on Ukraine because this is really the time where we are tested.

(01:49:24)
If you want to stand up for democracy and freedom, it’s now and the place is Ukraine, and I expect that the NATO leaders will agree a substantial package for Ukraine. There are fundamentally five elements in that package. One is that we will establish a NATO command for Ukraine to facilitate and ensure training and delivery of security assistance to Ukraine. It’ll be 700 personnel will take over much of what the US have done so far in leading the coordination of security assistance and the training. It’ll be command in Germany, but also with logistical nodes or hubs in the Eastern part of the alliance to ensure that we have a more institutionalized framework for our support Ukraine. Then it’ll be a long-term pledge to support Ukraine, not least to send the message to President Putin that he cannot wait those out because the paradox is that the stronger and the more we are committed for a long term to support Ukraine, the sooner this war can end.

(01:50:40)
So that’s the thing we have to do. Then we will have, and we already seen some new announcements of military immediate support with the air defense systems with F-16s and all the things that allies have and will announce. We have the bilateral, that’s the third there also the announcement of more military aid. Then we have the bilateral security agreements, 20 agreed between NATO allies and Ukraine, and then the fifth element of the package for Ukraine will be more interoperability. We will have a new joint training and evaluation center in [inaudible 01:51:26] in Poland. We’ll have the comprehensive assistance package to help Ukraine implement reforms on the defense and security institutions to ensure that the armed forces are more and more interoperable with NATO and together the NATO command, the pledge, the bilateral security agreements, the announcement of new military support and interoperability.

(01:51:45)
These five elements combined constitute bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine, and later on today we’ll see the language which we’ll agree and the NATO declaration on how to ensure that Ukraine is moving closer to NATO membership. So these are the five important deliverables on Ukraine that I expect allies will agree later on today.

Not to press you on what’s actually going to be in the document, because of course you can’t reveal that, but we saw at the [inaudible 01:52:21] summit, hearing it again in Washington, that allies closer to Russia or more eager to provide NATO membership sooner for Ukraine. And no doubt, the bridge and all the elements of the bridge are pretty impressive, including the new command. But are Ukraine’s NATO membership prospects sufficient? We did our own war gaming with our Estonian partners in the Estonian government. We found almost under any scenario Ukraine was safer in NATO that Russia would respond in a way that would be less provocative within than outside. What’s your thinking on that and have we gone far enough with Ukraine?

So first of all, the language you will see later on today in the NATO declaration or the declaration from the heads [inaudible 01:53:10] government, of course that language is important because language matters. It sets an agenda, it points a direction, but of course action speaks louder than words. So in addition to the language in the declaration on membership, which again is important, I think that what we actually do together with Ukraine is as important and therefore the fact that we now have a NATO framework, we’ll have a NATO framework around the support, the fact that we have a long-term NATO commitment when we agree that the pledge and also the fact that we actually are delivering more weapons systems to Ukraine, all of that is helping Ukraine to become closer to NATO membership because when we now deliver F-16s, we don’t only deliver F-16s, we deliver the training, the doctrines, the operational concepts that will actually move Ukraine closer to being fully interoperable with NATO on more and more areas.

(01:54:08)
So again, language is important, but the elements in the package I mentioned, they are actually changing the reality enabling Ukraine to come closer to membership so we can then when the time is right, when you have consensus and the political conditions are in place, so when an invitation then is issued, they can become members straight away. I cannot give you a date because as you know, there has to be consensus in this alliance on membership, but what I can say is that when the fighting stops in Ukraine, we need to ensure that that’s really the end because what you have seen is a pattern of aggression. First, the Russia annex Crimea, we said that was unacceptable. After some few months they went into the [inaudible 01:55:00]. We said that that was unacceptable. Then we had the Minsk one agreement with the limitation of the disease file line that was violated, and Russia pushed the front lines further East, sorry, further West in Donbas in 2014 we had. Minsk two and the Russians waited then for seven years and they had a full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 because Minsk two was in 2015.

(01:55:27)
So we have seen a pattern where they’ve taken slices of Ukraine. So if there is now a new ceasefire, a new agreement, then we need to be a hundred percent certain it stops there regardless of where that line is. And therefore I strongly believe that when the fighting stops, we need to ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities to deter future aggression from Russia and they need security guarantees. And of course the best and strong security guarantee will be Article 5. So therefore I believe that a way to ensure that it stops is actually a NATO membership.

Thank you for the very clear answer. One more brief question on Ukraine and then we’ll move on to Indo-Pacific. In a press conference you had with President Macron a couple of weeks ago, you noted recent gaps and delays in how they’ve led in funding and weapons and led to battlefield consequences. You said quote, “We must give you Ukraine, the predictability and accountability it needs to defend itself.” So two questions is everything you’ve talked about today that’s going to be agreed enough and secondarily, not just with uncertainties in US politics which exist, but also uncertainties in European politics, do you worry at all about the sustainability of that support over time?

So first of all, you are right that I have referred to, I also did that in Kiev in a meeting with President Zelensky earlier this spring to the fact that during this winter and the early spring allies didn’t deliver on their promises to Ukraine. We saw the delays in the US months agreeing as supplemental, but we also saw European allies not being able to deliver ammunition and the support they have announced. So of course these gaps and these delays in military support Ukraine, they created a very difficult situation for the Ukrainians on the battlefield. The good news in that difficult situation is that despite of the delays in our support Ukraine, Ukrainians have actually been able to hold the line more or less so the Russians have not been able to utilize these delays in really making any big advantage on the battlefield. Now we are providing more support and I’m confident that allies will now actually deliver, and we see that, for instance, ammunition moving into Ukraine have been significant increase over the last weeks.

(01:58:15)
The purpose of a stronger NATO role in providing training and security assistance, the purpose of the command and the purpose of the pledge is of course to minimize the risks for future delays and gaps. But of course you don’t have guarantees because at the end of the day, it has to be support in all the individual allied capitals and parliaments to providing this support. At the end of the day, you have to go to the congress to the parliaments across Europe and Canada to get support. But I believe that when we turn this into something which more a NATO obligation, a NATO framework, it is the threshold for not delivering will be higher than when it’s based on more voluntary ad hoc national announcements.

(01:59:06)
So the purpose of creating a stronger NATO framework is to make the support more robust and more predictable. It’s also another part of this NATO framework for the support on the pledge and the command, and that is that it will visualize and ensure burden sharing because my impression is that especially in the United States, there’s this perception that United States is almost alone in delivery support to Ukraine. That’s not the case. When you look at military support, roughly 50% of the military support is provided by European allies and Canada, 99% of the support military support Ukraine comes from NATO allies, but 50% of that comes from European allies and Canada, if you add economic macroeconomic support, humanitarian support, the European allies are providing much more than United States.

(02:00:01)
So the point with the pledge is to ensure that we have some kind of agreed formulas for burden sharing, that we have more transparency and we also that we have more accountability because then we can use NATO to count, to measure and to ensure that allies deliver. It’s not the same, but it’s a bit like the 2% pledge because the important with the pledge made in Wales in 2014 was actually give NATO a role to enforce and to ensure that allies delivered and also that we agreed how to count and what to count, and that’s also what we now do with the pledge to agree how to count on what to count and to give NATO role to having also accountability. So again, there are no guarantees, but by giving NATO that role, I think the likelihood for allies delivering what they have promised will increase and the likelihood of new gaps will decrease, and that’s the purpose of giving NATO a stronger role.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary General. Let’s go to China, 2022, strategic concept, NATO strategic concept recognized China as a challenge for the first time and the broader rules-based system. You’ve noted that Russia imports 90% of its micro electronics from China, which goes into military. Secretary Blinken today talked about 70% of machine tools that help the military coming from China. You’ve also said that if this doesn’t change as they’re fueling the greatest armed conflict in Europe since World War II allies need to impose a cost, is it time for that and what costs can NATO and NATO countries actually impose?

So first of all, I think it’s important that we recognize the reality, and that’s the first step towards any action, and that is that not only are Iran and North Korea important when it comes to enabling Russia’s war aggression against Ukraine, but China is the main enabler because as you refer to, they are delivering the tools, the dual use equipment, the microelectronics, everything Russia needs to build the missiles, the bombs, the aircraft, and all the other systems they use against Ukraine. While I have said that it remains to be seen how far allies are willing to go, but I strongly believe that if China continues, they cannot have it both ways. They cannot believe that they can have a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies in North America and Europe and then continue to fuel the war in Europe. That constitutes the biggest security challenge from security since the second World War. So this is a challenge for the alliance. Let’s see how far we’re willing to go as allies.

So we’re getting close end of time, such as two other brief questions. First, Indo-Pacific four, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand are here. Third time taking part in NATO summit, but it’s going to be the first NATO joint document with this group. Can you give us some insight into what might be in it and any concrete outcomes?

Yeah, so first I would just say that the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand and South Korea, that reflects a change in NATO because that was not the case a few years ago. And as many of you may know, the first time we mentioned China in a agreed negotiated document in NATO is at the NATO summit in London in 2019. And in the previous NATO strategic concept, China was not mentioned with a single word. Now, China has a prominent place in the strategic concept we agreed in Madrid. And the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners reflect of course the fact that we have to take China seriously when it comes to the challenges it poses for our security. And the war in Ukraine is perhaps the most obvious example, or as the Japanese prime minister said several times, what happens in Ukraine today can happen in Asia tomorrow.

(02:04:32)
We are now working with our Asia Pacific partners how we can do more together with them. We will agree some flagship projects that’s about technology, it’s about support Ukraine, but we are also working, for instance, as part of our defense industrial pledge, how we can ramp up defense industrial production and cooperation with these countries. They are big, some of them on defense industry. We can work closely with them to ramp up our combined defense industrial capacity. We can exchange more information. And I also welcome the fact that more and more allies are now also conducting joint exercises. Recently there was a big area exercise are also more and more actively also looking into how they can also have more naval exercises with our Asia Pacific partners because NATO will remain an alliance of North America and Europe will not be a global NATO, NATO will be North America and Europe.

(02:05:33)
But this region, the North Atlantic region, we face global threats. And the reality is that’s nothing new. Global terrorism, international terrorism brought us to Afghanistan. Cyber is global. Space which is becoming more and more important for our armed forces is truly global. And of course the threats and challenges that China poses to cybersecurity is a global challenge. So this region, the North Atlantic region faces global challenges. We will remain a regional alliance, but we need to work with our global partners, the Asia Pacific partners to address these global challenges, that I guess will be a very important issue at the next NATO summit. I’ll not be there, but I’m certain it will be [inaudible 02:06:21].

And that brings me to my final question. This is your [inaudible 02:06:25] Summit. As you prepare to step down, I think everybody in the audience, everybody virtually would love to hear what gives you the most hope, stepping down from this, but also what gives you the most concern?

First of all, I’m an optimist because the reality is that we are very different in this alliance. We are different countries with different history, different culture from both South Atlantic and we have different parties and we are always very concerned that when a new party comes into government, they will make bad things for the alliance. And if you read the history of NATO, we have been concerned about that from the beginning. There were big concerns in NATO when you actually got the Democratic elected government in Portugal in 1975. They were concerned not we were going to be committed to NATO. There were concerns when you had some lefting parties coming into government in some European countries in the ’70s. When I formed my government in my second government in 2005, there were big concerns that we had the left source, this party there, it went quite well to be honest.

(02:07:34)
And now there are big concerns again. But the reality is that despite all these differences which are part of NATO, we have proven extremely resilient and strong because when we face the reality, all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians, they realize that we are safer and stronger together. And that’s a very strong message. And that’s the reason why this alliance pervades again and again. As I said in my speech yesterday, we cannot take it for granted. It was not a given in ’49, it’s not a given now. It’s not a given in the future. But the reality is that we have so strong common interest in standing together. So therefore, I’m optimist for the future of this alliance. That was the first question. The second I’ve forgotten, I think I answered both of them, but say one thing and that is that I remember very well when I became Prime Minister in 2000.

(02:08:36)
First of all, I attended my first NATO summit in 2001. That was a very different guest list. It was President Bush, newly elected, it was [inaudible 02:08:47], Tony Blair, and very different people than now. So I think it’s time for me to leave. But second, also, I remember then my predecessor when I became Prime Minister in 2000, she told me, [inaudible 02:09:08], she told me, yes, you have to remember that most of your life you’ll be former Prime Minister. And now I have to acknowledge that most of my life I’ll be former secretary general NATO, but that’s not so bad. And I’ll hang around and see you and I look forward to then perhaps be a part of this audience next time. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary General, nothing more need be said.

No, thank you. Thank you. Thank you

Frederick and his excellency, Jens Stoltenberg. Thank you for such an enticing conversation. I personally loved the commentary on the first pitch. As a baseball fan myself, we can be safely assured that the Secretary General is focused surely on transatlantic security and not baseball. As you mentioned, the alliance is truly being tested. Any outlines, some crucial elements of aid to Ukraine. The alliance is working on from joint training to defense assistance packages and looking how to secure Ukraine not just now, but even after the fighting stops. Thank you again. Our next panel, strengthening the Transatlantic bond will aim to answer questions such as what is the future of the Transatlantic partnership? How can Europe and North America cooperate more efficiently? How can the transatlantic bond be affected by recent elections? Now, please join me in welcoming to the stage Mr. Robert Vass, president of GLOBSEC and the panelists.

Thank you very much and welcome to this very high level panel. I would say we have an extremely good setting in this panel for this conversation. And we have something like 55 minutes, so it’ll be quick and speedy. My name is Robert Vass. I’m the president and founder of GLOBSEC, and I’m extremely honored that I have the opportunity to partner in the consortium with our American friends and with the White House to organize this forum as the only European partner. Yesterday… Thank you. Yesterday we were celebrating the 75th anniversary of the alliance in the Mellon Auditorium in the same room where the Washington Treaty was signed. It is undoubtedly the largest, most successful and longest enduring military alliance in the history of mankind. We are also celebrating 20 years of enlargement of NATO and the 25th of enlargement of NATO. And actually countries of central Eastern Europe joined NATO 20 and 25 years ago. And I think that was a symbol of Europe whole free and at peace, something that was not automatic, something that leaders needed to take hard decisions and they needed to make bold decisions to make it happen.

(02:12:47)
And 20 years later, I think it is a great success. And the story of the enlargement is connected also to GLOBSEC because we have organized our first conference 20 years ago, exactly in the year when we joined NATO. We have here, and I’m happy that I’m joined here in the panel by Petr Pavel, the President of Czech Republic. Welcome.

Hello.

Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister of Estonia. Welcome. Mette Frederiksen, the Prime Minister of Denmark. And James Risch, Senator of the United States of America. He’s the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Welcome.

(02:13:44)
As we celebrate the 75th anniversary of NATO and all these anniversaries that I mentioned, at the same time, we are facing the most difficult challenge for the alliance, and that’s the Russian aggression in Ukraine. The war is back in Europe, and we’ve done a lot. We united and we’ve been stronger than ever. But is that enough for the future? Is that enough to secure our future? Are we up to the speed because Russians are speeding up as well in Ukraine? So these will be the questions and the conversations we’ll be talking about today. So let me turn to you, Prime Minister Kallas, first. You come from, and by the way, congratulations on nomination to be the high representative of the European Commission.

Thank you.

It’s a great achievement of this nomination as you’re coming from a eastern European country, a Baltic country, a small country Estonia, who is really punching above this weight. And that shows how a small country can be influential on the world stage. So congratulations to it. You have demonstrated incredible determination to whatever it can to support Ukraine, understanding that if Ukraine does not succeed, Estonia and rest of us in this Europe can be the next. And you’ve been one of those who wanted all NATO countries collectively to be even more serious about our ambitions, about our collective defense. Emmanuel Macron at the [inaudible 02:15:27] Forum last year in [inaudible 02:15:29] said that NATO is not branded anymore, that it was revived by electro shocks in the East. And he also said that we should have listened to you more in the central Eastern European countries. So what is your message now? What the other leaders from Western Europe and the United States should listen right now?

First, I want to correct one thing, and that is I never say that the Baltics or the Eastern Flank

Is next because we don’t have any second or first class countries in NATO, we only have NATO countries. So if Russia decides to move on and really use its power to attack, then it’s going to attack NATO and not single countries. And this is actually one of the narratives that Russia once says Dubai because they constantly separate, like the Baltics and the Warsaw backed countries are separate from the NATO. It’s not like Germany or France. No, we are in NATO and that’s why we have the Article five, and that means that attack on one is attack on all. But you are correct in that sense that this war in Ukraine and our response to it actually determines also whether NATO is credible or not, whether it is also acting as deterrence for Russia. Why we don’t have a war in NATO countries is because Russia is not taking up that fight. Why Ukraine is having this war is because they are in the gray zone.

(02:17:16)
They are not under NATO’s umbrella. And therefore my conviction is that Ukraine will have to become member of NATO when we want to get rid of conflicts and the areas of gray zones because gray zones are sources for the potential conflicts and I don’t think it’s good for the peace.

Thank you, Prime Minister. I will come back to you in the second round, but let me move to Prime Minister Mette Federiksen. Denmark is a great example how a country can rather seriously change its approach to defense and rise up to the challenge. Denmark was supposed to reach 2% of defense spending by 2030, and you just recently announced that Denmark will do this this year, so six years earlier than it was planned. It’s a pretty big increase from 1.3% that you had two years ago. Denmark has also been robust in supporting Ukraine, ranging from providing Ukraine with F-16s, fighter jets and preparing its Air Force capabilities to making bold decisions to give you Ukraine even maybe entire artillery stocks. These are all very difficult questions to make. At home… You say no, which is good. It’s a good leadership.

It’s not difficult.

But my question is, how long can we sustain these decisions? Are we in the risk of Ukraine fatigue in the future and how do we prevent it?

Well, first of all, it’s not a difficult decision.

It’s the right decision.

Yeah. You have to do what is the right thing to do, and doing the right thing is never difficult. You’re totally right. We decided many months ago to give away our entire artillery to Ukraine. Why? Because it’s better used in Ukraine than it’s used in Denmark. And we have to do the same now with air defense. We have a lot of air defense systems in the NATO Alliance. It’s better used in Ukraine than it is used… Especially in the western part of NATO. The eastern part is a different case. And we said from the very beginning of the war that we are going to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes and with what it has to… I mean, the measures we have to take will be taken. I’m very proud of everything we have done collectively. We have a stronger NATO, we have a stronger European Union now than when the war started.

(02:20:07)
But we have to admit that we have been moving too slow. I think we have to speed up, we have to scale up and we have to take a decision, do we want Ukraine to win the war or not? And I see no signs, no signs in Russia and in the Russian behavior that they’re going to stop with Ukraine. When I watch Russia through the last years, but also now, not only in Ukraine but also in the West Balkans, what they do in Europe with cyber attacks, hybrid attacks, disinformation. Look at what they’re doing in Africa, in the Middle East, they’re trying to destabilize everything we believe in. Everything we believe in. And therefore asking me, it’s not enough to provide the Ukrainians with what they need to defend themselves, we have to provide them with what is needed so they can beat Russia and push Russia back. I think this has to be the main discussion on the table also in the coming days.

(02:21:14)
And you are right, when I came to office five years ago, we were spending 1.3 on defense, now we are spending 2.4. And if you ask me, are you sure it will be enough in the future? I cannot say yes because we have to put it the other way around. And let me just conclude by saying what you have said from US, for many years now to us in Europe, you have to be able to protect yourself, you have to spend much more money on deterrence and defense. You have been correct and we have to admit from a European perspective that we were depending on you, we are still depending on you and never leave us alone. Never. We have to fight together also in the future. But you were right that we have to be able to defend ourselves. And putting that question on the table, then you cannot say 2% is enough, then you have to put it the other way around.

Exactly. So Ukraine is… And that’s exactly the leadership we really need in Europe, to say that Ukraine is not only fighting for its sovereignty, it is fighting for the very basic principles of international law and of the principles of European peace and security. If we give up on these principles, who will believe us in the future? It’s the deterrence of any other parts, not only of the NATO territory, but of our allies, starts in Ukraine. Absolutely. And winning in Ukraine. So thank you for that clear leadership. President Pavel, you are the President of Czech Republic who is leading a lot of international initiatives supporting Ukraine, especially the munition initiative that has really caught interest internationally, so Czech Republic is also pushing or punching above its weight. You also spent all your career in military, you were also chairman of the NATO Defense Committee and you will be hosting the next GLOBSEC summit in Prague, and we are very glad. Thank you for that.

(02:23:36)
But your voice has been among the boldest when it comes to helping Ukraine, defeating Russia and building strong Europe’s military strength. But you also said several times that we need to manage expectations on the war in Ukraine. Your assessment was, and correct me if I’m wrong, was that we cannot expect Ukraine to liberate all its territory anytime soon, especially given that if we are not providing Ukraine with all that it needs to win. So my question is, we all say that we stand with Ukraine as long as it takes. Is it a winning strategy? Shouldn’t we say whatever it takes? Do we have a consensus within NATO on what our short-term and long-term goals in Ukraine are? And most importantly, if we have these goals in place, do we have a consensus on how to achieve them and how to provide the means for Ukraine to win?

Well, I’m not going to fight the words, if it should last forever or how long does it take, but I believe it’s a matter of principle. It doesn’t matter if we take it as a matter of liking or disliking Ukraine. It’s about if we like to live in a world where rules matter or not. And this is what it is all about. I believe that supporting Ukraine is a matter of principle. We want to live in a world where also smaller countries are protected, where they have the guarantees to live up to their aspirations, and that’s why we believe that it’s necessary for our own interest to defend Ukraine. But of course, reality is different. We haven’t given Ukraine anything they needed for successful defense from the beginning. There were some delays and gaps that cost Ukraine a lot of lives and some territory, but also some self-confidence when it comes to meeting their own goals. Right now we are trying to give Ukraine everything to defend their territory and not to allow Russia to progress because if, and under the circumstances that Russia has a chance to succeed, to progress, there will be no chance for stopping the war, for taking Russia to the table.

(02:26:16)
So right now what we need to do is to provide Ukraine with ammunition, armor, long-range artillery missiles, and especially air defense, to prevent Russians from successful attacks on civilian infrastructure as we saw it recently in Kiev and as we see it in Kharkov and many other cities. And at the same time, to come up with a lot of effort on a diplomatic and political arena to get support of as many countries as possible to push on Russia and China to sit at the table under the meaningful conditions, not conditions that were represented by Russia. Obviously we cannot accept that the territories currently occupied by Russia will be recognized as Russian because that would mean that we would go against the principles on which our societies are built. But we would probably realistically accept that there will be part of Ukrainian territory that will be temporarily occupied, that such a situation shouldn’t prevent us from going on with Ukrainian integration into NATO or the EU and pushing on restoring their full sovereignty in the foreseeable future. But for that, Ukraine really needs our support and full determination in our own sake.

Thank you. I’ve seen Prime Minister wanted to react.

Yes, I wanted to react. I think everybody wants this war to end, so that is very clear. And what we have to do, I mean, of course, give military aid to Ukraine, but there’s also one element that needs to be addressed and that is, we have the sanctions in place so that Russia wouldn’t build its war machine really. But then if it is true that what was written in the media that the Russian missile that hit the hospital, children’s hospital actually has Western elements in it, so they are not able to bomb if they are not using the western elements to build this. And this is very important. When I go to different European countries that are further away from the war and don’t see Russia maybe the way that we do, then I see this will still to profit from it. I mean, yeah, it doesn’t really concern me. I just want to do my trade and we see the circumvention of sanctions, but these are the same companies that are complaining that our businesses are hurt, our economies are hurt because of it. But actually, we need to concentrate our efforts, everybody.

(02:29:19)
And of course it’s painful, it’s painful, but if we do it, the war could be over sooner. Then when everybody’s dragging their feet, they’re thinking that, “Okay, it doesn’t really concern me, I can still profit from this,” And then eventually it’ll go on longer than we want.

Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Absolutely right. Let me move to Senator James Risch. You’ve been a very strong supporter of the alliance of Ukraine and of our collective security, and thank you for that, and all of the countries represented here at the NATO Summit have done their utmost to support Ukraine and to raise the bar when it comes to the defense spending. The EU has provided economic assistance to Ukraine and has put Ukraine on the track towards EU membership. Do you think we are doing enough? What can be done more?

Let me take that on. But before I do, I want to respond very briefly to what the Estonian Prime Minister said right at the beginning regarding the Baltics. Right after the invasion, a number of people from the Baltics came to see us here in America and they were concerned. NATO had become stodgy. We’d forgotten what it was formed for. NATO was formed for the exact circumstance we find ourselves in today. I told my friends from the Baltics, I said, “Look, Article five means exactly what it says. An attack on one is an attack on all.” Not one square inch, whether it’s in the Baltics, whether it’s in London, whether it’s in New York, not one square inch. Mr. Putin, listen. Article five means exactly what it says. I make that commitment now for the United States and the United States is there to meet that commitment if we ever have to. So let’s take on that question. Are we doing enough? That’s kind of a general question. I mean, enough for what? You’ve got to state what your objective is, and if the question is are we doing enough to reach the objective? Well, you reevaluate that every day, whether you’re doing enough or not. I would say that we are a robust democracy in the United States, just like the European countries are, and there are people who dissent from the view that we should be doing something in Ukraine. In the United States, I think people are not as in tune with how we got to where we are as far as Ukraine is concerned. You have to go back to December the fifth of 1994 when the Budapest agreement was entered into. We made a commitment. On that date, Ukraine was the second largest nuclear armed country on the planet. And it was the policy of the United States then, it’s a policy of the United States now and always has been that as few countries have as few nuclear weapons as possible so you have less of mischief on the planet.

(02:32:44)
We said to the Ukrainians, as did the British at the same time, give up your nuclear weapons, they’re going to cause you a lot of troubles for a lot of reasons, and if something happens, we’ll be there. We said that, we meant it and we have to keep that commitment now, and we have all the Europeans to help us do that because of Article five. So are we doing enough? We need to continue to do more. The people who are dissenters in the United States always point to the fact, “Well, the Europeans aren’t doing enough.” It depends on how you do the math. I mean, look, you can’t penny this out, nickel and dime this out, but you certainly have to look at what the Europeans have done, way beyond what I think a lot of people’s expectations were here. But secondly, not just on the military side, but also on the humanitarian side. I mean, it’s stunning to me. When I went into Ukraine, I went through Poland and they were talking about the number of refugees they had there.

(02:33:42)
Never been in a country with 2 million refugees, but no refugee camps. Why not? They’re all in people’s homes and they’re being taken care of. So look, we need to continue to do that. And one of the things I will say to our European friends and has been said over and over again, that 10 years ago in Wales, we all agreed two percent would be the number. It’s been 10 years and fortunately we’re up to 23 countries now out of our alliance. We got nine more to go. But if we want to silence the critics using that point of view, we need to all get up to 2%. And frankly, now that this has happened, and a lot of us always hoped this would never happen, but now that this has happened, 2% probably isn’t enough. We have been stunned. I think all of us have been stunned by the weakness and the holes in our industrial production when it comes to defense. We’re going to have to do more.

All of us.

Absolutely. Absolutely right. Mr. president, you wanted to react?

Yeah, with my experience from NATO and especially NATO Military Committee, I would like to add an argument to what has been said on the account of defense spending. I think we should also pay attention not just to the figure, how many percent of our GDP are we spending for defense, but how do we meet our capability commitments, capability targets, because this is what matters for real and credible defense. Strategic commanders will not take a chart with the percents once they are confronted with the situation. They will count aircraft, ships, combat units at required readiness. And this is what we should focus on beyond this 2% line because we have serious gaps in meeting our capability targets. So if we really want to be credible in our deterrence, because I think no one would argue that Russia knows very well about the real estate of our armed forces, we should really do much more in meeting these capability targets.

I will give you the word in a second, but I would like to follow up on what you said because we at GLOBSEC in several reports, we’ve been saying that there are several transatlantic gaps. One is in the defense spending that we are closing down, another one is in the efficiency, how we spend this money. In Europe, we have a huge potential still to increase the efficiency of that spent money. And the third transatlantic gap that is not closing down but is growing is the technology gap. US is much faster in the technological innovation than Europe, and Europe is lagging behind. This is going to create the serious troubles in the future if we don’t act now. And NATO has started with the Diana, with the innovation fund, et cetera, but I think we need to speed up Europe that it’s up to date. Prime Minister Frederiksen and then Kallas.

But that was exactly the point I wanted to make actually, because one thing is, of course, traditional deterrence and defense and we have to wrap up, especially on our industry, and I think it’s quite clear. I mean, some of us have said for many months that we are able to finance more deliveries for Ukraine, but we don’t have anything on stock on our own. But during the Czech initiative, we are very much engaged in that. We are trying to buy from third countries outside Europe because we don’t have anything on our own, and of course that cannot be the situation in the future. So we need to invest much more on traditional capacities and capabilities. But talking about technology, that’s another chapter. And what I see when I look at all of us, especially in Europe, is that China is going to win this race. I’m not afraid if the US is going to win the race, but if China is going to win this race, then I am afraid. And when I look at Qwanda, when I look at AI, when I look at the pillars that are not traditional security issues, but it is today security, energy and our industrial production and so on, it’s all interlinked, and China is way ahead of Europe.

(02:38:46)
So that’s why I’m saying are we sure that 2% will be enough? Because I think the 2% maybe can cover the traditional security questions, but if we are going to include technology, and we have to do that, and we are, as a country, very much engaged in Diana, especially on Qwanda, we have to, I think, invest much more and we have to build much stronger partnerships outside NATO. And that’s why it’s important that tomorrow we are going to see our friends and partners from Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand for the third time now in a row. We cannot do this on our own, but please be aware about China and let us not repeat the mistakes we have done about Russia in the future with China.

I wanted to build on that because innovation is the key and I think there’s actually also the possibility to take the costs down and be more effective. We have a very vibrant tech sector in Estonia, so what we did was to bring them together. So the tech sector that is very much into investing into defense and making these processes faster, more innovative, and more up to date and the traditional defense sector. So combining the two is actually the key. But of course, what is the question is the access to funding because we have defense investments are very much in the same category as pornography for the funds, private funds, so you can’t really use the funds for those. So we need to open up those, we need to open up the public funds as well. And what I also wanted to say is that I’ve been meeting with the defense industry and it’s a bit the chicken and egg issue. So the defense industry says that we don’t have orders, we have slogans, but we don’t have orders from the governments, whereas the government say that from richer countries.

(02:40:57)
One prime minister asked me that, “Where can I spend? I want to spend 2%, but nobody’s selling me now because they don’t have anything.” If you have a defense company that says that you buy 12 tanks, so I produce 12 tanks for the money that you present, not 16 or 13, but 12 because you don’t take any risks. I think also both sides, also the defense industry should read the room and understand that you have to make and take some risks even if it is not the governments immediately showing the money because we have the decisions coming in many countries to invest more in defense, but there has to be something to really be able to invest immediately.

You have opened up a very important question, which is the European defense industry, and how do we make sure that the defense industry is up to the speed? How do we get the necessary funds not only from governments, but banks? European Investment Bank, they were banned to invest into dual-use products, so I think there is a lot that needs to be changed on the European level in the European Union as well. And here the next European commission is going to be crucial in making sure that we are speeding up because Russia has already begun with the war economy and we are not there yet. And in long-term, it’s going to cause a problem.

Yeah, I think the understanding is there. The understanding is amongst the prime ministers of Europe, definitely, that we need to move faster, but the question is how?

Mr. President, you wanted to react.

Yeah, I wanted to use the opportunity to extend the comment of Mette Frederiksen about how all these problems are interlinked. I think if we look at the current security and international environment from broader point of view, it’s not a separate problem of aggressive war of Russia against Ukraine, and on the other side, systemic challenge from China, it’s all linked together because what we see now is a confrontation of two systems. On one side, there are democratic countries, being in NATO, EU or elsewhere around the world, including Indo-Pacific, on the other side, different forms of autocracies, mainly now represented by Russia and supporting countries, China, North Korea, Iran, but many others. And if we want to prevail in this global confrontation competition, we really need to approach our cooperation from a different angle of point. Because right now, we pretty much compete in the economic terms between the EU and United States, we are quite secretive when it comes to research and development. When we look at China, how they can combine resources, how they can focus on priorities, we are not doing the same.

(02:44:16)
I think if we look at it not only from the point of view that we need to support Ukraine so that they defend their territory, because if Ukraine fails, it doesn’t only mean that the security in Europe will be worse, it’ll be much worse globally because it’ll also encourage China to be more assertive and aggressive. So the same way as we ask for United States being with us in solidarity in supporting Ukraine, we should be in a solidarity with United States to support them in their competition with China in all areas around the globe. And collectively, we should also strive to convince countries in Africa, Latin America, that we are a better option for cooperation than autocracies around the world.

Quick reaction from Senator.

When you talk about our competition with China, it isn’t just our competition with China, it’s your competition with China.

[inaudible 02:45:19]

Look what’s going on with Russia. I think it’s a warm-up for the rest of this century as we compete on the planet. China’s the issue. China’s going to be the… We’re all talking about Ukraine here, and we should because that’s the hot war going on, but this thing with China is going to go on for the rest of this century, and the United States and Europe will be able to compete with China if we join together. And there is no more obvious ally for us than you, and there’s no more obvious ally for you than us. And we need to join together as we push back against China. And look, one thing that the war has brought out, the Ukraine war has brought out is the fact that what we’ve always known as an undercurrent, and that is the relationship between China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, the autocracies. It’s there, it’s real, and it’s going to get stronger, only stronger as we go forward in this century.

(02:46:28)
I think the challenge for this century is going to be how we all occupy this planet without killing each other and compete with each other. We should be able to compete with each other without killing each other. We need to figure that out because this is not going to get better as we get forward. The autocracies are not going to change their belief as to what they think is best for their people, and the democracies are not going to change their belief as to what they think is best for their people. We are going to have to figure this out.

You opened a very important question of China, and we will see that there is an increasingly clear voice that how China is supporting Russia in its war with Ukraine. It’s a problem for us and it’s a problem for NATO. There are many voices in the US as well that basically Ukraine is just a distraction from our main adversary, which is China in long-term, and it’s decreasing our focus on the main challenge. Well, I like the argument of my friend Ben Hodges who said Ukraine is all about China because if we are sending a wrong signal now that we are not able to defend a country on our borders, who will trust us whatever we say in the future about Taiwan or anything else? So the future deterrence really starts here. So I would say even the future of the West is now being decided in Eastern Europe in the east.

Interesting you should mention that now because yesterday, there was released a document titled Next Steps to Defend the Transatlantic Alliance from Chinese Aggression. The author is one of the distinguished thinkers and actors in the 21st century, myself.

Good, good.

This is a follow up to a report I did a couple years ago on the same subject and it is becoming a hotter and hotter item as we go forward. So I…

Thank you for that commercial. We will all read it.

It is free.

I want to move to a question from the audience, and I want to enlarge a question, but I’ve seen you really want to react on China.

It’s just one thing is the signal, and I totally agree. Let’s be honest. If we let Russia take Ukraine, that will, of course, invite many others to do similar things. That’s one thing. I mean, that’s basic knowledge. And no matter what, it’s a bad idea to allow Russia to take a European country. So I mean, that should conclude the discussion about Ukraine actually. But the other thing, and I think that is extremely important, that the triangle between North Korea, Iran and Russia is something we have to have as top of mind now. There is nothing that integrates the three of them except for one thing, that they don’t like us. That’s what combined those three, and they are willing to do, I guess, what it takes to defeat us. And I think we cannot only look at the triangle, we have to see how China is connected to that triangle. This is the new reality.

(02:49:46)
It is good we are talking a lot about Ukraine, but we have to talk about Russia. Ukraine is just one example. It’s a terrible example. And they’re paying

The highest price … I mean, they are losing thousands of good young men and women, so they’re paying the highest price, therefore we have to talk about it, but it’s just a part of something bigger, and I think we have to understand that is … it’s more question about Russia than it is a question about a single European country, unfortunately.

And all of these conflicts are somehow connected-

It is. Everything [inaudible 02:50:25].

… and that’s why we have this conversation. Exactly. So let me turn to the questions from the audience, an online audience who are watching and listening us. There’s a question from Matt Burton. What measures are in place to counter the internal and external actors that continually work against the West and NATO with influential disinformation campaigns? So let me enlarge that question a little bit. We are seeing that the frontal attack on Ukraine that Vladimir Putin has started two years ago, is not only a frontal attack on Ukraine, but on all of us. He clearly said that his goal is to dismantle the Western-led world order, and he has opened several front lines. We are seeing the physical front line in Ukraine, but there is another front line of the same war inside of our societies in information space, is the same war, is hostile against us to divide us. There is another front line in energy, in economic dimensions. So we have to win in all of these dimensions to be able to help to Ukraine. We are seeing that Russia is increasingly active with its agents in Europe. We’ve seen bombings in Czech Republic, actually, in Vrbetice. We see a lot of hybrid war actions in Europe. Is this a new normal? Are we … and, actually, are we a subject to the aggression, as well? Are we at war or is just Ukraine at war? Because hybrid war and information war is also war. And as my friend from UK said that if two parties are at war and only one recognizes it is at war, it tends to win. So shouldn’t we recognize that there is a war that is waged against us in information space, hybrid, cyber and many other domains, because unless we clearly say that that’s a situation, and we appreciate the long-term impacts of that, we are not going to be able to win it. So that’s my question to all of you. Who would like to be?

Well, there is a shadow war going on, that is clear, in all those domains that you mentioned. So the question for us is what is our response, really? I mean, because we see all these events all across Europe and the Western Hemisphere, but we treat those events as isolated events, and not connected to each other. I mean, there’s a fire in a warehouse, so it’s treated as a fire in the warehouse, although we have intelligence that, actually, Russians wanted to set the fire in that warehouse. So the question to us is, what is our response?

(02:53:24)
Because it could also be a provocation, because Russia wants us to react very strongly. So how to find the balance is a big question. I think we have to raise the awareness. We see this in our intelligence, but I’m not sure that everybody does see this in the same way. And then, the question is whether we are being the frogs that are being boiled, because every next time they’re bolder, and we don’t react. So how do we address this? And we have discussions going on in NATO about these things, but they are really very initial. It should start from the awareness, the same awareness of all the members in NATO.

Thank you, [inaudible 02:54:15].

To answer your question, I think it is not so important how do we see us, at what stage we are finding ourselves, because we are … I heard a number of academic discussions, if we are in war or not, because we still work in the categories of peace, crisis and war. But for Russia, it looks different. They see, at a history, like continuous conflict where only intensity and tools differ. From time to time, they are using hard power. From time to time, they are using hybrid tools, which we see today. Since the times of, we call it Gerasimov Doctrine, but actually it came up earlier than Gerasimov.

(02:55:07)
But it was around 2010 when Russians came up, again, with their vision of non-linear warfare, where all the kinds from cyber, hybrid, disruptive operations, sabotage, up to hard war fighting are present. So, actually, what Russia is doing against us is a continuous conflict that they are using tools that are available, that are much cheaper, quite often more effective, than hard weapons. If you look at information operations that they are doing now, all these disruptive events within the hybrid warfare across Europe, they are to make us unsure, not trusting our institutions, and being always under pressure. So we need to take not only passive measures, but also active measures to defend ourselves against this kind of warfare, because this is the way how Russians see the world, and we have to see it from their perspective, not from ours.

Prime Minister Frederiksen, and I would just follow up that. Of course, we need to watch, very closely, all the disinformation campaigns that are going on in several countries in Europe with the goal to divide us, and to also alter the political conversation. Also, there is a role for both NATO and the EU in protection of our critical infrastructure, because we are seeing that this critical infrastructure is under threat. So what do we expect from the NATO summit, and maybe also the next European Commission, in this regard?

Well, first of all, I think we have been spending too much time discussing what we can say about this war, and what we cannot say. What is the right wordings? I mean, if a foreign country is trying to destabilize Denmark by misinformation, I consider it as an attack against a democratic society. And the same way, when they use hybrid attacks, cyber attacks, and so on, so I think let’s call it what it is. They are trying to destabilize all of us, and they are using different measures. If it’s Ukraine or if it’s Denmark or Estonia or Czech Republic, and therefore it’s so dangerous what they’re doing. And talking about … one of the mistakes we have made, I think putting a lot of red lines on the table when you are handling a war is also a mistake.

(02:57:55)
I mean, it’s simply giving the enemy two good cards on his hand when you are, all the time, telling Russia what we are not going to do, or what we are not going to accept, instead of putting it the other way around. That we are willing to do whatever it takes to defend Europe, and to defend our alliance, and to defend the world order that we believe in, and that we have built since the end of the second World War. I think the awareness is rising. I agree that we cannot see all these episodes as isolated. We have to see the system in it. Again, it’s all interlinked, and therefore I think we have to take it more seriously, and maybe the most important question as NATO countries is, are we going to accept it? Are we going to accept that they are attacking us every day now in Europe with different measures? And I don’t think we should accept it.

Thank you. So we are running out of the time, and I have plenty of questions, but let me ask one. And that’s that NATO has proved to be very vital 75 years. Politicians are coming and going. We have elections everywhere, and there is an important election coming up in the United States. And we’ve seen that many of the conversations in supporting Ukraine, NATO, et cetera, are also not only in US, but also in European countries are somehow domestic conversations about, and they’re connected with domestic conversations on economy, et cetera. But my question is, what do you expect how the election campaign and the elections might change the conversation in the support for Ukraine and for NATO?

Is that for these guys? Well, I can give you a very clear answer to that. I don’t know. Look, the United States has a treaty that is a NATO treaty. Now, admittedly, Ukraine is not part of that treaty. Nonetheless, the attack on Ukraine is clearly as close to that treaty as you can possibly get. We have taken great steps in the United States, already, to do what we should do in order to help Ukraine. I really believe that’s going to continue. I don’t think the election is going to change that greatly.

(03:00:40)
I know that at least one of the candidates has said that they’re going to end the war. We haven’t got an explanation as to how that’s going to happen, but the candidate who says that, generally, gets done what he says he’s going to get done. So I’ll be anxious to see that. But look, I think people should not be wringing their hands over this. As far as the Congress is concerned, which is where I come from, the vast, vast majority, and it’s only a small minority, are saying that we shouldn’t be doing what we’re doing. Look, this is the right thing to do. America, generally, does the right thing that should be done. And given that, I have confidence we’ll be there.

Thank you very much, Senator, and let me thank all of the panel, because this was a wonderful conversation, and this shows that we had US and three small countries of Europe who have shown the way how to raise up to the challenge, and how to support Ukraine. And I think there is an increasing understanding of the situation we are in, that we are to be in a difficult situation, but we all understand that we are stronger together, and that we need to do whatever it takes to secure Europe and Ukraine. So with that, thank you very much for the conversation, and I wish you a nice rest of the day. Thank you.

So it’s this way.

Thank you so much to our panelists and our moderator for such an engaging conversation. They talked about some crucial questions of elections, and language, giving Ukraine what it needs to keep fighting to push Russia out, and keep Russia out. They talked about keeping pace with China, concerns about competition with autocracies around the globe, and challenges and gaps racking our defense industrial bases. We will now be viewing a second video from the NATO Youth Summit, which took place on May 14th in Miami, Florida in the US, and Stockholm, Sweden, with watch parties viewing around the world. The NATO Youth Summit delves deep into the most pressing global issues of interest to youth. Let us all now learn something from how the next generation will tackle the future issues of the alliance.

On May 13th at the NATO Youth Summit in Stockholm, I warned about the dangers of disinformation, and the imperative to tackle the challenge more robustly. The time to act is now. There is no need to wait for further reports and no time for half measures. We need to be decisive and commit ourselves collectively and without reservation to a much more assertive approach. Winning the information war is foundational to our security and, as NATO youth, we say, without hesitation, that our leaders must rise to the challenge.

In the 75th year of our Transatlantic Alliance, we celebrate our steadfast commitments to peace and to security. Our ability to maintain unity and effective deterrence is more crucial than ever, and our success in doing so will serve as the ultimate testimony to the strength of our common values. Emerging technologies can significantly enhance our defense capabilities, however, they also introduce new risks. Cyber attacks, AI-driven disinformation, and the development of autonomous systems all pose serious threats to global security, stability, and to the democratic ideals which unite us as allies.

With the rise of AI, cyber threats are becoming a more increased threat. Just like a double-edged sword, while AI enhances our capabilities, it also creates new security challenges. AI’s ability to analyze vast amounts of data can strengthen our defenses, but can also be exploited by malicious actors. Therefore, NATO must adopt proactive strategies to create robust security measures.

Quantum computing, sensing, and communications could revolutionize defense cyber security, and help strengthen our deterrence against Russia and China, which has already made achieving quantum supremacy a national priority. What NATO’s leaders should think about now is how the organization can become a facilitator to bring together the expertise and strengths of Allied nations to drive quantum innovation and empower its application in Allied defense. The time is now to make sure that NATO and member states remain at the forefront of quantum innovation and realize its potential.

When we talk military tech or innovation or countering disinformation, those are all reactive actions, or actions that will help us win a potential hot war. But the most important strategic question that we have to find the answer to and start working proactively with is, how do we change the will of the Russian people? If we really are committed to the desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, we have to change the will of the Russian people to stop being aggressive towards its neighbors, as well as funding international crime and terrorism, so that we can achieve a sustainable and stable peace, and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

Our democratic values are victims of the self-imposed red lines. Our democratic values are victims of the appeasement of dictatorships. As we face the largest war in Europe since World War II, with Ukraine at its forefront of protecting democratic values and paying the highest price with the lives of its people, we find ourselves trapped by these self-imposed red lines. It’s not time to appease the axis of evil any longer. Without adherence to rules, everyone’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are under the threat. It’s time to demonstrate the strengths and unity of democracy.

Ukrainians have been remarkable in defending their country, but they need your support. But do not support Ukraine just enough to survive, support Ukraine to win. We know that decisions in democracies take time, but time, in Ukraine, is not measured by days, hours, or weeks. It’s measured in human lives. Therefore, do not let political games and individual interests get in the way of decision-making. Therefore, I urge you to be bold, to be brave, and to be decisive. The biggest gift for NATO’s 75th anniversary would be a victorious and free Ukraine.

Thank you. What a great way to highlight the individuals and issues that will be shaping tomorrow with our youths. Now, please join us for lunch where we will all be able to discuss these pressing issues before resuming our programming. For those of you joining us online, you will now hear a series of interviews, the first from His Excellency, Alexander de Croo, Prime Minister of Belgium. The conversation will be moderated by Alena Kudzko, Vice President for Policy and Programming of GLOBSEC.

(03:07:51)
Next, you will hear from His Excellency, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the Prime Minister of Greece, which will be moderated by Nadia Schadlow, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. And, finally, we’ll be replaying the earlier conversation between Rachel Rizzo and Douglas Lute on the history and geography of NATO. Enjoy. And a few notes for our in-person audience, and those of you in the plenary room, we kindly ask that you refrain from saving seats as it is disruptive in the room, and impedes the flow of traffic. Also, please be mindful, and do not leave your personal belongings in the plenary room during pauses in programming. Our programming will resume at 1:15. Enjoy your lunch.

(instrumental music)

Decide in 6 out of the 10 domains that are of the general request of Ukraine. It is about military capacity, but it is also about reconstruction. It is also about humanitarian supports. It’s a very broad scope. Of course, a lot of people talk about is the delivery of the F-16s. So we have committed to at least 30 F-16s that will be delivered between now and 2028. That is contingent on the deliveries of our new planes, which are the F-35s, and we hope that we would have deliveries … I mean, we will aim to have deliveries this year of a couple of F-16s. We will do that. And there’s not that many countries that do it. The Netherlands does it, Denmark does it, and Norway. We are already involved in the training mission with our planes, and we hope that we will deliver a few this year. With the 30 that we committed, we will be the biggest contributor to the fighter jet capacity of Ukraine.

And, of course, the sooner they arrive, the better.

Obviously, the sooner they arrive, the better. Of course, we have to maintain our own defense capacities. Our F-16s are being used today, for example, in the Baltics for Baltic air policing to protect NATO territory for almost daily trials from the Russian side to see how much we defend. So we really have to balance that. Well, the earlier the F-35s are delivered, the earlier we can deliver the F-16s.

And what’s the timeline on those ones?

So we have four that we have now, for the moment, already. They are in United States here for training purposes for our pilots, and we will start getting those during the course of next year.

We are living, definitely, in very uncertain times. Everything is uncertain, and things are increasingly challenging given that half of the world is going through elections. And Belgium is one of those countries who just had elections. There is going to be a new government in Belgium, but people do want certainty. Both our populations want certainty to know that the governments can deliver, but also for Ukrainians, it’s important to know that we stay committed to the course, and we deliver what we promised. Are you certain that your new government is going to stick to the pledges that you’ve made?

I really have no doubt on that. And we have a long history of these type of commitments, and these types of commitments were always maintained even if you get new governments. And really, the public debate that we’ve had over the past months, related to our election, about Ukraine, there was really almost no doubt, no difference between the different parties. So I am really confident that the agreement that we signed, and we signed that agreement, I mean that is something that needs to be respected, whichever government is there. So yeah, democracy leads to changing in governments. That’s how democracy works. But stability and long-term commitments with our partners is something that we will respect.

This is very reassuring to hear. We all have a lot of doubts how long we can carry on for, that the public getting tired, but it’s good to hear that, regardless of the government, Belgium can stay the course.

But you address an important element is, indeed, the support from our home citizens. And you can do all the public policy, all the foreign policy in the world, you can do all the military training in the world, you can only do that as long as you have the support of your home population. And this is something that I think we need to put much more effort on is to explain why are we supporting Ukraine, why it is so important to do so.

(03:12:53)
It is important, of course, for the Ukrainians, Ukrainians that are fighting for our values, for our security, but it’s also a very important signal we give to the rest of the world is that we Europeans, we will defend our way of life, and we will do so together with our American friends, and other NATO friends. And it’s more important than ever to explain what we are doing, and to maintain the support from our home population. I’m not saying that because I feel that it is under pressure, but the moment you lose it, it’s too late.

And, of course, the other side is doing everything possible to make sure that there is no public supports, trying to sow doubt, and make sure that we do not stay committed. Support for Ukraine is one side of the dimension. The other side is, of course, our commitment to our own security, and that comes with defense spending, as well. A lot of allies are coming to Washington saying that they will deliver the 2% pledge this year. I think it’s 23 out of 32 this year. Belgium is not there yet.

Not there yet.

How do you explain that, and are you going to get there?

So we’re not there yet. We have increased our military spending with 30% over the past three years. So it is very significant what we have done. We have a path set out by 2030 and 2035. True, it will take us some time to get there, but, to me, that is … that’s one dimension, and it’s one dimension that we need to deliver on. But besides what you would call an input metric, which is how much do you spend, we also need to look at output metrics, and output metrics is how active are you if there are requests. And there, Belgium has always been at the forefront. When there were requests to use our fighter jets, we were there. When there were requests to use our marine capacity, we were there.

(03:14:48)
So you really have to look at both dimensions. And I think it’s important, then, when you increase your spending, that you increase your spending in a way that it builds an industrial supply chain. And we know that that today is the [inaudible 03:15:02] is spending more, but spending in a way that you develop an industrial capacity, that you develop technological capacity, that you also develop the human side of defense. Doing that in a well organized way, I think, is the main challenge with which the 32 countries are confronted.

I’m so glad you are bringing this up. I was, actually, very excited about the conversation with you. I know that you did MBA, actually, here in the United States, and this business mindset seems to be something that all leaders, political, but also military leaders, desperately need right now. So what is your recipe? What Europeans can do better to increase defense capacity? What kind of investments it needed? What kind of change of policy would it take to get there?

Okay. So, yeah, we have a long history of very national defense spending, and most of our militaries would mostly buy with their own industries, which has led to an incredibly fragmented supply chain. We see that now those borders are being broken, and you see that there is M&A activity that is happening across European borders, and that’s a good thing. I think next to that, as you pointed out, we need more investment. There is a tendency to always look at public investment. Now I think public investment has a role to play, but the real volume of investment needs to come from private investment. And it’s not that there is a lack of capital throughout Europe. I mean, we are a rich continent with people who have savings, and who want to invest their savings.

(03:16:35)
And so, we need to create a very attractive business case for our population to say, “Your savings can be used to invest in technology that will make us safer, that will help us to maintain our freedoms, our way of life.” So that means that public investment has to play a role, but it, really, has to be merit-based. So not in the classic way where we say, “Okay, we have 10 billion, we’re going to split it up within Europe, for example, across 27 countries.” Let’s look where the capacity is, let’s look where the expertise is, and allocate it based on the merits and not just on an accounting principle. And that public investment should be used to leverage private investment, and getting the private investment going into those industries is how we will get there. So I’m not against public investments, but I think public investment should be something that is an accelerator to get private investment going.

Right. And it’s a bigger problem in Europe where we have not particularly well-functioning capital markets, but also, when we are talking about investments in defense, we need to make sure that it complies with our own ESG standards. So there is a lot of work to do on this dimension.

There is a lot of work to do, and our ESG standards, of course, date a bit from another era, and the world has changed so rapidly. So, yes, we need to adapt to that. But, I mean, that is why … the world is changing. I mean, if you look at NATO, what are the two pillars of NATO’s success? And we are here to celebrate 75 years of NATO. The first pillar, obviously, is solidarity, is we say we stand shoulder to shoulder, and we will defend one another. But the second element, besides solidarity, is adaptability. The world has changed so much and so fast in the past 75 years, and an organization like NATO has only been successful, because it can adapt. And it’s quite clear that, again, we will need to adapt to a new environment.

And I’m afraid we’re running out of time, but I’ll sneak in one last question. We’ve been covering a lot of ground here, but also at the NATO Summit. What do you think, though, is the blind spots, a particular challenge that we’re not paying too much attention to, right now, but we will regret it in the future?

Well, so I think one of them was working on our own public support. That we addressed. I think a second one is what we would call the southern flank, is what is happening in the Sahel, for example. I’m convinced that if there would not be the war in Ukraine, and the dramatic violence in the Middle East, that we would be talking much more about what is happening in the Sahel. So this is something that we need to address. It’s good that, at this summit, we’ve come up with an action plan. But I’m convinced that in the next years, we will be investing way more into stabilizing the Sahel, into creating economic development there. All of that is necessary for us. If we want to live well, we need to make sure that our neighbors are living well, as well, and that will need a big engagement from our side.

Thank you, so much, Mr. Prime Minister. I’m afraid I’ll have to release you back to the NATO Summit negotiations. We appreciate your time here, and thank you, so much, everybody for being with us today.

Nine, eight.

Welcome back to the NATO Public Forum. I’m Nadia Schadlow, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, and it’s my pleasure this afternoon to have an opportunity to have a conversation with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Prime Minister, it’s really great to be here with you today. And since we only have a few minutes, I wanted to jump right in. When you became Prime Minister first in 2019, Europe looked different, and the challenges facing NATO seemed, perhaps, less intense than what we’re facing today. Could you talk to us a little bit about whether or not NATO has been adapting enough since 2019, since 2022? I know Greece has been really in the lead in terms of modernization and adaptation, but I’d love to hear your views.

When I became Prime Minister in 2019, no one thought that we would be faced with a war at the heart of the European continent. But this is what we have to deal with after Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. And I do believe that the Alliance has adjusted, and has tackled this momentous challenge as successfully as it could. Back in 2019, we were still faced with a question of whether enough European countries would meet the 2% commitment, 2% of defense spending as a percentage of GDP.

(03:21:29)
Now most countries have already met that target, and those that haven’t have made very clear pledges that they will do so. Greece has been one of those countries that has surpassed the 2% threshold, ever since, essentially, we joined the Alliance. We’ll be spending 3% of our GDP on defense, significantly modernizing our armed forces, and thus contributing to the overall capabilities of the Alliance. So new challenges force us to think differently, also in terms of what this means for the collective European security as a pillar of the overall NATO integrated structure. And I think this discussion is advancing at a very fast pace in Europe.

Yeah. So you mentioned European security. How do EU defense measures complement NATO, or how do you see the relationship between EU efforts to increase, and substantially increase, its defense and NATO? Is the relationship complementary, and how so?

In my mind, it is fully complementary. We need to spend more, but we also need to be smarter about how we allocate our defense spending. When I look at the European defense industry, I see a lot of fragmentation. I don’t see enough interoperability. I see a lot of sometimes, maybe, I would say … I wouldn’t say unnecessary competition, but certainly too many weapons systems that don’t necessarily talk to each other. So we need to spend more, but we also need to be smarter about how we integrate our spending.

(03:23:01)
And, I guess, I do think that at a time when the Russian invasion of Ukraine poses an existential threat for Europe, we also need to be creative in terms of finding new sources of funding in order to support our defense spending. It is not just going to be enough to rely on national budgets, as we have done so far. And that is why I’ve been one of those strong proponents that we need some sort of European facility that will complement the defense spending that we undertake at the national level with more European funding. So this combination of public and private initiatives, in my mind, is going to be necessary if we build a solid European pillar when it comes to NATO’s overall defense capabilities.

So would that be some type of European fund, or how do you envision that mechanism?

We have submitted, with President Donald Tusk, a proposal for

A flagship European project, which would essentially be a European iron dome that would complement the existing air defense capabilities that we have, which could be, again, I stress the word could be because we clearly don’t have agreement at this stage, which could be funded through some sort of European joint borrowing. When we faced COVID back in 2020, we took the momentous decision to raise 750 billion euros to address the economic downturn that COVID caused to all of our economies. And this money is currently deployed, this was a European facility. So it seems to me that if we have raised 750 billion euros for the green of the digital transition, to support our competitiveness, to protect jobs, it would be reasonable if we could raise a significantly lower sum at the European level to strengthen our European defense initiatives.

Right. And that would get us beyond always a discussion about the 2%. Also, it’s different, it’s ways to get to the 2%, but also ways to increase capabilities and integrated capabilities across Europe.

And of course also ways to strengthen also our European defense industry at a time when we talk a lot about strategic autonomy, when the issue of competitiveness is at the top of our agenda, bolstering European defense co-operation, European innovation. We’ve made some first steps at the European level in that direction, but we clearly need to do more.

Right. And speaking of doing more, Greece has done an incredible amount for Ukraine. You’re one of the leading states in terms of providing the Ukrainians with missiles, with ammunition. What more do you think NATO needs to do quickly and how can we get there? A key theme throughout this past year really has been speed and NATO’s ability, or lack thereof to get things to Ukraine fast enough. And that’s been a problem we’ve had in the United States too. How do you think things might shift over the next few months, or what could be most meaningful to get us to act faster?

Well, first of all, I think Europe has stepped up to the plate and has delivered. Back in 2022 I think many, including many in Moscow, would’ve placed bets on the inability of Europe to remain united when it comes to supporting Ukraine. They were wrong. Europe remains united. We are providing Ukraine with European financial assistance, 50 billion euros. It’s a significant package that we agreed a few months ago. But also member states are providing Ukraine with defense capabilities to the best of our abilities, and we will continue to do so. And initiatives such as a Czech initiative, for example, have proven to be very efficient in terms of delivering aid to Ukraine as quickly as possible.

(03:26:47)
At the same time, we need to look at the holes this has created to our own defense capabilities. And as much as we talk about sophisticated systems, we also need to make sure that we have the basics. I mean, Ukraine demonstrated how important, for example, 155 shells are, and that not everything is going to be sort of as technology-driven in a modern war as many people thought. So making sure that we also streamline production, strengthen our stockpiles, while at the same time having the capability to support Ukraine. This is a challenge that we have to meet.

Right. Quantity matters.

Quantity and quality.

Can you tell us a little bit more about the Czech initiative that you just mentioned in passing?

Well, I think the Czech initiative has proven to be an efficient way of transferring weapon systems to Ukraine. Many countries have joined that initiative, and as you pointed out, now it’s just up to speed and making sure that the necessary transactions, whenever they involve, for example, sale of equipment take place as quickly as possible. And it seems to me that this is one avenue which is worth exploring further.

So as we close, what is your hope for the 75th public forum? What would you like to see out of the 75th anniversary summit?

Well, first of all, I think it is important to take stock of what we have achieved. NATO has been successful because it has been able to adapt and occasionally even reinvent itself, and this is exactly what we need to do now. For me, the most crucial aspects of NATO has always been the strength of the Transatlantic partnership. And I think it is very, very important that we maintain this mutual commitment, but to also recognize that in an alliance, we all need to do our own own part. There are no free riders. And that is why meeting the 2% commitment is so important, at least for those countries that have always been very consistent with this target. And maybe at some point we will need to discuss about raising it. Maybe 2% is not enough. Maybe we need to get to 2.5% if we really want to deliver everything we want to do within the alliance.

(03:29:11)
But the one thing which is certain is that at a time of great uncertainty, being part of an alliance that is strong, defensive and capable of defending us all against external threats is as important as it has ever been.

Well, thank you so much.

Thank you.

It’s been a pleasure. Thank you.

Thank you.

Good morning everyone from Washington D.C. at the NATO Public Forum. My name is Rachel Rizzo and I am a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. And today I am thrilled to have with me Ambassador, Doug Lute, who served as the US Ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2017.

(03:29:58)
Ambassador Lute, thank you so much for being with us today for this interview.

Well, it’s great to be with you, Rachel.

Absolutely. So we’re celebrating a huge milestone here in Washington for this NATO Summit 75 years. Now, you’ve talked a little bit about how there’s three different versions of NATO, NATO 1.0, 2.0. 3.0. Can you talk a little bit about that and your ideas around what that looks like for NATO?

Right. So 75 years is a long period of time to absorb. And so I think it’s useful to unpack the 75-year history of the alliance, now the longest-serving alliance in modern history into these three periods. And 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 is sort of a nod to the next generation.

(03:30:43)
I count the first period, the first segment of NATO history marking from 1949 for 40 years to 1989, and obviously the fall of the Berlin Wall, and then the aftershocks of the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of ’89, which eventually two years later saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union. And during NATO 1.0, it had the bipolar global standoff between the West and the Soviet Union, most prominently with the iron Curtain running north to south and dividing Europe itself. And this was a period of the zero-sum game. If something was good for one side, it was bad for the other. And it really spoke to the original purpose of NATO, which was the defense of the 12 allies itself.

(03:31:34)
I think that period ended in the ’89 to ’91 period. And the post-Cold war period or NATO 2.0 dawned with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I count NATO 2.0 as running for about 25 years. So from roughly 1989 to 2014, and in that NATO 2.0 period, we had some dramatic changes. I mean the cause, the original cause of NATO, the threat from the Soviet Union had disappeared, at least briefly. We’ll come to that. And NATO began to question its purpose, its standing in the world and so forth. And it found its feet. It did so by first of all, enlarging its membership. So this was a period when the first Central and Eastern European countries joined the Alliance. Now the first three are celebrating their 25th anniversary, also simultaneous with NATO’s 75th anniversary this week.

(03:32:36)
It also saw NATO look beyond its borders and make a very simple, logical statement, which is that the allies themselves are more secure if beyond our borders, our neighborhood is more stable. And this ushered in the of NATO partnerships. This began, of course in the early 1990s with Partnership for Peace. And now it’s extended to some 40 partners that range geographically from Mauritania to Japan. And these diverse set of partners really bring a great value to the alliance. They give us not only insight into regions beyond our borders that are critical to NATO security itself, but they also gain by way of access to NATO military standards, essentially the gold standard of military interoperability, access to the NATO school system and so forth. So this two-way street of NATO partnerships began in this NATO 2.0 period.

(03:33:41)
And we even fashioned a partnership, as unusual as it may seem today, with the Russian Federation, the successor to the Soviet Union. And I think that that partnership was well-intentioned. It was exploring the potential that NATO could actually have meaningful, reliable relations with its largest geographic military neighbor. And I think that that experiment, that exploration actually marked the end of NATO 2.0 with the Russian seizing and illegally annexing Crimea destabilizing the Donbas and so forth. And so I think in 2014, we really began to see a move towards NATO 3.0, and that’s the period we’re still in. And much of the substance of this summit has to do with this transition from NATO 2.0 to NATO 3.0 and how NATO will continue to adapt as we face new challenges.

We’re at 75 years, the longest military alliance in history. The next big milestone is going to be 100 years. What is that going to look like? There have been a lot of things written, a lot of discussions being had about how the US-European security relationship will have to fundamentally change as the US is pulled in multiple directions, as the US focuses more on the Indo-Pacific, that will ultimately mean that Europe will have to shoulder more of its own security burden. Is that what NATO 4.0 might look like? What’s your idea on that?

Well, obviously this is a pretty hazy crystal ball-

It is.

… in terms of gazing into the next 25 years. But I think there is a NATO 4.0, and it features a new security architecture, certainly in Europe, after peace is established in Ukraine and stability is established after the Ukraine war. I think it has to account for the fact the geographic reality that Russia will remain NATO’s closest neighbor, nearest neighbor, most militarily capable neighbor and will have to settle on some sort of security architecture that provides stability on both sides.

(03:36:15)
And I think increasingly, as your question suggests, it’s got to account for the fact that security is perhaps more than ever a global equation, a global dynamic, and will have to account for the rising, the looming competition with China, which NATO now formally recognizes by way of its strategic concept. And I think what that must mean is that European allies with US support, continued US, have to assume even more responsibility for security here in Europe. That doesn’t mean the absence of the United States, but it means a more equitable balance from the roughly 70%/30% distribution that we see today. So if I were to predict 25 years, with some hazard, I’d suggest those are some cornerstones of NATO 4.0.

One of the major meetings that’s going to happen at this summit is alongside NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners, and there’s sort of a debate happening in Washington about the role that NATO has to play in the Indo-Pacific. Secretary General Stoltenberg has made it clear that this is not about NATO pushing itself into the Indo-Pacific, but it’s a response to China’s inroads throughout Europe. But there’s also another side of that debate where people say, look, NATO’s main area, its main theater of operations is the European continent, its main adversary is Russia, and that’s what it should be focusing on. What are your thoughts on how NATO should navigate this new geographical challenge when it comes to China and the Indo-Pacific?

Well, I think the first point to make very clear is that the NATO Treaty itself lays out the geographic confines of the alliance. So it is the North Atlantic area. And so NATO doesn’t have a treaty obligation beyond the North Atlantic, so not into the Indo-Pacific, for example. But it’s undeniable that the looming, in fact, I would argue already ongoing competition with China will have a direct impact on not only Europe, but also North America. I mean, we’re seeing this play out in so many ways. And I think Secretary of State Tony Blinken made this quite clear in his interview earlier today.

(03:38:44)
I think for European allies, one of the things that has to be of concern is the buying up by China of commercial infrastructure in Europe, which is actually not just civilian infrastructure, but dual-purpose infrastructure. So here you see this pattern, this trend of Chinese investment and purchasing of seaports, transportation infrastructure, energy infrastructure, mass communications infrastructure and so forth. And it’s, I think, increasingly important that NATO and our partners at the European Union appreciate that these are dual purpose and that rail lines, for example, or ports used by commercial entities are also a part of the military equation.

(03:39:31)
So I think being more aware of Chinese attempts to influence Europe by way of commercial infiltration with the expectation that there’s a political payoff down the road after these commercial investments are made, that’s a place for us to be much more aware. And I think it illustrates China’s endgame, China’s long game, which is the Belt and Road Initiative leading to the marketplace of Western Europe, and with the idea of commercial infiltration leading eventually to political influence.

So we are here in Washington just blocks away from where the Washington Treaty was signed at the Mellon Auditorium back in April of 1949. There were 12 original NATO members, were now at 32. What do you think would surprise those original founders about where the alliance has been and where it is today?

Right. Well, first of all, I think they’d be surprised that we’re at 75. I mean, I don’t think anybody does something today and imagines where he or she’ll be in 75 years. So I think they would be surprised, the 12 founders would be surprised of the durability of the alliance. And I think that they would remark that the source of that durability is actually in the second sentence of the Washington Treaty that cites that all the signatories to the treaty will abide by and believe in three democratic principles, which I think are the glue of the alliance and largely account for how we made it to 75. And those three are democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law.

(03:41:14)
Now, look, NATO was at 12 and is today at 32 a alliance of democracies, but there’s 32 varieties of democracies here. And each of those I would offer and humbly as an American citing American democracy as well, each of them is a work in progress. But the fact that we’re grounded on these core values, I think is part of the reason that we’ve been this durable, and I think that the founders would be proud of that second sentence.

(03:41:46)
I also think they’d have to be surprised at the geographic scope of the alliance. I mean, I don’t imagine any of them could have thought of 12 becoming 32, and I think that they’d marvel at that. I think with the Washington Treaty being signed in Washington, that they’d be shocked that the only time Article Five has been invoked in these 75 years had nothing to do with an attack in Western Europe, had nothing to do with America responding to that attack and reinforcing our European allies, had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. But in fact, on the day September 11th, it was actually the inverse of all that, it was Europe coming to the assistance of America to include in part because of an attack here in Washington. So they’d be surprised about Article Five.

(03:42:51)
I’d also remark though these photos may clear that the 12 men who signed the Washington Treaty, I think would be surprised today at the role of women in leadership positions in NATO at multiple levels. So head of state and government, ministers, both foreign and defense ministers, the NATO staff, ambassadors and so forth. I would add there that today perhaps we should be surprised that there aren’t more women in prominent roles in NATO. So I think there’s a lot to be surprised at. One thing that they would not be surprised at-

Yeah, that’s my next question.

I’ll preempt your next question. They would not be surprised that NATO today is rallying in the face of Russian aggression.

Yeah.

That of course was the original forming cause of NATO, and today I think the founders would see a familiar Russia in terms of imperialist designs and aggression on its neighbors.

They probably would also be surprised that we’re trying to get Germany to spend more on defense and do more and be more forward-leaning as well.

Perhaps.

Perhaps.

Maybe even the Germans, they’re a little surprised at that.

Yeah. Yeah. There’s a lot of surprise that has happened to us since 1949. Finally, one of the main headlines at this alliance or at this specific summit is what the alliance is delivering for Ukraine. There’s a lot of talk about a bridge to membership that’s well lit, that is short, but there’s also been criticism that the weapons that we’ve been giving them have so many caveats on them that we’re having Ukraine fight with one hand tied behind its back. What are your thoughts on the deliverables for Ukraine at this summit?

Well, I think that the military deliverables and the political deliverables, these two parallel tracks or lines of effort for Ukraine are predictable and quite candidly, quite modest. I would’ve liked to have seen even more progress on military assistance and on fulfilling the commitment that Ukraine politically will eventually become a member. The bridge metaphor works in part, but I’m not sure it’s completely satisfactory.

(03:45:18)
Look, I think everyone here at the summit this week was stunned by the blatant aggression of the most recent Russian attack on Kiev and other cities, to include the tragic attack on the children’s hospital. It’s important for us to remember two things. First of all, that attack originated from inside Russia, and the base from which that attack was launched is essentially in sanctuary because it is beyond the ability of Ukrainian indigenous capacity to strike it. And we have placed limits on the geographic range of the systems we’ve provided Ukraine. I know of no effective air defense program, which focuses solely on defense of the target site by way of air defense systems and so forth, and neglects the attack of the launch sites. Air defense is a two-way street, offense and defense.

(03:46:26)
So in particular, you use the words caveat. I think that the restrictions, the caveats that we’ve placed and others have placed on some of our systems are not justifiable in legal terms, these are legitimate military targets and they don’t make sense in terms of military science.

Thank you for that clear answer and for your support of NATO and your support of Ukraine as well. And for this interview, Ambassador Lute, and to our audience watching online, tune in for another two days of programming here at the NATO Public Forum in Washington. Thank you so much.

(music)

Welcome back. Welcome back to the Forum after a nutritious lunch, hopefully, for all of you and I would invite everyone to the front, slowly closing the doors. So we are back for the second half of the day. I hope you had a great first half of the day. Good conversations over lunch. Exciting part two of our program. Before we start with our next panel, I’m going to invite you to watch a video, one of our video productions, on the pressing issues of NATO’s Eastern Borders. So please watch the video with us. Thanks.

As a fighter pilot, it’s an honor to be here in the Baltic Air Policing mission in Lithuania, in Šiauliai Air Force Base. Especially this year, which is the 20th anniversary of the BAP Mission and the 75th anniversary of NATO, an organization which works for the freedom and security of all its members. I perform my part of the collective defense support of all allies just in order to deter possible aggressions and defend the population and territories of our alliance. This duty makes me feel very proud, and if required, and as a part of the deep commitment that all of the members have with this organization, I would love to be here again with my friends for the 25th anniversary of the BAP Mission and even for the centenary of NATO. Thank you.

I believe that for young people who have only ever known peace in their countries, the challenges that NATO is facing may seem distant and foreign. We must not create spaces for our enemies to sow fear and distrust, but we must ensure that our societies are prepared for the threats that we are facing.

As NATO reaches its 75th anniversary, the alliance has a lot to be proud of, yet its greatest accomplishment is providing security and defense to the former captive nations of the Soviet Union. Through the credible deterrence and security provided by NATO, the countries of the Eastern flank, including my country, Latvia, have been able to prosper, escape Russia’s imperial orbit, and the iron curtain we see today. This mission, however, has not yet been completed. Our Ukrainian friends deserve the same.

This is the first big anniversary Finland is celebrating as a member of NATO, but NATO has been important to Finland for over 75 years. By keeping the peace in Europe during the Cold War and by preventing Soviet efforts to dominate Europe, NATO contributed to Finland remaining independent. Today, Fins across the political spectrum are determined to safeguard democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. And as allies, we are ready to do this across the transatlantic space. Finland has always been ready to defend itself. As one of some 900,000 reservists, I am so happy we no longer have to do it alone but together with our allies. Thank you.

This larger occasion contains within itself the 20th anniversary of NATO’s Eastern expansion in 2004. And this represented a major milestone in Bulgaria and Central and East Europe’s process of Europeanization based on deep-seated military modernization and democratization of security policy. And moreover, as a country located on the southern and eastern flank of Europe, Bulgaria now enjoys an unparalleled level of security, which was, however, critically missing in its difficult past, defined by wars and foreign authoritarian domination.

NATO should pay even more attention to the Eastern flank and encourage societies in member states to be proactive about their security and freedoms. The alliance can create a reflex against authoritarianism, something that is especially needed now. I believe that the Black Sea region is still not a priority, unfortunately, and this must change as soon as possible.

The ongoing Russian invasion in Ukraine is turning the Black Sea into an increasingly dangerous and [inaudible 04:27:12] for NATO. For Turkey, the Black Sea holds critical importance as a significant economic artery, a buffer between Russia and Ankara, and a critical security flank. In this summit, NATO should prioritize strengthening its A2/AD capabilities in the region, as well as strengthening regional collaboration mechanisms between literal states, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, under an allied framework.

Great. I hope you enjoyed the video, and now we’ll have a conversation that fits, of course, very well with the theme of European security transformed with, I must say, my favorite foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, not surprisingly, but one that will be moderated by a colleague from the Atlantic Council, Jenna Ben-Yehuda. Jenna, the floor is yours.

Thank you.

Welcome back. We’re delighted to have you all here at the NATO Public Forum. I’m Jenna Ben-Yehuda, executive vice president at the Atlantic Council. We are here to talk about Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine and how it has fundamentally changed the security landscape in Europe. And to discuss these changes and the future of the alliance we have with us really tremendous speakers here today. To my right, we have his excellency, Gabrielius Landsbergis, Foreign Minister of Lithuania. Welcome. Prime Minister, excuse me, Foreign Minister, I almost promoted you, Radosław Sikorski of Poland. Thank you for being with us.

Prime Ministers watch these things.

We’ll see what we can do. And Mr. Micael Johansson, president and CEO of Saab. Welcome.

Thank you.

We have 45 minutes together. The first half an hour will be in conversation, and then we’ll come to all of you. So be thinking of your questions. We’ll take them from online as well as here in the room. So we’ll let you know when you can start queuing up. We’ve heard a big metaphor this week, and it’s a bridge. It’s a two-way bridge. It’s a long bridge. It’s a short bridge. What should the bridge look like?

Should I?

Please.

Okay. Well, I mean defining the bridge I think we shouldn’t start with the… I mean, we are in a position where we have to say something, right? So we’ll say that it’s a bridge. It’s understandable. What we’re looking for, and enduring the whole negotiations process for the declaration, we’ve been looking for the end goal of the bridge. A very clear commitment that would find itself coming from NATO that we are serious about the invitation. The processes might take long. That’s understandable. They might require reforms. It required for every country that joined, especially recently. That’s understandable. But throughout the process, it was clear where we will end up, and this is the main thing that we’ve been looking for. Therefore, I’m not particularly keen on emphasizing the bridge itself, I’m still remaining a goal-oriented person.

Would you agree with that?

I’m not sure I’m good at literal metaphors. NATO was founded to deter an aggressive Russia in the guise of the Soviet Union. NATO won the first time, and we need to win the second time. Russia is aggressive again. She has broken international law, her own voluntarily accepted treaties, Budapest memorandum, and many, many international documents. Putin should not benefit from his act of aggression, and it’s our business to help Ukraine win this so that we don’t have to spend the money and treasure, and worse, on doing the job ourselves.

And so what does success look like in this context? What do you think is confidence building for Ukraine coming out of this summit?

Well, success is that Putin makes a phone call to his defense

… defense minister and tells him to get out of Ukraine.

Will that happen this week? I don’t know. What does success look like within a summit context for each of you? Let me turn to you, Mr. Johansson. What can be achieved this week that is confidence building, that leaves folks feeling as though the 75th anniversary is not just a marker of what’s been in the past, but a really strong future yet to come?

Many have said it, but I think as industry, we are doing everything we can to support our nations to donate and to raise capacity and all that, but to really make sure that we give them something that makes them win the war rather than not to lose the war, there’s still a little bit of hesitation on that in terms of may it escalate or how do we treat that in terms of can we avoid to keep that stuff ourselves? So can we actually donate things? So if we can come to giving them really sophisticated things going forward to make the win the war, that’s probably the best thing that can come out of this I think.

We heard Secretary Blinken say from this stage just this morning that the F-16s are coming. This was reiterated by Secretary of Defense Austin last night. We heard President Biden say that Russia is losing this war, additional material support is on the way. Do you agree with that? Is Russia losing right now?

Well, I would not necessarily subscribe to narratives, especially when the situation on the ground is not agreeing with them. The situation is very difficult, and the security of Ukraine and security of Europe and the Transatlantic Alliance has not yet been defined, and it’s being fought for in the trenches of Kharkiv. Today, right now when we sit here, there are men and women in trenches out there fighting for our security so that we, those who sit on the stage and those who listen to us, are able to celebrate today. And this passage of history has not yet been written, so we can help, and we are helping. And I hope that the things that we are doing today, that the decisions that we will make throughout these days will add to that passage as something of a course to the victory because there’s no other alternative. If it’s not the victory, then it’s loss. If it’s loss, it’s our loss. It’s not just Ukrainian or anybody else. Everybody who is here will lose that.

(04:34:47)
And for defining what could be a success of these couple of days in Washington, Putin sent a very horrible and bloody postcard to each and everyone here, what he thinks of us being gathered here, with a ultrasonic missile that attacked a children’s hospital in Kiev. That’s on us if we are going to react to that. If we’re not, then it’s out there behind our back left for these couple of days as a reminder, what is actually happening while we’re here discussing. So I think that if I were to look for a successful answer, and I would add what Minister of Poland just said, that yes, that would be a very good victory sign so that Putin is forced to rethink or at least he’s forced to pay for what he did to the children of Ukraine just a couple of days ago.

Does payment look like F-16s this summer and additional air support, air defense mechanisms? What sends a strong message, Minister Sikorski?

Well, the Patriots are on the way. The effectors to the Patriots are being produced. The F-16s are on the way, the American packages on the way, so things are happening. The Russians have regained initiative on the ground. They’re making incremental gains at huge personnel losses. I think last year there was an opportunity to push them much harder, and the confluence of Ukraine delaying its mobilization and the American package being delayed did not help. It was perhaps an opportunity to settle the war quicker.

(04:36:37)
But I believe that Putin has already lost in the sense that his original war aims are unachievable. He wanted to have all of Ukraine as a vessel state and I don’t think he can take Kiev anymore. Even when he makes these outrageous demands that counter amount to Ukraine capitulating, he actually now talks about occupying chunks of Ukraine rather than all of it. So this is the real negotiation on the battlefield. Ukraine won the battle of the Black Sea.

(04:37:21)
Russian aviation cannot move freely over Ukraine, so Russia has advantage but not domination, and you have a few more apparent victories over places like Avdiika and Vovchans’k and others, and Putin will also run out of personnel, of troops. Plus, do not be misled by Russian propaganda about how their economy is doing. To measure what Russia is doing by GDP is silly. When you produce a tank instead of a motor car and you send that tank into battle and it gets destroyed, you have created a lot of economic activity, but you’ve also destroyed a lot of wealth.

That’s right.

Wars and in all kinds of ways. World War I ended for Germany when they ran out of resources and I think Putin is way on the way.

This is a good place to pivot to a conversation on industry, Mr. Johansson. One of the defining moments of this war has been the totally revolutionized role of industry. How has it changed for you as CEO of a defense company? Is it easier for companies to move? Has the acquisition process changed in a meaningful way? We’ve talked about things are on the way, on the way, on the way. Part of the challenge has been fielding this and getting it into theater. What’s your impression of how things have shifted?

Now, of course it’s a huge wake up call and industry, if I look at Europe, have been optimizing their capacity and capabilities to more or less appease dividend sort of situation. And all of a sudden everyone wants everything from us at the same time everywhere, and then a little bit of the problem ends up in our lap. Why can’t you deliver in short lead times? And we are investing heavily, my colleagues when I talk to them, all of us are investing heavily now to step up. And we start by boosting the capacity we have, the shifts and automation and production lines, and then we build new facilities and all that. This is not a walk in the park. It takes a bit of a time before we can actually raise the capacity. It has led to much more collaboration also in Europe between industries, but it’s a whole ecosystem that we have to look at.

(04:39:46)
It’s not only us as primes, it’s a huge amount of companies that have to come with us, and also commercial companies to get us the components and stuff. And this is maybe something that industries in Europe especially can do a little bit better together to sort of help the ecosystem come with us and not to saturate them in terms of we need powder, all of us, to do ammunition, and it’s the same supplier or powder and that means it’s a problem. But we are definitely stepping up. The problem is are we doing enough as industries? Probably not. So the big discussion is now what do we need long-term, guarantees? What kind of guarantees do we need to actually take the really big investments? Because I think we have a paradigm shift here in front of us, not a step-by-step approach. But I can honestly say the last three years has been nothing like I’ve ever experienced before.

Certainly.

It’s crazy in terms of [inaudible 04:40:49]

No doubt, and the numbers certainly bear that out. And if I could draw you out a little bit, you are also Swedish, so you are here as part of Sweden’s first fully exceeded summit in that way, although Sweden’s been a long-time partner. Minister Sikorski, of course of Poland. You talked about the gains in the Black Sea. Let’s move to the Baltic Sea. There is an opportunity for Nordic Baltic cooperation, which is obviously dramatically strengthened by the accession of Finland and Sweden. What do you see as the capabilities between your nations, and what is first out there that you really want to see in the next 6, 12, 18 months as a result of accession? What can the Baltic do now that it couldn’t before?

I don’t think we have a problem in the Baltic at all anymore. Russia has these two narrow points of access to the Baltic. There are eight nations now around the Baltic. If you look at what Ukraine without a navy has done to the Black Sea, think of what we can do to the Baltic fleet. They have a problem.

So it’s a NATO lake.

Yeah, I agree. It’s a NATO lake. I think though that we could do a bit more to have the deterrence that we need going forward, even though we have a lot, and of course Poland and Sweden and Finland and the Baltic states can sort of do this together. I strongly believe that what we lacked because we were inside the bubble, many of us are, of the Russian bubble of the threats that they have, so we need an integrated air missile defense system of real sophistication level like an onion with several layers. That would probably be the best thing to invest in going forward now.

One of the big conversations here in Washington, and I’m sure each of you have heard this this week, is the talk of 2% and who is hitting that threshold? Poland has been there for 20-odd years. You’re at 4% ,heading on five. There is still a number of NATO members, although fewer than before, who haven’t yet met that threshold. We often talk about how we make the case about the imperative for Ukraine to be victorious in this war beyond Europe. What do you say to partners who aren’t yet meeting that commitment within Europe?

Well, the only thing that we can say is offer our example, and as Poland did, as you mentioned with already in the past, we’ve just reached 3% in Lithuania by actually adding even some additional taxes to the people because there is no other way how we can fund the procurement that is needed for our country. But when you look at the Nordic Baltic region, the countries around the Baltic, you would see that there is no big debate whether we should be funding our defense, so that tells you something. That means that political decision-makers do understand the threat, that there is most likely a huge and wide support by the population and it is geographic. That means that for us, the threat is very real and very tangible. So with that, when we’re trying to influence a debate that is taking place here, for example today in Washington, it’s not that we’re saying, “Look, let’s all of us find a way how to finance,” we’re saying, “Look, we are already doing this.”

(04:44:25)
A tiny Lithuania is 3.03%. Estonia is there, Latvia is there. We talked about Poland. Others are getting there also to big numbers. It’s not just empty political words. It’s something that is very, very tangible, and here it connects to the industry. What is the biggest problem with the industry? They’ve seen how we went through COVID, where everybody said, “Look, you just produce as many vaccines as possible because they will be needed years and years and years into the future.” Many of them invested and a couple of years later, suddenly, basically boom, there’s no big need. And many of industries, defense industries are thinking exactly the same thing. Oh yeah, so you’re talking that you’re going to spend three, 4% right now. What will happen in a couple of years?

(04:45:16)
The geopolitical situation might be very different because not everybody’s saying that, “Look, this is a huge change, historic change that we’re seeing globally and this will stay for us for decades.” But industry is very practical, and they’re saying, ” Can we trust you that those three, 4% will stay there?” And this is up to us, to politicians to convince not just the public, but also the investors who are planning their investment and building new factories, new lines of production, that yes, Russia is going to be a threat, other dictators are being emboldened. And unfortunately for many of us, we are entering an unstable period in our history and we have to be prepared for that, and that’s why we are going to invest. And we are going to invest, we are going to devote money, and you can invest into this or that factory.

I think this is a really important point. Mr. Johansson, I’d love for you to respond to this. It requires massive capital investments to produce the kinds of systems that SAAB is known for. Can you walk us through some of the decision-making as president and CEO of this company that you think about? What kind of investments will be there? What does the market look like years down the road? And does the EU align with this with NATO requirements or is there a gap there?

Many questions at the same time, but let me try and say that of course our industry comes from a peace dividend period. So of course there is some hesitation on how long term will this be in terms of how can we trust that you will never dismantle again the critical mass that we need to keep call it a lukewarm production capacity even if times go in a different direction? So of course that’s the owner’s perspective. Return on investment is what we need to understand, so this is a business case. We’re taking much more risks today than we did three, four years ago in terms of what the board approves and what the owners approve. So we’re getting there, but we actually do not understand the aggregated demand situation that the politicians and the countries are looking for. What are the NATO new requirements on capabilities in different regions? It hasn’t been fully settled yet. If we knew that in a 10 to 15-year time period, of course the investment perspective would be much more different.

(04:47:43)
Looking at EU and Europe, of course what EU is doing is great in terms of initiatives, financial incentives to start having companies and countries collaborating. I support that 100%, but they don’t put any money in this. You can compare it to the pandemic, when you put like 700 billion euros in a fund or something to make companies work on that, and they did. But you put one and a half billion euro in something, which is important, you say. That is, sorry, peanuts. If we really are serious about this long-term, we have to show that, and then EU cannot guide what capabilities we need in Europe. That is a NATO responsibility, is my perspective. We have to be completely aligned. So member states, sovereign decisions, and being part of the alliance is important planning here and we need to understand the aggregated demand. But of course, EU can step up and put a huge amount of money in that fund, more than 100 billion euros, and then you will see things happening. That’s what I’d like to see.

So the rhetoric needs to be met by action and by resources. Minister Sikorski, we’ve heard a lot of rhetoric about the role of China. Europe is now fighting this battle to help Ukraine win against Russia, China has been a not insignificant player in this process. You heard the president last evening talk about that China can’t have it both ways. You had Prime Minister Modi of India in Russia earlier this week during the hospital attack, I believe. Should India get a pass too? What does it look like for some of these partners who are engaged in providing dramatic material support, especially for purchases of Russian energy? What should NATO be saying about that kind of extra-regional engagement?

I’ll solve the China in India problems for you in just a second, but let me just say that Napoleon Bonaparte, who is in our national anthem, said that a country that doesn’t feed its own army is doomed to feed a foreign one. In Poland, we have a somewhat similar saying that every country has an army, either your own or a foreign one. Your own is cheaper in the long run. We are spending over 4% of GDP on defense this year, we have the 14th biggest defense budget in the world, and next year we’ll go higher. We will do whatever it takes not to be a Russian colony again, irrespective of what anybody else does.

(04:50:50)
India, I think, sees its role as the leader of the non-aligned movement, traditional. And by buying Russian oil for rupees, I hope it is making President Putin realize that he’s lost his most lucrative market for his oil and gas, which is the biggest sanction that we have imposed. China is also driving a very hard bargain in terms of the gas price. China is respecting our thickest red line, namely is not supplying actual weapons or ammunition to Russia. Components, yes, dual goods, yes, UAVZS, but actually it’s selling them to both sides because I’ve personally seen Chinese drones on the Ukrainian side. China I think is getting a vessel on the cheap. My friend and mentor here in Washington, [inaudible 04:51:52], used to say that Russia’s choice is to be either an ally of the west or a vessel of China, but to be an ally, you have to respect some rules like not invading neighboring countries.

Details.

And if I were a Russian nationalist, I would be furious at Putin for putting Russia into this position vis-a-vis China. And I hope they recalculate in future because I think China is taking over the Russian market. They’re cut off from apps, so they’re now using Chinese apps, Chinese white goods, Chinese everything. I don’t think that’s good for Russia in the long run. And also, the two countries have a history of territorial claims, unequal treaty of Beijing of 1860, under which Russia got Outer Manchuria and the port of Vladivostok, which the Chinese now call Haishenwai. If I were a Russian general, I would be very concerned about all that.

Let’s pull back to some of the broader nature of the conflict. We’ve heard a lot about these gray zone attacks, those acts short of traditional warfare. We have commercial air traffic that has been grounded in Finland because of GPS jamming, we’ve seen massive waves of cyber attacks by Russia across Europe. Is NATO doing enough to respond to this dynamic? What should be done and what does success look like? How do you really wrap your arms around this? Because it feels like a drip, drip, drip on a national level, but collectively is generating dramatic losses.

Well, that’s a very good question, and I’d like to focus on some specific events that took place in my country and in some of neighboring countries. These are, we call them sabotage, but basically it’s arson against civilian objects in my country. And I’m not sure whether it can be called just hybrid events or gray zone event any longer because it’s quite clear a terrorist attack sponsored by a hostile neighboring country against one of the NATO countries. The problem is at this stage that when you’re saying this, you immediately have to say what you’re going to do about it.

(04:54:38)
And this is currently, and I’m happy that it’s being addressed right now in the summit. It is the first time that we are going to address this in that respect that we have to find an answer. And Putin has to be notified as we’re just not just seeing, we’re not just registering, but we are going to act. And in this, I’d like to remind that the only time that Article V was invoked was because of a terrorist attack., so we have to be very clear that we’ll make no definition. When it comes, when we’ll decide that it’s needed, we’ll do it and there will be an answer. So

Should these attacks be called terrorism?

If it is terrorism, definitely. Burning down a shopping mall and paying a person to do that and the money is coming from Russia, then yeah. How else can you call it?

They’re sending death squads that kill people. That’s definitely terrorism.

Yeah. And in our case, a Russian opposition representative in Vilnius was attacked. So it is clear, and I would not shy away from calling what it is, naming very clearly what we’re going to do about it because if we don’t do that, we have two problems. One is that Putin will escalate because every time we keep silent, he takes it as a weakness and pushes forward. The second thing is that countries will be forced to formulate their own strategy, because this is what our people in our countries will demand. You cannot just expect people just to be okay with something happening in your country. So therefore, this is one of the reasons why we’re in this alliance and we have to have a common answer to this.

Please.

One footnote. I expect the worst from Putin but on the GPS signal, we had a brilliant briefing at the Council of Baltic Sea States by a finished specialist. I’m no specialist, so correct me if I’m wrong, but what he told us is this, that the GPS signal is in fact very weak coming from satellites just above background, so it’s actually very easy to interfere with.

Yes. It’s a pretty dumb instrument, if you will.

And so if the Russians are protecting their own bases and assets, say around St. Petersburg, from these long-range Ukrainian strikes, which are sometimes very successful, that would have a spillover effect pretty widely and is not necessarily deliberate. And Ukraine, of course, does it too. So when I was last in Kharkiv delivering pickup trucks to the front last year and there was a Russian drone attack on Kharkiv, the Ukrainians would switch on GPS jamming in order to make that job more difficult, and your Google maps suddenly go crazy and you have no idea how disorienting it is.

Of course. Well, you raised a really important point, which is that there is an element of this where attribution becomes pretty fuzzy, and we see this in cyber too, which is part of what makes it effective. It’s damaging the system, but its origins may be unknown, and what I’m hearing is that naming it is critical. Is there some kind of proportional response element that needs to be clarified as well?

Well, I think that what wouldn’t work probably is that if every time Russia does something, we go against every single event because, and they’ve shown that, their capacity is vast and they can wreck havoc in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland ,wherever they want because with social media, they can reach very wide audiences and find people who would do their job for them in those countries. But we have to create a very clear deterrence for these sort of events so that then the next time they start planning, they know that there is an answer ready, prepared, signed on the table, and if you do this, this will be the answer.

(04:58:56)
And now currently, the easiest way, I’ve got this question so many times, what would you suggest? How do you manage this sort of escalation? Now we have a country that’s willing to manage escalation for us. They’re actually asking here in Washington today, “Allow us to strike deeper into Russian territory. We will manage your escalation for you.” They’re saying, “Look, no, no, not right now.” So I think that this is a mistake. If we cannot find any other reason, no other reason, no children’s hospital, no kindergarten, nothing for why to allow them to attack deeper into Russian territory, then at least this.

Absolutely.

If they attack us in any way that they think of, then less allow Ukrainians to attack them.

I understand that a final communique we’ll refer to Russia as a multi-domain threat to the alliance. We have to have an answer to them in every-

In every domain.

… one of those domains.

Yes. Folks, it’s time to start queuing up. I’ll take the first question from Anna Maria Boss. “Making money available for new equipment is one thing, but how are NATO countries going to find the necessary personnel when many people don’t want to serve?” Huge manpower issues even within Ukraine, how do you respond to that?

Well, in Poland, we are beginning to train the first Ukrainian brigade composed of volunteers from inside Poland. We have up to a million Ukrainians of both genders, and several thousands of them have already registered for their draft. And interestingly, many of them do want to serve and rotate their compatriots, but they say, “We don’t want to be thrown into the battle without being properly trained and equipped,” and we are going to do this for them and they will then be available to the Ukrainian government as a unit with the right to return to Poland after they’ve done their rotation. If every European country did that, Ukraine would have several brigades.

Yes. I want to take us to the future, but first go back just to this morning. We heard from General Cavoli on this stage that NATO’s transition from out of area operations, Afghanistan and the like, to fighting now on the European continent, reshaping those plans, thinking about those capabilities represents a really dramatic shift for the alliance and it’s taken years to get there. So in this moment now, what is the next big moment we should be planning for? What is the blindness that you feel we have now that we will look ahead to 25 years from now and think boy, we really missed that?

Well, the blindness would be, I’m not necessarily saying that it is there, is the expectation that somehow this Putin will stop. And I have a sense that it is in the room in some cases, this expectation that one day there will be negotiations and we’ll prove to Putin that he cannot continue. That if he does continue, then blah, blah, blah. We were unable to prove that in 2008, we are unable to prove that in 2014. I don’t think that we have any difference in our position to prove it now. That means that he will continue.

(05:02:39)
And and I’m returning back that this is the message to the industry. This is the message to the electorate in each and every country, and this is a message to all of us that look, we are in this for a long run and we have to prepare for this. This won’t be over in two years where we’ll be back into some pre-war reality with Ukraine calm, us calm, and again, all business as usual. That’s it. There’s no longer business as usual, or there is business as usual in our case, in the Baltic case, where we’ve seen Russia for what it is. Yes. So for us, it is quite a natural state of mind, but it has to be wider. If we’re expecting this, that is blindness. If we’re expecting this, this is a mistake.

Mr. Johansson and then I’ll come to you, Minister.

I would say that if you look, I agree, NATO is coming back to regional defense capabilities and many of the countries, of course, Sweden now being new kid on the block, are waiting eagerly to get our capability targets from NATO. Now, there are two port that I think I would like NATO to discuss more, and that is looking at security of supply as a capability target, meaning that NATO could decide where will we have in our geography capabilities to ramp up production or production of drones, or who should take that responsibility? Because today you give different capability targets. I would like to see that as you give them security supply type of capability targets. That would be great.

More coordination, more in line with-

More coordination on that in terms of setting up a regional defense again. Then of course, the interoperability question is huge. If we cannot come to a new architecture where there is a real multi-domain operation capability, which everyone in NATO can book up into, it will never work. So that’s also a big thing going forward to make that happen. Those are the two things I’m thinking about.

Minister?

Deterring Putin is a major job in Europe, and if we stay the course, I believe we can source him out in a couple of years. The emerging threat, I believe, is in Africa. The Wagner Group has now been renamed Africa Corps, and Africa Corps is trying to take Tobruk again. The Russians have no business in meddling in Libya and switching on and off the mass migration to try to destroy the European Union from within through the political process. This business of Russian mercenaries taking over goldmines and other African resources and then destabilizing Africa using their own money, this has to end. But I believe that this is a job that could be done by the European Union, that we don’t need to beg the United States to solve every problem for us. We should have a reinforced brigade operational as an EU rapid reaction capacity

… in a couple of years. And from what I hear from the Pentagon, that at last they see the logic of relieving the United States for other jobs in other theaters.

You made this argument in Foreign Policy magazine recently. This is the 5,000.

Up to 10.

Up to 10. And you think this could be operational within the next few years?

This is what we’ve pledged ourselves to do.

Yes.

We have a crisis center, we’ll soon have a joint operations command. We have a defense budget of the European Union, wonderfully called the European Peace Facility. And I believe in the new commission we need a defense commissioner to ramp up production mostly for the defense industry. Europe as Europe should not be completely helpless.

This brings me to another question, and then we’ll turn to you, ma’am. How confident are you in US leadership? And what does the US need to do to reinforce confidence in American commitment to European security?

I think that a lot has been done to reinsure that US is interested in European security. Now what we need to do is we need a common approach from Europeans and United States when it comes to how do you ensure that it stays stable, the end goal, and it’s the note that you hear throughout the conversation here. How do you make sure that Putin is no longer able to do and to repeat the things even in more brutal way? So this is yet what we need to achieve, and to find consensus. I don’t see any other way. I agree with Minister Sikorsky, what he says, that Europe has to play a stronger role on its own, and that’s definitely a fact, but Europe cannot act alone. And I don’t think that any other major conflict globally, wherever that would happen, that US could act alone. That means that we need these two pillars of transatlantic alliance working together either in Europe or anywhere else to support stability.

If you had to make the argument to the American people about why its investments in Ukraine matter for American security, Mr. Sikorsky, what would you say?

Well, I could make it crude and say that you’re selling us a lot of weapons made in the United States, but I would make it more strategically by saying that if Putin captured Ukraine and used the resources of Ukraine, both human and industrial to go further, then the price of deterring him would rise. And Ukrainians are doing our fight so that Americans don’t have to go to Europe in greater numbers. And also, if Ukraine wins, it’ll send a powerful signal to the far east that recovering what you might regard as a renegade province is much harder than you think, so don’t do it.

Ma’am, please give us your name and your affiliation.

Hi, thank you so much. Erin Osborne with Radio Free Europe. And we’ve heard from Seker Covoli and Secretary General Stoltenberg today that there will be a Ukrainian information exchange or joint training center in Poland, so a question to you, Minister Sikorski. Well, thank you all so much for being here, but to Minister Sikorski, how will that help deter Russian aggression and make sure that Ukraine is ready to stand on its own two feet? Thank you.

Well, I’m very pleased that JTEC, the Joint Analysis and Training Center, is coming to my hometown in Poland, which will be a second nature institution in Bydgoszcz. And we need it. It won’t be big, but it’s an analysis center. This is the most up-to-date war and it’s reevaluating many of our assumptions. The role of drones has been transformational in this war, and we need to study it and then apply the lessons. And I believe that the people who will be, in future it will won’t be us training the Ukrainians. Ukrainians will be teaching us.

Yes indeed.

And JTEC I hope will serve that.

Sir, I’ll come to you.

Yes, thank you. My name is Adam Dudash from Tilburg University. First of all, thank you for the insightful discussion. You’ve discussed the impact of Finnish and Swedish recession on the Baltic and its waters, but what about the high north? Does NATO need to reevaluate his strategy in the Arctic in light of melting ice cracks that are going to allow or are already allowing Russian naval assets to move more freely in these waters?

Yes, the melting arctic.

Well, Henry Kissinger once said that there is never a shortage of opinions in Poland, so let me give you my piece of wisdom on this. What a fool Putin is. With these Houthi attacks on the Red Sea, with the problems in the Suez, he would now be making a lot of money servicing the northern route, the shortest sea route from Europe to the far east, and instead he’s ruining his country.

Mr. Hanson, would you like to respond? And Ms. Saab has some technology that’s weather built.

I think we are moving in the direction of looking at much deeper collaboration between the Nordic country, so to say, in terms of how to at least have 24/7 coverage of what’s happening there in terms of airborne early warning and all that. So we are doing a lot in that area, and we do have the expertise on how to operate in that Arctic condition. So us coming into NATO, being the alliance, I think will mean a lot, and we’re already seeing movements in that direction. So that’s one of the capability targets that I hope that now we as countries in the Nordic will get. So yes, we will provide technology to do that.

We are almost at time. I want to turn to each of you for a quick final word. What do you want folks to take away? What should they remember from this summit in this moment? What do you think is the key message that you want them to know from you?

Very easy. Ukraine has to win.

Ukraine has to win.

NATO prevailed in the confrontation. With a much more powerful soviet union, we can prevail again.

Now, give Ukraine what they need to win the war, and the industry is there to support. And the industry needs to give and sell and do contracts with Ukraine directly. We cannot only do donations. But I’m prepared to give everything we have to make them win the war.

Please join me in thanking.

Thank you.

Thank you Jenna, thank you ministers for this fascinating, wide-ranging conversation focused on victory at the end. Looking forward to seeing you all. Don’t run too far. I saw a lot of determination, a lot of leadership in the last conversation and it was very well summed up by a statement of we’ll do whatever it takes not to be a Russian colony again. We are all having fun here, but we have another great panel coming, so please take your seats or set up conversations a little bit… Oh yes, this is great. Please take your seats, take your seats, because we will now focus on a specific issue of Russia’s ability to reconstitute its forces. And this conversation will be led by a good friend of mine, Henry Foy of Financial Times. Henry now serves in Brussels, but he has very good Polish roots, that’s why he’s my favorite FT journalist. Henry, the floor is yours.

Hi.

Are we good?

Yes, we’re good. Hello everyone. Good afternoon. It’s really nice to be here and enjoy your air conditioning. It’s tremendous to be out of that other room. We only have a short amount of time, so I’m going to get straight to it. We’re very lucky today to have a great panel, two formidable women. Baiba Braze is the foreign minister of Latvia and of course, the former ASG at NATO. Dara Massicot is the senior fellow at the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

(05:15:16)
We’re going to talk about Russian force reconstitution, which is a real tangible thing. It’s a real thing that’s happening. It’s a really important issue that I think doesn’t get enough coverage at the moment while we talk about more theoretical ideas. Baiba, you have a frontline view of what’s happening across the border. When you look at what Russia’s doing to reconstitute it’s armed forces two and a half years after the full scale invasion, what do you see? What are they doing differently now that they weren’t doing before February 2022?

I think the big picture is pretty clear, that there is not one element, one instrument of power in Russia that would not be orientated towards the war.

Right.

So Russia’s policy is war. And when we look at the military instrument of power, economic, politics, religion, education system, anything, it’s all about war. Media, public, anything. So in that respect, I think it’s on us to understand and to integrate that in our thinking and to really, and again, I will repeat what I said already yesterday at the dinner with our Ukrainian friends, is very clear that our problem is not support Ukraine. We’ll get there. Our problem is Russia, and this war policy of Russia is not going to get away. So it’s upon us to deal with that and to find a way how to degrade the military capability, economy and so on and so forth. Because ultimately, what the leaders have said is that the strategic objective would be returning Russia to peace, peaceful state. So if we put that in front of us, then of course in interim measures, whether it’s containment, constrainment, whatever we will find in the declaration using our instruments of power to achieve that objective. So that is ultimately, when we look at the big picture, is what is there. And then of course we are seeing that yes indeed currently we have quite a number of bases at the NATO borders are not back where they were before the war. Russians are fighting down in Ukraine. So in the short term, what we are saying is that there is no direct military threat to us, it’s true, but it doesn’t mean that Russia is not learning. Russia is learning and it is integrating its lessons in Ukraine, it is changing its ambition, it is returning to a different command structure, at least on the paper we know [inaudible 05:17:59]’s doctrine, the numbers, and so on and so forth. But for now, for the short term, there is no direct military threat to the allies and helping Ukraine, strengthening our own deterrent defense, degrading Russia’s capability is something that we just need to do.

Dara, you see bandied around five to seven years, end of the decade, as a rough idea for when Russia might be able to get back up to a level where it was before. But are we missing the point when we think about numbers, we should actually be thinking about structure capabilities? How’s Russia going about it differently now?

So reconstitution is a little bit of the numbers and there’s also some qualitative aspects that I think we should discuss. So just for everyone, reconstitution is restoring a force to a sufficient level of combat capability. It’s not just counting tanks coming off the line, it’s also about personnel, it’s also about proficiency in what they can do. So it’s not how fast will Russia restore to 2022 levels, and if we only count the tanks in the artillery, we’re missing some of the story. We should also be asking ourselves, not asking ourselves, are they reconstitute or are they not? The question is reconstitute to what? For another attack on Ukraine? For an attack on NATO? For a power projection into Libya? There are different requirements.

(05:19:21)
But if we were to talk about the timelines, I think about three aspects. If we look at the equipment, based on their loss rate right now, based on the choices that they’ve chosen and the capacity that they have right now, I think seven to eight years is a good median estimate. It changes a little bit depending on if you’re talking about tanks, which is longer. Armored vehicles may be a little bit shorter. The personnel question, yes, the lines are stable because they’re using convicts, they’re using foreign fighters. After the war they’re going to have some unresolved questions for recruiting and retention.

(05:19:51)
And then there’s the issue of proficiency and learning and that’s happening right now, but it’s very much for survivability and lethality. The longer proficiency is something we’ll know later. But I think last point, we should not assume that they’re going to go back to what they were before the war. It’s going to be different. They have changed, Ukraine has changed. We have all changed in various ways.

Yeah. It’s interesting, do you agree with that assessment, seven to eight years? Is that what?

Different services have different assessments. There are those who look at the shorter term. Again, as Dara rightly says, it depends what you look at as a point of reference. They won’t be going back to the spring of ’22, it’ll be a different force. So it can be three, it can be five, it can be seven depending what you take as an estimate, but again, it does depend on the success of Ukraine on the battlefield, and that depends on us.

So the reason we care of course is we have to be able to defend against what they might be able to do. We keep hearing that the war being fought in Ukraine is not the 21st century war we all thought it would be, it’s more like a 20th century war. Is Russia preparing for both in the future and are we doing the same? Can we? Is it possible that NATO can prepare for both the 20th century war and the 21st century war? How do we balance those two?

Well, it’s both the first world war, second world war and the future war because what we are seeing, I think it was the chair of military committee who said it’s both modern blood and bits and bots on the battlefield as we see it. So we see the use of most modern future technology and our companies know it very well because quite a bit of modern tech, dual use tech, whether it’s drones or targeting or munitions and so on and so forth are provided by our companies and they are really working very closely with our Ukrainian friends and partners on that.

(05:21:46)
So again, integrating that into our future thinking I think is crucially important. There is no past battlefield at all if you take that into account, so you can have visuals that look like the past, but they will all be equipped with very modern tech. So the electronic warfare has been taken to a new level, lots of capabilities related to that have been taken to a new level. Private sector involvement, open source involvement, it’s a totally different war, and that is quite likely what we have to look at depending on the threats that we see.

(05:22:29)
So for that, I think we might need some adjustments among the allies. I don’t think we are as flexible and as able and agile as Ukrainians. Still so many bureaucratic structures, procedures, standard operating procedures that we have, that we have to look at that also. So it’s not just about the stuff, about the data, about the connections that we have, but also about the procedures and processes and TDPs, as you said.

That’s really interesting because I remember people talking about whether Russia was learning those lessons. Dara, have you seen examples of that, that Russia has actually become more flexible now in terms of how it deploys forces?

It is. So we’ve seen them make a lot of unexpected mistakes in the first six months of the war, and then that learning phase kicked in. So I think something that we need to keep in mind, the Russians and the Ukrainians are coping with this every day, is just the pervasiveness of reconnaissance. Neither side can safely mass forces and attack each other. It’s very difficult to even do rotations at this point, they’re being disrupted. We are talking about food and water being delivered by drone.

(05:23:42)
And the nature of warfare is at least in the ground, domain is changing so rapidly. Electronic warfare is something I think we’re still grappling with. NATO equipment works very well. It works very well at keeping crew alive, the precision is amazing, but it is very susceptible to electronic warfare jamming, and we’re all learning that, our enemies are learning that about us, and we have to move forward from that.

I wanted to pick up on that, this idea that Russia’s got a pretty good look at a lot of the weaponry that we’re using because giving it to Ukraine to use, but we’re also getting a pretty good look at Russia’s weaponry. When you had to assess the level of who’s learned the most, where would you say we are, to both of you? Maybe Dara, if you want to start.

Sure. So from a strategic intelligence level, I think that Ukraine and NATO far and away have the advantage just in terms of our understanding of intentions and how things are playing out in the battlefield. That advantage, just like all intelligence work, is not guaranteed. You have to fight to maintain it, you have to fight for that access. Tactically, both Ukraine and Russia, they’re learning about each other and the cycles of adaptation and countermeasures are compressing, they’re very rapid right now. And just like we as NATO are benefiting from what Ukraine is showing us and teaching us, we have to think about the other side as well. Russia’s allies and their partners are learning from them, and this is now a currency that Russia has to give to Iran, China, North Korea, that learning of our equipment.

Exactly.

When people, observers are looking at this, I don’t know that there’s any real surprises here that Russian equipment is not very good at keeping its crews alive, but it is quite rugged and quite durable and it’s inexpensive. And so for people looking for that kind of capability, they like what they see.

Do you agree with that, Baiba?

Yes and no. But I want to pick on a different point, that actually there is quite a bit we can do, that we have done, and we need to do, and that relates to Russia’s ability to sustain the warfare. So again, there are different angles to that, Russia its pushing its propaganda that its economy is doing very well, that it’ll last and so on, so forth. And when you look and scratch of that propaganda, it’s actually not. And that does depend on us because Russia is financing the war from the budget. The income in the budget has significantly decreased its own taxes, rationale taxes, the tax base is much narrower.

(05:26:12)
They depend on the oil largely for the income in the budget and other exports. And that is indeed upon us, how to deal with the oil cap, how to lower it, how to implement it, how to make it more efficient, plus all the other enabling capacities that it gets for its missiles. We saw the Cage 101. It was FT that puts a nice table out on the components in that missile, largely western, so there are elements across the board that we can actually really address, both the income in the budget, the ability to sustain the war, but also the components on the battlefield, what it fights. Yes, China is trying to replace it, but again, there are limits also to that.

And in terms of this reconstitution, are we seeing, Baiba mentioned it there, this reliance on Iran, China, other countries supplying weapons to Russia, or parts I should say? No confirmation that China has sent weapons. Is that changing the nature of the way the Russian military industrial complex works or is it still so tiny amounts that there is still the same mega lift that it always used to be? How is that changing how they build weapons?

The Russian defense industrial base has different quirks to it, to put it lightly. So they had to basically purchase a capability from Iran and now they’re building it in Russia and they’re scaling it up with respect to the Shahed drones. There’s still many aspects about it that do remain mired somewhat in the Soviet past, but I think about what could change from the pathway that they’re on right now that would cause them to reconstitute faster. Right now Russia is choosing to maximize the factories that it has, it is not constructing new ones to refurbish tanks and artillery and things like that. That could change if that was important enough to Putin, but right now he’s managing a lot of different economic considerations and labor shortage situations.

Sorry, so Russia has not built a single new arms factory since.

With the exception of drones. If we’re talking about tanks, artillery, things like that, they are working triple shifts around the clock to maximize what they can put out. And the estimates are anywhere from 200 new tanks a month to upwards of 600-ish armored vehicles of various types. But most of the equipment going into Ukraine right now, 75% of it is refurbished Soviet era materials being pulled out of bases in Siberia, and they’re burning through that stockpile very quickly.

Wow. By the way, we hear a lot about rhetoric from the Kremlin about every time the EU or NATO does something they deem to be escalatory, they’ll reposition troops near to Finland or reposition troops near to the Baltic States. Do you see that happening in real time or is this all just total bluff?

You mean the Russian troops or troops our side?

Correct, the Russian troops.

It’s largely empty. I mean, it’s open source information, so I’m not really revealing any secrets here, but-

Feel free to reveal secrets if you want.

… to our border and further down at a helicopter base, Scof, Luga. It’s largely maintenance of facilities and some minor stuff. There is no increase, there is no significant operations. That can change. Again, it doesn’t require. Luga is 200 kilometers from our borders with the armored vehicles tanks 50 kilometers per hour that if they want to fill it up and get to the border, that’s four hours. So we are always on the watch out there together with the allies and the investments that NATO has done with the new military strategy. And here I would like to pay the highest respect to our military colleagues who were the ones initiating and turning around the whole NATOs military instrument of power and creating the new military strategy and the DDA, what Secure was talking today about, the defense plans, the exercises, the command structure, everything.

(05:30:25)
So that allows us to be pretty sure that not only troops in place that we have now, but also the ability to have that situational awareness on the oral threat, and if necessary to have those rapid reaction forces are there to deter, and if necessary, defend. So our task is to ensure that we don’t relax, but also that we apply our instruments of power to make sure that Russia does not succeed, because at the end it’s about NATO security. It’s not something abstract. Peace is not an abstract term for us.

Well, that’s what I wanted to ask and we’re running out of time, but there’s obviously a difference between capability and intent, and we talk about seven to eight years time to build up capability. Are there ways, Dara, to look at the way Russia is reconstituting and trying to derive intent?

Well, if we are talking about replacement rates for armored equipment, right now that is not sufficient to attack NATO in a very large way, but it could be sufficient to make another attempt at Ukraine. And this is the pathway that Russia’s on, and I want us all to be aware that probably within the next six months, maybe early 2025, the Russians are going to announce their 10-year rearmament program. And they’re signaling that they want a larger army and they’re signaling that they want more drones and more first person munitions. There’s things that they can do to compress that timeline if they’re willing to take domestic risks. So I think we should hold seven to eight years because nothing ever quite goes right in Russia even when they want it to, but there are choices that they can make if they wanted to take that risk and go faster.

(05:32:04)
So I think that to end on a philosophical point if I may, this is a quote from a long time ago but I think about it often right now, is that no man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same man. And I think about that with the Russians and I think about that with NATO. We’re not the same that we were two years ago, Ukraine’s not the same, Russia is not the same. We’ve learned so much about each other and we need to update some of our assumptions and our war plans and our procurement and our intelligence and our focus.

And the policy actions that we do. You reside in Brussels. The packages at the EUs that we do on restrictive measures, so-called sanctions on Russia, take miserably long. The negotiations at the groups that people have to go through is just pathetic, I’m sorry, really. The 26 ships that we designated now carrying Russian oil, and I commend both your journalists who have done a fabulous job in bringing it out, the whole issue on the oil shipments that are insecure but also violating the oil cap, all the rules, but also all the other work done by open source researchers on that.

(05:33:22)
So we just need to get our act together and we can actually make a difference. We are a border country. We see in our statistics everything that is going out and in through our borders. We see how the sanctioned goods decrease to Russia and increase proportionately to Belarus. That’s why we did the sanctions packages to Belarus. Not enough. Not enough. So there is more that we can do, it’s about our security. And as far as long as I’m foreign minister, my colleagues, foreign ministers, knows that I will be at it with them and it’s not going to stop.

There we go. It’s a great mess. Thank you so much, we’ve run out of time, and there are sadly no questions from the audience on this session. But thank you both to Dara and to Baiba. It was brilliant.

And thank you to the work your colleagues do.

Pleasure.

I mean, all you matter. You matter. You matter.

We all love each other. Great. Have a good forum. Shall we?

Henry. Thank you Henry, thank you panelists. Another fascinating conversation with the closing questions about the capabilities which we know Russia will have versus the intent. Someone from my side of the world could remind everyone that Putin gave us very clear list of demands in the winter of 2021, what he wants to achieve. So I think we have also some notion of his intent. But to explore these issues in more details, I now would love to invite Luke Coffey from the Hudson Institute for conversation both with the president of Slovakia and then for the panel. Luke, the floor is yours.

Thank you. Good afternoon, and for those of you watching online in Europe, good evening. Welcome to this event on NATO’s policy towards Russia at the NATO Washington Summit Public Forum. My name is Luke Coffey and I’m a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Russia’s large scale invasion of Ukraine changed the geopolitical landscape in the transatlantic community in a way not seen since the second World War. In its 2022 strategic concept, NATO described Russia as, and I quote, the most significant and direct threat to the alliance. To discuss NATO’s approach to Russia, we have a very distinguished panel. However, before that, to kick us off with a scene setter, we are honored to have his excellency, President Peter Pellegrini, the sixth president of the Slovak Republic, here to offer some opening remarks. So please join me in welcoming President Pellegrini to the stage. Thank you so much.

Thank you. Thank you very much. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is really my pleasure to be here with you today, shortly after my inauguration, on the occasion of the Washington Summit that takes place in the changing, rather unpredictable and thus increasingly dangerous world, as we commemorate the 75 years of this most successful defense alliance in our history. I am proud that Slovakia has been a reliable ally for the past 20 years. And we will be so in the years to come for the sake of security of our nations, of our neighbors, our continent and the world. Our historical experience taught us that there is no better option to guarantee our safe place, security, economic and social development than this alliance. The engine of our success has been and remains as a commitment to democracy, freedom, and human rights with a clear understanding where we belong. Our present and future is in and with NATO and European Union.

(05:37:56)
Strong transatlantic bonds built on a fair share by the European allies is the best collective approach to preserve peace and deter any aggression. My country’s strategic interest has always been based on full respect for international law and rules, shared values and norms, commitments and obligations. In February 2022, following the aggression by Russia, which we have condemned as a clear violation of the UN charter and international law, we stood by Ukraine. Our citizens opened their homes to people escaping Ukraine and many of them remained on our soil. Ukraine must survive and preserve its own national identity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. And as any other country, Ukraine must have the right to choose its own security arrangements. We will never agree with change of borders by force. For us in the NATO eastern flank, an eventual collapse of Ukraine would have a very negative consequences.

(05:39:12)
Without any Hollywood announcement, Slovakia provides significant and stable support to Ukraine in many ways. We do it through NATO and European Union, but also bilaterally. We still belong to the biggest contributors of assistance to Ukraine, calculated per capita. As the only country, we have organized joint meetings of the Slovak and Ukrainian governments and developed a joint action plan of cooperative projects. And we just agreed a few days ago to have soon yet another meeting of the two governments on the Ukrainian soil. We are one of the most important providers of electricity to Ukraine, so crucial

… crucial after the continuous attacks on its vital infrastructure. And as our electricity production doesn’t depend on wind or sun, our supplies can and will continue, also during the next winter. On top of supplies of non-lethal equipment like demining machines, we have increased production of our own defense industry, including ammunition or howitzers. Also, for the need of Ukraine. To endure our collective support, we need the Slovak and the European public on our side. What are the lessons learned out of the recent European elections? How can we better prepare for the forthcoming elections, including here in the United States in this regard? We need to invest more into wide international understanding that we are not trying to disintegrate Russia, but to change its behavior to the one that fully respects its obligation under the UN Charter and international law and its OSCE commitments. And this will be also a powerful message also to G20 and BRICS members.

(05:41:18)
Let me make clear, supporting peace, ladies and gentlemen, does not mean supporting the aggressor. It is up to Ukraine to decide on this, but a just, a sustainable peace acceptable to Ukraine, is badly needed. And a just and sustainable peace can only be a peace based on international law. I wish to stress, to safeguard peace shattered by the Russian aggression, we, the alliance, must work on all options to be ready for all possible scenarios. Until peace can return to Europe, the alliance must be up to the task and responsibilities. It has to be the guarantor of peace, yet remaining through to its purpose of the defensive alliance.

(05:42:14)
I am convinced the answer to today’s topic, NATO’s Russia challenge, lies with us. The future of security on our continent and our own deterrence and defense will be built on our own strength, on the ability to project power to deter any potential opponent to test our resolve. But we must be honest to ourselves, there would probably be only few allies meeting the 2% GDP goal if there was no war in Ukraine. The Article 5, combined with the strength of the United States, made us more relaxed on our commitments in the past. We have largely ignored the fact it is not only Article 5, but also Article 3 we need to invest in to be able to defend our countries until we can execute a collective action. This is where we need to deliver more.

(05:43:17)
Imagine Russia would not attack Ukraine, but one of our allies. The question is, were we really ready for the collective defense at that moment? We have done a lot in the meantime, an unprecedented strengthening of our collective defense, but it is enough. There are still gaps such as air and missile defense that we must fill in to make our defense up to the task, especially in the eastern flank.

(05:43:50)
We have here several defense ministers, and I wish to ask them, is our defense industry ready to ramp up the production? If we speak about air defense, we may have plans, but how realistic are they? Can we build it in five years or 10 or more? How much time does it takes to produce, for example, to produce and sell five Patriot systems? Russia has managed to restart its defense industry. How much time do we need? It is evident, two and a half years have not been enough. We need to turn plans into reality, as our opponents do.

(05:44:36)
And let us also not forget about the new, what are the lesson learned from this war? Drones, electronic warfare, keeping the technological edge and the hybrid warfare that accompany this aggression. Are we already implementing this aggression? Are we already implementing these lessons into our plans and our forces? We have been meeting the 2% commitment already, but will this be enough? Is there a true political will to do the necessary?

(05:45:12)
All those question may be sensitive, uncomfortable, and absolutely necessary, and we need to find the answers and deliver on them, including in Europe, to send a strong signal to the United States that we are paying our bills and we are a solid ally. And, ladies and gentlemen, we should not shy away from the sensitive and maybe unpopular ones, including how to restore peace in Europe, how to make everything possible to have, again, peace in Europe. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Great. Well, again, good afternoon. We are now here with our very distinguished panelists to take this conversation another step forward to assess what the Russian threat is, what NATO needs to do about it, and how we can best be prepared to do this in the 21st century. To do this, we have immediately to my left, your right, Andris Sprūds, the Minister of National Defense for Latvia. To his side, we have the Right Honorable John Healey MP, Secretary of State for Defense for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. And last but certainly not least, we have Lieutenant General (Retired) Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army Europe and Distinguished Fellow with GLOBSEC.

(05:46:59)
I’m going to turn to Secretary Healey first. You’ve been the Secretary of State for Defense since July 5th, five days. I’m told you haven’t slept yet. No, I’m kidding.

That’s true.

In this time you have already been to Ukraine, which I want to touch on that a bit later, but you’ve also … You’re here now at the 75th Anniversary NATO Summit, is truly hitting the ground running.

(05:47:37)
I want to ask you first though about Russia and the new Labour government in the UK. How will the new government deal with the challenges and threats posed by Russia? And I know you don’t want to get ahead of any defense review, but Prime Minister Starmer said that a review will be carried out. Can you give us a flavor on what you think or how you think Russia might be factored into the thinking with this strategic review?

Thank you. I’m slightly awestruck actually to be in this chamber with such an audience because the collective experience and knowledge in front of me is so much greater than my own. So bear with me, but thank you for inviting me. I’m really grateful.

(05:48:27)
The Russian threat, well, for those of you from the US, your president said at the NAC about an hour ago that Russia is our greatest threat that we face as an alliance. It has its sharpest, most immediate challenge in Ukraine. My first priority, the first priority of this summit and center stage, is Ukraine. It’s my first priority, was why I went in my second full day in the job to Odessa and spent the afternoon with President Zelensky and his team.

(05:49:06)
But the Russian threat isn’t just directed at Ukraine. You know this very well. In fact, we all, in our own countries, have had warnings of this. We’ve all had knowledge of this and experience of this for a number of years. So we face wider Russian aggression directed at our own democracies, from hybrid attacks to threats in the High North.

(05:49:33)
And I think this is why this NATO summit in many ways is so important at this time. This is the first time that we’ve had a NATO summit meeting with 32 members, which I think shows that NATO is bigger, stronger, more united than ever before. We meet also with the involvement of Ukraine and the IP4, which I think shows that as NATO nations, we stand together in support of Ukraine. And it shows also I think for me, the growing indivisibility between security and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic and security and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

(05:50:18)
And then finally I suppose, for the UK, the new UK government at this summit, you’ll hear Keir Starmer, you’ll hear David Lammy as our foreign secretary, I’m afraid you’ll hear from me as well as the defense secretary, that we will be a government that sets out determined to fulfill our NATO obligations, to secure our role as the leading European nation in NATO, and to make Britain democracies’ most reliable ally across the world. So to link that to your I think third question in your set of questions, which was-

My third question and my one question.

We will follow up this NATO summit by launching a strategic defense review. That’s the way that we get to grips with the threats that we face, the capabilities in the UK that we’ve got, the real state of our forces, the state of our alliances, and for all of us as governments also the state of the public finances we’ve got to work with. That will be launched by the Prime Minister shortly after the summit. We’ll do that at pace, we’ll do that properly, but that will be the way that we then set out the approach that we’ll take to defense and security of the UK and our alliances for the years beyond that. And it will have a NATO-first commitment right at the heart of it.

Thank you. Mr. Sprūds, a conversation about Russia at a NATO summit would not be appropriate if we did not include the important voice from the Baltic region. So that’s why I’m very grateful that you’ve taken time out of your schedule to come here to speak to us today.

(05:52:15)
Now for years, of course the Baltic States, including various Latvian governments, have been warning the rest of the alliance about the threats that Russia poses to the transatlantic region. But it wasn’t until 2014 that the alliance started to get serious about this, and frankly, it wasn’t until February of 2022 that we started to see real action. Once again, the Baltics were right. We should be listening to the Baltics more.

(05:52:45)
Looking at it from your point of view in your region of Europe, how do you assess the threat that Russia poses, not only to the region, but also to the alliance as a whole, and what should NATO do about this?

Thank you so much. Thank you for having me in I think a very symbolic anniversary summit, and also here in the public forum. I’ve been participating in public forums for years, and a think tank representative, community representative, now I switch sides, but of course I’m always very glad and grateful to come back and of course discuss those very important issues for all of us.

(05:53:22)
Yes, indeed, the Baltic voice is important, and thank you for including the Baltic voice as well in this discussion. We’ve been advocating taking a strict position in Russia for years. We ourselves have been experiencing hybrid attacks from Russia for decades, so that’s why the threat has been quite clear what we’re facing. We are facing Russia, the country, which can change in every five years, in every 10 years dramatically, but nothing changes in 100 years. So we pretty much see the same Russia. It’s expansionist, it’s imperialist, regardless what kind of regime we are dealing with.

(05:54:06)
On the one hand we might say that it is Putin’s Russia, but we might also say that it’s Russia’s Putin. Basically it represents those long-term resentments, ambitions, the expansionist moods, what we have and seen experienced for years. That’s why certainly we have to have a mindset that we have to deal with Russia, which is imperialistic and expansionist in a long-term perspective. So the long-term perspective approach, the mindset, is important. And I think we are there because we start always with a basis of how we think about, how we analyze, how we assess. I think the threat assessment absolutely is the basis how we built our policies up.

(05:54:56)
Additionally, to this, apart from mindset, I would say another layer of mindset is that we should approach Russia, and I would say not only Russia, we should approach the challenging transformative world, also from positions of strengths. Let’s not underestimate ourselves. Let’s not underestimate the strengths of our unity. Let’s not underestimate the strengths of our democracies. Let’s not underestimate the strengths what we can also put on a battlefield if we need to. We are the most successful collective defense alliance in the history, and I can fully agree with those assessments. But that’s why, of course, understanding and believing and also acting from positions of strengths with Russia absolutely is important.

(05:55:40)
What we should do practically, of course that’s also what NATO Summit is about, invest. And it’s about political investment, it’s about financial investment, it’s about investment, of course, in our armed forces, in our military industrial capacity, it’s about societal resilience. So of course we open also other domains as well, hybrid security, cyber security. Being resilient against illegal immigration, being resilient against any incidents against critical infrastructure. What we experience also in the Baltic Sea region, also in the Baltic countries. So that’s why of course these 360-degree approach is pretty much also should be there how we deal with strengthening ourselves, our own capacities, but of course also how we deal with Russia.

(05:56:26)
When we deal with Russia, I would say the words like containment, constraining, countering, contesting, that we should of course constrain what Russia can do militarily. That it is not able to attack its neighbors, it’s not able to undermine international rules-based order, that we are able also to contest globally. So when contest not militarily, but also politically, also in terms of information, also in terms of strategic communication. Because at the very end it’s also about the global fight for the hearts and minds of the people, so the strategic communication absolutely here is a must as well. And it’s not only with Russia, it’s also with other authoritarian states which actually support Russia in its aggressive and assertive resentment to geopolitics, and aggressive geopolitics.

(05:57:16)
And of course, also the countering, so we should be active how we deal with those things. It’s not just about being passive and reacting, but also basically moving out and clearly defining those strategies. And last, but not least, of course, now supporting Ukraine. Then now the international rules-based orders being defended in Ukraine, the values of democracy, the values of freedom are being defended in Ukraine. So that’s why of course support for Ukraine, imposing strategic defeat on Russia in Ukraine is a must, what we should achieve and what we should aspire. And we should once more not underestimate that we cannot do it, we can do it. Thank you.

Thank you, absolutely. Yeah, well done. For all the think tankers out there, there is hope. Some that you’re sitting out there, you might be right here.

But don’t worry, I will move back at some point.

General Hodges, you bring a unique perspective to this debate. You took command of US Army Europe soon after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. You were instrumental in leading some of the very early efforts to shore up deterrence along the eastern flank, and for starting the early days of the training and the assisting of the Ukrainian armed forces soon after that illegal annexation of Crimea.

(05:58:42)
But now you’re a civilian. You view this perhaps differently from the outside, so to speak. You’re not constrained as you would be being an official. So can you tell us your candid view about what the Russia threat is and what NATO should be doing about it?

Russia is at war with us and we need to wake up. We need to acknowledge that they are at war with us. It may not be T-72s or Sukhois that are striking NATO countries, but they are absolutely at war. The GPS jamming, the sabotage, the interference in our elections, complete disregard for international law. Selling oil on unseaworthy, unsafe unregistered ships that they sell to India and China, which gives them money to keep buying ammunition and drones from North Korea and Iran, that then they use to kill innocent Ukrainians.

(05:59:39)
They are absolutely a war with us, but yet somehow we have a lot of people, including in this city, that are like, “Oh, Russia, it’s a great power. It would be terrible if the regime collapsed and they might use a nuclear weapon.” And so our policy towards Russia seems to be avoid escalation, when the policy should be defeat Russia. Help Ukraine defeat Russia, knock them back.

(06:00:04)
And that does not require one single American soldier, British soldier, Latvian soldier. Not one, not one, but it does require the political will of my president, all the other heads of state and government of the alliance, to say this is not about helping Ukraine. Our policy should be protecting our strategic interest, which is to defeat Russia, make them live within their own borders, otherwise it’s absolutely … We’re going to have a continuation, exactly what the minister said, three years from now. We’ll think we’ll have a peace, they know that we’ll lose interest, and will be back at it.

Absolutely. Secretary of State Healey, I mentioned you just returned from Ukraine, I think on day two you were in Ukraine, you met with President Zelensky in Odessa. Anyone who’s been to Odessa recently knows that it’s a very difficult time in the city with the airstrikes and the impact on the electrical grid and just day-to-day life for the Ukrainians that live there.

(06:01:10)
Prime Minister Starmer has made it clear that Britain’s leading support for Ukraine will continue. And in fact, I believe you said that you’re going to look at ways to expedite existing support and commitments to Ukraine to try to get that material to the front lines faster. Can you tell us a little bit about this and why coming into government you believe that a Ukrainian victory is important to the United Kingdom?

General Hodges just said, “Look, we need to view Ukraine in our own strategic interest.” He’s a general, he’s got that strategic insight. I’m a politician. I’d put it plainly because I don’t think our public and our people fully and properly understand what’s at stake here.

(06:02:02)
And so some of the arguments I try to make in the UK are, especially on the campaign trail which we’ve just finished, defense of the UK starts with Ukraine. And that’s true for us, it’s true for most of the European nations. It’s relevant also to America’s interest as well. And that’s the case because we know that if Putin prevails in Ukraine he’s not going to stop there, that’s even before we get … The truth that General Hodges just said, that Putin, without deploying the military against us, is already at war with all of our countries.

(06:02:48)
There’s a wider importance as well because if Russia does prevail, then it says to other big countries around the world, “You’ve got the scope too to try and redraw international boundaries by force,” which reinforces the instability, and the danger to us all. So fundamentally, that’s a public argument we need to make more forcefully. Certainly in my country, that may be true in other parts of the alliance as well.

(06:03:22)
For a UK perspective, we’ve been bipartisan from the start. It was just five weeks before Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that David Lammy, now Foreign Secretary of the UK, and I, together went to Kyiv and we were discussing the risk then of the threat of the invasion. And we told them then, if Putin invades, the UK will stand united with Ukraine. And I’m proud that that’s the case in my country. I’m proud of our government, the previous government, not ours now, and the leadership that you’ve mentioned on Ukraine. And Keir Starmer and I are dedicated to developing that.

(06:04:13)
So that’s one of the reasons that I wanted to be out in Ukraine at the first opportunity having been appointed. And I was able to say to President Zelensky two days in and his team there, first of all, we will speed up the delivery of the equipment and military aid that’s already been pledged by the UK. We will do that, we will complete that delivery within 100 days. So the big Rishi Sunak pledge in April, the largest UK package to date at that time, will be fully delivered within a 100 days with a Starmer guarantee.

(06:04:51)
The second is that I was able to require a immediate stock check of what we could offer, and we’ve been able also to provide an extra package of equipment, the sort of kit that they’re using day-to-day and need in battle. I can give you some of the details. It’s not big, but it’s an important sign I think for the Ukrainians that the UK commitment continues, and there may be a change of government, but there’ll be no change in the UK’s determination to stand with Ukraine or confront Russian aggression or indeed pursue Putin for his war crimes. The third is, I said to him we will now work with Ukraine and we’ll work with allies to work out how we can step up what we do to support. My view is that we need to see this in a much bigger picture, the sort of picture you were drawing of the Russian aggression. Because too often we’re focusing on the immediate military battle, the immediate military equipment needs, when if Ukraine’s hand is going to be strengthened by us as allies it isn’t just the military help that we can provide, it’s the political, diplomatic, economic support and pressure that we can put in Putin. And if Ukraine’s going to be in a position to judge that the time may be right to pause the fighting and try and find some settlement, it needs to have the strongest possible hand in the strongest possible position, and that’s our responsibility.

(06:06:23)
And that finally, I think is why, again, this NATO summit is so important. The unanimity behind very significant long-term multi-year commitments to support Ukraine, not just militarily but also industrially, is so important. And if we do what we say, if we deliver what we promise, then we will be playing a big part in making sure that Putin in the end does not win.

I think that is music to our ears, hearing that in 100 days this equipment will be expedited, as very much needed, of course. Keeping on the theme of Ukraine, Minister, I’ve heard you say a number of times and just five minutes ago, say that Russia needs to receive a strategic defeat in Ukraine. Can you explain what that is? What is that strategic defeat, what does it look like?

Yes, of course. Again, one step back, we must remember what are the consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and what are the consequences of how the war goes and what will be the outcome of it. The consequences that if Ukraine loses, it’s undermining the international rules-based order, it’s undermining our credibility, it’s undermining our security. So I think the stakes are high, and this should be always remembered.

(06:07:55)
Which also means that we must have a very clear strategic goal what we want to achieve together with Ukraine. We, as a transatlantic community of democracies of like-minded, what is the strategic goal? And strategic goal is not Ukraine not losing the war, the strategic goal is Ukraine winning the war and imposing strategic defeat on Russia.

(06:08:18)
What does it mean? I think it’s again clear, it’s restoring territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is taking those war criminals accountable for their crimes, what just we’ve seen a few days ago as well with brutal attacks against the children and innocent civilians. It’s also about financial repercussions, using the frozen assets. And at the very end, strategically it’s also about Ukraine becoming the 33rd member of NATO, and it will become the 33rd member of NATO.

(06:08:53)
How to achieve it? Of course, keeping the strategic ambition in mind, yes, we have to make also practical steps. Practical steps providing military support. And I think the financial commitments here also shows how seriously we take it. Now Latvia, both the countries, we allocated the committed zero 25% of GDP for military support to Ukraine. It is quite a considerable amount. It is for Latvian military or defense budget almost 10% of our military defense budget goes in supporting Ukraine, and I think we should still consider even providing more.

(06:09:35)
It is also, of course, coordinating all those different activities what we have. We have a lot of activities. We are co-leading together with UK a drone coalition, and I think it’s excellent coalition. There are other capability coalitions. What we realize that we should also take steps faster, a more [inaudible 06:09:57] approach. Well, but we are also democracies with our procedures, so unfortunately sometimes things take longer than they expect.

(06:10:04)
Last but not least, we should be ready to support Ukraine as long as it takes, being ready that the conflict must be or can be protracted as well. So be ready for it and support Ukraine. And I think the strategic goal of imposing strategic defeat on Russia will be quite realistic.

Absolutely. General Hodges, you’ve been one of the most outspoken supporters of assisting Ukraine, arming Ukraine. You were leading-

Obviously not very compelling.

Well, we have seen some progress on your focus regarding the long-range strikes, ATACMS, missiles, trying to isolate the Crimean Peninsula. We’ve seen steps in the right direction. We haven’t gone as far as I think many of us would like. We haven’t gone as quickly as we would like.

(06:10:54)
But practically speaking, what does NATO, and you can talk about the US or individual countries inside the alliance, what do we need to be doing more of and faster to help Ukraine win on the battlefield?

If President Biden would come out tonight when he’s hosting all his heads of state and government guests at dinner, if he would say, “Ladies and gentlemen, it is the policy of the United States, it is our strategic objective that Ukraine defeats Russia. And we’re going to do every damn thing that they need so that they can do it.” Not this empty, “We’re with you for as long as it takes,” but, “We’re going to do everything they need.,” That right there would be the seismic change that would lead to Ukraine actually winning, and that would be a crushing strategic defeat for the Kremlin. So far, they’ve been confident that the American president would not do that. The German Bundeskanzler would never do that, and unfortunately a few other heads of state and government.

(06:11:51)
The first step is to say, “That’s our objective.” If you don’t even say that’s the objective, then you end up with, I must say, really bad policy decisions such as, “Okay, well, finally, after two years, you can have ATACMs, but you cannot use them against airfields from which murderous attacks are emanating against Ukrainian cities.” That’s terrible policy. Or this drip, drip, drip, drip. Everything that we are providing Ukraine right now … You can see why I’m retired. Everything that Ukraine has right now from the United States, with the exception of Javelin, was a no for the first months of the war. I mean, you can remember, Luke, there was a time-

Absolutely.

… where, “We shouldn’t provide Stinger because what will happen if a Ukrainian soldier shoots down a Russian helicopter with an American Stinger, they might use a nuclear weapon.” I mean, that was the thinking. And so we’ve had this taken two and a half years and tens of thousands of lives to get to where we finally are, and we’re still underestimating Ukraine’s ability to integrate new equipment. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, make it our policy. This is our objective, strategic objective. And I mean, look, eight months when nothing came from the United States. Eight months Russia achieved nothing. All they could do is continue attacking Ukrainian cities. So they could not even exploit for over half a year, despite having other advantages, they’d lack the ability to knock Ukraine out of the war. They can’t do it.

(06:13:27)
Imagine if we had been providing everything that was needed with an aim to helping Ukraine actually win and if we used all of our economic tools. I cannot understand why they are still able to get ammunition from North Korea, drones from Iran, parts from China, and your ships loaded with oil going through the Baltic Sea, which we control. Black Sea, we should still be able to stop it but unfortunately we’re not able to do that. And that oil goes to India and China. You saw the

… the graph that came out the other day, the top 20 countries that are buying Russian oil, India, China, but also 10 European countries, including Germany, still buying Russian oil. Unbelievable. And that money is what pays for that Kinzhal missile that slammed into that children’s hospital, so we’re not serious. We have to declare that we want Ukraine to win because it’s in our interest.

Yeah, it comes down to we have to start wanting Ukraine to win more than we just hope that Russia might lose this war, and we need to start acting that way. Now these gentlemen have very busy schedules. They rushed over here from the NAC and they’re going to be rushing directly back to the NAC as this ends, and I’m very mindful of the time and I don’t want to make their schedules delayed. So with that, please join me in thanking our three panelists.

Ministers, thank you very much. I must say that this perhaps was one of my favorite sessions because it was a very clear-eyed assessment of the threat from Russia, also an assessment of the long-term nature of the threat, and of course, we could count on General Ben Hodges to give us very specific ideas of how to deal with this threat. Right now, if you are watching us online, stay tuned for a couple interviews with NATO veterans as well as a conversation with Senator Roger Wicker. And for those of you here, please join us for well-deserved coffee break. See you back here in half an hour. See you.

Good afternoon. We were asked today to come and share some perspectives from the ground level as veterans of NATO operations. And although we can only share our limited perspective from our own personal experience, we want to do this in honor of all of those who have served on NATO operations and sacrificed over 75 years providing security for our one billion population.

(06:16:36)
My name is Lieutenant Colonel Melanie Lake. I am a combat engineering officer in the Canadian Armed forces. I had the privilege of serving three tours in Afghanistan with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force and most recently commanded Canada’s training mission in Ukraine Operation Unifier just prior to the full-scale invasion. I currently work with Canada’s Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security and I’m really honored to be here today with my distinguished colleague, Mario. Mario, can you introduce yourself?

Sure. Thank you. My name is Mario Marquez. I’m a retired Marine sergeant major with 31 years of service. I first entered Marine Corps at the end of the Cold War, so 1989, and I served all the way through the end of December of 2020 when I retired and I stayed here in the Washington, D.C. area. I currently serve as the American Legion’s National Security Director, America’s largest veteran service organization. My time in the Marine Corps took me to places like Kosovo under NATO forces. I also served four tours in Iraq. I served in two earthquakes in Japan, 1995 and 2011, and I also served in the Middle East under central command and I retired out of III Marine Expeditionary Force in the Pacific.

(06:17:48)
I’d like to close out my remarks by saying that I am grateful to the alliance for invoking Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks when I was a young 31-year-old Marine in solidarity for the United States, and on behalf of our nation, we are grateful for that and we will never forget. So thank you. I’m glad to be here for this opportunity.

It’s interesting that you start with 9/11. I was a young fourth-year officer cadet at our Royal Military College in my last year on that terrible morning when we watched as aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In those moments, I mean, all of us, all we could think was, how do we help our American partners in this time when they’re under attack? And I had a very similar feeling on the 24th of February of 2022 watching as Russia launched its full-scale invasion to Ukraine, into Ukraine, where I had been just four months earlier, feeling that we need to do everything we can to help our Ukrainian partners as they defend their democracy and ours and to enable victory and defeat of this unprovoked aggression.

(06:18:57)
I was struck really recently by these images of President Zelensky meeting with a US veteran on the shores of Normandy during the 80th anniversary of D-Day and seeing them recognize that commonality in their fights against evil and oppression and the courage needed to face it, and face it decisively. And I think we’re reminded of how critical that is right now after seeing this horrible attack on Monday against the children’s hospital in Kyiv.

(06:19:29)
As soldiers in the alliance, I think that those of us at ground level, we’ve always understood and accepted that great sacrifices might be required of us in the defense of our values, our democracies, protecting other nations’ rights to self-determination and deterring others who might be aggressors. And we stand very willing, very willing to do that and ready do that. Finding ways to contribute for me when things go wrong in the world gives me a way to counter some of that frustration and anger that I think many young people are feeling right now watching world events. Mario, I know you have immense operational experience. What have you learned on your many tours working with allies and partners?

Thank you, Melanie, for that. I talked about my time in Kosovo, and that was my first exposure to NATO in a formal capacity. I was the operations chief for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and we quickly moved from our ships into Greece, Macedonia and we began operating across southern and southeastern Kosovo. Our German, Austrian and Swiss partners swiftly integrated us. They brought us on board and we seamlessly began operations as if we had been working together for years. And I will never forget that because we worked out so well initially that we began to do other things such as interoperability, training or staff engagements, marksmanship training, other types of humanitarian work that we were not planned for. And so what that did is the camaraderie and the bond that we build with our partners from the alliance and enabled us to just service the people of Kosovo much better, and I took a lot from that.

(06:21:21)
I think the second thing, and probably the most vivid memories that I remember, is being in a convoy, in many convoys, and riding in the front seat, and we would share the roads with civilians. Well, why would we share roads with civilians? Because the country was mined. There was mines everywhere. So the civilians would put their lives at risk by walking on the road between these big vehicles and feared stepping off into the dirt because not every minefield was marked. And I never forgot those images. It was powerful and it taught me to be compassionate and understanding. And then we would go into villages and we would provide humanitarian aid and the mothers would look at us with fear but hope in their eyes that there would be peace and stability in their future, and the children would smile with kindness and just hope that they would also maybe grow up in a better place one day. That’s what I took away. It made me a better Marine, it made me a better service member and human, and I employ all of that today, all of the time.

That’s impressive, Mario. It was actually seeing that mine threat in the theaters like where you were operating that inspired me to become a combat engineer. I joined the military not long after the Ottawa Treaty was signed to ban anti-personnel landmines, and that was something I knew I really wanted to be a part of.

(06:22:38)
On my first tour in Afghanistan, I felt like I was able to do something that mattered at a local level when we were able to destroy some landmines, clear some of the explosive threat in some small villages south of Kabul. I have a lot of positive and difficult memories from three tours in Afghanistan. The camaraderie and that connection with the local population certainly stands as a positive, and it was remarkable seeing how we work together as allies, that allies and partners, that reassuring feeling of having air support come online, and it didn’t matter what country it was from-

That’s right.

… you knew that aircraft had your back. ISAF and the war in Afghanistan, that was a really defining period for soldiers of my generation, but also had a profound impact on Canadian society as we were losing soldiers in combat.

(06:23:35)
I did see there that NATO, as an organization, that we have this ability to collectively learn. And one important example I think was the evolution of our approach to mitigation of civilian harm. I personally struggled with memories of the fear on young children’s faces that we encountered during some of the night raids that I participated in on suspected insurgent compounds, and I think through these difficult lessons and experiences, we realized that protection of civilians went beyond this need to adhere to the laws of armed conflict, that it was a strategic imperative, really core to our mission success, but also central to our legitimacy and our credibility as responsible military forces, and I think these are lessons that we can draw upon as we look next year to revamp our policy on protection of civilians. I think this is also really important as we’re shifting our focus to deterrence and defense on our own territory amongst our own populations.

(06:24:43)
Seeing the images of Bucha and Irpin, understanding what even temporary occupation under Russian forces looks like, I think that we have to reconsider some of these military concepts in defense like trading space for time. When Kabul fell to the Taliban in 2021, I was in Ukraine and I found it really powerful seeing how the veteran community and serving members around the world mobilized for those who mattered in that really dark time. So many of us who served there were left questioning, what was this all for? And it was Afghan women who gave me the clearest answer on this. They said to me that, “This gave us 20 years to pursue our education, get jobs, be a part of public life here, and we’ve seen what our country could be and we’re not willing to go give up on that.” RAnd right now, they are the fiercest resistance that the Taliban is facing both at home and in exile around the world, and I think we really need to continue that support to them in this fight.

(06:25:49)
Now pivoting back to you, Mario, this week, the Secretary General published an op-ed that said, “NATO’s main purpose is not to fight war but to prevent it.” And our experience taught us that the best way to maintain peace is to be prepared for war, that credible deterrence and strong defense. How do we get there?

Sure. First I’d like to comment on your last segment you just spoke of. I’m really proud to hear of your experience. It brings back a lot of memories. It’s healing, it’s soothing to know that other people have witnessed many of the things that veterans from across the alliance have seen and felt and suffered and worked through.

(06:26:23)
To answer your question, for me, I’ve heard a lot of fantastic briefs not only during the summit and the forum but throughout, and I think it’s important to discuss all those things. They are all matters of urgency. But my advice and my recommendation to every leader that is listening today, both partner nations and the alliance, is to invest in your non-commissioned officer corps. Because without that mid-level leadership who is competent, able to make tough decisions in a decentralized manner, carry out commander’s intent, whether it’s in humanitarian missions or combat, those are the critical aspects of any successful military organization or alliance. You will never achieve your full aim without a competent non-commissioned officer corps.

I couldn’t agree with you more. A big part of the training we were doing in Ukraine was focused on the professionalization of the NCO corps, and to them, that was a really important part of their journey, of their reforms towards NATO interoperability. I think, I mean, those senior NCOs have showed us without a doubt the value of that on the battlefield. From Canada’s experience, as we stood up our enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia, which is now growing to brigade with 14 countries all working together, we’re working through many of the complexities that come with interoperability. I mean, there’s a lot of challenging technical aspects like, how do you get your radios to talk? How do you work through language barriers? How do you get your resupply? How do you resupply each other when you have all different systems? But we’re doing a lot of work on this right now, figuring out how we really work together effectively and getting through those challenges so that we can work together effectively in crisis.

(06:28:04)
And although there are many challenges, there’s so much strength that comes in this many countries working together united by a common purpose. It was a young master corporal on my training mission in Ukraine when we were training the fourth Rapid Reaction Brigade who, he had just arrived and we were training and he said to me, “Ma’am, I will go to war with these soldiers tomorrow.” And I looked around and all of our soldiers were wearing Ukrainian flags on their arms, all the Ukrainians had Canadian flags. And it struck me that the foundations of interoperability, they truly start at that most basic level with human relationships, friendships, bonds, and that understanding that comes from working side by side.

(06:28:47)
One final note on this. I think that another lesson from is around civil society and citizens, how they’re integrated with their military, and I think there’s a ton that we can learn around civil military cooperation in total defense from Ukraine to strengthen our own resilience, and a shout-out to the incredible role that women in civil society are playing to that. We’re down to two minutes. Do you have any final thoughts?

I’m just blessed to be by your side. I really am. Look, for the leaders out there, the alliance, the partners, and even other people watching this throughout the world: we need to do a better job about incorporating our veterans from military to civilian life. If we start doing that, our veterans will be more productive citizens. We have a powerful voice. We impact and influence policy and decision-making at the highest levels. We need to do a better job about that globally. There’s this thing called a military recruiting crisis. It’s not an America problem, it’s a global problem. And until the world starts taking care of veterans and including and showing them the value, including veterans and showing the world the value of our service, then we’re going to continue to have those problems. Thank you.

I totally agree. And I think it’s the thousands of small acts every day interlinked together that create security. This is all about people and our connections.

(06:30:04)
As a final thought, I think that our values within NATO are actually our strategic advantage. Our human rights, liberty and freedom, gender equality, these things are actually our best weapons and the biggest threat that we pose to authoritarian regimes, the fact that everyday life for our citizens is better in democracies, that governments are accountable to their people and that our citizens are invested in their countries. But in order to defend these values, we have to live up to them. We have to be willing to defend them and fight for them even when that’s most difficult, but I think that’s when we’re truly at our best. We’re seeing more conflicts around the world than at any period in my lifetime with devastating consequences for civilians I believe that with this alliance, by courageously living up to our own values and defending them, we have the ability to change this, to be a force that stands in the starkest contrast and opposition to authoritarianism and the defense of freedom.

(06:31:02)
Thank you so much on behalf of both of us for this time today. We truly honor the service of all those who came before us, those who continue to serve, and we never forget those who gave the ultimate sacrifice for all of us. Thank you.

Welcome to the NATO Public Forum. I’m John Walters, President, CEO of Hudson Institute. I am very pleased to be joined by United States Senator Roger Wicker of Mississippi. He sits on the Committee on Armed Services in the United States Senate, and most of all, I think he has been the author of this report, Peace Through Strength, which is an analysis of the needs of the United States military, how to meet those needs with actual budget numbers. So we’re not talking about talk, we’re talking about actual dollars and building capacity. Thank you for being with us.

Thank you, John. Glad to be with you.

Thank you for your work. You released this report on how to maintain 21st-century peace through strength. Can you give us a little idea about the key parts of this plan, because you’re the author?

Well, the key parts of this plan are getting us back to 5% of gross domestic product, just like Ronald Reagan did. During the Reagan years, we stood the Soviet Union down by saying we’re going to be strong enough that nobody’s going to take us on. That’s called peace through strength. That was Reagan beginning in 1981. So my plan is modern-day peace through strength. And really it’s based on everything we see in the news, but also the specific testimony that we’ve gotten from defense leaders and from people who actually are tasked within the Pentagon and within the administration to keep us safe and get the job done.

As a think tank head, I read a lot of reports, government and so forth. A lot of them are not interesting. They’re not as specific. They’re not very general. I urge everybody, read this report. It’s online. It gives you detailed analysis of weaknesses and how to fix them, which is most important.

Thank you very much. Well, we did put a lot into it, and I have to credit my staff for working through the minutiae, but these are specific plans to build our Navy up where it should be, to rebuild our shrinking Air Force, and also to get us where we need to be on our munitions. There’s so much that needs to be done. Of course, this interview is taking place in connection with the NATO Public Forum, so we need to work with our allies and the great alliance we’ve had.

What do you see as the biggest shortfalls and where do we need to make up deficits? The nice thing about the report I think is also it does near-term needs and threats and building a base for longer term.

Well, the principal shortfalls are in the Indo-Pacific, but also, this report asks us to recognize, and excuse me for my voice, that we are facing an axis of aggression between Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. And in regard to what we are being challenged by and what’s going on in Ukraine, for example, it’s Russia on the attack, but there’s no question Iran is helping, North Korea is even sending assistance to Russia, and certainly Xi Jinping is doing everything he can to keep the West tied down in Ukraine so he can continue to build up in the Indo-Pacific.

This NATO summit is on the backdrop of burden-sharing discussions, burden-sharing and what allies actually owe each other and how they work as allies, and not as dependents or protectorates, and that’s a big debate in the United States. You’ve been a part of that debate. Can you say a little bit about how you think… where we stand? Are we making progress on burden-sharing? How do we deal with this, given the threat environment, it becomes more critical?

It is absolutely important, essential that our NATO allies keep their promise that they made several years ago at a NATO conference that each country would spend at least 2% of their gross domestic product on national defense. Now, at first there were only a handful, really single digits of all the NATO members, and that was indeed troubling. Now we’re up in the 20s, but there are some notable exceptions, and quite frankly, the leadership of the Senate, me included, met with Prime Minister Trudeau, our northern neighbor and one of our closest allies yesterday, and we pointedly mentioned that they are one of the laggards when it comes to putting in money on their national defense so they can help the alliance. It’s only about 1.5% in Canada.

(06:41:24)
I can report to you that Prime Minister Trudeau said that they were going to unveil a plan later on this week, and perhaps it will come Thursday, Friday, but before the end of the week, to get Canada to 2% of GDP within a decade. Within a decade. So that will be helpful. Clearly, we’re making progress. Clearly not, we’re not where we need to be, but it is, I would have to say, the strong rhetoric, perhaps hyperbole on the part of President Trump during his term of office and during the course of this election has been a wake-up call for our NATO allies. And so they’re headed in the right direction. A lot more needs to be done.

Since the context here allows speaking to the American people as never before, and a reminder, what is the importance of NATO as you see it? You have to look at the appropriations for the US military, you have to work with our allies, but you see the overall threat situation. When you look at that, how do you tell your constituents what the importance of NATO is?

Well, the question is, who will lead the world in the rest of the 21st century? Will it be dictatorships like Iran, Russia, Communist China, North Korea, or will it be the great democracies of the West and people like them, like we’re beginning to form alliances with in the Indo-Pacific, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines even, and Australia. So someone is going to lead in the world. Will it be the dictatorships of Putin and Xi Jinping or will it be the United States and our allies? And that will determine what kind of world we live in.

(06:43:25)
I don’t want to turn this country over and the rest of the century over to my grandchildren in a world that is ruled by dictators. Democracies don’t invade their neighbors. Look around. The countries that threaten their neighbors and try to change the borders by violent aggression and armed forces are the dictatorships of this world. And chief among them are this war criminal named Vladimir Putin. Absolutely, if Russia were a democracy, they’d be tending to their own business, seeking to internationally recognize borders that the rest of the world has agreed to abide by. Since we’ve had NATO, we’ve had a relatively peaceful Europe, and that has meant a relatively peaceful Atlantic alliance, including the United States and Canada.

Yeah, I think people forget that the combined GDP of America and its European allies, when they worry about being swamped by the economic power of China and others, we dwarf them out as far as you can see. We’d have to let them not wreck that.

True, except for this: China is increasing their defense spending dramatically, and that’s why we have this report. We are being overtaken by the dictatorships of this world. They don’t have to spend money on school lunches, on social spending, on retirement programs. We need to be absolutely mindful of what the witnesses in this year, last year and the year before have told us, and they tell us this is the most dangerous era that we have faced in half a century or more. And so, yes, while we have the economic might, we’re not spending a big enough portion of it on defending our future and defending freedom and democracy.

Well, I want to thank you again for this plan.

Well, John, thank you so much and-

… and for your leadership.

… thanks for the Hudson Institute. We really appreciate it.

You’re welcome. Thank you, sir.

I hope that you all enjoyed a quick coffee break. I feel like people are still trickling back in. Please now join me in welcoming to the stage David Shullman for our next session, the Axis of Upheaval.

Okay. Well, welcome back, everyone. Welcome to our panel on the Axis of Upheaval. We’ve had a bit of a last-minute change in moderation, so I will be acting both as moderator and panelist. What we’re here to discuss over the next 40 minutes or so is, we’ve discussed over the last couple of days of course NATO’s successes in recent years and expansion, but it’s critically important that we discuss as well what NATO adversaries are doing, obviously Russia, we’ve talked a lot about China, but also the role of Iran and North Korea and what that means for the NATO alliance, what that means for the United States and for Europe.

(06:47:14)
Just as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revitalized cooperation and cohesion among the NATO allies, it’s also spurred a lot more cohesion among Russia and its backers. We’ve seen the consequences of that in cooperation that’s on full display in Ukraine, where the support Russia has received from China and Iran and North Korea has enabled it to sustain its warfighting machine, and we’ve talked a lot about that over the last couple of days, but that’s really just the tip of the iceberg. We see their relations deepening in a whole range of different domains. They’re increasing trade, all of these countries. Russia has become China’s largest supplier of crude oil, trade between China and Russia hit a high mark last year, Moscow is now Iran’s largest source of foreign investment, and they’re finding ways to

Work around the Western financial system in critical ways that undermine US and NATO foreign policy tools, including de-dollarization. And of course, they’re also deepening military cooperation. And we see China, and Iran, and Russia having held naval exercises just recently in the Gulf of Oman and having done that now three years in a row. And they’re also looking to expand their access to other countries. So, this is a really critical domain that we need to dig into further. And we have some excellent panelists here today to discuss it from a variety of different angles. I’m happy to be joined by Jon Alterman, who’s a senior vice president and holds the Brzezinski chair in global security and geo-strategy and is director of the Middle East Program at CSIS. And we have Benedetta Berti who serves as head of policy planning in the office of the Secretary General at NATO.

(06:48:52)
So maybe why don’t we get started and just jump in, maybe start with you, Jon, and give us a sense of where you think Iran is when they think about this axis that we’re talking about between North Korea, and China, Russia, and Iran. How do they view it? How is it of utility to them and where are maybe their concerns going forward?

Thanks very much, David, and thanks to all of you for coming. Very important set of discussions this week in Washington. It seems to me that Iran feels very isolated in the world and looks and talks about how much it shares in common with Russia and China. And one of the principal things that shares in common is it hates that countries aligned with the United States have non-kinetic means of coercion. What they would like to do is say, “If you want to stop us doing something, we’ll fight you.” And that’s a high threshold, and they have lots of asymmetrical tools to use, and that’s the space they want to be in. When you start talking about sanctions, when you start talking about diplomatic action from an Iranian perspective, that makes Iran more isolated, weaker, and they love the fact that they feel that both China and Russia share an interest in undermining the ability of the United States and its allies to use those non-kinetic tools.

(06:50:16)
So they try to build that sense of commonality. They try to use China and Russia to defend them in international fora. I think the rub is that oftentimes the Iranians understand just how weak they are vis-a-vis China and Russia. China represents about 30% of Iranian trade. Iran represents less than 1% of Chinese trade. And the Chinese have a much bigger game to play and they use Iran. And Russia has had a long and often difficult relationship with Iran. It’s changed with the Ukraine war and with sending drones and other materiel, there is a tactical sense of partnership. But deep down, Iran aspires to be a great power. It knows it’s not a great power. And the larger powers, Russia and China, find Iran disposable in a way the Iranians wish they can change and they can’t.

(06:51:24)
So they try to build the common practice of undermining sanctions, undermining the kinds of collective action that the US and its allies work on while they desperately try to build leverage against these great powers who on the one hand they need and the other hand consistently disrespect Iran and use Iran to further their own goals vis-a-vis the United States, the West, and others.

I think great points. And I think the fact that you started, or, at least, centralized your comments around Iran’s desire for this access to fight US centrality in the global system and to push back on the United States generally. That’s very similar to, I think, China’s view of this relationship specifically with Russia, but also with Iran and with North Korea.

There is this concern about US hegemony. And they feel that if you reduce international affairs to how do we undermine US hegemony, not only do the Russians, and the Chinese, and the Iranians share a view, but then you start to bring in this whole sense of a global south, a very diverse and disaggregated group of people. But if you can put it in terms of undermining US hegemony, those are the sort of common terms that Iran finds very, very close alignment with Russia and China on.

Yeah. I mean, from the China side, there is definitely a value in terms of more of the security space in terms of how to push back on the United States in terms of relationship with Russia. That has bolstered China militarily in terms of the trade that China’s gotten from Russia for years for defense equipment. But in addition to that, the deepening of military exercises with Russia that has been of great value to China, a PLA that has not had a lot of operational experience, more joint training with Russia, that has been of great value. And there’s the potential for deepening collaboration on cyber, on military AI, on intelligence, of course, and on potentially getting even more in the way of advanced technology for defense that China wants from Russia. So there’s that aspect.

(06:53:42)
And then, there’s also the aspect of China hoping that the US, and NATO, and other allies having to worry about a potential contingency where you have to worry about China, but not just China, also Russia, also North Korea and Iran undertaking actions at the same time that complicates planning for the Pentagon and for other defense planners. That, I think, is of great value to China in this security space. And then, more broadly, this sense, and we’ve discussed it at the summit over the last couple of days, that you can’t divide Asia from Europe, right? So, I think, in Beijing there is a sense that if Russia were to succeed in what it’s been trying to do with its brutal invasion of Ukraine, if the NATO alliance and the United States were to fail in pushing back on that, that would have fundamental consequences for any kind of contingency in Asia over Taiwan, over the South China Sea. And China could be more confident that there would not be a robust response from the alliance.

And there’s a very important way in which Asian countries look at how the world deals with Iran and thinks that that’s how the world will deal with Asia contingency. Asian countries have profound energy security interests in the Middle East. And therefore, the extent to which you can work through allies and partners and provide security, that gives you security not just for Europe, not just in the Middle East, but it extends to helping provide security in Asia.

Benedetta, I want to come to you. So how does, from your perspective, NATO, the alliance, the members view this emerging axis in terms of the interests and how it affects the NATO alliance itself?

Yeah. Well, I would probably agree with a lot of the points that have already been made, but maybe just to start framing the discussion. I think in the 2022 strategic concept, so a couple of years ago, NATO already recognized what it defined as the growing strategic alignment between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Now that trend remains very much part and parcel on how we look at the security environment today. But I would say that as of 2024, the scale and scope and just intensity of that relationship has grown in a way that wasn’t perhaps forecasted into 2022 strategic concept. And now really we’re looking much more at what does concerted action and increasing strategic alignment by the PRC, the Russian Federation, Iran, and the DPRK look like, and what’s the impact on your Atlantic security. To make a long story short, I think you need to look no further than Ukraine to see how this all crystallizes and comes together.

(06:56:32)
And that’s one of the reasons why we talk about Ukraine about as a test, both for the resilience of Ukraine itself, but also for the future of European security and global security at large. And in terms of what are their concerns, what are the trends that we pick up in Ukraine, and what are we learning about it. Well, first of all, we see these actors amplifying each other hostile narrative in a very systematic way. And that’s something that, of course, it’s part of the knowing that the information space is really important. When we talk about deterrence and defense in a 21st century, that’s an issue of concern. Another issue of concern is that, of course, we see these four actors working together to try to minimize the impact of our foreign policy tools. For example, to hold Russia accountable and to try to constrain its war machine, including by circumventing sanctions.

(06:57:23)
So that’s, of course, a very significant issue of concern, especially today, where we know that the PRC is the greatest, the largest enabler of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine today. And really key to how the Russian Federation has reconstituted its military instrument of power and why that’s working out at a faster pace than anticipated. So, that reciprocal enablement is, of course, a very strong issue of concern. That’s not just an issue between the PRC and Russia itself. We also see, as was mentioned, the Iranians supporting the Russian Federation through their own technology, but Iran gets something in return. And the same is true for the DPRK. Just as important, I think, I would highlight the trend of authoritarian learning, mutual learning. And I think you have to look no further than the recent example from the Iranian strikes against Israel, in which they used a large combined swarm of drones and missiles in a way that very much resembles what the Russians are doing in the Ukrainian theater.

(06:58:29)
So these two theaters operationally are more and more linked, and that’s a cause for concern. The more these actors slur from each other, the more, of course, we have to be concerned. And then, at the macro level, there is what we defined already in 2022 as a pushback against the rules-based international order and the attempt to promote an alternative authoritarian model of global governance. So, all of this together, I think, are just one of the many reasons why what’s happening in Ukraine and the stakes are so incredibly high. And the concern, of course, is the more the Putin’s war of aggression is seen as succeeding in Ukraine, the more these actors will be emboldened. And that’s why for Ukraine to prevail is for us, one of the most important, if not the most important test for the future stability of all the Euro-Atlantic space.

(06:59:18)
In terms of what we’re learning, I’ll say very much agree with you in terms of this highlights the interconnectedness between the different theaters and the fact that we might wish to separate, but our adversaries are not going to play that game. And they’re rather driven by opportunism or strategic logic. They’re going to try to create strategic dilemmas simultaneously for us and we need to prepare for that. Maybe 30 seconds just to say that since you asked me to highlight the concerns, I did that. But I also want to say that these actors working together are yes, a reason for concern. And yes, their strategic intent and actions are growingly convergent, but they do not have anything that resembles the type of alliance that we have with NATO in terms of institutional, in terms of force structure, in terms of military might, economic heft. So we need to also remember that.

(07:00:15)
And when we work together with our Indo-Pacific partner, then we’re talking about 60% of the world’s GDP and military might. So yes, it’s a cause for concern. No, it’s not a cause for panic. Yes, it’s a cause to double down on the rebuilding of our military instrument of power and on that cross-theater solidarity that we see at play this week in Washington.

That’s such an important point.

If I could just add to that point, one of the interesting things about the way that these countries engage with each other is they’re constantly calibrating how close should we be? How far can we be? There isn’t this sense of common purpose. They have some shared strategic goals, they have a whole number of goals that don’t overlap. And I think there’s more agility within how these countries are really willing to sell each other out all the time because they are in it for themselves. And one of the things that’s different, listening to Benedetta talk about how the alliance works, we are in it together. And there’s a way in which this isn’t an alliance, this is a pickup game.

(07:01:24)
They can help each other. They sometimes pass to each other. They sometimes don’t pass to each other. They sometimes let him take the hit. And it just operates in a different way. And I think is difficult for us. But I think we also need to recognize that for all that these countries are together, you can also pick them apart on different issues. And certainly with the Iran nuclear program, there was a time when both Russia and China decided it’s actually constructive to try to put the Iran nuclear program in a box, and that time has changed. But there are times when you can bring these countries together and work with them.

I agree with that. I think I want to make clear, though, from at least my perspective of where China sees this axis and especially the Russia relationship, that while it may be, at some level, a marriage of convenience and based upon alignment of interests that are potentially temporary. There is such a deep and, I think, abiding level of congruence on how they’re looking at what they’re trying to achieve. Not only in light of undermining the United States and undermining NATO. But I think also, and this comes back to what Benedetta was saying, the fundamental drive to transform the current global order is really at the heart of what China wants to do in the next 5, 10, 15 years. And for them, that is essential to China establishing itself really as the central economic and technological player globally. And these actors are really central to that because, and we’ve discussed it a little bit already, China as the benefactor for Russia, and for Iran, and for North Korea and the destabilizing actions that they’re taking.

(07:03:12)
China’s playing a neat trick now where they are supporting these different actors as basically agents of war, and chaos, and upheaval. And then, a day later coming out and saying, “Okay, now we’re going to play the role of being the peacemaker. We’re going to play the role of being the stabilizer. We’re going to propose a 12-point peace plan for this conflict that we have helped to create by continuing to support Putin’s war machine.” And then beyond that, also proposing, “Okay, now we have ideas for a common future of shared destiny for mankind.” The Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, these grand ideas which are ideological at their root that are meant to fundamentally transform the order and put China at the center of it. And it’s not really possible without partnership from these other destabilizing actors that can make everyone stand back and say, “Oh, this order is unstable. It’s not working anymore.” And the United States can’t do what it used to be able to do in terms of preserving the peace.

And it seems to be that fundamental to the Chinese notion of world order is world order is predicated on bilateral relationships between states where China is stronger than every bilateral partner except for the United States. And as they look at a map of the world, that’s a nice way to be. I think it is important not to underestimate how much distrust is between the Chinese and the Russians, how much disdain the Chinese have for the Russians. I’ve had some really interesting conversations with some Chinese about the Russians are drunk, and they don’t work hard, and they’re not serious, and the place is falling apart. I mean, the Chinese are happy to jump all over how inept the Russians are.

(07:04:57)
The Russians are useful, but let the Russians take a hit from having a confrontation with the West. The Chinese will trade, the Chinese will build win-win solutions. They’ll build these big international conferences. Let the Russians do the aggression part. And ultimately, I think as there’s a huge power disparity between the Chinese and the Iranians, there’s a huge power disparity between the Chinese and the Russians. And I would bet the Chinese don’t lose a single opportunity to remind the Russians. And the Russians don’t go a single day wishing they didn’t have more leverage against the Chinese, desperate for leverage against the Chinese, and knowing the Chinese would sell them down the river in a New York minute if it became convenient.

If I may, I would just point out that over the last year or so compared to, let’s say, the Vilnius Summit, where we had a similar discussion about where we were in terms of the relationship between the PRC and the Russian Federation, things have changed and they’ve changed quite substantially. And there is now a past dependency. The level of PRC support for Russia’s war machine to enable, and energize, and allow to reconstitute its defense and technological industrial base is now the most critical enabler. And that is really important to underline. So it is really, we may have very intellectual discussion about whether we want to call this a marriage of convenience, a strategic alignment. The reality is today Russia is able to fight its war in Ukraine and reconstitute its military instrument of power at the speed and scale it can because of the provision of dual use goods from China.

(07:06:47)
And I think that’s an important point that we are discussing this week. And one of the issues that you will hear leaders discuss is exactly what should be our response. Is it reasonable to have a country that, on the one hand, wants to trade, wants to be treated like a normal and respectable member of the international order. And on the other hand, it is their financing a largest full scale war of aggression, illegal war of aggression that we’ve seen in generations. And perhaps, there has to be some type of signaling that it’s difficult to have your cake and eat it, and consequences must come to table.

You went exactly to where I wanted to go, which is this is this notion of the forcing China to choose as Secretary General and others have said. Because China is different in many ways, but in this particular way, different from the other three countries that we’re talking about in the sense that they do want to portray themselves as a force for stability and peace as a responsible player. And they do want to be able to continue to have productive relations with Europe and with developed countries for economic reasons and for other reasons. Unlike, arguably, but correct me if I’m wrong, Iran, and Russia, and North Korea, which are quite content to accept that there’s not going to be any deep integration with the West or benefit from engagement with the Europeans. And the question, I think, is can China get away with that? Will there be costs to China trying to have it both ways?

The last Iranian reformist president, Mohammed Khatami, had this big idea of the dialogue of civilizations. And there was a big Iranian idea that, in many ways, maybe planted some of the seeds of some of the Chinese global initiatives and all these things. You now have a new reformist president in Iran. I don’t think the reformist president in Iran actually has any power to make the kinds of changes the rest of the world cares about. But might there be language coming out of Iran that would try to imitate that to move into some of that space of, let’s just talk about this while acting in deeply malign ways. But I think we might see Iran pick up some of the language as part of its recent political impact. Whether that matters either for China or for Iran, I don’t know. I don’t know if you think that any of these global Chinese initiatives are meaningful at all, either practically or even in terms of information, whether anybody takes them seriously.

I think people do and should take them seriously, even if they are fluff language that you have to dig into if you want to try to get to, okay, what is the meat of this? What does this mean? Understanding how these kinds of phrases and these kinds of initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative have shaped China’s grand strategy and foreign policy approach, especially in developing countries over the last 10 years. I think we make a mistake if we dismiss them as meaningless. Because, I think, China is now in the way that it has for years referenced the Belt and Road Initiative in most of its engagements with countries across the developing world as well as in the developed world. It’s now referencing the Global Security Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, et cetera. And it also underscores the fact that what China’s trying to achieve here is ideological, right?

(07:10:18)
I mean, it is a transformation of the order, which to one that is, China at the center, not US-led. But inherent in that is what China puts forward in these initiatives, which is no focus on individual rights, of course, or democracy, a focus on sovereignty, which of course, we know that China itself violates by its support for Russia. But all these other principles that are baked into a notion that is countries such as Europe and the United States should not be lecturing other countries on how they run their own systems. And one system authoritarian is just as legitimate as another. So in that sense, I think we should take them seriously.

And certainly there’s enthusiasm in the Middle East, not only in Iran, but in the Gulf, and Egypt, and elsewhere about Belt and Road and what it means for them. And I think it’s important as we think about the alliance, that there isn’t a Western strategic vision that’s attractive either to people in Iran or even throughout the region. And certainly, the Gaza war has created even more fissures between the region and for countries like Iran that say we’re part of the resistance to what’s happening in Gaza. It gets them support throughout the developing world. And the Iranian strategy under President Raisi which was, “Let’s look more toward Asia, look toward regional partners. Let’s stop chasing the West and let’s support these agents of resistance.” That strategy from an Iranian strategic perspective, I think, most Iranians think it’s worked really well. And the Western alliance hasn’t come up with a way to undermine it.

Yeah. Well, we have a few minutes left and then we’re going to come to questions. So I encourage people to start to come up to the mics if you have questions for our Q&A session. But before we get there, and you were starting to take us in this direction, Jon, I want to start talking about what should the NATO alliance be doing in terms of pushing back on this budding axis, if we want to call it that, among these adversaries. What is essential both in terms of our response to those adversaries, and then, what is essential in terms of trying to ensure that the key swing states that we’re looking at in the international system, your Brazils, your Saudi, your Indonesia. All these kind of key countries that may determine where the future order goes, make sure that they feel invested in some version of a current order that maybe does need to transform, but we don’t want to necessarily buy into what China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are offering. Yeah, Benedetta.

Maybe we can start with what we are doing because we are actually doing a lot. But let’s start with Ukraine because I think let’s not… Maybe I will repeat myself, but I think it’s worth doing so. Right now, Ukraine is the test case. It is the laboratory for authoritarian learning, authoritarian cooperation, and the stakes there are incredibly high. That’s why I go back to Ukraine. There are very different paths for our future. One is where Ukraine prevails as a sovereign independent country, and it’s vindicated in its fight for freedom. And that’s a word in which there is a powerful lesson sent to Beijing, sent to North Korea, sent to Iran, sent to Russia itself, of course. And that’s a message that, of course, supports the global rules-based order, supports the beginning of the rethinking of a European security architecture, which right now it’s on life support because of Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine.

(07:13:55)
So, if you want a strong first policy proposal, and that’s exactly what the alliance is doing by supporting Ukraine is, first of all, Ukraine must prevail. The war of aggression must fail. These authoritarian actors need to see that using force does not pay off. And that’s really important. Because the alternative one in which Putin’s war of aggression is successful, is where these actors become even more emboldened, even more brazen interactions. And we already see it in the last year with Iran’s destabilizing role in the Middle East, support for terrorism, non-proliferation concern. We see this in the Korean Peninsula. We see this, of course, with the PRC enabling Russia’s war of aggression. We see this with the Russian Federation itself, which is now stepping up its hybrid activities in our allied countries. And you will hear statements from allied leaders this week expressing not just concern, but also our response options to make sure that we build resiliency and counter this hybrid attack. So, first of all, Ukraine must prevail. These actors must understand that aggression will not pay off.

(07:15:04)
In addition, we are, and you will have heard this I think throughout the day, in the midst of the largest reinforcement of our deterrence and defense posturing generation. This is part and parcel of how you communicate, resolve, and credibility to these adversaries. Because I don’t think we must be naive. The main language that Putin understands is power. And we need to be, and that’s why we have such a key task to rebuild and reenergize our defense industrial base and our military instruments of power. So we’re doing that. We’re also working on resilient or resiliency of our infrastructure, supply chains, of our societal and democratic institution. All of this is so that we are better placed to respond to this coercive hybrid tactics by these authoritarian actors.

(07:15:52)
And we’re doing that not alone. We’re doing that as an alliance of 32, but we’re doing that more and more with our partners. And it’s not a coincidence that tomorrow there will be a session with our partners from the Indo-Pacific: Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. Again, this is what transatlantic and Indo-Pacific solidarity looks like. Not just in supporting Ukraine, but in pushing back against authoritarian aggression. And of course, we also have multiple partnership in the rest of the world working with countries that are interested in cooperating with us on issue like countering disinformation, countering hybrid threats. So there is a lot that we are doing. I’m looking forward to hearing what more we can do, but I think we have to start with recognizing that we recognize the reality we’re responding and adapting to it. And possibly, again, I’m going to be boring, but the most important thing we can do today is ensure Ukraine prevails as a sovereign independent country. That is the lesson that we want to send to Beijing, to Moscow, to Pyongyang, and to Tehran.

I couldn’t agree more.

Thank you. Thanks.

Absolutely agree. Jon, anything to add?

I think there are any number of ways in which the actions of countries like Iran and North Korea threaten the interests of countries like Russia and China. And we can find ways to cooperate on what we can cooperate on to constrain the bad things that Iran is doing. For example, Red Sea security affects China in a pretty profound way. Because so much of Chinese trade passes through the Red Sea and through the Suez Canal. China cares a lot about Egypt. China has a lot of investment in Egypt and Suez Canal tolls, which are a huge source of revenue for the Egyptian government, are down 50% since the beginning of the year. I think there is a case that can be made that China should be playing a more constructive role. Not to help some broader international alliance, not to join, not to bolster the United States. But to advance Chinese interests and call out China for not doing it, to call out China when it does the right thing. I think, say, on the Iran nuclear issue, we had support from Russia and China for the JCPOA.

(07:18:20)
I think there are ways to make it about less than global hegemony and more about these country’s interests. And just be clear about you’re hurting yourself, you’re hurting everybody. You could play a role, be responsible. And I think that there are ways that Europe can work with the United States to make clear to Russia and China that there are rewards for doing the right thing and costs for doing the wrong thing. And we should find ways to, again, you don’t have to agree on everything, but there are some things they’re not in anybody’s interest or they’re certainly not in Russia’s interest, or certainly not in China’s. When energy costs go up, that’s good for Russia, it’s really bad for China.

Yeah, I would agree that I think the fundamental way to approach this, at least when it relates to China, is not trying to create wedges between these countries because I don’t think that that’s going to work. But to basically change China’s calculus such that they start to understand that their interests are going to be better achieved, not by aligning themselves with countries that start and lose wars. And I think that they’re not going to get to this position of centrality in the global system and be perceived as a responsible player by doing this.

(07:19:36)
The problem at this moment, as we have said already, is that China at this point is making these decisions in terms of its support for some of these countries, and its position on things such as Iran’s support for the Houthis based, I think, more around what might hurt the United States and hurt NATO. Not so much what might be not convenient for Chinese interests such as shipping through the Red Sea, right? We can talk about to the extent to which China actually put pressure on Iran, but I’m betting it was pretty minimal. So, that, I think, is the challenge is that we are not necessarily framing this as the Chinese would say in Cold War terms. It’s China that is looking at the United States and is looking at NATO through that lens and how do we deal with things given that reality. We have a question. Great. Please share your name and your affiliation.

Yes. Hi, I am Nick Lokker from the Center for New American Security. Dave, I wanted to ask you a little bit about how China is viewing the deepening relationship between North Korea and Russia that we’ve been observing really since the onset of the February 2022 invasion with North Korea’s military support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. And then, we did just see Vladimir Putin visit Pyongyang recently. So just I assume that this has some implications for China’s outlook on the region more broadly, but I’d be curious to hear your thoughts on that. Thank you.

Yeah, thank you. That’s a great question. As you know, China has long-standing relationship with North Korea. China is North Korea’s only formal treaty ally going back to 1961. And I think when we look at how China views this burgeoning, tightening between Russia and North Korea. As you mentioned, we have this meeting between Putin and Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang. They had a new announcement of a defense pact. I think on the whole, China is uneasy about this development between Russia and North Korea. I think there is a positive in the sense that obviously we’ve seen or there’s indications that North Korean missiles and other support are going to Russia and from China that’s probably all to the good. But in terms of China’s ability to have sway over

… over North Korea in the determination and the decisions that it makes. That potentially gets diminished by Russia and North Korea deepening their ties. And I think China, as we’ve discussed, kind of use itself as a more responsible player in these other countries that it’s dealing with as their risk appetite… Ones with high risk appetite and doing things that might be dangerous. And when you look at the Korean Peninsula right on China’s border, I think, the notion of Russia and North Korea getting closer and potentially making decisions that are risky, that damage China’s security is of great concern to China, potentially Russia, even giving North Korea advanced technology that helps North Korea to further its nuclear development in ways that could create even more security hassles for China in the region.

(07:22:51)
So on the whole, I think China is watching this warily, not terribly happy about it, but there’s not much they can do about it to be honest. And I think the question that I’ve gotten about this is, “Well, is this an opportunity to create a wedge there between these countries?” And I don’t see that at all. I think it’s just something to watch and wait. But it is an indication, as we’ve discussed, that there are these… This is by no means a smooth relationship between these four countries that we’ve been talking about. Anything-?

No, I would agree that smooth is possibly not the word that comes to mind, but I think still the reality is that it is further along than what I think most analysts would’ve anticipated before 2022 in the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. And that also goes when we look at the DPRK-Russia relation, and there are of course very serious concern as you alluded about what would in the future or even a very imminent future, the North Korea getting a return for the significant military support that it’s providing to Russia and what would it do in terms of stability in the Korean peninsula, what would it do in terms of concerns over non-proliferation, and more broadly, what would it do for the stability of the Indo-Pacific theater, which as we know is incredibly important to global stability, global prosperity. And of course there’s also direct implication for the security of the Atlantic area being such a central domain of growth, development, and competition.

(07:24:27)
So it is a very, I think, concerning development, and I would agree that maybe not everyone in this “axis,” which is a word I am a little hesitant to utilize, but maybe… Whatever you want to call it, strategic convergence. Not everyone may be enthusiastic about it, but yet none of these actors is taking active steps to slow down the cooperation or undermine it or call it out an international forum or frankly support sanctions to North Korea. So I think that, again, we see that despite the fact that there may be baked in frictions and disagreements for the time being, the broader strategic direction of trying to undermine the United States, NATO, and its allies remains, I think, the dominant consideration. That’s something that we need to take on board and reflect upon and adjust our posture and actions accordingly. But of course, it’s something that we need to keep a close watch on.

Yeah. Jon, anything to add in terms of the Iran-North Korea relationship and how you think that is developing or not or where is the kind of runway for that to kind of become-?

Well, they talked to each other and a former Iranian foreign minister was gleefully telling me about the advice he got from the North Korean foreign minister about the Trump administration, which is only deal with the president, don’t deal with his aids. So I think there’s a lot of conversation. I think there’s conversation probably on some of the nuclear issues. I don’t think there’s a lot of trust and mutual respect, but these countries don’t have a lot of options. There aren’t a lot of people who will talk to them. And I think that they do think there are things they can learn and they are in contact. New question now.

Yeah, please.

Hello, my name is Julia Jamila Werner. I’m from Germany. I’m the co-founder of the Trans-Atlantic Student Initiative. In Iran, there’s just recently been an election and economic ties to Russia, for example, also China are flourishing also when it comes to European partners. Do you think that NATO and its allies has really understood the impact of the alliance we’re talking about when it comes to the war in Ukraine, for example? Or are we still a bit too easy with that?

If I may repeat the question back to you so I can make sure I understood your question?

Yes.

Your question is whether we have fully grasped the dynamic, the scale and the scope of the relationship between these four countries and how far it has gone?

Exactly. That, or are we too naive?

That’s always a good question because it’s really good to check our assumptions and we may in the past have been that way, but I would say that us today, and you’ll see it this week in the discussions that the NATO leaders are having at this summit, I think we’re clear-eyed about the fact that this relationship is incredibly worrisome, that there is a strategic alignment, that there are concerted actions. And again, we put… This principle was already identified in 2022 when we had the strategic concept, but I think we’re taking a hard look at how much faster than anticipated and closer our relationship has become, not least over the last year because of the Chinese decision to go all in when it comes to the provision of dual use good that enable Russia’s war of aggression. So I don’t think there is a naivete. I think we are clear-eyed about it as an alliance and I think you will hear leaders making statements to that effect.

How do you describe then or how do you explain some actors such as Germany, for example, still having those good economic relationships?

Well, I think that each and individual countries is balancing between different considerations and that’s really how policy works. You’re balancing between economic and trade considerations, domestic politics consideration, defense and security, foreign policy. That’s how you square the circle of policymaking. And I think that applies to all many… And I’m not going to go into individual member states, but I would say that applies into how each and every member states is looking at the one hand enhancing security, ensuring collective defense, on the other hand, maintaining prosperity and having healthy economic relations. And one of the conversation we’re really having, and it’s really important, is how do we better integrate national security consideration into our economic policies? And I think this is something that we are learning.

(07:29:16)
We learned it the hard way, to be honest, after Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine because we learned what it meant to have a one-sided strategic dependency on Russian oil and gas. And I would very much say that it is in our absolute vital interest to make sure we do not repeat that mistake and have similar dependencies on other assertive, authoritarian actors.

I think that’s a great place to wrap up because I mean the very fact that we’re having this conversation here at the public forum indicates that there’s a growing understanding of the need to discuss not just China’s support for Russia, but the role of these others actors as well, what that means for NATO, what that means for all of us in terms of the future and how we need to deal with it, but that there’s a lot more that needs to be done in terms of more unity of vision on these issues and what we might be able to do about it in terms of joint joint efforts. So with that, thank you, Benedetta. Thank you, Jon. And please join me in thanking them for this great panel.

What a brilliant panel discussion! Thank you to our panelists. We talk so much about Ukraine and how NATO member nations can provide assistance to Ukraine right now, but it’s always helpful to look at the future and take a step back and look at what it’s going to look like five years out, 10 years out. And looking at the relationship between Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran is crucial to that conversation and the panel touched on such an important point that China’s willingness to back Russia and enable its war in Ukraine is allowing Russia to continue its war of choice against Ukraine. And they discussed as well North Korea and the burgeoning relationship between North Korea and Russia, which the White House has raised alarm about in terms of whether there are expectations from North Korea to receive additional military assistance from Russia as well. So thank you to the panel.

(07:31:20)
For the next portion of the agenda, we will have two concurrent sessions. The first session, Nuclear Checkup, will take place in salon 12 and the second, a conversation on NATO Looks South, A Perspective on Strategy and Partnership. This will take place in the other salon. I believe it’s salon 10, but please check with any of our audience members on the way out. The salon is located on this floor down the hall and to the right. Please proceed to the breakout if it interests you in an orderly and timely manner so our next sessions can begin shortly. Before the next session starts, we will take a poll and answer the question, “What is the most pressing challenge to global security today?” So start thinking about it, but in order to vote, go to the polling function in your app, if you have the app, and select your response.

(07:32:08)
Soon we’ll have some results to share with you. If you’re on the live stream, press Slido to access the poll. So we’ll wait a minute while the results are coming in and I’d like to take a step back and bring us through a moment of reflection of our day so far. We’re on the sidelines obviously of the summit where world leaders are discussing the same critical issues that we have heard so many world leaders discuss today. And we’ve gotten a front row seat to those discussions. We’ve heard a resounding round of support for Ukraine from the foreign ministers of Poland and Lithuania. “Ukraine must win. We’ve done this before, we can do it again.” And it sounds like a doubling down. We’ve also heard from UK’s Defense Minister, John Healey, and he put a fine point on the stakes. If we don’t stop Russia in Ukraine, Russia will not stop there. The stakes couldn’t be higher. And so many member nations and many of our guests here today know that very deeply.

(07:33:09)
We’ve also heard a similar message focused on Americans today. If the fight is not won in Ukraine, Americans may also face some further threats in the future. And we’ve even seen some acute threats in just the most recent days. Earlier this month, of course, commanders put bases on high alert, a very rare case, linked to threats that might come to harm service members and their family and facilities. And it’s been reported that’s due to Russian backed plots of sabotage and attacks targeting US military personnel and facilities. This is already, of course, impacting Americans. And here’s the thing. We’ve heard a number of esteemed guests talk about how we are in a changed. 2.5 years into this, after Russia reinvaded Ukraine, Russia’s changed, Ukraine has changed. And Lithuania’s foreign minister put a very intriguing point out on the stage today. He signaled all of the hybrid sort of gray zone operations we see Russia do from attacks to arson attacks to cyber attacks and other operations might not be appropriate to be called hybrid operations anymore because it’s clear they’re terrorist attacks. And so we continue to see Russia pushing the envelope against the grain and the Alliance will continue to have to deal with that moving forward. So in the meantime, we now have our results coming in… It looks like they’re still coming in live a little bit, but it looks like the most pressing challenge many people feel is… Okay, we’ve got military actions by Russia at the top, however, the erosion of democracy is a close second, 6% behind here. And with that, I think I will turn us to our next panel. Please join me in welcoming to the stage GMF trustee and Senior Vice President of Global Public Policy at the Boeing Company, Steve Biegun who will moderate a conversation on the perspective of NATO southern states. Thank you.

Wow, what a great day. And thanks to all the organizers and to NATO public affairs for organizing such a great conversation. We’ve covered a lot of territory today, literally and figuratively. We’ve talked about NATO’s plans, we’ve talked about the priorities for the Alliance, and we’ve talked about geography as well. We’ve spoken about the threat to the north and to Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, appropriately, we’ve talked quite a bit about the war in Ukraine, but there’s one part of NATO that’s very important that we haven’t spoken about, which is NATO’s southern flank. And it’s my honor today to be here with Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez of Spain to have that discussion. Prime Minister, you’ve been in office since 2018. If I did my math and dates right, June of 2018, which means this will be your sixth NATO summit.

Yes.

And during that time, you’ve not only been a witness to the transformation of the Alliance, but you’ve also been one of the people who’s been steering it and guiding it. I was wondering if you could start us off today with some thoughts on what are the most pressing challenges in NATO’s southern flank and what do you think about Spain’s role in helping to address those for the Alliance and with the Alliance?

So thank you very much, Stephen, and thank you to the German Marshall Fund for this invitation to talk about the role of NATO in the South, especially when we are celebrating the 13th anniversary of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the 20th anniversary of the Istanbul Corporation Initiative. So the Middle East and North Africa, there’s a hell. And the broader African continent have the strategic importance for peace and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic region. Likewise, our Alliance can do a lot to reinforce security and stability in our southern neighborhood. Spain is one of the allies that is closest to the south, not only geographically, but also in the intensity of our political, economic, and human links to the region. We have always understood that our wellbeing depends on ourself and neighborhoods. Today after two years of proprietary work, we have adopted, and this is good news, an action plan to strengthen our approach to the south.

(07:37:50)
This is, as I said, excellent news. For the first time, the Alliance will have a comprehensive, detailed, and practical roadmap to work with our southern partners. So let me first highlight why instability in the southern neighborhood is a threat to NATO allies. To start, our adversaries do not hesitate to use its stability in NATO’s eastern and southern neighborhood against us. They work with non-state actors to amplify terrorism, maritime insecurity, or the consequences of climate change. Their goal is to weaken Euro-Atlantic security by creating a crescent of instability around us. In the process, they harm human and state security in our neighboring countries who are the first direct victims of this destabilizing tactics.

(07:38:47)
Dozens of women, men, and children are killed in raids of Russian mercenaries in Sahel villages and thousands more are forcibly displaced trying to escape. Furthermore, Russia is developing links between stability in the east and the south through human trafficking organizations, terrorist networks, or coordinated disinformation campaigns against NATO in many African and Middle East countries. Thousands of people drowned in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean after falling in the hands of human trafficking networks. Irregular borders crossing, originating in Africa into Poland, are increasing dramatically.

(07:39:37)
Who is helping these criminal networks and why? The human cost of these hybrid tactics is dramatic. NATO, I believe, must therefore a comprehensive strategy to promote stability and good governance in the south to work with our partners for strong security and defense institutions on capacity building with the practical cooperation measures and doing all of these based on mutual respect. This is where our new action plan comes in. First, through this action plan, we will invest in more political dialogue and more hands-on cooperation. NATO’s political dialogue with our self and partners must reflect this spirit of friendship, mutual respect, and mutual benefit. NATO has to be more present in the south. We already have a regional center in Kuwait and we hope to have a liaison office in Amman soon.

(07:40:37)
Second, we will work more with international organizations, the African Union where we have a liaison office, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, all are very important interlocutors and partners for NATO. With our support, they can be effective in areas that are essential for regional security. For example, initiatives to curb the spread of light, sorry, and small weapons are crucial to end the insecurity that plague the daily lives of millions of peoples in the south. NATO should particularly coordinate its actions with the European Union. I think this is very important, this is instrumental, especially now that both organizations have adopted comprehensive approaches with their southern neighborhood. And third, NATO is ready to work with its southern partners on critical issues such as terrorism, climate change, maritime security, or resilience.

(07:41:43)
So let me finish, Stephen, by highlighting that the endorsement of this action plan is a big step for NATO. It’s a real big step for NATO and we particularly welcome the appointment of a special representative for the south, but this is not the end of the roadmap. Implementation in years to come will be key. In this difficult endeavor, you will always find a staunch commitment and support of my country. Spain is already working on many of these fields with ourself and partners and we are ready to scale up our efforts in the context of NATO operation. So thank you very much for your attention and happy to exchange some views on this with you.

Great. Well, thank you, Prime Minister, and congratulations on the action plan. I know Spain provided the leadership and the heft to get that through the Alliance and in another year, it might have been seen as one of the centerpieces of the summit but for what’s happening in the East, what’s happened since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the full scale war in 2022. But in the shadow of all that concerns us to the East, there’s also a war happening in the South as we all know. The war between Israel and Hamas despite efforts to broker a ceasefire continues. And I was wondering if you could share your thoughts on where this conflict is headed and what are the implications for NATO South. You ticked off some of the challenges that the southern flank of NATO face, the refugee flows and so on, terrorism. Where do you see this going and what are the implications for NATO?

Well, I believe that the implications are very difficult for all of us, for NATO, and of course, for all the countries in the region, in the Mediterranean, and of course, the Middle East. But I think this is a global challenge for all countries. As you know, Spain and other countries in the Europe, we took that step to recognize the State of Palestine because we believe that we need to give a political horizon to the people in the region, especially in Palestine, a political horizon to create the conditions for a new state that could coexist in peaceful and with security with their neighbors, especially with Israel. So I would like to acknowledge the efforts that President Biden has been taking since the beginning of the war regarding different aspects. The first one is the release of the hostages. The second is in the beginning to support Israel in its fight against Hamas.

(07:44:41)
I mean we, of course, condemned the terrorist attacks to Israel perpetrated by Hamas. But on the other hand, we understand that we need to create the conditions for an immediate and urgent ceasefire. Why? Because first of all, we need to avoid any risk of escalation and there’s a real risk of escalation to Lebanon. Second, because we need to stop this terrible humanitarian crisis that the Palestinians are suffering not only in Gaza but also in the West Bank. And last but not least, because it will be important to convene an international peace conference to create the conditions for, what I said in the beginning of my speech, the Two-State solution and to create that political horizon for the people in Palestine. So I think that we need, of course, that political effort. We need also to understand that UN resolutions from the Security Council are abiding.

(07:46:06)
And that last UN resolution led by the US administration stated clear that we need a permanent ceasefire in order to stop this terrible war and focus on the humanitarian catastrophe that we’re witnessing through the international media. So of course, I think that this is going to be one of the challenges of the southern flank that we need to face and address from our NATO organization and we will do our utmost to create those conditions and not to be, again, prisoners, I would say, of a new cycle of violence in the Middle East in the years to come. I think that this is enough. There’s a lot of suffering on the ground and we need to create those political conditions to avoid any risk of escalation and of course, a new cycle of violence in the future.

Well, I hate to jump from one gloomy environment to another, but there’s another part of Europe as well that’s suffering terrible violence and bloodshed right now, the brutal war that Russia is waging against Ukraine as Ukraine fights for its own independence. One of the things that we’ve talked about here during the course of the day with other leaders is the bridge to NATO membership that the summit is agreeing to today. I was wondering if you could give us your take, the view from Spain, which is a long way, way from Ukraine. What is your take on the bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine, and what do you see as the opportunities and challenges along the way?

So we actually have, Stephen, in Spain more than 200,000 refugees coming from Ukraine, even though, of course, we have this long distance. And I can tell you that large, the majority of the Spaniards, they support our efforts regarding Ukraine because we understand what is at stake. It’s not only the defense of the territorial integrity, the freedom, the right to exist of a nation, but also the respect of a world ruled by clear, let’s say, principles. And this is also what we are defending, democracy, freedom, and the right to exist of a country such as Ukraine. So I think that it would be… It is indeed very important for our citizens to understand that what we are defending in Gaza and in Ukraine are not only the international law, but we have a consistent position, a consistent political position, that we don’t have double standards.

(07:49:19)
So if we are telling our people that we are supporting Ukraine because we are defending the international law, this is the same to what we have to do towards Gaza and I mean the war that we are now witnessing in the Middle East, saying that we are backing the international law, especially the international humanitarian law. So this is, at least from our perspective, what we defend as a country. And I would also add that, coming back to Ukraine, perhaps we don’t have the conditions yet on the process for the integration of Ukraine in NATO. But in the statement, the declaration that we already endorsed, we say that that path is irreversible and this is something that is going to happen. In the meantime, what we need to do is to support and back Ukraine as all member states from NATO, we are doing.

(07:50:32)
And last but not least, I would say that it is important, this double-path, not only NATO enlargement, but also the European Union enlargement. And second semester of last year we had the privilege to chair the European Council and we were leading along, with the commission, the process for the enlargement of the European Union towards Ukraine. So I think this is also very important because at the end of the day, NATO and European Union, we have a strategic partnership that could create those synergies, not only on the defense and security dimension, but also the political one. And this is something that I think is recognized and people in Ukraine are grateful for that.

Well, Prime Minister, I know you have a busy day and I wish you the very best in the summit proceedings. On behalf of the entire forum, let us join in thanking Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez for his time. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Prime Minister Sanchez, for that insightful perspective on NATO’s strategy and partnerships in the South. It is now my pleasure to soon welcome to the stage Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director for the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council for our next panel on Nordic Security Redrawn. Please join me in just a moment in welcoming Matthew to this stage. All right, let’s welcome Matthew to the stage.

Well, good afternoon. I’m pleased to welcome you to this discussion on Nordic Security Redrawn. As you’ve just heard, my name is Matthew Kroenig. I’m vice president and senior director of the Atlanta Council of Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. As we all know, NATO has two new members, Finland and Sweden, bringing the NATO Alliance to 32 countries. It also means that now every Arctic country except for Russia is a member of NATO. So to dive into some of the challenges and opportunities presented by this new Nordic security landscape, I’m honored to introduce some distinguished panelists. So starting all the way at the end here we have Minister of Defense of the Republic of Finland, Antti Häkkänen. Welcome. Next we have Minister of Defense of Norway, Bjørn Arild Gram. Welcome. Next we have Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Þórdís Kolbrún R. Gylfadóttir. Welcome. And then next Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of Sweden, Pål Jonson. And last but not least, to my immediate left, Minister of Defense of Canada, Bill Blair.

(07:53:46)
So your excellencies, welcome to the NATO Public Forum, and we have five ministers and only about 35 minutes so I think we want to jump into it. And so let me ask the first question. And Minister Jonson, you’re the rookie here, so maybe I’ll start with you. Some Americans might say, “Well, additional countries in NATO, aren’t these just additional countries we need to defend?” Why is NATO stronger with Sweden in the Alliance?

Sure. And thank you for that question and also thank you for having me on with a great panel. We interact a lot and I think there’s many things that unite us around this panel as well. But just a few things then on Swedish NATO membership. I’ll start with geography, Sweden, of course, being located at the heart of the Nordic region, meaning that when we’re inside the Alliance now, we are going to be an important staging and basing area for assuring that NATO can deter and defend the Baltic States and Finland. We just ratified in the Swish Parliament a DCA with the United States, meaning that US also will have the possibility, for example, for basing military equipment in Sweden. So that’s important also for the Alliance as such in its ability to deter and defend. And then, of course, there’s capabilities we bring to the table.

(07:55:06)
We have been operating for many decades in the Baltic Sea with our submarines, with our surface competent… We speak less Corvettes and in the air with our air surveillance plane and our intelligence plane. So we know the Baltic Sea inside out, we like to think. Yes, that’s the other countries on the panel. We also have good arctic capabilities. I always say that’s one thing to be able to survive in that cold weather up in the north, but another to fight. And our soldiers know how to do that. For being a smaller country, we have a quite strong defense industrial base since there’s no other country in the world of 10 millions who can produce fighter aircraft, submarines, advanced surface combat artillery systems, and IF Swiss. And we score quite well on innovation, both military innovation and civil innovation. So we’re also enthusiastic about joining DIANA and NATO

… NATO investment fund as well. So that are few things that we can bring to the table. And in the end, I think Sweden is safer and NATO is stronger by having us inside.

Many impressive strengths indeed. And let’s go to Finland next. And Minister Hakkanen, same question to you. Why is NATO stronger with Finland as a member?

Well, I think that when the situation that the most of the democracies belong to NATO, NATO is stronger in that case. That’s the one point we see that the world is going dividing to autocrat countries and they’re playing even stronger together. And that’s why democracies must play also together. That’s the main big issue. But what Finland brings to NATO, for example, we have decades built our own defense neighboring Russia. We have thought that we have to manage by ourselves. That’s why we have almost, I think, the highest number of will to defend the country, over 80%. And 90% of our people also say that they’re willing to defend NATO allies. Now, this is the recent newest poll. We have a large reservist army. We have almost 900,000 citizens who are military trained, wartime strength, almost 300,000. We have old traditional warfare capabilities, but also new highly valuable capabilities.

(07:57:34)
We have almost largest artillery in Western Europe. We have been prepared for that kind of conventional warfare, what Russia is now waiting in, in Ukraine because we have true intelligence, watch really closely what Russia is doing. That’s why end of the Cold War we didn’t let our guards down. We kept our large reservist army, large artillery, large land forces, and now we are also purchasing new high-tech capabilities, F-35s, and developing our army with heavy investing programs, 2.4% last year. And now it’s a new thing for us to do a close cooperation with all our allies. We have done it closely with the Nordic countries, with several partners in JEF Cooperation and with United States for decades. But still Article 5, that’s a new thing for us. And last year when we joined to NATO, everything has gone smoothly. We have been integrated really fast to NATO, to our common defense system. And that’s why we are really happy to see the results from this summit. We are taking a stronger stance with the collective defense and also the Finnish integration in the collective defense has been really smooth.

Wonderful. Thanks very much. And I should note that you’re going to have to leave us a little bit early, so if he walks off stage, I didn’t offend him, he has somewhere else to be, but Minister Gram, let’s maybe come up to you next. A lot of focus on NATO’s Eastern Flank, the war in Ukraine for obvious reasons, but Norway’s often been oriented to the High North and of course there’s increased geopolitical competition in the Arctic. Tell us a little bit about why we should be focused on the security challenges in the High North. Why could a conflict with Russia escalate into the High North? How should we be thinking about this?

We have a border with Russia. We have never been in conflict with Russia, but we see their will to use force against another peaceful neighbor of them. And Russia is always the point of interest when we think of our defense planning and just a few miles across the border, we have one of the world’s non-Western largest nuclear bases. Russia has much of their strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines and so on, on the Kola Peninsula just across the border. And this basing complex increases in importance for Russia these days. Much of their conventional forces on the land has been sent to Ukraine and they are depleted there. They are killed, but they have most of their nuclear forces, their submarines, their airplanes intact, and with the difficulties they face in the Black Sea with their naval forces, the Baltic Sea is more of a NATO lake you could say, than the northern fleet. And their basing in the Kola Peninsula is even more important for them then of course want to defend and protect this capabilities.

(08:01:11)
And so for us it’s very important to have situational awareness, to have presence in the High North, follow the activity. This was also a very important part. We had just presented our, and had a unanimous support in parliament for our new long-term defense plan. Increasing the situational awareness when it comes to the space domain, to maritime surveillance, the intelligence, to being more present with the naval forces and so on. I think this a very important part of the deterrence. We want predictability and stability in the High North. We welcome more allied activity also in the High North. At the same time, we want to calibrate this and as I said, have a stability and predictability.

(08:02:04)
So this is important for us. We also watch closely what kind of development we see with the Russian and Chinese cooperation in the High North. We have Chinese researchers on the Svalbard Islands in the far north, so we have to watch this closely. But can I also say, but because you asked the importance of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, I think this is a huge thing for us as well. Of course for Sweden and Finland, this is a huge step [inaudible 08:02:37] in Sweden, more than 200 years neutral or alliance free. But also for us, this is a huge development. Being able to see all the Nordic geography, the whole of the Scandinavian Peninsula when it comes to defense planning, to operational cooperation. We have been used to be, for the first time we have a border, a land border with an NATO ally.

(08:03:04)
That was when Finland joined-

Trusted ally.

… trusted ally. And I know we have this Nordic defense cooperation and we see so many possibilities in all domains, in all areas when it comes to defense planning and defense capabilities. So this really opens a new world. And it happened, there were some hiccups when it came to the ratification process, but still it happened really fast. So we don’t have all the answers yet, but we see there is a lot of possibilities to strengthen the northern part of the Alliance.

Great. Minister Gylfadottir, let’s come to you next. And Iceland is a unique and special country in many ways. One of the ways it’s unique is that it doesn’t have standing armed forces. So given that, how does Iceland contribute to NATO security?

Yes, thank you. I need two mics for some reason, I’m sorry. First of all, Iceland is a founding member of NATO, one out of 12. And our contribution is partly literally our strategic location. Being in the middle of Europe and North America, our presence and us being a member of NATO is of course a cornerstone of our national security policy and it has been for all these decades, 75 years, but it’s also a contribution to the region. We have radar stations around the island, which feeds NATO information 24/7. We have Keflavik Air Base where of course the United States was there up until 2006, we took it over. We have host nation support. So when France and Allies are operating and doing all kinds of air policing and practicing et cetera, and we have, from the US, submarine surveillance, which again, with the increased capable of mobility from Iceland, it’s not only a question whether it makes us safer in Iceland, but what does it mean for the region? What’s our contribution in that regard?

(08:05:25)
And I have to add the point on Finland and Sweden’s membership. It truly matters tremendously, both of course for Sweden and Finland, but also for the region and not only the Nordics, it’s the same goes with the Baltic states, the region itself and for NATO. And of course what these countries bring to the table. I mean, it’s tremendous and that’s why it has gone smoothly because of course we’ve been close partners and the integration has been very strong, but also as countries, because NATO is not only about tanks and weapons, it was founded to cherish and protect democracy, individual freedoms and the rule of law. And to have two members that rank the highest in that regard with such a big, huge resilience and strong societies, that really makes NATO stronger without a doubt.

Wonderful. Well, minister Blair, let’s continue on this theme with you. And so how does Finland and Sweden joining the Alliance change the Nordic security situation? It makes the Baltic Sea a NATO lake, but closer to home for Canada, it means that now all Arctic countries other than Russia are NATO members. How does that change the situation when it comes to Arctic security?

I believe it’s hugely beneficial and frankly, it has brought to my country a renewed focus on some of our responsibilities and for the last 150 years and plus, my country has been blessed by extraordinary geography. We’re surrounded by three oceans, one of which has been mostly frozen. We also live next door to a great superpower, a benign and supportive ally and friend. And so almost for our entire history, Canada has not been invaded, but we have a very significant armed forces. And all of our work for the last century and a half has been primarily expeditionary. We have fought in almost every war, but not in our own country. But there’s been an acknowledgement, the world has changed, and I think we’ve seen certain evidence of that with Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. But we’re also seeing through such impacts of new technologies and in particular with climate change, our Arctic is becoming far more accessible.

(08:07:51)
The High North is actually being impacted by climate change at four times the global average. And what we’re seeing is the melting of the permafrost, but also new accessibility in the Arctic. And we estimate that if we continue on the same path, and hopefully we won’t, but if we do continue on the same path, by 2050, the Arctic ocean could be the primary point of transit between Europe and Asia. And as it becomes more accessible, security concerns become, I think, far more significant to us. And so what we have observed, certainly in our own country, between Alaska which, and the Americans, do, I think, do an outstanding job of providing security for the Beaufort and the Bering Sea. They’re right across from the eastern shores of Russia, but between Alaska and Norway, frankly, there was not anywhere near as much work done there. There are huge gaps in our security and in our presence.

(08:08:44)
I believe with the advent now of Finland and Sweden joining Norway, Iceland and I would include Denmark and the United States, of course, in that relationship, we have now got a United NATO presence from Russia’s eastern shore to their western shore. And I think we have as much to learn from each other, the opportunity to work together. In my country, we’re investing very significantly now in new capabilities in our High North building multi-mission or multi-use infrastructure, up there, investing in new technologies. We’re investing very significantly and over-the-horizon radar and over-the-polar radar to improve our domain awareness. But we believe that there’s great opportunity to learn from our new allies. And we have always been friends and we have always worked well together. But through the Alliance of NATO, I think we are strengthened by it.

(08:09:33)
And one of the things, the final thing I would observe as well, that since February of 2022, NATO has transformed itself into a more powerful alliance. Everyone, I see a greater unity, a greater resolve, a greater focus of purpose. And I think that that strength and that unity can be applied in all domains of risk, including potentially in the High North and in the Arctic.

Okay, wonderful. Well, you talked about investments. So let’s pick up there. One of the major themes of course of the summit is deterrence and defense. We have new regional plans. We need to get the capabilities to make sure those plans can be implemented. And so part of that is burden sharing and making sure all allies are contributing. Some of the countries here are at 2%, some not there yet. I’m wondering if you could talk a little bit about burden sharing. For those of you who are already at 2%, what is your strategy for staying there? What are the capabilities you’re going to provide? And for those of you who aren’t there yet, what is your strategy for getting there? And I’ll throw that open to the group.

If I may start-

Please.

… because I’m one of the larger economies in the NATO Alliance. We have the sixth largest military even today, but we are not at 2%. And we’ve got work to do to get there. One of the great challenges I think we’re all facing is first of all issues around personnel. And there’s things that I’ve been learning from the Swedes and the Finns that are going to help me solve some of my challenges. But what we’re seeing in production. Production is also deterrence. And what we’re finding is some real challenges in military production. And even, I’ve signed contracts for almost 200 planes for my Air Force just in the past year. But it’s going to take a number of years to deliver those capabilities. We’re building new surface combatant ships, 15 of them in our country, but I won’t see the first one until 2032, and we won’t be able to deliver them all until 2050.

(08:11:24)
And so I think we also, I’m absolutely committed. Canada has to do more and Canada will do more and we’ll meet the 2% pledge. And I think we have to even go beyond that 2% pledge. But having said all that, I think it’s also incumbent upon us to make sure that we invest well. And part of the unity of NATO, I think, creates opportunity for us. Just earlier today, I entered into an agreement with Norway and Germany because we have agreed to work together on issues around production and meeting those targets so that we can go back to our respective constituencies and say, “Yes, we’re doing what is required. We’re going to invest the money that we need to invest, but we’re going to do it well.” And then we’re going to create real value. And by working together, I think we’re much better than working apart.

Looks like some others wanted to come in? Minister Jonson.

Sure. We increased our defense budget with 28% this year after decades of underinvestment. And we doubled our defense investment during these last five years. And we are at 2.2%, but 2.2 doesn’t get us very far. We are going to get new capability targets already this fall and which are going to be demanding because we know we’ll have deficiencies all across the Alliance when it comes to air defense, when it comes to available ground forces focusing on enablement, autonomous systems and so forth. So 2% is certainly is a floor, but it’s not the ceiling and we are going to be investing heavily. Also, we have a trajectory up to 2.6 by 2028. Now that’s one of the challenge. The other one is the defense industrial base. And in all honestly, right now in Europe, we have a defense industrial base that’s shaped for peacetime situation. And then we look at the war in Ukraine.

(08:13:08)
And the war in Ukraine is a war of attrition, i.e., a war of warehouses. So I think there’s lots of things we need to do in order to ramp up industrial production. That means more spending more and spending more together, meaning placing large orders. That’s going to be a demand signal for the industry so they also can beef up their production because right now we’re challenging with increasing prices at the same time as a lead time for us to get the platforms, the systems is very long. Before, if you would ask us a decade ago, we would say there will be very little money, but lots of time because people didn’t think there would be a war. And now there’s much more money, about 100 billion and of course 23 allies now being in 23 being at 2% or more. But there’s little time because due to Russia’s behavior, its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its propensity to use military force. It’s low, the fact that it take political, military risks and so forth. So I think there’s a sense of urgency within the Alliance. And we need to more also on the industrial side.

Mm-hmm. Mr. Gram, please.

Yeah. First we have to acknowledge that the last decade, the defense spending within the NATO allies has increased year-by-year every year. That’s a good development. And I’m also very happy that on 23 countries now reaching 2% and happy that we are one of them this year past 2%. And with our new defense plan, we are, I think we’re almost going to double our defense budget and move towards 3% in a few years. And what do we do with all that money? Well, we strengthen really all our armed forces from one to three brigades in the army, the home guard more than doubling the air defense. But the main effort will be when it comes to the maritime sector, and we are a coastal maritime nation. We have Norway’s geographically, quite big land, not so much people, but we have seven time the land area at sea with huge resources, energy, fisheries, lines of communication.

(08:15:32)
So it’s so important to protect this, to be present. As I said earlier, follow the development, have situational awareness. So we have these new submarines, new frigates, renewing most of the coast guard and other surface vessel as well, having new satellites for surveillance, maritime, long-range maritime drones, and so on and so on. This is absolutely necessary, but we are also worried that it takes time. And Pal mentioned we both mentioned production capacity and what can the industry deliver. And so that is also very, we have to focus even more on that. And it’s a topic on this summit that’s very important. We see also what can we do together in the Nordics, but also with other close allies to see how we can enhance production capacity and procure more together. That’s an important part of the answer to that, I think.

Minister Hakkanen, it looks like you had your hand up as well.

Yeah, I just shortly say that before we joined NATO, we had this almost ten-year period, a planning period in the National Defense that we were assessing first that threat analysis from Russia and our 1,300 kilometer border with Russian military plannings. And we would compare that what kind of military planning should we also have with capabilities and how large reservist army we need. And those were kind of the requirements to put the size on how our national defense should be planned. Now we are trusting that the SACEUR will do the planning as overall planning. And now when we are seeing the threat analysis with Russia, with their ever deepening partnerships with China, Iran, North Korea and other countries, we are seeing that this defense spending is not going to be enough, to present is not going to be enough. Like Pal said, it’s going to be a floor, but where’s the ceiling? I don’t know.

(08:17:50)
During the Cold War, it was three to 4% in Europe, the spending rate, is it something like that? I don’t want any news now, but it’s much higher. If we are looking where the world is going and do we want to keep our defense in good shape? But even the deterrence, which is even more important that Russia is taking huge risks. And that’s why the deterrence is also a big question. And we know that even though we have invested heavily in our defense for decades, we need a lot more money to build up these new capabilities. What comes from NATO also. But I think it’s much more cheaper than to let them off the list. That’s why the Finnish people are trusting that the NATO capability targets are kind of plan it wisely. And the money which we use to the NATO capability targets, it’s wisely used money. And together we need a lot of these, what Pal and other say here that join procurements and cooperation with EU and cooperation with transatlantic industry. And there’s a lot of good things going on now.

Yeah. Well you said the 2% may not be enough. And in fact, I was talking to one defense official recently who said, according to their internal calculations, to get the capabilities needed to implement the regional plans, it might take something more like 3.6% across the Alliance to get there. So I think maybe we all have to do more, maybe even in the United States, Roger Wicker calling for a major increase in the US defense budget. So I think we all can do more.

(08:19:43)
You mentioned your long border with Russia and of course a lot of focus on the Russia’s conventional threat, but there’s also the hybrid threat, the disinformation, the cyber attacks. Because of that, a lot of focus in the Alliance on resilience and at the Atlantic Council, we’re setting up a new national security resilience initiative. So I’m very interested in this, but I guess maybe we’ll start with you, but open it to the group. You have a lot of experience with resilience, your total defense concept. What are the lessons the rest of the Alliance needs to learn about dealing with these Russian hybrid threats and how we can be more resilient?

Well, first of all, we have a long history with Russia after the Second World War, they have used during the Cold War all the tools and means in this broad spectrum influence or hybrid influence, what you call it with all means. And now we are just seeing that they are using, they’re doing the same thing, hybrid warfare or hybrid influencing with this new modern age tools. The first thing is that we have in Finland, this comprehensive security model where we have participated all our civil sectors and private companies to what’s the overall security situation in the society? And all those sectors have a role to support also the defense.

(08:21:17)
And that’s a good way to also watch the hybrid influencing what Russia is doing. For example, now we are watching much more tighter restrictions to Russian real estate ownership, migration flows in the border control. Now there’s a stricter law also coming to that critical infra and those. We have done a lot for last decades, but now we are seeing that the Russia is finding new tools, for example, migration is new tool and tackling also into cyberspace, some new measurements. That’s why we have to run fast and do a closer cooperation between NATO countries.

Others want to jump in on resilience? Maybe you Minister Jonson, I know you have a new national security strategy just out with resilience as a major concept.

Yeah, sure. We launched it on Monday actually. And I think what you should think about this resilience? And this is not an issue I’ll be able to solve at the Ministry of Defense and not even at the Minister of Justice so this is a whole of government, but even better, a whole of society approach I think is really important. I mean, there’s various forms and we see that Russia is stepping up when it comes to activities such as cyber attacks, disinformation, cyber espionage, for and direct investment into critical infrastructure. So I build a whole of society endeavor, making sure you have good interagency cooperation, making sure your security services are working well with the police and the military intelligence, I think is really, really crucial to it.

(08:23:01)
Good private, public partnerships is crucial. A lot of the critical infrastructure right now being, at least in Sweden, being it in energy, banking, telecom, it’s in the hands of the private operators. And of course they are also exposed to a lot of hybrid activities. And then we have to be able to share intelligence going two ways and enhancing our resilience in that regard as well, I think is really crucial.

Okay, great. Minister Gylfadottir, you wanted to come in on resilience?

Yeah, just to add some points, because I think societal trust and national resilience, information sharing and political unity are probably the most important issues to counter attack that. And we have increased the cooperation and information sharing a lot. And I think we need to do even more because what we’re seeing as well as it’s really important to look at it holistically. There’s a pattern there and we’re being tested and we have to have the overview of what is really happening. And we also have to have a honest conversation with our peoples about what is happening, both because it shows the development, it shows that what is truly at stake, because we’re always saying we’re being tested, they’re going to test, but still a lot of people think it’s quite far away from them. And I know that from my own country, for example, and we see the development and we need to do the information sharing between friends and allies, but we also have to have an honest discussion with our people.

(08:24:58)
And the other reason why we have to do that is because we need resilience within the society to counter attack that. So people also have to be vigilant and we have misinformation, disinformation, and then way more serious hybrid warfare, but we need to be more on the same page because it also takes time for individuals to digest new reality, which is darker than it was, and we’re still moving in the wrong direction. So we have to take that seriously. But for us to do that, we also have to have an honest debate with the general public.

Okay, great. We’re almost out of time, so maybe a final word to Minister Blair and Minister Gram, and what is the most important thing you think the audience should take away from this discussion? And you had your hand up first, and you also mentioned an interesting thing in the green room about some things you’re doing in Canada. Don’t know if you maybe want to share that with the group.

Well, I think we’re all doing some interesting things.

Yeah.

I’m hoping over the next few days that we’ll be able to articulate for our colleagues a credible and verifiable path for Canada and the investments we have to make. I think one of the ways we’re finding the smartest way to do that is through alliances. If I just may add just a small point to the last thing, because we’ve talked about hybrid warfare and asymmetrical warfare, and I think quite understandably at a NATO conference, we’re talking primarily about Russia, but we are noticing a very significant level of activity directed towards Western societies and Western democracies by the People’s Republic of China. In many respects, it is more insidious and more threatening to us. I think what we’re seeing is a very overt action to undermine our public institutions, attack our critical infrastructure through various cyber attacks.

(08:26:48)
I think in many respects, our response has been, might even characterize it as somewhat naive because we constantly attempt to defend ourselves from these daily attacks, but I think we need to be very outspoken to our own populations, as you mentioned, how important it is to attribute the activities of hostile nations in their actions against our interest. We’re seeing, the Russians do it in a very different way. The Russians are, I think, trying to torque up political and public opinion on certain areas, but again, the intent is to undermine the democracies that we rely on and also to put in jeopardy, I think our alliances. And so our awareness of that and a very strong response, a united response, I think is the great strength of NATO and the possibility that presents itself here. That’s it for me.

Okay. Minister Gram, final word?

Well, yeah, since we’re out of time, I just want to [inaudible 08:27:47] on the resilience part and because we are all strengthening our defense forces now, doing a lot, that is absolutely necessary, but it still isn’t enough because we have to think about the whole of society securing the state security, that’s one thing. But health security, food security, and civilian resistance is also an important. When we have this all for this in place, then we are truly resilient and can be able to defend ourselves.

Well it’s been a fascinating discussion. I’ve learned a lot. I wish we had more time, but I’m afraid we’re out of time. So thank you very much for sharing your insights. Please join me in thanking our [inaudible 08:28:32]

Thank you for that. Very insightful on Nordic Security. Now please allow some time for your colleagues to rejoin us here in the plenary room from the Nuclear Check-up parallel panel. We will resume our programming shortly. Please do not leave the room during a brief pause as colleagues join us. Thanks.

All right, everybody. Thank you for your patience. As we all filter back in, I want you to now please join me in welcoming Francesca Chambers of USA Today who will be moderating our next panel on the legislative commitment to Transatlantic Security. Please welcome Francesca Chambers.

Everybody left, I think. Come back in.

Well, I’m Francesca Chambers, White House Correspondent for USA Today. I am thrilled to be leading this discussion between Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Thom Tillis. Thank you all for being here, and thank you for the invitation to speak at this forum marking the 75th anniversary of the NATO Alliance. As you may know, Senator Shaheen and Tillis are the co-chairs of the Senate NATO Observer Group, a bipartisan group that they reestablished in 2018 after more than a decade of inactivity. The topic of this panel is the legislative commitment to Transatlantic Security, and that is where we will begin, taking head on the question on everyone’s minds. Regardless of who wins the US Presidential Election in November, how will you ensure that the United States remains a member of NATO and that it will uphold its Article V obligation to every member of the Alliance, regardless of whether they spend 2% of their GDP on defense or not?

Well, first of all, thank you. It’s really nice to be here. Thank you to the Atlantic Council and to all of you in the audience for being here for this conversation. For those of you who have done this event in past years, you will know that Senator Tillis and I have now done this for four years in a row. We were in Brussels, Vilnius, Madrid, and now it’s nice to be able to celebrate the 75th anniversary of NATO here in Washington D.C. I think that speaks to the strong bipartisan support that NATO has in the United States Senate and really, in Congress. Earlier this week, I went to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly event in the House that had a number of members of Congress who were there in support of NATO. As you’re probably aware, in the last session of Congress, we changed the legislation to require approval by the Senate for any president who wanted to withdraw from NATO. So I think the support is ironclad.

Yeah, and actually, that clarifying legislation was just that it already… This is a ratified treaty that has existed for 75 years, and the Article V commitment, the only time that we have had to mobilize under the Article V commitment was when our family of nations came to support the United States and Afghanistan, and the War on Terror. So we’re in the political silly season here right now, and you have to deal with campaign rhetoric. But for anyone to think that Congress would ever support the exit from the most successful, most important alliance that has ever existed is quite frankly rubbish, and I’ll speak purely, at this point, from a Republican standpoint. I think Jeanne would say the same thing from a Democratic colleague. So, at this point, we have to speak frankly about this. This is not a real threat. This is something that is used as a political device to create the fear, and uncertainty, and doubt. I’m an elected official. I understand that. I don’t know that I would ever use it, but let’s just be very clear. This is not something that’s in the cards. I do remember when we went to Brussels.

Right.

I think it was-

In 2018.

Literally, when we were on the way, then President Trump said, “Maybe we should withdraw from Brussels.” I think we were coming to speak at this event, and I was saying our institutions of government and the Article I institution that we happen to be a part of is very prominent when it comes to ratifying and enforcing treaties. You should know that the Ukraine vote, the Ukraine Supplemental vote is a good indication of just how strong support for the alliance is and also, incidentally, for Ukraine.

Well, the prolonged debate over that Ukraine aid in Congress has called into question the legislative branch’s commitment to protecting its European allies from Russia’s military aggression. Secretary General Stoltenberg has asked allies to maintain their spending on Ukraine over the next year and pledged to contribute a collective $43 billion USD at minimum. Given the fierce debate in Congress, is that a commitment that the US can realistically deliver on?

I think that we have to. We have to go through it. I mean, if you think about when we entered that debate, many people thought that we were not going to be successful with the Ukraine Supplemental. It got done, and I should also say that from a Republican perspective, we’re well into the primary season. There’s not a single Republican who has gone through a primary who has lost… who voted for Ukraine Supplemental who’s lost their primary. So I think that’s also a good benchmark for anyone else who thinks that this is something that’s politically sensitive back home. So there’s every indication. We’ll go through it.

(08:43:14)
Look, we have to go through it, and to my… I keep on using this analogy. Maybe I’ll do something different next year. We’re a family of nations like I’m one of six kids. I argue with my brothers and sisters. I have one sister, I’m convinced, would not vote for me if she lived in the state of North Carolina, but we care about each other. When our safety and security is threatened as a family, we come together, and we dispense with the disagreements.

(08:43:40)
We’ve seen that happen. We saw that happen in Afghanistan. We saw it happen in Ukraine after some of the complexities and challenges with our NATO partners after Afghanistan, but we have to have a serious discussion about the exposure here. This is not just about achieving a 2% floor. First off, let’s dispense with the idea that that’s a ceiling. It’s not about achieving a floor. It’s about take in today’s dollars, the dollars that have not been invested in our modernization, and our mutual defense, and our defense industrial base.

(08:44:15)
I can think of one founding nation that in this century, the amount of money that they have not committed to achieve their 2% minimum obligation is $300 billion in today’s dollars. So adjust for inflation. That’s a half a trillion dollars in modernization that we’ve lost over the last 24 years. Russia exposed some weaknesses that we’re now addressing, but those weaknesses will be buttressed by a consistent commitment to 2%. For my purposes, take that off the table, and then when you do that, almost all the political headwinds that we have to deal with here will essentially go away or be de minimis.

Look, I think we will continue to support the Ukraine effort against Vladimir Putin not just because it’s in Ukraine’s interest, in Europe’s interest, but because it’s in our interest in the United States. The reason the Ukraine Supplemental bill got done ultimately is because a significant piece of it went to our defense industrial complex here in the United States, and as Senator Tillis says, one of the things that the war in Ukraine has exposed is the challenges that we have to get prepared for war, to support our own national security.

(08:45:34)
I had a chance to go to the Indo-Pacific back in March with a delegation, and we visited the Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan. One of the things that really surprised me was the focus among the leaders that we met with about what was happening in Ukraine because they got the connection between what happens in Ukraine and what Xi is looking at in China and his interest in the South China Sea and in Taiwan. They got the fact that there is a connection between what happens in Europe, NATO, and what happens with our adversaries. So it’s not just our allies who are watching what we do in the United States. It’s our adversaries. The best thing we can do to slow Xi down in China, to help ensure that in Iran and in North Korea, that they are being very careful about challenging the United States is to see Vladimir Putin defeated in Ukraine.

Staying on Ukraine, any future expansion of NATO would require Senate approval. Allies are poised to declare at this summit that Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO is irreversible, provided that it makes the reforms that NATO allies are seeking. Does Ukraine’s eventual inclusion in NATO have enough backing in the US Senate for America to be able to agree to that?

Well, I think that’s not going to happen while they’re in open conflict with Russia, while there’s a war going on, but I think the goal is to provide a bridge to NATO membership. That’s part of what our security agreements have been about with the US and Ukraine, and also, some of the other bilateral security agreements. Obviously, as you point out, NATO is not just a defense military alliance. It’s also an alliance of values, of shared values, democratic values. So Ukraine needs to on its reform path to ensure that it can also comply with all of the values that are part of the NATO Alliance.

Yeah, I agree with Jeanne. I just think about… We moved fairly quickly to move forward with the accession votes in the United States. Actually, more quickly than historically with both Sweden and Finland. But going back to the family analogy, now we’ve got 32 family members. I think that we will provide the Ukraine and other seeking accession in the future. We’re going to continue to enlarge NATO, but we’ve got to maintain a high bar, and in the meantime, figure out what we need to do in terms of defense cooperation and other things to provide incentives and a sense of security short of NATO membership.

(08:48:43)
I clearly see a future for Ukraine. Ukraine has demonstrated an incredible… Let’s go back and thank the Ukrainian people for their bravery, their adaptability, their innovation. I mean, this is an extraordinary country, a population of people in a parliament that is listening to… while they’re fighting a war. When their capital city is being bombed, they’re having committee hearings about the very reforms Jeanne referred to that they have to get into place to continue to make steps towards accession. That is extraordinary, so we should think the Ukrainian leadership for addressing things that arguably, maybe they should have addressed sooner, but we are where we are. We should thank those on the battlefield for doing the courageous job that they’re doing every day.

Hear, hear.

So you’re comfortable with that language, “irreversible?”

Yeah.

Okay.

I’m really comfortable with Vladimir Putin reading that language.

This NATO Summit marks the 75th anniversary of the Alliance with cause for celebration among member nations, but it’s also a chance for reflection. Change is afoot in Europe and the US as we’ve discussed here today. Later this year, the organization will usher in a new Secretary General for the first time in a decade. What are the biggest threats to the Alliance’s strength and relevance politically and militarily?

Well, I think when Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, he thought he was going to split NATO. He thought it would be weaker, we would not be able to stay unified. In fact, it’s had just the opposite effect, and I think that’s the most important thing going forward that we can ensure that NATO provides is to continue to be unified. It’s also stronger. I mean, not only is it stronger in terms of its compact and the provisions that we are doing in terms of putting more troops on the Eastern front, looking at interoperability for our equipment and making progress on that, new weapon systems, but it’s stronger because we’ve added new members.

(08:51:10)
The addition of Sweden and Finland has really been amazing. Amazing both because they have changed their internal policy of being more neutral to actually having so many of the highest percentage of their population who wanted to join NATO, and they add a lot of capability as well both from the geographic location near the Arctic and Finland sharing the long border with Russia, but also because of their capability on the sea, in the air. Thom, talk about your piece on Finland where you talk about the F-35s that Finland has.

Yeah, yeah, and I’ve tried to explain this to some of my members as we were talking about a session with Finland. I said, “This country has ordered 65 Joint Strike Fighters.” If the United States, on a per capita basis, were to order the same number, we’d have to have 4,000 operational 24/7. That suggests to me that they’re a badass country, and they will be welcome to NATO.

(08:52:33)
Here’s other serious topic that we have to talk about. Ladies and gentlemen, I do believe that Putin subjected us to a stress test that he thought we were going to fail as an alliance. There’s no way he could have assumed that he would’ve been successful. If he was gaming this out, he had to make a certain assumption with a high degree of probability that there would be fractures in the alliance, and that did not happen, but we also have to understand… We understand a lot of weaknesses.

(08:53:02)
Number one, our intelligence about Russia’s capabilities was wrong, absolutely wrong. They have non-commissioned officer corps. It’s going to take them 10 years to develop. Their weapons platforms are far short of what they should have been, and I’m reminding some of our friends who buy Russian platforms, they may want to dispense with the brochure, and see how it actually operates on the battlefield, and rethink their weapons’ sources, but we have to modernize. We have to invest. We have to have latent capability that can be scaled up for the defense industrial base.

(08:53:34)
These are not necessarily things that have to go 24/7, 365 today, but we have to be able to demonstrate that capability. Hopefully, never have to use it, but it will be an enormous deterrent. But if we don’t have it and we get into a live fire situation, we will be dramatically limited in terms of our response without addressing elements of the stress test that were not relevant to what we’ve done in Ukraine, but would be absolutely relevant if we had to come together and satisfy our Article V commitment.

The other thing that NATO is working on, and I’m really excited about this because I’ve been involved in the US in Women, Peace, and Security, and I know there’s going to be a panel after this one talking about this. Back in 2000, the UN passed a resolution on Women, Peace, and Security that basically recognizes that women need to be integrated into all aspects of what we’re doing. NATO is working on this. They have a proposal that they’re presenting this week on implementing WPS in to all aspects of their operability which is really critical.

(08:54:49)
It’s based on the recognition that when women are at the table in conflict negotiations, that those negotiations are 35% more likely to last longer than 15 years if women are part of that. There are a number of other data points that show the connection between women’s participation, and empowerment, and stability in societies, but that’s one that I think is really critical, and it’s exciting to me as the sponsor of this legislation in our Congress back in 2017 as we are the first and only country that has implemented this legislatively, and to see NATO adopting it and really fully implementing this policy is important.

I’d like to go back to something… I’d like to go back to something that you said, Senator Tillis, about things that NATO might need to do in the future. I know that the 2% GDP commitment has been a central theme of the US delegation, both Republicans and Democrats, so what have your conversations with member nations been like about that? What is your argument to those that are below that number about why they need to increase their spending sooner rather than later?

Okay. Number one, I complimented Finland. I should also say that Sweden also brings a number of capabilities, particularly their power projection in the Arctic. Okay. So I don’t want anybody to think I’m favoring them. I’m glad Sweden’s in, and a happy anniversary to Finland now that they’re 1-year-old. Now, ask the question again. I had to get that in.

What has your conversations been like with member nations that are below the 2% GDP? What is your argument to them to increase that [inaudible 08:56:41]?

The reason why I try to use the family analogy is to make it very clear I care deeply for every one of the other 31 members of NATO. This isn’t a discussion of criticism. What I hear from some people, it doesn’t play very well back home. They want us to spend more on this policy or that policy. I said, “Have you explained to them that their personal safety and sovereignty is a part in increasing that, improving their safety, improving our collective ability to even deter an aggressive act by making this investment? Have you really connected with your population in a way to make that understood?” Because if we don’t continue to press on it, then why should anyone else who’s struggling politically continue to pursue the 2% or more?

(08:57:39)
I mean, we can’t afford, in the world that we live in today, to get back to single digit members contributing 2% and considering that a ceiling. We have to dispense with that and communicate it in terms that the population understands. I would love to spend resources on other things that address domestic priorities, but we only exist as free nations and are able to implement those policies because we are sovereign and we are secure.

(08:58:11)
National security is a prerequisite for long-term democracy, and we have to communicate it that way to diffuse the politics and eliminate that. I’d love to have a NATO conference where we’re not talking about the 2%. 30% of the dialogue this week would probably be about fair share or burning share. Let’s get past that. Talk about modernization. Talk about industrial base expansion. Talk about deterrent effect that comes from the amount of money that we’re spending on modernization, interoperability, defense supply base. Let’s get to that point.

I agree with Senator Tillis. I’m not going to disagree. I think one of the other arguments that I have used with some of the countries that still need to get to their 2%, and there are a couple that don’t have a plan to actually do that yet, and we’re hoping to see those plans this week, is that it allows us in the Senate and in the US Congress to take that off the table in terms of opposition to whatever might be happening in NATO, and it allows us to stay focused on what the real issues are which is defending Europe and-

I really want to make sure… Yeah. I’m sorry, Jeanne. I really want to make sure that we understand numbers here because 2% doesn’t sound like a lot, but I used one example of a nation that is below 2% and has been below 2% just in this century, and the delta between what we believe they should be paying and what they paid is $300 billion. Ladies and gentlemen, let’s aggregate the others and say, “What if all had been paying 2%? What would 2 or 3 trillion more dollars over the last 24 years have created in capabilities? Who knows?” I mean, it’s only guessing, but if we had put 2 or 3 trillion more dollars in or our mutual defense over the last 25 years, would Ukraine have even happened? One has to ask the question.

Yeah. It’s about deterrence and defense.

Yeah. Other than that, I don’t have an opinion on it.

Well, let’s talk about the next 25 years then. How should the NATO Alliance approach the Indo-Pacific in light of the military aggression that we have seen from China in the South China Sea?

Well, I think one of the exciting things that’s happened over the last three years has been the addition of those four Indo-Pacific nations to… They’re not NATO members, but they are participating in the NATO Summit, the NATO Compact, and coming out of Madrid, talked about China for the first time and the threat that China presents. I think having those partners in the Indo-Pacific who recognize the connection between what’s happening in Europe and the potential for what happens in the Indo-Pacific is really critical.

(09:01:25)
Again, as I said, what we know is that they are watching what happens in Ukraine, that China is watching what happens in Ukraine because it has an impact on what President Xi might actually do in Taiwan. They see the connection. If Putin is successful in Ukraine, what’s to prevent Xi from going into Taiwan? So it’s connected, and they understand it. It’s not by accident that Japan has announced this year that they’re going to double their defense spending because they recognize the challenges to their own security that China and North Korea present.

I actually think having the IP4 here since Madrid, right?

Yep.

It was a funny story. We were meeting with the Japanese delegation, went to the wrong Marriott, but we finally got there and had a wonderful discussion with them, welcoming them to the NATO Summit, but having the IP4 now for the third year, China is watching. I don’t know that China is necessarily concerned with quantitative differences between our arsenals and theirs or maybe even qualitative differences, but we know that China is concerned with our alliances. The more we see this cooperation for the first time in the strategic concept, China being mentioned six times, those are things that China watches. I think by itself, it has a deterrent effect, but it also forces discussion amongst our allies, amongst the IP4 in this forum and other forums which I think are very helpful and by themselves have a deterrent effect.

Do you see a role though for NATO in that theater, and if so, what would that role be?

I, for one thing, I don’t want to get into NATO necessarily becoming a global alliance. It may be. I mean, in terms of the United States, the world is small, and I think increasingly, our colleagues in Europe feel the same way, but I don’t want to get into the complexity of making NATO a global sort of alliance. I think that we could have something short of that and have other agreements, alliances that make sense for that part of the world and for some of our partners in NATO. It may make sense for others, it may not, but I don’t think we have to get there yet because we’re only three years old in terms of having Indo-Pacific nations represented here at NATO, and I think we continue to build on that. That by itself is great progress.

Yeah, I think NATO will determine that along with other countries what the appropriate-

Well, you’d have to change the acronym and everything too.

Well, we are almost out of time here, so I just want to offer you both the opportunity. Are there any closing thoughts that you’d like to deliver?

Well, just to reiterate that 75 years is amazing to have the strongest, longest lasting military alliance in history. I was talking to the President of Kosovo yesterday, President Osmani, who was talking about Kosovo’s liberation or freedom as an independent state being one of the biggest successes of NATO. And she said, “25 years ago we became a country and my children are the first generation that hasn’t had to struggle with war that we can remember in our country.” Well, I hope that 25 years from now, we will be hearing from the people of Ukraine that their children don’t have to worry about war because of NATO’s support for Ukraine.

The message, it is perfect timing for the NATO Summit to be in the United States because a lot of people, like I had in my opening comments, are wondering whether or not there’s a risk to US involvement in NATO. We need to dismiss that. And I’ll give you various data points. The number of people who were so supportive of accession of Finland and Sweden. It was extraordinary. It was never a discussion. We didn’t have to work hard to get support for that. That’s pro-NATO. Because we’re talking about accession and expanding NATO.

(09:05:58)
Ultimately, what you saw with Speaker Johnson, in spite of all the political headlines and everything else, you saw Speaker Johnson support the supplemental over the objections of some of the members of his conference in a very tumultuous time. That’s another demonstration of long-term commitment to NATO. I think what you see in the Senate, the very strong vote for Ukraine supplemental is another indication. So I hope you all leave here recognizing that our democracy is a messy one, but it’s been relatively successful. And I expect it to continue to be very successful and I expect that to also continue to be an unqualified support for the most extraordinary treaty that’s ever existed.

Well, thank you both for being here again and doing this panel again together. And thank you all for coming and I think we have another panel after us. Thank you very much.

Thank you Senators and Francesca for such an interesting conversation on peeling back the layers on the legislative perspective, on the transatlantic relationship and an irreversible path for Ukraine to NATO membership. Please now join me in welcoming Andrew Desiderio from Punchbowl News to the stage for our next session on Women, Peace and Security: The Role of Women in Leadership.

All right. Good evening everyone. It’s my pleasure to welcome you all here to Washington and to this session on Women, Peace and Security: The Role of Women in Leadership. My name is Andrew Desiderio. I’m senior congressional reporter for Punchbowl News, where we cover the power, people and politics that drive the decision-making here in our nation’s capital. I am honored to be here today moderating this panel which seeks to highlight the Women, Peace and Security Initiative as a critical element of transatlantic security. As many of you know, NATO’s policy on women, peace and security was first unveiled in 2007. And during this year’s summit, we’re seeing the first update to that policy since 2018 in order to reflect the latest geopolitical developments. And of course in 2022, NATO named the women, peace and security as a core priority in the strategic concept. I’ll also note that in 2017, the United States became the first nation to comprehensively enact, through legislation, a Women, Peace and Security Strategy with the goal of promoting gender equality in the field of conflict resolution. And this has remained a bipartisan issue importantly in Congress.

(09:08:57)
So what has changed since then? Well, quite a lot. Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has completely redefined the security landscape in Europe and here in the United States, especially for women on the front lines. And as we know, intensifying conflicts around the world pose targeted threats against women. However, women have proven to be indispensable leaders, working to guarantee peace and security. Against all odds, women in Ukraine continue to demonstrate their courage and bravery. And across the entire NATO alliance, women in positions of power are transforming the very way we think about our collective security and defense.

(09:09:33)
So without further ado, I’m going to stop talking and introduce my distinguished panelists here, who I’m thrilled to be with. To my immediate right is Olha Stefanishyna. She’s the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic integration. We also have Irene Fellin. She’s the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security. And at the far end of the stage, Jennifer Klein, Assistant to the President and Director of the White House Gender Policy Council. Thank you to all three of you for being here. Really excited to dive in and start this conversation. Yes.

(09:10:14)
Deputy Prime Minister, I want to start with you. A couple of years ago you were given the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Women for Peace and Security Award. And I want to read something that you said at the time, “I accept this award on behalf of Ukrainian women who are making every effort to protect their country from the Russian invaders and who have been fighting alongside men for freedom and essential democratic values.” Can you start us off by talking a little bit about the contributions that women have made and are making to the war effort in Ukraine and how Ukrainian women have been so disproportionately impacted by Russia’s unjust invasion?

Well, probably I’ll start with the numbers which are not that vivid across Atlantic and probably somewhere beyond the Ukrainian borders. We have around 20% of women constituting the overall entirety of the Ukrainian armed forces. With more than 10,000 serving on the frontline and around 50,000 in different areas in different senior officers position. Just to compare, it’s a totally different number from the one we had before the full scale war. Though as a advancing democracy, we were mainstreaming gender equality policy and trying to lift every barrier which has been arising from our post-Soviet legacy, putting the restrictions to women to access to military, to any other profession or whatever. But the situation has changed dramatically because of the war. And as a country who has continued to be an advancing democracy throughout the war, a country who has remained fully functional and resilient regardless the massive aggression and amount of the war crimes, we also made sure that we can catch up with our legislative and institutional changes enabling women to be more effective throughout the war.

(09:12:13)
That’s why we have started a lot of transformations. We lifted all the barriers for women to access any profession in the armed forces and the security and defense sector, enabling them to have the same access to defend their country as the men had before. It is done. We, of course, reinvent the woman’s role in recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine as we are going through a mobilization period where we need a mobilization to be scaled up, to be capable to defend and win back our territories. And mostly conscription addresses the man and that’s why the recovery needs are not getting smaller. So we have a massive program, which means that women would get more access and more engaged in the recovery and reconstruction process. But of course with around 6 million of people who had to flee from the places they were living in Ukraine, whether it’s to the other parts of Ukraine or Europe, the vast majority of them are women and children who had to save their lives and their families. They lost their houses, they lost their lives. Basically, in a very moral way of this understanding, many women are still facing a lot of challenges because their families are splitted because men are serving in the armed forces. These are the same men who were designers, painters, technicians before the war. These are different people. So there are a lot of challenges related to that. And also we are working hard to work with those families who are with the men and the women who are coming back from the combat experience and their reintegration back into the society is really different and it’s really hard to keep the family going from this very challenging period. And that’s all the complexity of things we’re thinking about. But also moving through these challenges opens the priorities for ourselves. We have started to advance and pioneer a lot of new experiences. And with Irene together, I think we have invented the new NATO standard, which has a female uniform and everything related to enabling women to serve in the armed forces equally, not on the paper but not on the frontline, but also according to the procedures and the standards.

(09:14:48)
And NATO is about to launch and finance a new massive project which will sponsor the development and production of the female uniform and everything related to that. So Ukrainian women will feel that they’re not serving because of their desire, because the country proud of them and make sure that they’re part of it. So many things are going on, but I think from this point, when the full scale war started, we all were standing as a nation, as one, women and men, elderly and younger one. And of course, I think the major element of morale for all the people serving on the frontline is that those families who keeping the country running, and these are mostly the women of Ukraine.

Thank you very much for sharing that with us. I think it’s a very good foundation for the conversation we’re having today. Special Representative Fellin, I want to go to you next on something that the Deputy Prime Minister set us up for actually, the modernization this year of the WPS policy. You were at the State Department yesterday with Secretary Blinken. You spoke about this. Can you talk about the updates to the policy that are being rolled out this year and also how they’re going to be implemented?

As you mentioned yesterday, yes, we were at the Department of State to prepare, to set a stage for announcing the new policy on WPS. Let’s make a step back and go to the other policy, the one you mentioned that was in place since 2018. The world has changed, the security environment has changed and therefore there was a tremendous need to have a document that was fit for purpose. This does not only apply for the strategic concept and the other policy, this applies to women, peace and security as well. And therefore the first step was to make sure that the language was integrated in the new strategic concept.

(09:16:49)
For the first time, the current strategic concept makes a reference to the importance of integrating women, peace and security across the three core tasks. And then following this first important decision, we worked to have a new policy that could really reflect the new poster from NATO. Which means that moving, shifting the focus from a crisis management where it was mainly a stage where we were integrating gender perspective, deploying gender advice, and to look into what is today the core business of the alliance, as you said, deterrence and defense. So the new policy is framed around the three core tasks. I really want to start from the strategic concept and translating this document throughout a gender lens. And that’s very important to speak the same language that our political leaders and military leaders speaks. Because one of the prong when we talk about gender equality in the documents, that the language that we use, especially when we are in the defense and security context, does not speak to our leaders. It’s very important, that’s what I’m learning during my mandate, that we come with concrete examples and projects that really resonate, especially with our military colleague. And the project that Olha mentioned, it really worked in this way because I could get the attention from the military. Because when we talk about other less concrete dimension of the agenda is more complicated. So we brought the uniform last month at the NATO HQ to really showcase what it means having different uniform fit and develop around the female anthropomorphic data. And there were also trousers for pregnant women. And there was a shock by the colleagues and the generals going around.

(09:18:43)
And the point here, what I shared is, “Did you ask women what they want when they are pregnant? Do they want to stop their service? That must be their right. But if they want to continue their service, what they need is to be able to have their uniform.” So all these elements help to create a new document that is structured around the three core task. And I would like to share only a couple of elements that are innovative in the policy. The first point is the strategic goal around gender responsive leadership. We have the tendency, it’s almost 25 years since Resolution 1325 was adopted, to see this as an agenda about women for women. But in a security environment that is still male dominated, we need men to be gender responsive leaders. So that for me was the first goal. We will not achieve results and our goals if we don’t work together.

(09:19:41)
And this is really the main point that for me is the fundamental of the agenda. And then altogether, we will implement this across the core tasks. And we have new elements coming in such as gender disinformation and misinformation, the impact of new technologies, artificial intelligence, technology facilitated gender-based violence. All those elements where we as an alliance are advancing a lot. And so the policy will support our war to make sure that we will not create more discrimination, but on the contrary, we will advance gender equality.

I want to pick up on that actually. You mentioned gender-based violence. Director Klein, you advise President Biden on a range of topics from gender-based violence to women’s economic security. So your role in the administration is quite broad and far reaching in terms of the topics that you advise the president on. Can you talk about how NATO’s Women, Peace and Security Initiative factors into all of that that you do at the White House?

Yeah. First of all, thanks so much for the great question. It’s great to be here with both of you. One of the things that the president felt very strongly about when he created the Gender Policy Council, which he did by executive order in March of 2021, and I’ve been lucky enough to lead it ever since, is that the work needed to be both global and domestic. Because while contexts are very different, so many of the issues cross borders. And one of those issues, as you well point out, is gender-based violence. So we work at the Gender Policy Council on intimate partner violence.

(09:21:14)
The president will very proudly tell you that he was the original author and sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994. And we were able to reauthorize that, speaking of bipartisanship, with bipartisan support just last year. But there are issues like conflict related sexual violence, which is core to the work that NATO and the women, peace and security policy that NATO has put out and that the allies are going to adopt this week, which is very exciting. That are about how women need to be protected, women need to be free from violence, and that there is a direct relationship between that and the ability of a democracy to function.

(09:22:02)
Irene raised technology facilitated gender-based violence, which I have come to refer to as the 21st century latest form of gender-based violence. And it’s very important, you said this, but I will emphasize your point, that while the NATO policy that the allies are adopting this week is similar to what has come before it in that it acknowledges the importance of the status of women to the stability of nations and understands those linkages and understands that meaningful participation and protection and leadership are core. It reinforces that. It also addresses these very new security challenges like technology facilitated gender-based violence.

Deputy Prime Minister, I want to come back to you because I’m wondering what you want to see from the allies out of this year’s summit in terms of the Women, Peace and Security Initiative. What steps do you think need to be taken in order to not only elevate women’s participation in the peace and security process, but also to support women and girls who, as you mentioned before, are contributing so much to the war effort for you guys in Ukraine?

Well, probably I could have focused on something related to women, peace and security, I think. But I think the best response we can get is to bring more air defense capabilities to Ukraine to save Ukrainian women and children from being murdered by the Russian Federation, by Putin. But also for those women who has been tortured and raped in the occupation by the Russian Federation, is the justice. I think these are things which are really important and all the other things, Ukraine will do it itself.

Absolutely. Special Representative Fellin, I want to try to put the new policy into the context of Ukraine. One of the things that was announced yesterday at the State Department was that it’s going to be able to provide bulletproof vests, body armor and combat boots for women in Ukraine. Can you talk about what that means for on the ground situation in Ukraine and how that is all going to be spearheaded through the WPS program?

This project we just mentioned with Olha before, it’s particularly important first because it’ll support the service women in Ukraine and their ability to fight and be at the same time better protected. Because especially when it comes to the bulletproof vests, the one that they are currently using are done around male body and they are too heavy and they don’t fit to the women’s body. Which means that if you don’t move comfortably, you are not able to fight and you are at risk. But then this was extremely important when it comes to my work and the role that alliance is doing when we talk about integrating gender perspective and implementing the women, peace and security agenda within everything that we do at alliance. The division that covers the work on the Comprehensive Assistance Package, that is the mechanism throughout which we will fund a uniform, is the operation division, which is not under my responsibility.

(09:25:24)
So this project is particularly important because it’s really a concrete example on how we could work together in synergy and with the other colleagues across the House and as a teamwork and a team effort with our colleague in Ukraine respond to their needs because the Comprehensive Assistance Package is based on Ukrainian needs. So identify the needs, listen to women that are talking with the Ministry of Defense, listen to how they were already addressing the problem. And then bringing the project together and have allies upon this. For me, it’s really a success story. But other important element that have changed since the full scale invasion is also how we analyze the conflict. Something that was not happening at the beginning in the first week was to integrate a gender perspective in the conflict analysis. And that is something I started four weeks before this full scale invasion. So I had to learn very quickly and then to see how we had to integrate this.

(09:26:25)
And the alliance had to adapt to this as well in terms of having the weekly briefing and monitoring the situation and developing the support. And that’s how to work closer with intelligence, for example. And this is something where we have to increase our research and change our way of doing our business. So the women, peace and security agenda is an agenda that is not static. When it was endorsed, they adopted the resolution the year 2000, there were some priorities. They still remain the same.

(09:26:56)
Talking about participation, I was thinking how the language has changed. Refer to what you were saying, Jen. We were talking before only about meaningful participation. Today we talk about full, equal, safe and meaningful participation. And the safe part relates to different aspects. One, because once you are participating, then you face more challenges physical. But the other one is also the online lack of safety then has an impact on our political participation. So there are different ways we also need to adapt on this new way of working and that’s why the new policy is extremely important because it is the tool that will enable me, and me as the main focal point for the alliance, and our colleague to better support Ukraine in the months to come.

Director Klein, I know we’ve touched on this a couple of times so far, but the event yesterday at the State Department in which Secretary Blinken, Special Representative Fellin were there to sort of talk about and unveil, the modernization of this policy. Clearly the administration is committed to it and the president when he comes to these summits obviously has a lot of competing priorities, right? The Deputy Prime Minister mentioned the need for air defenses in Ukraine. Obviously a major point of discussion here at the summit this year and of course the last couple of summits as well. I’m wondering if you could give us some insight into the president’s thinking on all of this, especially since there are so many priorities that are competing for his attention at the NATO Summit every single year when it comes to specifically the Women, Peace and Security Initiative.

Well, as I said, the existence of the Gender Policy Council is one proof point of his commitment to this set of issues. The other thing is both in the military and in his own government, he has really prioritized women’s leadership. Obviously we have the first female vice president, we have the first gender equal cabinet. He appointed the first Black woman to the Supreme Court. And as I said, really coming from the top, him and from the vice president, to create a Gender Policy Council, the first thing we did was create the first ever for the United States National Gender Equity and equality Strategy. And one of the pillars of that strategy is the importance of women’s leadership and political and civic participation. So this has been a priority for him since day one. And in particular, when you think about the military, we know that participation and inclusion and retention and advancement in national militaries is critical, including our own.

(09:29:37)
So again, one of the things he did early on was make sure that our own military includes women and includes opportunities for women to really grow. So to your point earlier, one of the first things he did was create an Independent Review Commission on Military Sexual Harassment and Assault to reduce sexual assault and harassment in the military. And actually those sexual assault and harassment in the military are at a low for nearly a decade. The other thing he did was appoint the first ever woman to serve as the chief of naval operations and on the joint chiefs of staff. So walking the walk, talking the talk about prioritizing not only the issues but the people who can lead.

You mentioned women serving in the military. I want to put my Congress hat back on if I can. That’s where I spend many hours of the day every day. Director Klein, the Senate Armed Services Committee included a provision in the annual defense policy bill last month that would expand the selective service or the draft to women. Does the White House support this and what would this mean for the NATO alliance as a whole, you think? Especially as so many of the allies are starting to reconsider their policies when it comes to the role of women in combat forces, in fighting forces?

Yeah, well I think you see the importance of this in Ukraine, as we’ve just been talking about. Women are in all parts of the military, including on the front lines. And what we think in the United States echoes what we’ve seen abroad, which is that women’s full participation and leadership in our military is not only a moral imperative, it’s also of strategic importance. And we can’t out-compete our adversaries, we can’t win wars, we can’t meet the greatest global challenges facing NATO and the world without using the talents and the skills and the courage of women service members. So that is an administration commitment.

Deputy Prime Minister, you’re seeing this firsthand in Ukraine, obviously, but the direct involvement of women in the fighting forces in the combat forces. Do you think the allies are doing enough to support the meaningful participation of women in national militaries and in NATO forces?

Well, we have been thinking about ourselves and I’ve presented a pretty wide picture of what we have learned. And just as we’re sitting here, North Atlantic Council has released its statement, which precisely says that Ukraine is the major source of innovative experience of the warfare. And I think the gender elements and the gender equality and the gender aspects of serving in the armed forces and the access to the armed forces and representation are also the enormous source of data and information to learn from Ukraine. Because again, as I was referring in my speech in the very beginning, Ukraine is an advancing democracy. And, I mean, for years gender equality policy was mainstreamed and across the government, across the government planning, we have multiple strategies. Institutions went through the gender audit, everybody from Ministry of Defense to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education and the Government.

(09:33:16)
But only when the war started, we thought that we were advancing very much. We also had the gender audit in all our security and defense forces. But when the war started, all the barriers which were unseen through the papers and through the feasibility studies, they revealed. And we had to close every loophole, a barrier after barrier. So if there are any new experience that could be gained to strengthen the bond of the women, peace and security vision and the concept, they could of course be learned from Ukraine. Speaking about the uniform, we were just exchanging with the Irene, that in fact it’s only Sweden from all of the allies who has a really precise approach to the female uniform and everything related to that. And now we invest 7 million euros to invest in Ukrainian women in Ukrainian armed forces. So definitely the outcome of this project will become a new NATO standard.

And Ukraine is obviously setting a very, very good example for the rest of the world, certainly the rest of the alliance as well. Special Representative Fellin, we only have a couple minutes left here, but I want to get your thoughts on what the Deputy Prime Minister was talking about as well in terms of integrating women more fully into the fighting forces of the allied nations.

As also it was said, it’s clear that Ukraine is leading by example on this. And this is a broader observation we would like to make as part of our cooperative security, NATO and the relationship based partner. We will have a lot to learn from Ukraine and this experience on many fronts, including about women fighting in the armed forces. And what is example showing and what Olha just said about the uniform, that this is something that is missing across the alliance as well, says a lot about the need that we have to integrate this perspective in peace time. Which applies also to the fact that integrating women in the armed forces during peace time, it’s what we need to be ready if and when we have to deploy them. Because what shows this is that there was a need and women were ready together with men to fight for freedom and democracy. But the system was not ready to incorporate them. So what we have to learn here is that maybe we need to change our legislation and to see how to better integrate them and equip them with the right uniform. But that does not only apply to uniform, it applies to weapons, to tanks, to how all the capabilities and so applies to the defense industry as well. So there is a further reflection to do how we equip and then our armed forces.

All right. Thank you so much to my distinguished panel for joining me. Thank you to all of you in the audience as well and those watching at home.

Thank you.

Very much. Appreciate this panel. Very important initiative. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Thank you to our esteemed panelists and moderator. Dear audience, that concludes our first day of programming. Thanks to everybody who attended and watched us remotely. I would like to recognize once again the effort that went behind this event. Our co-hosts NATO and the US government and the five co-organizing Think Tanks. A special thanks to our corporate partners as well as our institutional partners. Thank you again to all of our speakers and guests for a great day of programming. We look forward to welcoming you back tomorrow.