Iran Elects First Reformist President in Two Decades

Reformist Masud Pezeshkian will ascend to the Iranian presidency in a delicate moment for the Islamic Republic, both on the world stage and within its borders. He faces a government still largely controlled by hard line clerics, tension with the West over Iran’s nuclear program, and domestic frustrations with the regime. Ali Rogin has more.

To discuss what this means for Iran, the US, and other stakeholders, I’m joined by Suzanne Maloney. She’s the vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. Suzanne, thank you so much for being here. Tell us a little bit more about Masud Pezeshkian. What did he campaign on?

Masud Pezeshkian is a 70-year-old longtime member of the Parliament who served also as the health minister during the second administration of President Mohammad Khatami, who was Iran’s first reformist president. He has kept a relatively low profile up until this campaign. He did register in previous rounds of Iranian elections back in 2013 and then again in 2021 when he was in fact prohibited from running by the Guardian’s Council, which vets all the candidates. This time around, it was a little bit of a surprise that he made it through in part because he wasn’t terribly well known. But of course, all of the elements about this election were very improvisational because it came in the wake of the unexpected death of the prior president, Ebrahim Raisi.

And Pezeshkian had fashioned himself a reformer. What sort of campaign did he run? What kind of message was he putting out there?

Well, Pezeshkian is a longtime member of the Reformist Party that has largely fallen out favor due to the fact that President Khatami, its standard-bearer and others were really unable to affect meaningful change for the Iranian people, and yet it has remained a part of the Iranian political system. And Pezeshkian, when he was selected to run, entitled his [inaudible 00:01:54] Iran or “For Iran.” It was really meant, I think, to talk about the theme of Pezeshkian’s campaign one of being pro Iran, very much non-disruptive, very much in favor of the current clerica-led system, but one in which he wanted to see Iran more engaged with the world and less confrontational and hostile to the world.

Iranian officials have long pointed to relatively high turnout levels in Iranian elections as a sign of legitimacy behind the regime, but this time around there were two rounds of voting and both of them had relatively low turnout numbers compared to previous years. What does this year’s turnout say about the feelings among the Iranian voting public?

I think it’s been clear for many years that much of the population is incredibly disenchanted with the Islamic Republic and the clerical theocratic regime that runs Iran, but they haven’t really had a way to demonstrate that dissatisfaction. The fact that only 40% turned out in the first round of this election was really startling number. In past elections, it’s run as high as 70 and 80% of the voting population that has in fact voted in part because there are requirements for individuals to vote. And so that so many risks that requirement to stay at home was a real concern for the regime, and I think it was part of the reason why the election went to a runoff and in fact why the clerical establishment is quite happy to have someone like Pezeshkian in this position now.

Where does this deep frustration with Iran’s ruling class come from and how might the presidency of Pezeshkian impact that?

Well, Iran has an incredibly young population. Most of the population has been born not just since the revolution, but since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. And they have seen varied attempts to try to normalize the regime, varied efforts to try to promote some liberalization of both politics and society, as well as some expansion of Iran’s ties with the world. But none have really succeeded in part because of the very hard line stance of Iran’s ultimate authority supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

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And so they’ve become very disgruntled, very much disillusioned with even the modest efforts of the system to try to give them some kind of political participation. They’ve also been very dissatisfied with the state of the economy, which has been subject to both very heavy American sanctions, but also to considerable mismanagement by the clerical system. It’s really unclear that Pezeshkian’s presidency will make a meaningful difference. He is someone who’s quite loyal to the system itself. But he will bring about a kinder, a gentler Islamic Republic to some extent, and that at a time of considerable tensions on the regional scene and considerable dissatisfaction at home might just be a benefit for both the population and for the leadership.

There is of course the Iranian nuclear program, which is the source of so much tension between Iran and the West, and of course rising tensions with Israel that we’ve seen play out since the October 7th attack. How do you think this election may affect Iran’s approach to all of those issues?

I expect the Pezeshkian’s election will have very little impact on Iran’s foreign or regional policies. He will have limited bandwidth or engagement with the nuclear file. The same is true for Iran’s relationships with its proxies across the region. It’s possible though that Pezeshkian can inject a note of caution, a note of prudence, which seems to have been both his style and his message on the campaign trail.

Suzanne Maloney with the Brookings Institution, thank you so much for joining us.

Thank you.