State Department Press Briefing for 8/12/24

… A dramatic escalation in Iran’s support for Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine. Iranian officials also continue to deny providing any UAVs to Russia when evidence is plain for the world to see.

(00:13)
Russia has used these UAVs in relentless attacks against the civilian population in Ukraine against civilian infrastructure, and this duplicity is only the latest reminder to the international community that the Iranian regime lacks in capability.

(00:28)
During his campaign, Iranian president, Pezeshkian, claimed he wanted to moderate Iran’s policies and engage with the world, and we have said we have no expectation his election will lead to a fundamental change in Iran’s direction and this pending transfer of missiles, if the reports are accurate, is further evidence or a continuation of Iran’s destabilizing behavior.

(00:50)
We will continue to judge Iran’s leadership by their actions, not their words. With that, Humayra or Sean, any of you want to kick us off?

No, it’s fine. Thanks, Vidal. Can I ask you, what’s the latest on US expectation on Iran’s response on Israel following the newest killing?

Look, it should be no surprise to you, Humayra, I’m not going to get ahead of assessments or speculate intelligence or operational matters from up here. What I can say is what you’ve heard, President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and others echo from up here before is that we are committed to helping Israel defend itself, and we have put robust military capabilities in the region to do just that.

(01:42)
At the same time, we continue to work diplomatically to prevent any major escalation in this conflict. Those are our goals. As you all have seen, no doubt, the secretary, over the past week or so, has been engaged in calls with his counterparts, discussing not just the need to finalize a ceasefire deal, but also continuing to work so that there can be de-escalation. We obviously don’t want to see any kind of attack or response happen in the first place.

Do you have any indications recently that your efforts are actually working and there might be a more subdued response from Iran?

I’m just not going to get into intelligence assessments or our operational assessments from up here.

Are the ceasefire talks that you called for August 15th, are they still going to go ahead after what Hamas said last night?

I’m aware of those comments from Hamas, and we fully expect talks to move forward, as they should. All negotiators should return to the table and bring this deal to conclusion. It is, in our view, time for Hamas to release the hostages, which as you all know, include American citizens and bring relief to the people of Gaza under the deal, which continues to be a lot on the table and we’ll continue to work that with regional partners and allies.

Right, when you say you fully expect the talks to go ahead, if they say they’re not taking part, are you going to have the talks without them or are you trying to bring them on board?

As I said, I will just leave it at the fact that we expect these talks to move forward as they should. I’m not going to-

Will you have it without them?

I’m just not going to speculate beyond that. We’ve seen reports of those comments from Hamas, and we fully expect these talks to continue to move forward.

In US view at the moment, who is the biggest obstacle to achieving this ceasefire and hostage deal?

I’m not going to color it one way or the other, but let’s not forget that it was early last week, the prime minister of Israel immediately welcomed this initiative and confirmed that the Israeli team will be there and they’ll be prepared to finalize the details of implementing the deal.

(03:58)
We also, in coordination, we believe our partners in Egypt and Qatar are emphasizing to Hamas that the onus is on them to agree to a ceasefire. We believe that there has been headway made, but we need to finalize this agreement, continue to close and bridge some gaps, but we believe that agreement is possible and that’s something that we’re going to continue to work between the parties. Sean.

Could we consider the Middle East, the strike on a school in Gaza? I think the latest toll I saw from officials in Gaza, the health minister was 93 dead. Israel has said that it identified 31 militants in [inaudible 00:04:40]. How much credence do you put in this? Do you think that… Even if 31 militants were killed, that means another 60+ non-militants died in this. What’s the nature of the assessment that the US has both on the facts on the ground and whether there’s any level of concern on this?

First, Sean, let me just say we are deeply concerned about this weekend’s horrific incident on the al-Tabin school in Gaza City that killed a number of people sheltering in place, and our hearts go out to the families of those who lost loved ones and we are praying for a speedy recovery for those who have been injured.

(05:17)
We have been clear, both to our partners in Israel that every possible effort needs to be taken to minimize the impact of civilian casualties but again, as we have seen in this instance, as our Israeli partners indicated, that there were a number of Hamas militants using civilian infrastructure, in this case, a school to hide amongst that. We condemn and deplore any attempt by terrorists to hide among civilians in or under protected facilities. That needs to stop. Sites such as schools may lose their protected status under international law when they’re used by combatants.

(05:59)
That certainly that does not take away from the moral and strategic imperative that our partners in Israel have to take every possible step to make sure that the loss of civilian life, impacts to civilians is not mitigated, and that’s something we’ll continue to stress apparently. On this specific strike and incident, we continue to be in close coordination with our partners in the IDF, and have continued to solicit more information around it, but I don’t have any information beyond that.

Sure. On the more information, is there any indication that US weapons were involved in this?

There wouldn’t speculate on that. I would let the IDF speak to any operations that they may or may not have undertaken.

They’re saying that 31 militants were there. I know you said that you’re seeking information, not you personally, but the United States are seeking information from the IDF. What are you looking for? Are you looking for them to verify that those 31, that the names match up with what they’re targeting?

Look, Sean, I’m not going to get into the specifics of the information that we solicit. What I can just say is that we are engaged with our partners in the IDF about this generally. Let’s not lose sight of the fact that ultimately here Israel does have… We support its ability to defend itself and we support its ability to take out Hamas terrorists to continue to hold to account those that were involved in the horrific October 7th terrorist attack. Again, we also will continue to stress that there is a moral and strategic imperative for Israel to minimize its impacts on civilians and to minimize civilian casualties.

(07:39)
Lastly, the last point I’ll make on this is that we are… The reason we’re having this conversation is because Hamas has a clear track record of continuing to co-locate itself among civilian infrastructure, use civilians as human shields. That’s not hyperbole. There is a clear track record of that.

Can I just follow up on that?

Sure.

Are you satisfied with the credibility of what the Israelis are saying about… Because you quoted their claim about a number of militants being in the building, and they published pictures and names of people they’ve said have been, in their words, eliminated. Are you happy with the credibility of that information?

I’m not going to speak to any satisfaction or not, Tom. What I will say is that we have a robust information sharing relationship with our Israeli partners and when things like this happen over the course of this conflict, we have solicited more and additional information from the IDF, and that relationship will continue. What I can say broad-

[inaudible 00:08:43] verify independently?

I’m just not going to speak to the specifics in which way we work with them, but this is a close and robust relationship and when we have or require additional information, we’re not hesitant to ask our partners in Israel for it and that

… It will continue to be the case.

There’s fairly strong evidence that at least three of the people they’ve published pictures of since Saturday and names were not killed in that incident, were killed in incidents before. That’s according to Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, who’s been going through the list. One of them, Muntessar Dahir, who Israel described as an Islamic Jihad operative, you can go on Facebook and see the picture of him being mourned as being dead just from the day before, with a relative or a friend saying that was in an airstrike on an apartment west of Gaza City. So a completely different incident. Do you verify these things?

Tom, I will let the IDF speak to its own operations and as I said, we have a very close information-sharing relationship with our partners in Israel. I’ll let them speak to their own operations. But again, there is a clear provable track record of Hamas using civilians as human shields, co-locating itself amongst civilian infrastructure. That does not minimize the moral and strategic imperative that Israel has to minimize civilian casualties, but they do have a clear track record of doing this. And as I said, protective facilities may lose their status when they are utilized by combatants in this way.

There’s also moral and strategic imperative for the information to be accurate, credible after the fact because it may or may not justify-

Of course.

… International humanitarian law. So I think what Sean was talking about effectively was the issue of proportionality. If you have many, many dozens of civilians killed, there has to be very strong and clear and overwhelming evidence that those killed created a risk that Israel attacking them gave them a clear military advantage. That’s what international humanitarian law says.

Sure.

So if it is emerging that some of these people were actually killed in previous incidents, it’s not an accurate account of people that were killed.

There is of course a moral and strategic imperative to make sure that any operation that’s being conducted is rooted in salient, accurate and most up-to-date information. That would be the case, not just for Israel, but for any country that has military. But again, as it relates to the details around this, I just will not, I’m not going to get into the operations, and I will let our partners in Israel speak to it.

Can I follow up on that particular incident? So Sean has asked you whether if you know US-made weapons were used. There is reporting actually. CNN reports that US-made small-diameter bombs were indeed used in the school attack. So I just want to understand, is the State Department trying to verify that information or not?

Humeyra, we have a strong…

These are US-made weapons and you regularly send these weapons to Israel. So while I understand it’s an IDF operation, there is reporting that the weapons used are US supplied. So I’m wondering if there is this systematic effort at this building to monitor how US- made weapons are being used.

Of course there is, which we have talked about a number of times in this briefing room. There are, of course, a number of tools and levers at the United States’ disposal to continue to ensure that US security assistance is used within appropriate confines of international humanitarian law.

So far, can you explain-

We talked about-

… After 10 months of war there-

I’m certainly not going to speak to-

They are being used in appropriate and-

… The ongoing and deliberative process, Humeyra-

… In accordance with law?

Israel is a country, which we have a robust security partnership with. That should be no surprise to you. I’m not going to speak to ongoing and deliberative processes, but as we do with any country in which we have a security relationship, there are tools at our disposal to ensure that the use of security systems are consistent with international humanitarian law. That is an ongoing around-the-clock effort that continues to be rooted in a lot of things. It’s in close coordination with our embassies in conflict. It’s in close coordination with NGOs and humanitarian organizations and civil society, and that continues to be the case. As it relates to this specific incident, Humeyra, I don’t have any assessment to offer. I’m not going to speak to Israeli operations from up here.

Right. So since we’re at it, can I ask about Netzah Yehuda, the Israeli Battalion that you guys needed extra information and in the end, US decided to clear that battalion and they’re going to be able to receive US security assistance. Can you tell us what accountability measures they’ve taken that basically made you take this decision, that you’re satisfied?

Sure, Humeyra. So just a little bit of, to take a step back, we made public in April, the Department of State found that after a careful review that incidents of gross violations of human rights by two units of the Israeli defense forces and two civilian authority units had been effectively remediated. The Department has, for the past several months, continued a process to review an additional unit to evaluate new information provided by the government of Israel. And after thoroughly reviewing that information, we’ve determined that violations by this unit have been effectively remediated, consistent with the Leahy process.

(14:08)
The crux of that information, Humeyra, was that two of the soldiers, for whom military prosecutors had concluded further action was necessary, were swiftly removed from their combat positions, have since left the military and are ineligible to serve in the Reserves. Additionally, the IDF has taken several steps to avoid a recurrence of incidents. It has enhanced screening requirements for personnel recruited into that battalion and it has put in place new control mechanisms and training efforts around trainings for individuals who join that battalion. Specifically, soldiers now receive a two-week educational seminar unique to the battalion and conduct is documented. But again, I will let our partners in Israel speak more specifically to their operations.

Will these individuals be prosecuted in Israel?

That’s not for the United States to speak to. It’s a question for the Israeli justice system.

Have you sought that from them?

Again, that’s a question for the Israeli justice system. That’s not something I would speak to from up here.

Yes, but for Israeli settlers, for example, in the West Bank, you have taken action when they haven’t prosecuted them. So are you applying the same criteria to this one or not?

So these are a little bit different circumstances, Humeyra. Let me just say broadly that when it comes to any actions, whatever they may be, if we find them to be destabilizing or contradictory to our stated goal of a two-state solution and wanting stability in the region, we of course won’t hesitate to take action. But I’m not going to speculate further on this. Our partners in the IDF can speak more specifically about individuals in this unit.

(15:53)
Jillian, go ahead.

Is the Biden administration still anticipating the potential for some kind of Iranian kinetic attack on Israel in the coming days?

I think that was her first question, speaking to that. Was it not?

I don’t know. Sorry. I wasn’t [inaudible 00:16:12].

Well, I think it was one of the first questions Humeyra asked, but I will just say again that I’m certainly not going to get into intelligence assessments from up here. What we’re focused on is continuing to de-escalate diplomatically. Our hope and our intent is to make sure that an attack doesn’t happen. You’ve seen for the past number of weeks the secretary to be engaged in conversations with his counterparts and leaders in the region and that’ll continue to be the case. But also, as I said to Humeyra, we are committed to defending Israel and have quite robust military capabilities in the region to do so, should we need it.

On Friday, Microsoft revealed that Iranian government-backed cyber hackers had targeted a US Presidential Campaign back in June. On Saturday, the Trump Campaign said they had been hacked by Iranian cyber hackers. Later the same day, Politico said they had been in receipt of hacked e-mails that had internal Trump Campaign documents and they believed those were coming from an Iranian source. I know you’re not going to comment on a campaign issue, I’m not looking for that. What I’m looking for is can you just comment more broadly on the threat of Iranian interference in the election?

Sure. So this is something that we’ve raised for some time, Jillian. We’ve raised concerns that Iranian cyber actors have been seeking to influence elections around the world, including those happening in the United States. These latest attempts to interfere in US elections are nothing new for the Iranian regime, which from our vantage point has undermined democracies or attempted to for many years now.

… specifically, I’d refer you to the Office of the Director of the National Intelligence for further details on recent reports about the natures of this kind of malicious interference, and colleagues at the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security can speak to what steps are being taken to combat domestic election influence by hostile foreign governments more broadly. As you know as someone who covers this department closely, that is not a line of effort that exists at the State Department.

Can you talk broadly about what kind of leverage the U.S. has to discourage Iran from even planning to interfere?

Well, for any kind of malign, destabilizing activity that the Iranian regime could partake in, and certainly trying to meddle and influence elections, I would certainly count that high among them, we continue to have a number of tools in our tool belt to hold the Iranian regime accountable, and we won’t hesitate to use them, certainly, and not just unilaterally, but also multilaterally through entities like the G7 and otherwise. But specifically on actions, on deterrent actions as it relates to this, I will let my colleagues at the FBI and DHS speak to it.

Thank you.

Alex, go ahead.

Thank you, Vedant. Moving to Ukraine, but before that, may I go back to your opening statement, please?

Sure.

You said that you are concerned about the reports that Iran is planning to deliver hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia. Last week there were reports that EUCOM, U.S. European Command, citing U.S. intelligence, told the Congress that Iran has already delivered hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia. And there was also a Reuters report citing European intelligence that there are hundreds of, Russians are being trained in Iran. Do you have any confidence in U.S. intelligence finding, and what are you going to do about it?

So of course we have confidence in our intelligence assessments. I’m certainly not going to get into them from up here. I think, Alex, to widen the aperture, what we’re talking about when I raise things like this is the continued, deepening security partnership between Iran and Russia, which continues to be incredibly concerning. It is not just a threat to European security, it’s a threat to Middle East security, but it also shows that Iran’s destabilizing influences has reached beyond the Middle East region, and that should be of concern to the entire world. And that’s what we’ll continue to work closely with our allies and partners on.

And two questions on Ukraine.

Yeah.

May I get your assessment on the latest on the battlefield, particularly Ukrainian advancing in Russian territory?

So Alex, I know my colleagues spoke a little bit about this earlier last week, but I’ll let our partners in Ukraine speak to their own military operations. But generally speaking, we have supported Ukrainian forces being able to defend themselves against attacks by Russia’s forces that are coming from across the border, to take actions to protect themselves from these attacks. That, as President Biden says, would be common sense.

(21:02)
We are continuing to stay focused on making sure that our partners in Ukraine have what they need to defend themselves from Russian aggression, and ultimately the decisions about how Ukraine conducts its military operations are decisions for Ukraine to make. Nothing has changed about the United States policy with respect to strikes across the border.

On that line, an advisor to President Zelenskyy told Washington Post last week that they are formally request the Biden administration to allow them to use ATACMS to hit back Russian … target Russian bases where the attacks are coming from because they have been targeting Ukrainian territory without impunity. Is it time, as we see Ukraine advance in the region, is it time to stop caring about what Putin thinks and untie Ukrainian hands?

So Alex, look, I’m not going to get into private diplomatic conversations with our Ukrainian partners beyond just saying that our policy hasn’t changed.

Can I just, very quick, follow on that?

Yeah, sure.

Because Putin has been sort of threatening a tough response, says this will get a worthy response after what’s happened in Kursk. That was within the last 24 hours, I think. Do you have any comment on what he said?

Sorry, could you …

Vladimir Putin talked about a worthy response to what’s happened in Kursk. Do you have any comment on what he’s been saying? There’s been sort of fairly threatening rhetoric.

Well, look, this is nothing new for Mr. Putin. Over the course of this conflict, he has saber-rattled, used escalatory language. Let’s not lose sight of the fact that, again, the only reason we are having this conversation, the only reason Alex was in a point to even ask me this question or raise this issue and you’re able to follow up is because in February of 2022 Russia illegally, unjustly crossed into Ukrainian territory with an attempt to subjugate its borders. And so really the solution here, and if Mr. Putin is interested in a quick resolution to this, would simply be for Russian forces to leave Ukraine. It could be as simple as that.

(23:19)
Nike, go ahead.

Thank you, Vedant. On Sudan, do you have any update on the Sudan peace talks in Geneva, on attendance of SAF? And is it fair to say that the talks will proceed no matter what?

So Nike, the United States at the highest levels of our government has been clear on the urgency of a nationwide cessation of violence, surging of humanitarian aid to address famine in what we believe to be one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, and building toward lasting peace in Sudan with an inclusive democratic governance that represents all Sudanese people.

(23:55)
As you all know, Secretary Blinken invited leadership of the SAF and RSF along with a range of international partners to talks in Switzerland, which are set to begin this week, to achieve that cessation of violence. After extensive consultations with both parties, the RSF has accepted our invitation and unfortunately the SAF has not.

(24:19)
Our view is that talks will proceed with or without the SAF to develop shared action plans towards a nationwide cessation of violence, opening additional humanitarian access, and a robust monitoring and implantation regime. That’s what our focus is on, but I don’t want to get ahead of that beyond that.

How about the format? Are they proximity talks in the-

I’m not going to get ahead of format, Nike, beyond just saying we are continuing to work towards convening those talks, and it’s important for both the RSF and SAF to attend talks in Switzerland. It’s vital to stop the fighting and to ensure humanitarian access to meet with the Sudanese people.

One final question on Thailand.

Yeah, really quickly.

So last week, the U.S. expressed concern on the dissolution of Move Forward Party, and protestors gathered around the U.S. embassy on the ground Friday. Do you have anything, any assessment on the situation on the ground, and how will that affect U.S. policy toward Thailand in the future?

So first, Nike, protecting freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly are essential to maintaining confidence in Thai democracy, and we’re monitoring protests in the area. We’re calling on all sides to act with restraint and to engage in constructive dialogue. I’m not going to get into private diplomatic conversations beyond that, but we have engaged the Thai Government about this, and we’ll continue to do so.

(25:46)
Camilla.

Thanks. On Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Government lifted its ban on certain weapons to Saudi. Granted that ban was also to help wind down things in the war in Yemen, The language that was used was that the department is lifting its suspension. So just understanding that this is not an expiration, this is something that was decided to be lifted now?

Correct.

And if lifted, does that mean we see that as also playing into the strengthening of the security relationship between the U.S. and Saudi and also the day-after plans for Gaza? How should we look at the timing of this?

So these are separate issues, Camilla. And you are correct, this is not an expiration or something like that. This initial decision is rooted in administration policy, a decision by the President, and that continues to be the case today. As you know from the earliest days of this administration, we set out to end the Yemen war. And when we entered office, this was war was escalating. As part of this policy, our administration froze the sale of certain classes

… Offensive weapons while also maintaining sales of systems to the Kingdom required to defend itself from attack. We also have, at that point, doubled downed efforts to interdict and disrupt illicit arms flows into Yemen in support of the Houthis. We also always made clear that the freeze on certain classes of weapons was conditional, and it was based on Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Yemen and efforts to improve civilian harm mitigation measures. The Saudis, since that time, have met their end of the deal and we are prepared to meet ours, which means returning these cases through regular order with appropriate congressional notification and consultation.

(27:45)
And to your broader question, Camilla, through this entire period, since the onset of this administration, Saudi Arabia has remained a close strategic partner of the United States, and we look forward to enhancing that partnership. We’ll continue to work closely with the Kingdom on preventing escalation in the Middle East on a post-conflict plan for the Gaza Strip, as well as them continuing to play a role in finalizing the ceasefire as it relates to the ongoing conflict.

(28:15)
And since you’ve allowed me to start on this topic, I will just note that, meanwhile, the Houthis have proven, once again, to be a group intent on using terror to advance its agenda, including through targeting of civilian shipping in the Red Sea. We, as the United States, are regularly conducting airstrikes to degrade Houthi capabilities, an effort that is ongoing and will continue together with the coalition of partners.

It is fair to just assume that this has happened now that there’s been active lifting of this, given detentions in the region with Iran and-

No, no, no. I’m speaking about the bilateral relationship in a broad context, Camilla. This is a result of strictly the policy as it relates to the ongoing conflict in Yemen and the role that the Kingdom played in maintaining their part of the agreement. And this was initially set out at the onset of this administration. Yeah, go ahead and then we’ll wrap up with you after. Sean, go ahead.

It’s in response to Yemen, but that’s been over two years since the truce was there, so what happened in the past? Did it take two years to verify that-

Sean, these things are processes, they take time, but as you so note, this policy was combined with intensive diplomacy, including direct diplomacies with the Saudi on a path to winding down the war. As you so know, in March of 2022, the Saudis and Houthis entered into a truce under UN mediation. And since then, there has not been a single Saudi airstrike into Yemen and cross border fire from Yemen into Saudi Arabia has largely stopped.

(29:56)
We’ve also seen and been able to assess, at a closer detail, that Saudi Arabia has implemented a number of improvements in civilian harm mitigation procedures, including modernizing its strike planning processes to align with US processes and continuing to participate in a number of US-led trainings and joint exercises. As I said, they have met their end of the deal and this is us holding our end of the bargain as well.

Can I just briefly go to Venezuela?

Yeah, go ahead.

There’s been a report in the Wall Street Journal saying that an amnesty has been offered, or this is a pipeline for Maduro. Can you say, at least from the US perspective, whether that’s something on the cards?

That is not true. We’ve not made any offers of amnesty to Maduro or others since this election. Since you’ve asked about the topic, Sean, let me just say that, as it relates to Venezuela, we reject the increased violence, the unjust mass incarceration, and the repression directed at Venezuelans, including members of the Democratic opposition.

You said the amnesty that’s been offered, it’s inaccurate. Is there something in the cards, that the United States has discussed with the opposition, for example, that they might make some sort of deal with Maduro?

Look, Sean, I’m not going to-

Maybe amnesty is not the right word, but is there some incentive to-

I’m certainly not going to read out the tea leaves of the process. As Secretary Blinken has said, now is the time for the Venezuelan parties to begin discussions on a respectful and peaceful transition in accordance with Venezuelan electoral law and the wishes of the Venezuelan people. The US is considering the range of options to pressure Maduro to return Venezuela to a democratic path, and we’ll continue to do so, but the responsibilities on Maduro and Venezuelan electoral authority is to come clean on the election results. All right. Thanks, everybody.

Just on Venezuela.

Thanks, guys.