Speaker 1 (02:26): Heather (33:59):
Ladies and gentlemen, please take your seats. The program is about to begin. (02:28) Ladies and gentlemen, our program will begin in five minutes. (07:39) Ladies and gentlemen, and please take your seats. The program is about to begin. (09:25) Good morning, everybody. Good morning. Good morning. Welcome to Washington D.C., everyone, and welcome to the NATO Public Forum, the public event taking place during the NATO Summit. I'm Shannon Vavra, a national security reporter, and a CNAS Next Gen National Security Fellow.
Michal Baranowski (11:32): And I'm Michal Baranowski. Michal Baranowski, managing director of GMF East and the director of our Warsaw office coming to you from the eastern flank. Wonderful to see you all. Many familiar faces, many friends and colleagues.
Speaker 1 (11:44): Exactly. Before we start, we would like to have your attention for a moment. We will have several interactive sessions where you'll be able to address your questions. For those in the audience, there are microphones located on either side of the room, and if you have a question, please proceed to the back of the room where our audience team will be able to guide you.
Michal Baranowski (12:03): And besides people in this room, there is many of our fellow citizens watching online. And for those watching online, you can register at the NATO's Public Forum website to ask questions to interact with the forum throughout the day.
Speaker 1 (12:20): You are encouraged to communicate about the event on social media, follow up on the discussion and amplify the conversation online by using the hashtag #NATOSummit. Also, I want to mention that we have a couple of content creators who are conducting interviews in the YouTube studio backstage, Sam Ellis, Victoria Reichert, and Marvin Newman.
Michal Baranowski (12:44): Wonderful. And this is, of course, a team effort. Working together with NATO, NATO Public Diplomacy division, and the US government was a team of co-organizers, which I want to recognize today, and right now. The Atlantic Council, CNAS, GLOBSEC, the Hudson Institute, and my home organization, the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Speaker 1 (13:06): I would also like to acknowledge our corporate partners. We are truly grateful for their support. I'd like to thank our lead sponsors, Google, who is also supporting the YouTube studio on-site, AWS, Microsoft and Northrop Grumman. And our generous partners, Boeing, Data Miner, Leidos, Lockheed Martin, MBDA, Oracle, and Saab.
Michal Baranowski (13:25): So as you can see, it takes a village to organize such an amazing forum. And I want to recognize also our institutional partners, those behind me, who reached out throughout the alliance to make this forum happen and to let everyone knows that this is great program. So please also reach out to our institutional partners.
Speaker 1 (13:47): And with that, to officially open the event, it is my great pleasure to invite on stage Marie-Doha Besancenot, Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy at NATO. And Amanda Mansour, Special Assistant to the U.S. President and Senior Director for Partnerships & Global Engagement.
Speaker 2 (14:04): Good morning.
Michal Baranowski (14:04): Hey.
Speaker 1 (14:04): Hey.
Speaker 2 (14:04): Welcome to the NATO-
Michal Baranowski (14:13): High five.
Speaker 2 (14:13): ... Public Forum 2024. On behalf of our secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, and all our colleagues at the NATO headquarters, I'm very happy to welcome you to this very special anniversary forum in Washington for the first time since 1999. That was 25 years ago. After Vilnius last year, it is a great privilege to organize this event here in the United States with a very special host nation.
Speaker 3 (14:38): And on behalf of President and Dr. Biden, the entire U.S. government team and our consortium partners who, I'm going to say them again just because they've been absolutely invaluable. The Atlantic Council, German Marshall Fund, GLOBSEC, Hudson Institute, and Center for a New American Security. We are thrilled to kick off this historic event. (14:56) This year's public forum is larger and more diverse than ever before, featuring voices from across NATO, from across the United States. Voices of civil society, military, youth, industry, and government. Those on the front lines of today's threats and on the threats of the future.
Speaker 2 (15:12): We have also partnered with institutions across the alliance to enable colleagues in all 32 allied nations and many partner nations, not only to follow the event, but also to engage with us live. So to all those attending the watch parties here in D.C., back in Belgium, in other locations across the Atlantic, welcome to you, too. And finally, a big welcome to the 4,000 followers who are already with us online. This event is indeed being live-streamed.
Speaker 3 (15:40): The United States is grateful for the opportunity to host the NATO Summit here in Washington D.C. for a few reasons. First, it's NATO's 75th birthday. So happy Diamond Jubilee. And congratulations to the 1 billion NATO citizens for this incredible milestone. For the investment, leadership and sacrifice that brought us here, and for the many accomplishments still ahead. (16:01) Second, as you NATO nerds might already know, 75 years ago, the Washington Treaty was signed right here by the original 12 allies in Washington D.C. And I'll note that last night, Secretary General Stoltenberg described the Washington Treaty by saying, "Never have so few words meant so much to so many." (16:21) Last, but certainly not least, we are grateful to be this year's hosts because of the foundational role that alliances and partnerships play in U.S. foreign policy. And there is no better example than NATO, the standard-bearer for the world. Strengthening and modernizing our alliances has been one of the central projects of President Biden's foreign policy since he took office. So you can imagine how happy we are to spend a whole week with single-minded focus on just that.
Speaker 2 (16:48): The Public forum is definitely NATO's premier public event to connect friends and citizens across the globe to our alliance. So what to expect? What makes this edition exceptional? It will feature over 40 panels and conversations. That's a lot of quality time with leaders and experts just over two days. We are proud to host 10 allied partner heads of state and governments. We are also very happy to host 21 ministers, 13 foreign affairs ministers, 11 from allied nations, two from partner nations, eight allied ministers of defense. And we are especially honored to welcome senior Ukrainian voices, like Minister Yermak and Stefanishyna. (17:28) We're also very grateful to the American senators and house representative who agreed to join us, as well as 10 U.S. government senior officials. We will also be joined by 13 senior NATO officials, including our three highest military leaders, general managers of our agency, NCIA and SPA, as well as our chief scientist. (17:51) Because we want this forum to be inclusive and to be open to other geographies, we have prepared for you Vox Pop videos from the U.S. heartland and from NATO's frontiers in the Arctic, in the east, in the south. We have also invited the youth to join, join from our very recent youth summit in Stockholm and Miami. So you will also hear their voices. And finally, you will also hear eight corporate voices because the industry matters and because we have great corporate partners.
Speaker 3 (18:21): As you know, the public forum is running concurrently with and right next door to the actual summit. Today, the North Atlantic Council, or the NAC, will meet to discuss NATO's deterrence and defense, as well as how we will continue to support Ukraine. Tomorrow, the NAC will be joined first by the EU and its Indo-Pacific partners in the morning, then by Ukraine in the afternoon.
Speaker 2 (18:41): As you see, we have designed this event to be in close dialogue with the mostly closed-door event next door, mirroring it, tackling the very same questions that are being discussed and negotiated there. And we have added a forward look on NATO's key trajectories for years to come. So let me say again, welcome and [foreign language 00:19:00] to the NATO Public Forum.
Speaker 3 (19:02): And now it's time to kick off our first panel entitled NATO Looking Ahead, Defending our Future. It is my honor to welcome to the stage U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, and GMF president, Heather Conley.
Heather (19:28): Well, thank you so much, Amanda and Marie-Doha. Warmest of welcomes to you-
Antony Blinken (19:34): Thank you.
Heather (19:34): ... Secretary Blinken. And good morning NATO Public Forum. You and I have an awesome responsibility here. You and I are sort of like the pace car for this two-day race of the public forum.
Antony Blinken (19:48): I'm counting on you, Heather.
Heather (19:48): Well, I'm counting on you. So I guess we have to say, let's start our NATO engines and let's get going. And we have a lot of news to talk about, a lot of the most pressing issues on the agenda. But I just want to take a moment. I want to take a moment and honor this historic moment. (20:05) So I looked back at those transcripts from 1949 and I discovered what the 51st Secretary of State said at the signing, Secretary Dean Acheson. He said, "For those who participated in the drafting of this treaty, the Washington Treaty, must leave to others the judgment of the significance and the value of that act." So I just want to ask you very personally, no talking points, from one Europeanist to another Europeanist, what does this moment mean to you very personally?
Antony Blinken (20:38): Well, first, good morning, everyone. It's great to be with you today. I don't think we've seen this kind of assemblage of... We heard referred as-
Heather (20:46): We heard the term. Use it.
Antony Blinken (20:46): NATO nerds, you're all here.
Heather (20:49): We celebrate this. We celebrate it.
Antony Blinken (20:51): And I proudly count myself among you, and have for more than 30 years now.
Heather (20:55): Yes, sir.
Antony Blinken (20:57): The moment means a lot of things. The moment means 75 years. Jens Stoltenberg said it yesterday, this is now the longest enduring alliance in history. That in and of itself is remarkable. But I think it's evidence that country after country, government after government representing now a billion people, has seen the extraordinary value of this alliance. (21:21) And I think it really boils down to this when you think about it, because when Dean Acheson was here, when our predecessors were here, they were coming off two World Wars. And the absolute priority for them was trying to put in place the understandings, the arrangements, the structures to prevent another global conflagration. And NATO was at the heart of that. And what is at the heart of NATO? This extraordinary commitment that an attack on one is an attack on all is the strongest possible deterrent to conflict, the best possible way to avoid war. Because any would-be aggressor contemplating an attack, knows that if they take on one of us, they have to take on all of us. (22:10) And what we've seen over 75 years is a defensive alliance that's kept the peace for the citizens that it represents. And that in turn enables something else. Because, ultimately, NATO is not an end in itself. The end in itself is to make sure that the citizens of the countries that come together in NATO are able to lead their lives freely, securely, to try to make progress, to try to hand down a better life to their children than one they had. And it starts with the security. If you have that, everything else becomes possible.
Heather (22:45): Absolutely. Thank you. Well, one of the pressing priorities at this 75th year is, of course, Ukraine. Last evening we heard President Biden make some announcements about a new air defense package in Ukraine.
Antony Blinken (22:59): That's right.
Heather (23:00): So Mr. Secretary, I actually want to start with that news. I hope you can help us unpack that and tell us a little bit more about the Ukraine package that we can expect at the summit.
Antony Blinken (23:11): Well, you heard the President yesterday talk about the work that we've done and other allies have done to put together more air defense systems for Ukraine, notably patriots, but also many other systems because we know that's the key to so many things. It's a key to defending Ukraine's infrastructure. It's a key to defending its people. It's a key to defending its forces. It's also key to making sure that we're unlocking the private sector and economic investment in Ukraine that will also be essential to Ukraine's success going forward. But people need to make investments in secure environments. (23:41) So these air defense systems we know have been job number one for Ukraine, and as a result for the alliance that's supporting it. But this is just part of a comprehensive package that we're putting in place that we've actually put in place since before day one to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to defend itself, when it needs it. And I'm also pleased to announce that as we speak, the transfer of F-16 jets is underway, coming from Denmark, coming from the Netherlands. And those jets will be flying in the skies of Ukraine this summer to make sure that Ukraine can continue to effectively defend itself against the Russian aggression.
Heather (24:24): So we also understand, coming out of the summit, we'll have announcements that there will be a new NATO command-
Antony Blinken (24:31): That's right.
Heather (24:32): ... in Wiesbaden that will be very focused building on the extraordinary work of the Ramstein Defense Contact Group to sustain capabilities for Ukraine operations maintenance. We'll have a NATO liaison officer-
Antony Blinken (24:44): That's right
Heather (24:44): In Kyiv. I mean, this is a pretty robust package that you're talking about. You said something when you last were in Kyiv on, I believe, May 14th. And you said, "Our strategy is that Ukraine must win." Is that package, and this is robust, but are the packages that NATO was putting forward, is it enough to fulfill that vision for Ukraine to win?
Antony Blinken (25:10): Yeah, I believe it is. And let's talk about two things. Let's talk about what winning means, what success is for Ukraine. And in my estimation, at least, success is a strong, independent Ukraine, increasingly integrated with Euro-Atlantic institutions like the European Union, like NATO. And that is able to stand on its own feet militarily, economically, democratically. (25:37) And what we see is Ukraine on a trajectory to do just that. Militarily, we have an incredibly robust package that will be unveiled over the next couple of days at NATO, that builds a very clear, strong, robust, well-lit bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine. Including, as you mentioned the first time NATO has dedicated a command to helping an aspiring country join the alliance. This in and of itself is extraordinary. (26:04) Just a few weeks ago, President Biden signed our bilateral security agreement with Ukraine. At the last NATO Summit on its margins, President Biden brought together more than 30 countries to negotiate and now sign these bilateral security agreements. What does that mean? It means that for the next decade, country after country has vowed to help Ukraine build its deterrent and defense capacity. That sends the strongest possible message to Vladimir Putin that he can't outlast Ukraine, he can't outlast Ukraine's partners. (26:35) So the military trajectory is clear. The economic trajectory is critical, making sure that private sector investment is being driven into Ukraine. Our former Secretary of Commerce, Penny Pritzker, has been leading our efforts with so many other allies and partners. We just had a very strong reconstruction conference in Germany. (26:53) But all of this is about making sure that investment is driven to Ukraine. I'm convinced that Ukraine has tremendous capacity, first to develop a strong defense industrial base for itself and for other countries, but also because of the extraordinary innovation of Ukrainian entrepreneurs, the Ukrainian economy, to develop a strong, robust economy. Of course, the air defenses are critical to make sure, as I said before, that investments that are being made, physical investments that are being made, are protected. (27:16) And then finally, democratic deepening. The fact that the EU opened a succession process with Ukraine, the fact that NATO also requires, as Ukraine moves irreversibly along the path to membership, that it continue reforms, that's the strongest guarantee that the reforms that the Ukrainian people so strongly support will continue and we'll deepen. And that results in a Ukraine that is strong, that is independent, and that is the best possible rebuke to Vladimir Putin.
Heather (27:49): Mr. Secretary, I'm so glad you talked about the well-lit bridge, because I think an enormous amount of energy is being expended upon verbal gymnastics in some ways, the irreversible path, the well- lit bridge, all of these terms. But what you've been talking about, the actions, the robustness, that speaks louder than words.
Antony Blinken (28:09): That's exactly right.
Heather (28:09): That's the relationship with NATO. But why are we so caught up? Why can't there be greater simplicity and clarity about this incredibly close relationship that Ukraine will join NATO. Help me understand why we're using all of these very creative words.
Antony Blinken (28:25): Well, we have a lot of very talented people who have to spend a lot of time writing NATO declarations. We want to make sure they're fully employed.
Heather (28:32): So that's the secret.
Antony Blinken (28:34): As someone who's done that myself in the past...
Heather (28:37): Okay.
Antony Blinken (28:38): In all seriousness, by the way-
Heather (28:40): Please.
Antony Blinken (28:41): ... our colleagues are doing extraordinary work. Because, look, we have 32 allies. This is a democratic alliance, an alliance of democratic countries. Different countries have slightly different views on some of these issues, and part of our responsibility is to proceed with consensus. The greatest strength that we have, the most valuable currency we have as an alliance is our unity. But that unity doesn't just happen. It's the product of conversation. It's the product of listening. It's the product of talking. It's the product of building that consensus. And it gets reflected in these documents. (29:15) But, Heather, you're exactly right. I think it's important to look at the words, but it's even more important to look at the actions. As I said a moment ago, the first time, NATO's had a dedicated command to helping an aspiring country join the alliance. And that has very practical components to it that will, I think, speed Ukraine's accession to the alliance. And we talk about a bridge. It's nice to have an image, a metaphor, as my colleague Jim O'Brien likes to say, it's a bridge that's going to be strong, well-lit, and with this command, I think it'll be a short bridge too.
Heather (29:48): So I'm going to sprinkle another historical quote, and this was by President Truman. The year following the signing of the Washington Treaty at his inaugural address he said, and I thought this is a good definition, not quite that word salad that we were talking about, "The main objective of the North Atlantic Treaty is to erase any possible doubt and uncertainty that may be lurking in the minds of potential aggressors." Is that package enough to deter Vladimir Putin on Ukraine? That's the question. Does that provide sufficient certainty?
Antony Blinken (30:25): Well, first, President Truman had the remarkable gift of speaking clearly, speaking directly, and we'll try to live up to that example as best we can. But, look, the proof will be in the pudding. I believe it should. But at the end of the day, what is so important is delivering these practical results, showing that Ukraine has the capacity, that its partners have the capacity. (30:53) I mentioned a moment ago the fact that the F-16 are on their way. The transfer is happening as we speak. They'll be flying in the skies of Ukraine this summer. That's another very important proof point because, again, it concentrates Vladimir Putin's mind on the fact that he will not outlast Ukraine, he will not outlast us. And if he persists, the damage that will continue to be done to Russia and its interests will only deepen. The fastest way, the quickest way to get to peace is through a strong Ukraine.
Heather (31:23): Absolutely. To sort of twist President Truman's words a bit, I'm wondering if the aggressor is starting to put doubts in the mind of some NATO members. And what I'm speaking about is these brazen hybrid attacks. We've seen a series of them. In fact, quite extraordinarily U.S. bases across Europe had to go on high alert this last week. This is starting to be of greater concern. What does NATO have to do to try to get to that problem? Because that is undermining NATO unity.
Antony Blinken (31:53): It has to do, and it is doing what it's always done, which is to adapt. When we came into office, one of the most important things to do from the outset, besides re-engaging the alliance, re-energizing it, and as necessary re-imagining it, was to put forward a new strategic concept, the first one in a decade, to take account for the fact that we're in a dramatically changed security environment with not only new actors posing challenges, but also new means, new methods. That strategic concept reflects the fact that we have these hybrid threats. (32:29) Since we put out the strategic concept, we've been working to turn it into real plans, real programs that demonstrate that NATO is capable and effective in dealing with exactly these kind of challenges. That's going to be carried forward at this summit. More to be said about that in the next couple of days. (32:44) But I can tell you from the meetings that we've had to prepare for this summit, every ally is acutely aware of this, every ally is acutely focused on this. The fact that we've seen attacks in recent months, arson attacks, sabotage, attacks, attempted assassinations, misinformation, disinformation, cyber threats, these are not one-offs. This is part of a deliberate strategy by Russia to try to undermine our security and undermine the cohesion of the alliance. It's not going to work because we see it and we're acting on it.
Heather (33:15): I think we need to start acting on it. It's so concerning that these are increasing, for sure. Let me turn a little bit to the broader elements of the summit. And working with our Indo-Pacific partners, the largest land war in Europe since the Second World War is not simply a concern to the Euro-Atlantic community. We now, this week, have Chinese military exercising with the Belarusian military. We have reports of North Korean trainers coming into Russia. This is now a global alignment of our adversaries, from Russia to China, Iran and North Korea. Can NATO play that bridge between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic? This is the third summit where our four Indo-Pacific-
Antony Blinken (00:00): ...
Heather (33:59): [inaudible 00:34:00].
Antony Blinken (34:00): That's right.
Heather (34:00): Prime Ministers are here. Their commitment is getting stronger. Can NATO play that role?
Antony Blinken (34:07): Yes. And we are seeing it play exactly that role. You mentioned, this is the third summit in a row that we've had Indo-Pacific Partners here, at NATO, Australia, New Zealand, Japan Korea. And it's a reflection of the fact of exactly what you said, that these challenges are linked, that our theaters of work together, are linked. And maybe this was crystallized by Ukraine, when Prime Minister Kishida of Japan, said that what's happening in Europe today could be happening in East Asia tomorrow. When Russia committed its renewed aggression against Ukraine and Japan stood up, South Korea stood up, Australia, New Zealand. This was a reflection of that recognition, that these challenges are linked, and when democracies stand together, whether they're in Europe, Asia or elsewhere, we're going to be stronger and more effective. (34:56) So as we're gathering here, in Washington, with our Indo-Pacific partners, what this means is we are breaking down the silos between Europe, Asia and the United States. And this has been a very deliberate objective of President Biden, from day one. Not only building convergence with our allies, stronger convergence when it comes to how to approach Russia and in a different way, how to approach China. But also breaking down the barriers, the walls, between European partners and Asian partners. And of course, what's happened just in the last year, year and a half, has only reinforced the imperative. Ukraine, we see, unfortunately, China not providing weapons to Russia to pursue its aggression, but being the major contributor to Russia's defense industrial base. 70% of the machine tools that Russia's importing are coming from China, 90% of the microelectronics that Russia's importing, coming from China, that's enabled it to sustain its aggression against Ukraine. (35:52) We've seen a massive buildup of its weaponry over the last year and a half, tanks, missiles, munitions, that's the product of a defense industrial base being fueled by China. As a result, European allies understand the challenge posed by China, to Europe's security, and of course, China can't have it both ways. It can't be all at once or claim to be, for peace and want to have better relations with Europe, while at the same time fueling what is, arguably, the most significant threat to European security since the end of the Cold War. We see it in the relationship between Russia and North Korea, that's abundantly clear. And in all of these areas, as well as some of the hybrid threats that you alluded to before, the connections are clearer and clearer, the Alliance is one place and maybe, I would argue, a central place, where we can bring everyone together, so that we're acting together.
Heather (36:46): So Mr. Secretary, you're talking about strengthening this global Alliance, which the United States has built over the last 75 years. You have some very vocal American national security analysts saying, "There's one thing we have to focus on, China. Everything else is a waste, let our allies deal with everything else, we have to focus on China." What is your answer to that criticism or critique, of what you're trying to build here?
Antony Blinken (37:12): Well, my answer is, first of all, of course, we are focusing on China and we're doing it in two ways. One, we are making the investments in ourselves, at home, to make sure that we're approaching China from a position of domestic strength. When you look at everything that's happened over the last three and a half years, with the incredible investments in our own infrastructure, in our roads, our bridges, our communications, through the infrastructure act. When you look at our commitment to make sure that we maintain our our world leadership on microelectronics and chips through the CHIPS and Science Act. When you look at the investments that have been made in climate technology, which is going to be a critical part of the 21st century economy, that puts the United States in a position of strength. European allies are doing exactly the same thing. (37:55) But the other aspect of this is, not only as we've done, re-energize our Alliances and partnerships, starting with Europe, but also make sure that there is greater and greater convergence in our approach, to some of the challenges posed by China. I think if you look at what NATO has said in the strategic concept, if you look at what key Europeans have said, what the European Union has said, it is abundantly clear that we have more convergence now when it comes to how to approach China than we've ever had. And that's a source of tremendous strength, it means that, instead of having one country having to deal with the challenges alone, the United States, representing maybe 20% of world GDP, suddenly we've aligned 40, 50 and with our Asian partners, 60% of world GDP. That makes a huge difference. And so, precisely because these challenges are joined, dealing with some of the problems posed by China requires this work with, alignment with, convergence with Europe as well as with Asia.
Heather (38:57): I believe, I would say, maybe, using a little bit of that Truman simplicity, "The adversary has a vote and they are aligning, we have not the luxury of focusing on one."
Antony Blinken (39:07): That's correct. And I think, it's a really important point. This is not simply a reflection of our choices, it's the reflection of the choices, the policies that China has chosen to pursue, and of course, that Russia is pursuing in Ukraine right now.
Heather (39:19): And I think you're right, it does pose, for all NATO members, a structural challenge of how do you work in those multiple theaters, when you're dealing with their alignment versus how we are organizing our Alliances. (39:31) Mr. Secretary, I wanted to turn because you raised it and I'm really glad you did, talking about Alliance unity. We know that is the center of gravity, we know how important that is, and we also know that sacrifices sometimes have to be made to keep that unity. You hear mutterings of the least common denominator, "We're not getting exactly what we want because we have to ensure that Alliance unity." But I think over the last week, we are crossing a threshold, we're accepting unity, we're sacrificing or jeopardizing NATO security. You've had one NATO member who has now visited Moscow and Beijing, has talked about Beijing as being a strategic partner. Has received, by NATO and the EU, an opt-out of support for Ukraine. You had another member this week, suggest that they would like to be welcomed into a security organization that is also, it participated with Russia and China. NATO's message has to be clear, does it not?
Antony Blinken (40:31): Well, I think NATO's-
Heather (40:31): This is getting to a point of straining unity.
Antony Blinken (40:35): I think NATO's message is very clear, it's very clear in what's happening here in Washington, over these couple of days. It's very clear in the entire trajectory of the Alliance, over the last three and a half years, an Alliance that's now 32 members strong, with Finland and Sweden, of course, joining. An Alliance that is better budgeted and resourced than it's ever been. When we started out, nine members of the Alliance were meeting the 2% of GDP for defense, a threshold that was set at the Wales Summit. We're now at 23 NATO allies, so NATO is speaking loudly and clearly with its actions. (41:07) As I mentioned before, we have a strategic concept agreed among all the allies, that very well reflects the challenges and threats that we face today and will be facing tomorrow. So I see NATO speaking, not only with unity, but unity that's actually raising the floor. Raising the floor on what NATO partners are contributing, raising the floor on an understanding of the threats that we face, raising the floor on our commitment to take action together, to deal with those threats. So, far from a race to the bottom just for the sake of consensus or unity, what I'm seeing is a race to the top by this Alliance. Again, let's be very simple about it, NATO is stronger than it's ever been, it's bigger than it's ever been, it's more fit for purpose than it's ever been.
Heather (41:51): I think Mr. Secretary, it's not about necessarily the 2%, and I think we're going to be raising that bar-
Antony Blinken (41:58): Yes.
Heather (41:58): Don't you think? It's going to be the new 2.5, maybe even the new 3% if we're heading into this era of tremendous instability. No, but I'm saying, even a NATO member can spend 2% but still be working to undermine the security of the Alliance itself, so it's not just 2%. How do we get back to, again, that core of the Washington Treaty, the preamble, "We defend democracy, we defend a certain set of values," when allies don't profess, necessarily, to uphold those values? What's the answer? I mean, this is about us, it's not about the adversary, it's-
Antony Blinken (42:35): Well-
Heather (42:35): About who we are.
Antony Blinken (42:36): Of course, allies, as we speak, for the last two and a half years now, have been defending those values, defending our democracy that's at stake in Ukraine. They know that it's not only about Ukraine, it's not only about the Ukrainian people, it's actually about the values that unite us and the basic principles that all of us have agreed on together, with so many other countries around the world, that were designed to try to keep the peace and protect against aggression. And NATO countries are standing up day after day, to defend those principles, to defend those values. (43:06) Now look, communicating with adversaries, with enemies, that's fine, communications are important, you want to make sure that at least you're not misunderstanding each other. But of course, what's communicated is really important as well, I would hope that anyone, for example, going to Moscow now, makes very clear to Vladimir Putin, that NATO's not going anywhere, Ukraine's not going anywhere, the European Union's not going anywhere. And that what we just saw the other day, a horrific attack on a children's hospital, is totally, totally, totally unacceptable. And Russia will continue to be ostracized as long as it engages in those kinds of actions. I would hope and expect that anyone going to Beijing makes clear what I said a moment ago, that continuing to fuel Russia's defense industrial base, continuing to allow the greatest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War to go forward, is something that is unacceptable to Europe. (44:02) And that means, unacceptable is a word, actions follow that, including as necessary, sanctions, including as necessary, not allowing relations that Beijing might seek to improve, to actually improve. So what we're focused on is what allies and partners are doing. And I can tell you, as an Alliance, what we're doing, is evidencing greater strength and commitment to the principles, the values that are at the heart of the Alliance, than I've seen.
Heather (44:29): Are you confident those messages are being sent?
Antony Blinken (44:34): I have confidence those messages are being sent.
Heather (44:36): Right.
Antony Blinken (44:36): But again, we come together as 32 countries, from the perspective of the United States, it's so important that we listen to each other, that we communicate clearly with each other, and yes, we develop consensus. But what I'm seeing, again, is a consensus that is moving us up, not holding us back.
Heather (44:59): So we've welcomed, this is Sweden's first-
Antony Blinken (45:02): That's right.
Heather (45:02): NATO Summit, great to come in. We've added this bolt of energy, I feel it, with Sweden, Finland joining, there's an energy in the Nordic-Baltic quadrant of NATO. How has it been to welcome those new mem? They're seeing what's behind the curtain, how have you introduced your two new colleagues now, into NATO? Tell us some good stories.
Antony Blinken (45:22): Well, of course, Sweden and Finland have been NATO partners for a long time. They've contributed tremendously to the Alliance, to our common endeavors, for a long time. But to have them at the table is something, I think, I suspect, most people in this room, three years ago, I doubt anyone really would've imagined that.
Heather (45:40): If you would've read a lot of Think Tank reports 15 years ago, you would've known this would've been the case, but that's okay.
Antony Blinken (45:45): I might've written-
Heather (45:46): I'll let it slide.
Antony Blinken (45:46): I might've written one or two of those reports back in the day, so.
Heather (45:48): Good, see.
Antony Blinken (45:50): But in all seriousness, you're right, I think it has added a jolt of energy. They're both remarkable partners, they bring so much to the Alliance. They changed the strategic equation in a very powerful way, but it's also a reflection of new realities that the entire Alliance is facing. New aggression, new forms of aggression, a new determination to stand up together to combat it. But look, we have a little kept secret for the Alliances, there's a pretty strong Nordic and Scandinavian component to this Alliance, as evidenced by Jens Stoltenberg. President Biden gave him the-
Heather (46:28): Yes, indeed.
Antony Blinken (46:29): Medal of freedom last night. And that was a very powerful reflection of the extraordinary leadership that he's demonstrated over a decade. A decade of incredible change for NATO, but a decade that he's managed with brilliance.
Heather (46:42): Well, he's really had a unique talent of communicating with some of those allies that don't see eye to eye always, with the consensus, was incredibly important in resolving some of the difficulties-
Antony Blinken (46:54): That's right.
Heather (46:54): In the run-up to-
Antony Blinken (46:55): That's right.
Heather (46:56): Welcoming Sweden and Finland. Any advice for his successor, about how to manage the diplomacy of maintaining Alliance unity?
Antony Blinken (47:07): Well, I know Mark Rutte, I think many in this room do as well. I have tremendous confidence in his abilities to take the torch from Jens and to do what Jens did so brilliantly.
Heather (47:17): Yeah.
Antony Blinken (47:17): Which was, actually, to listen to all of our partners, to build that consensus, to demonstrate through our actions that unity really is our most valuable currency and to build it every single day. But again, it doesn't just happen, it's the product of being engaged every single day, not pulling back, not isolating ourselves, actually leaning in, leaning forward. I know Mark is going to do that brilliantly, and I think the trajectory we're on with all of our member states, is to continue to do exactly that.
Heather (47:50): So Mr. Secretary, I'm going to end, my last question is going to be a historical question, but moving forward. So as Dean Acheson asked, " It is for others to judge," and the 71st Secretary of State just rendered judgment on the 51st Secretary of State's judgment. So let's look forward, when NATO celebrates its 150th anniversary next 75 years-
Antony Blinken (48:14): Look forward to seeing you all there, by the way.
Heather (48:15): Yes, exactly. We'll be in our wheelchairs, exactly. What judgment would you like your successor to render, about what you have done here on the 75th anniversary, to keep a billion people safe? Will they know that we've done enough to advance the cause of freedom?
Antony Blinken (48:39): The proof will be in the tests that are in front of us and how we meet them. But I hope that when we look back on this period in time, one of the conclusions that people will reach, is that the United States was leaning in. We re-engaged our Alliance, we helped to re-energize our Alliance, we helped to reimagine our Alliance. So that even as we celebrate 75 years of the most successful defensive Alliance in history, we were resolutely focused on the future and doing everything that we could, in our time, to make sure that that success for 75 years, would continue. And that the Alliance would be adapted, focused, fit for purpose for our time and for the years ahead. (49:23) Because again, I come back to what I started with, Heather, this Alliance is a reflection of a commitment that leaders, in all of our countries, make to the people we represent. A commitment that we do everything possible to keep them secure, to prevent wars, to deter of conflict, so that they can move on with their lives in freedom, in security. And so if we manage, as the result of the actions that we've taken over these last years and in this period, to do that in the years ahead, we will have succeeded.
Heather (49:58): We will know we will do enough if Ukraine wins.
Antony Blinken (50:02): That's right.
Heather (50:03): Thank you, Mr. Secretary, this has been a great kickoff. I hope we've started things off, we've revved up our engines. I know you've provided a lot of food for thought. Thank you so much, I know you have to get back to start your summit. But first, will everyone please join me in warm applause.
Antony Blinken (50:19): Thank you.
Heather (50:19): For the Secretary of State.
Antony Blinken (50:31): Thank you.
Heather (50:31): Thank you.
Antony Blinken (50:31): Thank you.
Michal Baranowski (50:32): Thank you. Thank you Secretary Blinken, thank you Heather, for a great scene setter for our conversation throughout the day. Really answering the question, what is at stake for NATO, for close to a billion of our citizens? This was a news making session. F-16s are coming this summer, the bridge for Ukraine will be, not only well lit, but also short. And as Secretary Blinken pointed out at the very end, it's all for us to lean in, both during this summit and in the next 75 years of NATO's history. So with this political scene setter, let me now turn to our military dimension and let me welcome Peter Rough of Hudson Institute, who will lead a conversation with General Cavoli. Peter, the stage is yours.
Peter Rough (51:38): Well, good morning. As mentioned, I'm Peter Rough, senior fellow and director of the Center on Europe and Eurasia at Hudson Institute. And it is my high honor to be joined today, by United States Army General, Chris Cavoli. General Cavoli was commissioned into the Infantry in 1987, he's had a long and distinguished career, culminating in his appointment to EUCOM, a position he took up on July 1st, 2022. And three days later, on our nation's birthday, July 4th-
General Cavoli (52:05): That's right.
Peter Rough (52:05): He became Supreme Allied Commander Europe. General Cavoli, welcome to the Public Forum.
General Cavoli (52:09): Thank you, Peter.
Peter Rough (52:11): At public conferences like these, that focus on European security, we tend to talk a lot about deterrence, how to preserve the peace that the Alliance has forged for us over the decades.
General Cavoli (52:20): Yeah.
Peter Rough (52:21): But there tends to be less focus on war fighting capability, the ability to actually win a war, should deterrence fail. So to rectify that imbalance a little bit, let me ask you, how confident are you that the Alliance could be able to conduct high intensity combat 10, 20, 30 days into a war with Russia, should deterrence fail?
General Cavoli (52:40): Oh, I'm quite confident. So we have, over the last couple of years, based on the work of my predecessors, one of whom is sitting right over there. Hi Scap, how are you sir? (52:53) We have been building out a strategic concept and then the enablement of that strategic concept for the deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area. So it started with the strategic approach and then it's come down through a couple of major documents. In the last couple of years, what we've done is turn those into concrete plans, traditional, classical, operational plans, that describe how we're going to defend specific areas of the Alliance and what we're going to use to do it and what the sequence of events is. This is a big, big shift, the Alliance had gone for many years without plans, since the end of the Cold War, real significant plans to defend the territory of the Alliance. (53:35) That has produced a whole range of changes for us. As you know, after the end of the Cold War, the Alliance refocused on out-of-area operations and crisis management. These tended to be smaller scale operations done on a predictable basis, so it allowed for a cyclical force generation model. All of this gave us the opportunity to economize, especially in terms of higher headquarters and enabling organizations such as logistics brigades and long-range fires and things like that. All that's coming back now, as a result of the plans, the plans have given us a four structure requirement that's guiding the way we resource the plans and the way NATO's militaries, the national militaries, compose themselves, what sort of forces they build for us. It is produced in a very short amount of time, instead of a cyclically available brigade or two, we suddenly now have 300 forces at the higher two levels of readiness, against the plans, 300,000, even more depending on how you count. That's because we've been able to amalgamate and incorporate national defense plans into the NATO defense plan, so they complement each other. (54:52) And it's produced an ability to be forward-postured, as you know, we've got eight battle groups on the ground forward-postured, that blend with National host nation forces in their Article III responsibilities. So it's a very effective method, we have the right number of troops forward right now. We've been practicing at large scale, our ability to reinforce, as you know, those battle groups need to be reinforced when the time is needed, up to the brigade level, we've been rehearsing that. We've done extensive readiness checks to make sure they have the right amount of ammunition and so forth. And as we go forward, we've continued to do these large-scale exercises where we practice the subsequent reinforcement of specific areas. A Steadfast Defender this year, over 90,000 soldiers, so I'm very confident in our ability to do that. We have some weaknesses that we have to work on and we will.
Peter Rough (55:46): Those DDA Family of Plans were, of course, ratified at the last NATO Summit, in Vilnius. How far along are the allies, in resourcing those plans.
General Cavoli (55:56): Quite far along. So all of this reorientation from out-of-area operations onto large-scale collective defense of the territory of the Alliance, is a profound shift, right. It's a very, very big shift. National militaries have to go through that shift on their own, the US military has been undergoing it for several years now, and for the Alliance, it's a big shift. It's challenged a lot of the ways we did business during the last 35 years. (56:26) One of those, is the way we generate force and the way we source our operational plans. The way we did it was, frankly, designed to put together very small organizations on a very predictable basis. Now, we've had to turn the system around, instead of, what will you make available? The question is, if we got into a large-scale fight-
Peter Rough (56:48): Right.
General Cavoli (56:48): What would you not make available? We assume you'll make most of your military available. My deputy, Admiral Keith Blount, is the one who came up with this reformulation of the question, and it immediately refocused our allies in the way they contribute. So several allies have contributed their entire military force structure, saved just a tiniest amount, to NATO's plans. As a result of this, for the most part, in capital platforms, in large ground units, we're pretty much where we need to be. We have some gaps in specific places, especially at enablement and logistics-
Peter Rough (57:28): Okay.
General Cavoli (57:28): That sort of thing. And those, we're working on through the NATO defense planning process, right now.
Peter Rough (57:33): My colleagues at Hudson Institute, who track the war most closely, have suggested that Russia has shown some adaptability on the battlefield-
General Cavoli (57:40): Yeah, sure.
Peter Rough (57:40): And have learned some lessons along the way. Is NATO learning lessons from-
General Cavoli (57:44): Everyday, yeah.
Peter Rough (57:45): The war in Ukraine? And are you confident that our learning curve is ahead of the Russians?
General Cavoli (57:48): Yeah. So I think the first thing to remember is that NATO consists of nations militaries, right. So those nations are studying, very intensely, the war in Ukraine and our member nations are developing and evolving new techniques and working on new technologies. But we as an Alliance, also study it very closely. We have a couple of different organizations that study the war in Ukraine, and we're about to set one up with our Ukrainian colleagues in Poland, the JTAC, is going to come together. And that will really be an information exchange center for lessons learned, then we incorporate those into our future doctrine. My friend, Philippe Lavigne, who I hope is here someplace, the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, writes future concepts that are largely informed by what we're seeing in Ukraine. And then of course, inside the Alliance, we use our exercise program to test new techniques and new technologies that, for the most part, nations bring forward into the exercise.
Peter Rough (58:52): When did-
General Cavoli (58:52): But it is quickly evolving. Your colleagues at Hudson are right, the Russians are very cleverly adapting, technologically and procedurally, to many of the challenges that they run into in Ukraine.
Peter Rough (59:05): One thing that's less discussed are SACEUR's peacetime authorities-
General Cavoli (59:09): Sure.
Peter Rough (59:09): But that has evolved somewhat, since the-
General Cavoli (59:11): Tremendously.
Peter Rough (59:11): Onset of full-scale hostilities in Ukraine. Are your authorities commensurate and sufficient to prepare the Alliance in a period of high tension prior to full onset of hostilities? And perhaps for the audience, you could just lay out what those authorities are?
General Cavoli (59:24): Yeah, so SACEUR's authorities were pretty circumscribed during long periods of peace, which is fairly appropriate, right. At the beginning of this conflict, my predecessor, Tod Wolters, petitioned the NAC to activate the five Graduated Response Plans, which is a form of planning process that we had. When those were activated, general Wolters suddenly got significant authorities to move folks around. For example, he got the authority to deploy parts or all of the very high-readiness joint-
Peter Rough (01:00:05): Yeah.
General Cavoli (01:00:05): Task force, on his plan. He got the authority to perform specified enhanced vigilance activities throughout the AOR, so we could name an operation and then conduct it, defensive operations. As we came through the new family of plans, one part of the re-modernization of NATO's collective defense, has been to change the way we grant authorities to SACEUR. And instead of going one by one through an incredibly arcane manual, like this thick, that gives one authority at a time-
Peter Rough (01:00:44): Sounds fun.
General Cavoli (01:00:44): What we've done is, we've bundled authorities together and we've attached those to certain alert states. And some amount of the alert state I'm allowed to declare, like up to alert state yellow and just inform the NAC, and that gives me certain authorities. And then for a higher levels of alert, the NAC has to grant that, in a deliberate political move. So I have the authority to do everything I need to do right now, I believe in the run-up to a period of conflict, to include deploying forces to deter the conflict, and then to be in position and be ready if the Alliance should invoke Article V. Yeah, I do think we've made a huge amount of progress in the past couple of years on that.
Peter Rough (01:01:30): Because it's so rare to have the opportunity to interview SACEUR, I-
General Cavoli (01:01:33): Oh no.
Peter Rough (01:01:33): I asked a few of my colleagues for a question, and so I've gotten one from them, which I'd [inaudible 01:01:37].
General Cavoli (01:01:37): Can't they just raise their hands?
Peter Rough (01:01:39): They dare not show up given the question, I'm just kidding.
General Cavoli (01:01:41): Oh no, no.
Peter Rough (01:01:43): The NATO force model is replacing the NATO response force-
General Cavoli (01:01:45): Yeah.
Peter Rough (01:01:46): And at tier three, the new force structure is expected to field 500,000 troops in 30 to a hundred days. Such a large-scale deployment at high readiness will require a thorough inspection mechanism. Do you have any such measures in mind like SNAP exercises?
General Cavoli (01:01:59): Yeah, we sure do. We've already got a readiness program inside the Alliance, the question is, how vigorously is it exercised? And is there any compliance mechanism inside it? Compliance in the Alliance is always up to nations, it's-
Peter Rough (01:02:19): Right.
General Cavoli (01:02:20): It's a political act, how high a level of readiness they want to maintain. But I do have the authority and the systems necessary to go inspect readiness. We're changing some of the things we look at, right. So as we look in Ukraine, we've put in an increased emphasis on stockpiles and munitions and supplies on hand and readily available. We've extended some of the things we look at to the logistical systems necessary to deploy and to resupply to our troops. Instead of just looking at the sharp side of the sword, we're looking at the whole sword now. And we've developed teams that will become active very soon, that will go out and check readiness based on my authorities to inspect the readiness of the forces under my command or that are to be under my command in a time of crisis, yeah.
Peter Rough (01:03:13): We have a minute and a half left, so I'll ask you one final question. You mentioned the battle groups earlier, the President last night, at the Mellon Auditorium-
General Cavoli (01:03:19): Yeah.
Peter Rough (01:03:20): Discussed the four that were in existence prior to the full-scale invasion, the four new ones that have been put in place in the southern eastern flank of the Alliance. We've seen what can happen under even short-term occupation by Russian forces in places like Bucha and Irpin. How confident are you that the Forward Land Forces concept can guard against such a contingency in, say, the Baltic states?
General Cavoli (01:03:39): Well, the Forward Land Forces concept is not the totality of our plans to defend, right. It's the beginning of it, it's the stuff that's in place, and it's only one domain, those are just the land forces.
Peter Rough (01:03:53): Right.
General Cavoli (01:03:54): We have air forces, we have other forces, right. It's just the beginning, all of that gets reinforced at time of crisis, and in the case of a conflict, all of that would become reinforced, and I'm very confident that it can defend forward. The plans are specifically designed, and the timetables are specifically designed to defend every inch of the Alliance's territory. And I think when we look at what happened in Ukraine, in places like Bucha and Irpin, in places like that, Izyum, I have a moral responsibility to defend every inch of our territory and all the citizens on it.
Peter Rough (01:04:33): General Cavoli, thank you for being here.
General Cavoli (01:04:34): Thanks, Peter. It was great.
Peter Rough (01:04:38): Thank you, sir.
Michal Baranowski (01:04:44): Thank you General Cavoli, thank you Peter, for really, another fascinating conversation focused on the military aspect of readiness, of how we are learning from our Ukrainian brothers and sisters fighting brutal war with Russia. But also for emphasizing the need to defend every single inch of NATO territory, and believe me, coming from the Eastern flank, this is very real for us and very important. Now, let me welcome Frederick Kempe, CEO and President of the Atlantic Council, for a conversation with the Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin. Frederick, the stage is yours.
Frederick Kempe (01:05:29): Well, what a great lineup to start the day, the Secretary of State, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Secretary of Defense.
Michal Baranowski (01:05:36): Yes, just give me one second.
Frederick Kempe (01:05:37): It's really an honor to be here, and thanks to everyone in the room. Good morning to you all, and good afternoon to everyone joining from Europe. And hello to everyone joining from all over the world, virtually. (01:05:51) Since its founding in 1949, since NATO's founding, the United States has played a pivotal role in safeguarding transatlantic security, and the Secretary of Defense has always been at the center of that. As one of NATO's founding members, the US has proven to be a critical part of the Alliance's collective defense, and its adaptability to deter evolving threats, and they have been evolving. America has always stood ready to defend and protect the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, continuing its commitments to the principles of the Washington Treaty. US leadership was pivotal, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, mobilizing tremendous support, and you've heard more about that today, new Air Force batteries, F-16s. To bolster collective defenses on NATO's Eastern Flank, fortifying the commitment to NATO allies and extending that kind of critical assistance to Ukraine. (01:06:44) So it's my privilege to introduce a leader who embodies this commitment to transatlantic and indeed global security, US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin. A graduate of West Point in 1975, Secretary Austin's career in the US Army spanned more than 40 years. Throughout his years of service, he has led the command at the core division battalion and brigade levels, in the US Armed Forces. Secretary Austin was awarded the Silver Star for his leadership of the US Army's third Infantry Division during the evasion of Iraq, in 2003. Before he concluded his uniformed service, Secretary Austin was the commander of the US Central Command from 2013 to 2016, one of our most challenging positions, where he was responsible for all the military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. (01:07:35) Under his leadership, the US Department of Defense, has adapted national defense strategies to address the greatest global challenges of our time. And it's reaffirmed the US's commitment to allies, in its role as a champion of the rules-based order. In particular, and this is really important, secretary Austin's late leadership in the Ukraine Defense contact group, has proven invaluable
Frederick Kempe (01:08:00): ... in uniting over 50 nations to provide critical military support and security assistance to Ukraine. We saw Vladimir Putin's message to the NATO summit on Monday this week, with a barrage of more than 40 missiles on Ukraine, including hitting a children's hospital. We've seen an answer in more air defenses, we've seen an answer in the F-16s, we've seen an answer in everything else that Secretary Austin and all the allies are doing. As President Biden has said, the world is at an inflection point with wars in the Middle East, Europe, rising challenge posed to China, biggest peaceful peacetime defense buildup in history from China. The secretary of defense is facing more simultaneous challenges than perhaps any predecessor, and we're lucky to have a man of his pedigree and capability at this historic moment. So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming to the stage the 28th US secretary of defense, Lloyd Austin.
Lloyd Austin (01:09:16): Well, good morning.
Crowd (01:09:17): Good morning.
Lloyd Austin (01:09:25): It's really good to be here with all of you. And Fred, thanks for that kind introduction and for all that you've done for the Atlantic Council, and for bringing us together on a pretty big week. It's a huge honor for the United States and President Biden to host this historic summit in Washington, just down the road from the site where the original 12 NATO allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty 75 years ago. And together we're marking one of the great success stories that the world has ever known. (01:10:07) On April 4th, 1949 those 12 democracies came together in the wake of two world wars and at the dawn of a new Cold War. And they all remembered, as President Truman put it, the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression. And so they vowed to stand together for their collective defense and to safeguard freedom and democracy across Europe and North America. They made a solemn commitment declaring that an armed attack against one ally would be considered an attack against them all. Now, that commitment was enshrined in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was the foundation of NATO, and it still is. (01:11:18) And on that bedrock we have built the strongest and most successful defensive alliance in human history. Throughout the Cold War, NATO deterred Soviet aggression against Western Europe and prevented a third world war. In the 1990s, NATO used air power to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. And the day after September 11th, 2001, when Al-Qaeda terrorists attacked our country, including slamming a plane into the Pentagon, NATO invoked Article V for the first and only time in its history. So NATO has always stood by us, and we're going to stand by NATO. (01:12:16) Without NATO, the past 75 years would've been far different and far more dangerous. I'm proud of the ways that NATO continues to strengthen our shared security. I'm proud of the way that NATO and America's other alliances and partnerships have grown and strengthened under the leadership of President Biden. And I'm especially proud of the way that our allies and partners, including our NATO allies, have met the challenge of Putin's increasingly aggressive Russia. (01:12:56) In 2014, Putin made an illegal land grab against Ukraine's Crimea region in Eastern Ukraine, and since then NATO has undertaken the largest reinforcement of our collective defense in a generation with more forces, more capabilities, and more investment. Since 2014, our fellow allies have increased their defense spending by an average of 72%, accounting for inflation. In February 2022 the world again saw what President Truman called the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression as the Kremlin's forces invaded the free and sovereign state of Ukraine. (01:13:51) As this administration has made very clear, we will not be dragged into Putin's reckless war of choice, but we will stand by Ukraine as it fights for its sovereignty and security. We will defend every inch of NATO and we will continue to strengthen NATO's collective defense and deterrence. In the wake of Putin's imperial invasion of Ukraine, we've bolstered NATO's forward defense posture, with more troops at high readiness, larger exercises, sharper vigilance, and multinational battle groups in eight countries. NATO is now larger than ever, and our new allies in Finland and Sweden have brought the alliance's membership to 32. And make no mistake, Putin's war is not the result of NATO enlargement. Putin's war is the cause of NATO enlargement. Over the past three and a half years we've also seen an historic increase in annual defense spending across the alliance by almost $80 billion. All NATO allies have agreed to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense. In 2014, only three allies hit that target. In 2021, only six allies did so. But this year a record 23 NATO allies are meeting the 2% defense spending target. Now, our NATO allies are not just spending more on their own defense. They're also spending more on America's defense industrial base. That means platforms and munitions built in America, and that's helping to revitalize production lines across our country and to create good jobs for American workers. (01:16:09) Now, all of that progress is a testament to US leadership and allied solidarity but it's also a testament to the leadership of our outgoing secretary general, my good friend Jens Stoltenberg. Throughout a decade of challenge, Jens has guided the alliance with skill and steal, and we are all deeply, deeply grateful. Now, we're going to keep building on our progress, and we've got an ambitious agenda this week. First, we'll continue to implement NATO's new family of plans, the most robust since the Cold War, and that will significantly improve our ability to deter and defend against any new threat. (01:17:08) Second, we'll work to endorse a pledge to expand industrial capacity across the alliance, and this will help us scale up military production and send an important long-term signal to industry. Third, we'll deepen cooperation in support of Ukraine's self-defense. We'll launch a new military effort to help coordinate some aspects of security assistance and training for Ukraine, and we're poised to agree on a new financial pledge to Ukraine. (01:17:46) As another sign of our deep commitment to Ukraine's self-defense, a coalition of countries has been working tirelessly to provide F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. And today, president Biden, alongside the Dutch and Danish prime ministers, is proud to announce the transfer of F-16s is officially underway and Ukraine will be flying F-16s this summer. And finally, we will continue to deepen ties with our global partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific. (01:18:28) I know that we're all troubled by China's support for Putin's war against Ukraine, but that just reminds us of the profound links between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security, and it sends a message to the world that we are united in our values. So we have a lot to tackle together, but we're also here to mark this moment. We're here to strengthen an alliance that has kept millions of people safe for 75 years, and we're here to reaffirm the ironclad commitment that those 12 leaders made on April 4th, 1949: an armed attack against one ally is an attack against us all. (01:19:23) As you heard Fred say, I had a brief 41-year career in uniform. I started working with NATO back in 1975 when I was Lieutenant Austin, and I've never seen NATO stronger or more united than it is today, and we are determined to keep it that way. I learned a lesson early on in my army career, and that lesson is that, as a soldier, the last thing that you want to do is to fight alone. So here's the blunt military reality: America is stronger with our allies, America is safer with our allies, and America is more secure with our allies. Any attempt to undermine NATO only undermines American security. (01:20:41) So we are here this week to strengthen NATO and to strengthen American and allied security for the next 75 years. As President Biden has said, our foes and rivals have tried to shatter our unity, but our democracies have stood unwavering. Ladies and gentlemen, that is the legacy that we celebrate. That is the vow that we uphold, and that is the work that we will continue. Thank you very much.
Michal Baranowski (01:21:29): Secretary Austin, thank you so much for the speech, for your thoughts, for your leadership as well. For really underpinning and emphasizing the message that the last thing that a soldier would want to do is fight alone. With that, for our guests online, please tune in for conversations with Doug Lute, US Ambassador to NATO, and Rachel Rizzo. And for all of us here, there is a coffee break. Please be back at 10:35 and enjoy the conversations. Thanks.
Ambassador Doug Lute (01:28:24): ... of the alliance. I don't imagine any of them could have thought of 12 becoming 32, and I think that they'd marvel at that. I think, with the Washington Treaty being signed in Washington, that they'd be shocked that the only time Article V has been invoked in these 75 years had nothing to do with an attack in Western Europe, had nothing to do with America responding to that attack and reinforcing our European allies, had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. But in fact, on the day, September 11th, it was actually the inverse of all that. It was Europe coming to the assistance of America to include, in part, because of an attack here in Washington. So they'd be surprised about Article V. (01:35:19) I'd also remark, though, these photos may clear that the 12 men who signed the Washington Treaty I think would be surprised today at the role of women in leadership positions in NATO at multiple levels. Head of state government, ministers, both foreign and defense ministers, the NATO staff, ambassadors, and so forth. I would add there that today perhaps we should be surprised that there aren't more women in prominent roles in NATO. So I think there's a lot to be surprised at. One thing that they would not be surprised at-
Rachel Rizzo (01:35:58): Yeah, that was my next question.
Ambassador Doug Lute (01:36:00): I'll preempt your next question. They would not be surprised that NATO today is rallying in the face of Russian aggression.
Rachel Rizzo (01:36:09): Yeah.
Ambassador Doug Lute (01:36:10): That of course was the original forming cause of NATO, and today I think the founders would see a familiar Russia in terms of imperialist designs and aggression on its neighbors.
Rachel Rizzo (01:36:24): They probably wouldn't be surprised. They probably would also be surprised that we're trying to get Germany to spend more on defense and do more and be more forward-leaning as well.
Ambassador Doug Lute (01:36:33): Perhaps.
Rachel Rizzo (01:36:34): Perhaps.
Ambassador Doug Lute (01:36:35): Maybe even the Germans are a little surprised at that.
Rachel Rizzo (01:36:37): Yeah, yeah. There's a lot of surprise that has happened to us since 1949. Finally, one of the main headlines at this specific summit is what the alliance is delivering for Ukraine. There's a lot of talk about a bridge to membership that's well-lit, that is short. But there's also been criticism that the weapons that we've been giving them have so many caveats on them that we're having Ukraine fight with one hand tied behind its back. What are your thoughts on the deliverables for Ukraine at the summit?
Ambassador Doug Lute (01:37:08): Well, I think that the military deliverables and the political deliverables, these two parallel tracks or lines of effort for Ukraine, are predictable and, quite candidly, quite modest.
Rachel Rizzo (01:37:26): Yeah.
Ambassador Doug Lute (01:37:26): I would have liked to have seen even more progress on military assistance and on fulfilling the commitment that Ukraine politically will eventually become a member. The bridge metaphor works in part, but I'm not sure it's completely satisfactory. Look, I think everyone here at the summit this week was stunned by the blatant aggression of the recent, most recent Russian attack on Kyiv and other cities, to include the tragic attack on the children's hospital. It's important for us to remember two things. (01:38:11) First of all, that attack originated from inside Russia, and the base from which that attack was launched is essentially in sanctuary because it is beyond the ability of Ukrainian indigenous capacity to strike it and we have placed limits on the geographic range of the systems we've provided Ukraine. I know of no effective air defense program which focuses solely on defense of the target site, by way of air defense systems and so forth, and neglects the attack of the launch sites.
Rachel Rizzo (01:38:50): Yeah.
Ambassador Doug Lute (01:38:51): Air defense is a two-way street, offense and defense. So in particular you used the words caveat. I think that the restrictions, the caveats that we've placed, and others have placed on some of our systems, are not justifiable in legal terms. These are legitimate military targets, and they don't make sense in terms of military science.
Rachel Rizzo (01:39:15): Thank you for that clear answer and for your support of NATO and your support of Ukraine as well, and for this interview, Ambassador Lute and to our audience watching online, tune in for another two days of programming here at the NATO Public Forum in Washington. Thank you so much.
Shannon Vavra (01:40:04): Hello, everyone. Dear guests, before we resume our live conversations we will be viewing a short video. Over the next few days you will be viewing several videos created by the organizing partners of the forum, bringing in voices on the ground from across the alliance on a variety of issues. Please join me now in viewing the first such video: From the U.S. Heartland.
Diana Huizar (01:40:35): I view NATO as a global institution that is a vehicle for deterrence and collected funds. It is a defender of the free world and it is a defender of our shared democratic principles.
Elijah Becerra (01:40:43): NATO as an organization means personally to me as a security cooperation between its member countries provides an environment where I'm able to feel safe and secure.
Howard Liff (01:40:53): NATO means hope to me. Hope that through strength of unity we will no longer have world wars and have to send our young people to fight in them. Hopeful that a rogue leader or a rogue nation will no longer be emboldened to attack a NATO country, and hopeful that, into the future, NATO will create a more democratic and peaceful union in the world.
Marilyn Davis (01:41:17): I feel admiration, I feel honor in that NATO was created after World War II. It means alliance among people, among nations who trust each other.
Diana Huizar (01:41:39): Apart from the obvious aim of peacekeeping and deterrence, it plays a crucial role in facilitating a coordinated effort to combat and counter terrorism, and cybersecurity. It is adapting to new threats, such as responding to disinformation campaigns and the weaponization of AI.
Elijah Becerra (01:41:54): In its 75 year history, NATO has been successful in providing and guaranteeing the security of its countries
Speaker 4 (01:42:00): He's from foreign intimidation.
Speaker 5 (01:42:02): I'm especially admiring the creation of NATO. Out of war came peace and there were ideals of peace and harmony for the world in 1949, 75 years ago.
Diana Huizar (01:42:26): NATO was created for establishing and promoting economic and political security against Soviet or another future demo of aggression. It's unfortunate that 75 years later, we are standing more or less in the same predicament with modern day Russian military hostilities in Europe. What I hope for NATO, first and foremost is for NATO to gain an ally in the next American presidency and secondly, for nations in Europe to rise to the occasion and to meet the continued Russian aggression with the severity and seriousness of demands in order to protect Europe. Finally, a unified show of support in the future will demonstrate to other authoritarian leaders that NATO will not allow malicious leadership to trample on the will of the free world.
Speaker 4 (01:43:05): What I wish for in NATO's future is to act as a bulwark of democracy in these trying times of uncertainty economically and politically.
Speaker 5 (01:43:14): As the future comes forward, we want that trust to be continued and if it is at all destroyed a little bit, we want it to come back. So I say to the NATO nations, thank you and keep peace for us in the world.
Shannon Vavra (01:43:38): What a great way to bring in voices from across the United States heartland. For our next conversation, please join me in welcoming once again, Frederick Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council to the stage for a conversation with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. Join me in welcoming Frederick to the stage please.
Frederick Kempe (01:44:18): Good morning. It still is the morning. It's great to see you all here in person. It's wonderful to have so many people here online from all over the world and of course across all of our allies in Europe as well. And so it's my honor to introduce someone I've known a long time now, the NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, and I'm going to moderate a conversation with you in a moment, something you've called a pivotal moment for our alliance. I was going to start by saluting you on something I didn't know about, which is your great arm because you threw out the first pitch of the Nationals game and it was an amazing... I was there in the heat sweating while I was watching you, but it was an amazing salute to NATO. But having been at Mellon Auditorium yesterday evening, one of the most moving events I've been at, I'll instead quote President Biden, what he said to you as he gave you the presidential medal of freedom to a standing ovation, a really remarkable moment. He called you a man of integrity, a intellectual rigor, a calm temperament in moments of crisis, a consummate diplomat, and I think the consummate diplomat, a person who can engage with leaders across all spectrums and across all nationalities. And I just want to salute you on behalf of everyone in the audience for more than a decade of the most extraordinary leadership. So let's start with that.
General Stoltenberg (01:46:00): Thank you.
Frederick Kempe (01:46:06): So we at the Atlantic Council gave you our highest honor, the Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Award in 2017, and I consider that visionary. We knew you'd already accomplished a lot in your life, and I won't go through it all. Prime Minister of Norway, all the things you've done for NATO and at NATO in terms of strengthening defense, strengthening the defense spending, and I think it would take too long to go on that, and you're a humble man and I don't think you would even want that. So I'm going to go right into the questions. You laid out three goals for this summit, increasing support for Ukraine for the long haul, reinforcing collective defense and deepening global partnerships. I'm sure they're all important, but for this week, what do you consider most crucial?
General Stoltenberg (01:46:57): I'll answer that in a moment, but let me first say that it's great to be here to be at the public forum and many thanks to you, Fred, and also many times to all those who have organized and are making this event possible because this is an important part of the summit, the public outreach, which this public forum is a very important part of. Then thank you for your kind words. It has actually been a great privilege serving as secretary general NATO for 10 years and I see around in the audience here, there are many people who have helped me, supported me. (01:47:34) So many thanks to all of you for your advice to help and support throughout these years. Then on throwing the first pitch, that is the most difficult task I ever committed as general of NATO, not least because I've never been at the baseball match ever before. The first time I touched the baseball, actually when I started to exercise for this, I thought it was a tennis ball, but it's not the case. So it was a very steep learning curve and I think my future is not in baseball. I think my future is in something else.
Frederick Kempe (01:48:06): I was going to say in the introduction that it showed that NATO always sets lofty targets.
General Stoltenberg (01:48:12): And we have to adapt to the challenges. Then of course, this summit, of course a summit where we're going to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the strongest most successful lines in history, but the only way to truly celebrate that achievement, the 75th anniversary, is of course to demonstrate that NATO is adapting, that we are changing when the world is changing because we are the most successful lines industry because we have changed when the world is changing and now we live in a more dangerous, more challenging security environment and therefore NATO is changing again and therefore we will make important decisions at this summit for the future, not only celebrate the past, and there are three main issues is the [inaudible 01:49:07] and Defense is our partnership with our Asia Pacific partners. But of course the most urgent, the most critical task at this summit will be everything we will do and decide on Ukraine because this is really the time where we are tested. (01:49:24) If you want to stand up for democracy and freedom, it's now and the place is Ukraine, and I expect that the NATO leaders will agree a substantial package for Ukraine. There are fundamentally five elements in that package. One is that we will establish a NATO command for Ukraine to facilitate and ensure training and delivery of security assistance to Ukraine. It'll be 700 personnel will take over much of what the US have done so far in leading the coordination of security assistance and the training. It'll be command in Germany, but also with logistical nodes or hubs in the Eastern part of the alliance to ensure that we have a more institutionalized framework for our support Ukraine. Then it'll be a long-term pledge to support Ukraine, not least to send the message to President Putin that he cannot wait those out because the paradox is that the stronger and the more we are committed for a long term to support Ukraine, the sooner this war can end. (01:50:40) So that's the thing we have to do. Then we will have, and we already seen some new announcements of military immediate support with the air defense systems with F-16s and all the things that allies have and will announce. We have the bilateral, that's the third there also the announcement of more military aid. Then we have the bilateral security agreements, 20 agreed between NATO allies and Ukraine, and then the fifth element of the package for Ukraine will be more interoperability. We will have a new joint training and evaluation center in [inaudible 01:51:26] in Poland. We'll have the comprehensive assistance package to help Ukraine implement reforms on the defense and security institutions to ensure that the armed forces are more and more interoperable with NATO and together the NATO command, the pledge, the bilateral security agreements, the announcement of new military support and interoperability. (01:51:45) These five elements combined constitute bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine, and later on today we'll see the language which we'll agree and the NATO declaration on how to ensure that Ukraine is moving closer to NATO membership. So these are the five important deliverables on Ukraine that I expect allies will agree later on today.
Frederick Kempe (01:52:13): Not to press you on what's actually going to be in the document, because of course you can't reveal that, but we saw at the [inaudible 01:52:21] summit, hearing it again in Washington, that allies closer to Russia or more eager to provide NATO membership sooner for Ukraine. And no doubt, the bridge and all the elements of the bridge are pretty impressive, including the new command. But are Ukraine's NATO membership prospects sufficient? We did our own war gaming with our Estonian partners in the Estonian government. We found almost under any scenario Ukraine was safer in NATO that Russia would respond in a way that would be less provocative within than outside. What's your thinking on that and have we gone far enough with Ukraine?
General Stoltenberg (01:53:04): So first of all, the language you will see later on today in the NATO declaration or the declaration from the heads [inaudible 01:53:10] government, of course that language is important because language matters. It sets an agenda, it points a direction, but of course action speaks louder than words. So in addition to the language in the declaration on membership, which again is important, I think that what we actually do together with Ukraine is as important and therefore the fact that we now have a NATO framework, we'll have a NATO framework around the support, the fact that we have a long-term NATO commitment when we agree that the pledge and also the fact that we actually are delivering more weapons systems to Ukraine, all of that is helping Ukraine to become closer to NATO membership because when we now deliver F-16s, we don't only deliver F-16s, we deliver the training, the doctrines, the operational concepts that will actually move Ukraine closer to being fully interoperable with NATO on more and more areas. (01:54:08) So again, language is important, but the elements in the package I mentioned, they are actually changing the reality enabling Ukraine to come closer to membership so we can then when the time is right, when you have consensus and the political conditions are in place, so when an invitation then is issued, they can become members straight away. I cannot give you a date because as you know, there has to be consensus in this alliance on membership, but what I can say is that when the fighting stops in Ukraine, we need to ensure that that's really the end because what you have seen is a pattern of aggression. First, the Russia annex Crimea, we said that was unacceptable. After some few months they went into the [inaudible 01:55:00]. We said that that was unacceptable. Then we had the Minsk one agreement with the limitation of the disease file line that was violated, and Russia pushed the front lines further East, sorry, further West in Donbas in 2014 we had. Minsk two and the Russians waited then for seven years and they had a full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 because Minsk two was in 2015. (01:55:27) So we have seen a pattern where they've taken slices of Ukraine. So if there is now a new ceasefire, a new agreement, then we need to be a hundred percent certain it stops there regardless of where that line is. And therefore I strongly believe that when the fighting stops, we need to ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities to deter future aggression from Russia and they need security guarantees. And of course the best and strong security guarantee will be Article 5. So therefore I believe that a way to ensure that it stops is actually a NATO membership.
Frederick Kempe (01:56:13): Thank you for the very clear answer. One more brief question on Ukraine and then we'll move on to Indo-Pacific. In a press conference you had with President Macron a couple of weeks ago, you noted recent gaps and delays in how they've led in funding and weapons and led to battlefield consequences. You said quote, "We must give you Ukraine, the predictability and accountability it needs to defend itself." So two questions is everything you've talked about today that's going to be agreed enough and secondarily, not just with uncertainties in US politics which exist, but also uncertainties in European politics, do you worry at all about the sustainability of that support over time?
General Stoltenberg (01:56:56): So first of all, you are right that I have referred to, I also did that in Kiev in a meeting with President Zelensky earlier this spring to the fact that during this winter and the early spring allies didn't deliver on their promises to Ukraine. We saw the delays in the US months agreeing as supplemental, but we also saw European allies not being able to deliver ammunition and the support they have announced. So of course these gaps and these delays in military support Ukraine, they created a very difficult situation for the Ukrainians on the battlefield. The good news in that difficult situation is that despite of the delays in our support Ukraine, Ukrainians have actually been able to hold the line more or less so the Russians have not been able to utilize these delays in really making any big advantage on the battlefield. Now we are providing more support and I'm confident that allies will now actually deliver, and we see that, for instance, ammunition moving into Ukraine have been significant increase over the last weeks. (01:58:15) The purpose of a stronger NATO role in providing training and security assistance, the purpose of the command and the purpose of the pledge is of course to minimize the risks for future delays and gaps. But of course you don't have guarantees because at the end of the day, it has to be support in all the individual allied capitals and parliaments to providing this support. At the end of the day, you have to go to the congress to the parliaments across Europe and Canada to get support. But I believe that when we turn this into something which more a NATO obligation, a NATO framework, it is the threshold for not delivering will be higher than when it's based on more voluntary ad hoc national announcements. (01:59:06) So the purpose of creating a stronger NATO framework is to make the support more robust and more predictable. It's also another part of this NATO framework for the support on the pledge and the command, and that is that it will visualize and ensure burden sharing because my impression is that especially in the United States, there's this perception that United States is almost alone in delivery support to Ukraine. That's not the case. When you look at military support, roughly 50% of the military support is provided by European allies and Canada, 99% of the support military support Ukraine comes from NATO allies, but 50% of that comes from European allies and Canada, if you add economic macroeconomic support, humanitarian support, the European allies are providing much more than United States. (02:00:01) So the point with the pledge is to ensure that we have some kind of agreed formulas for burden sharing, that we have more transparency and we also that we have more accountability because then we can use NATO to count, to measure and to ensure that allies deliver. It's not the same, but it's a bit like the 2% pledge because the important with the pledge made in Wales in 2014 was actually give NATO a role to enforce and to ensure that allies delivered and also that we agreed how to count and what to count, and that's also what we now do with the pledge to agree how to count on what to count and to give NATO role to having also accountability. So again, there are no guarantees, but by giving NATO that role, I think the likelihood for allies delivering what they have promised will increase and the likelihood of new gaps will decrease, and that's the purpose of giving NATO a stronger role.
Frederick Kempe (02:01:04): Thank you, Mr. Secretary General. Let's go to China, 2022, strategic concept, NATO strategic concept recognized China as a challenge for the first time and the broader rules-based system. You've noted that Russia imports 90% of its micro electronics from China, which goes into military. Secretary Blinken today talked about 70% of machine tools that help the military coming from China. You've also said that if this doesn't change as they're fueling the greatest armed conflict in Europe since World War II allies need to impose a cost, is it time for that and what costs can NATO and NATO countries actually impose?
General Stoltenberg (02:01:45): So first of all, I think it's important that we recognize the reality, and that's the first step towards any action, and that is that not only are Iran and North Korea important when it comes to enabling Russia's war aggression against Ukraine, but China is the main enabler because as you refer to, they are delivering the tools, the dual use equipment, the microelectronics, everything Russia needs to build the missiles, the bombs, the aircraft, and all the other systems they use against Ukraine. While I have said that it remains to be seen how far allies are willing to go, but I strongly believe that if China continues, they cannot have it both ways. They cannot believe that they can have a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies in North America and Europe and then continue to fuel the war in Europe. That constitutes the biggest security challenge from security since the second World War. So this is a challenge for the alliance. Let's see how far we're willing to go as allies.
Frederick Kempe (02:03:08): So we're getting close end of time, such as two other brief questions. First, Indo-Pacific four, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand are here. Third time taking part in NATO summit, but it's going to be the first NATO joint document with this group. Can you give us some insight into what might be in it and any concrete outcomes?
General Stoltenberg (02:03:28): Yeah, so first I would just say that the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand and South Korea, that reflects a change in NATO because that was not the case a few years ago. And as many of you may know, the first time we mentioned China in a agreed negotiated document in NATO is at the NATO summit in London in 2019. And in the previous NATO strategic concept, China was not mentioned with a single word. Now, China has a prominent place in the strategic concept we agreed in Madrid. And the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners reflect of course the fact that we have to take China seriously when it comes to the challenges it poses for our security. And the war in Ukraine is perhaps the most obvious example, or as the Japanese prime minister said several times, what happens in Ukraine today can happen in Asia tomorrow. (02:04:32) We are now working with our Asia Pacific partners how we can do more together with them. We will agree some flagship projects that's about technology, it's about support Ukraine, but we are also working, for instance, as part of our defense industrial pledge, how we can ramp up defense industrial production and cooperation with these countries. They are big, some of them on defense industry. We can work closely with them to ramp up our combined defense industrial capacity. We can exchange more information. And I also welcome the fact that more and more allies are now also conducting joint exercises. Recently there was a big area exercise are also more and more actively also looking into how they can also have more naval exercises with our Asia Pacific partners because NATO will remain an alliance of North America and Europe will not be a global NATO, NATO will be North America and Europe. (02:05:33) But this region, the North Atlantic region, we face global threats. And the reality is that's nothing new. Global terrorism, international terrorism brought us to Afghanistan. Cyber is global. Space which is becoming more and more important for our armed forces is truly global. And of course the threats and challenges that China poses to cybersecurity is a global challenge. So this region, the North Atlantic region faces global challenges. We will remain a regional alliance, but we need to work with our global partners, the Asia Pacific partners to address these global challenges, that I guess will be a very important issue at the next NATO summit. I'll not be there, but I'm certain it will be [inaudible 02:06:21].
Frederick Kempe (02:06:21): And that brings me to my final question. This is your [inaudible 02:06:25] Summit. As you prepare to step down, I think everybody in the audience, everybody virtually would love to hear what gives you the most hope, stepping down from this, but also what gives you the most concern?
General Stoltenberg (02:06:37): First of all, I'm an optimist because the reality is that we are very different in this alliance. We are different countries with different history, different culture from both South Atlantic and we have different parties and we are always very concerned that when a new party comes into government, they will make bad things for the alliance. And if you read the history of NATO, we have been concerned about that from the beginning. There were big concerns in NATO when you actually got the Democratic elected government in Portugal in 1975. They were concerned not we were going to be committed to NATO. There were concerns when you had some lefting parties coming into government in some European countries in the '70s. When I formed my government in my second government in 2005, there were big concerns that we had the left source, this party there, it went quite well to be honest. (02:07:34) And now there are big concerns again. But the reality is that despite all these differences which are part of NATO, we have proven extremely resilient and strong because when we face the reality, all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians, they realize that we are safer and stronger together. And that's a very strong message. And that's the reason why this alliance pervades again and again. As I said in my speech yesterday, we cannot take it for granted. It was not a given in '49, it's not a given now. It's not a given in the future. But the reality is that we have so strong common interest in standing together. So therefore, I'm optimist for the future of this alliance. That was the first question. The second I've forgotten, I think I answered both of them, but say one thing and that is that I remember very well when I became Prime Minister in 2000. (02:08:36) First of all, I attended my first NATO summit in 2001. That was a very different guest list. It was President Bush, newly elected, it was [inaudible 02:08:47], Tony Blair, and very different people than now. So I think it's time for me to leave. But second, also, I remember then my predecessor when I became Prime Minister in 2000, she told me, [inaudible 02:09:08], she told me, yes, you have to remember that most of your life you'll be former Prime Minister. And now I have to acknowledge that most of my life I'll be former secretary general NATO, but that's not so bad. And I'll hang around and see you and I look forward to then perhaps be a part of this audience next time. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you.
Frederick Kempe (02:09:58): Mr. Secretary General, nothing more need be said.
General Stoltenberg (02:09:58): No, thank you. Thank you. Thank you
Shannon Vavra (02:10:09): Frederick and his excellency, Jens Stoltenberg. Thank you for such an enticing conversation. I personally loved the commentary on the first pitch. As a baseball fan myself, we can be safely assured that the Secretary General is focused surely on transatlantic security and not baseball. As you mentioned, the alliance is truly being tested. Any outlines, some crucial elements of aid to Ukraine. The alliance is working on from joint training to defense assistance packages and looking how to secure Ukraine not just now, but even after the fighting stops. Thank you again. Our next panel, strengthening the Transatlantic bond will aim to answer questions such as what is the future of the Transatlantic partnership? How can Europe and North America cooperate more efficiently? How can the transatlantic bond be affected by recent elections? Now, please join me in welcoming to the stage Mr. Robert Vass, president of GLOBSEC and the panelists.
Robert Vass (02:11:24): Thank you very much and welcome to this very high level panel. I would say we have an extremely good setting in this panel for this conversation. And we have something like 55 minutes, so it'll be quick and speedy. My name is Robert Vass. I'm the president and founder of GLOBSEC, and I'm extremely honored that I have the opportunity to partner in the consortium with our American friends and with the White House to organize this forum as the only European partner. Yesterday... Thank you. Yesterday we were celebrating the 75th anniversary of the alliance in the Mellon Auditorium in the same room where the Washington Treaty was signed. It is undoubtedly the largest, most successful and longest enduring military alliance in the history of mankind. We are also celebrating 20 years of enlargement of NATO and the 25th of enlargement of NATO. And actually countries of central Eastern Europe joined NATO 20 and 25 years ago. And I think that was a symbol of Europe whole free and at peace, something that was not automatic, something that leaders needed to take hard decisions and they needed to make bold decisions to make it happen. (02:12:47) And 20 years later, I think it is a great success. And the story of the enlargement is connected also to GLOBSEC because we have organized our first conference 20 years ago, exactly in the year when we joined NATO. We have here, and I'm happy that I'm joined here in the panel by Petr Pavel, the President of Czech Republic. Welcome.
Petr Pavel (02:13:11): Hello.
Robert Vass (02:13:12): Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister of Estonia. Welcome. Mette Frederiksen, the Prime Minister of Denmark. And James Risch, Senator of the United States of America. He's the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Welcome. (02:13:44) As we celebrate the 75th anniversary of NATO and all these anniversaries that I mentioned, at the same time, we are facing the most difficult challenge for the alliance, and that's the Russian aggression in Ukraine. The war is back in Europe, and we've done a lot. We united and we've been stronger than ever. But is that enough for the future? Is that enough to secure our future? Are we up to the speed because Russians are speeding up as well in Ukraine? So these will be the questions and the conversations we'll be talking about today. So let me turn to you, Prime Minister Kallas, first. You come from, and by the way, congratulations on nomination to be the high representative of the European Commission.
Kaja Kallas (02:14:38): Thank you.
Robert Vass (02:14:42): It's a great achievement of this nomination as you're coming from a eastern European country, a Baltic country, a small country Estonia, who is really punching above this weight. And that shows how a small country can be influential on the world stage. So congratulations to it. You have demonstrated incredible determination to whatever it can to support Ukraine, understanding that if Ukraine does not succeed, Estonia and rest of us in this Europe can be the next. And you've been one of those who wanted all NATO countries collectively to be even more serious about our ambitions, about our collective defense. Emmanuel Macron at the [inaudible 02:15:27] Forum last year in [inaudible 02:15:29] said that NATO is not branded anymore, that it was revived by electro shocks in the East. And he also said that we should have listened to you more in the central Eastern European countries. So what is your message now? What the other leaders from Western Europe and the United States should listen right now?
Kaja Kallas (02:15:52): First, I want to correct one thing, and that is I never say that the Baltics or the Eastern Flank
Prime Minister Kaja Kallas (02:16:00): Is next because we don't have any second or first class countries in NATO, we only have NATO countries. So if Russia decides to move on and really use its power to attack, then it's going to attack NATO and not single countries. And this is actually one of the narratives that Russia once says Dubai because they constantly separate, like the Baltics and the Warsaw backed countries are separate from the NATO. It's not like Germany or France. No, we are in NATO and that's why we have the Article five, and that means that attack on one is attack on all. But you are correct in that sense that this war in Ukraine and our response to it actually determines also whether NATO is credible or not, whether it is also acting as deterrence for Russia. Why we don't have a war in NATO countries is because Russia is not taking up that fight. Why Ukraine is having this war is because they are in the gray zone. (02:17:16) They are not under NATO's umbrella. And therefore my conviction is that Ukraine will have to become member of NATO when we want to get rid of conflicts and the areas of gray zones because gray zones are sources for the potential conflicts and I don't think it's good for the peace.
Robert Vass (02:17:42): Thank you, Prime Minister. I will come back to you in the second round, but let me move to Prime Minister Mette Federiksen. Denmark is a great example how a country can rather seriously change its approach to defense and rise up to the challenge. Denmark was supposed to reach 2% of defense spending by 2030, and you just recently announced that Denmark will do this this year, so six years earlier than it was planned. It's a pretty big increase from 1.3% that you had two years ago. Denmark has also been robust in supporting Ukraine, ranging from providing Ukraine with F-16s, fighter jets and preparing its Air Force capabilities to making bold decisions to give you Ukraine even maybe entire artillery stocks. These are all very difficult questions to make. At home... You say no, which is good. It's a good leadership.
Prime Minister Federiksen (02:18:39): It's not difficult.
Robert Vass (02:18:40): But my question is, how long can we sustain these decisions? Are we in the risk of Ukraine fatigue in the future and how do we prevent it?
Prime Minister Federiksen (02:18:53): Well, first of all, it's not a difficult decision.
Robert Vass (02:18:57): It's the right decision.
Prime Minister Federiksen (02:18:58): Yeah. You have to do what is the right thing to do, and doing the right thing is never difficult. You're totally right. We decided many months ago to give away our entire artillery to Ukraine. Why? Because it's better used in Ukraine than it's used in Denmark. And we have to do the same now with air defense. We have a lot of air defense systems in the NATO Alliance. It's better used in Ukraine than it is used... Especially in the western part of NATO. The eastern part is a different case. And we said from the very beginning of the war that we are going to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes and with what it has to... I mean, the measures we have to take will be taken. I'm very proud of everything we have done collectively. We have a stronger NATO, we have a stronger European Union now than when the war started. (02:20:07) But we have to admit that we have been moving too slow. I think we have to speed up, we have to scale up and we have to take a decision, do we want Ukraine to win the war or not? And I see no signs, no signs in Russia and in the Russian behavior that they're going to stop with Ukraine. When I watch Russia through the last years, but also now, not only in Ukraine but also in the West Balkans, what they do in Europe with cyber attacks, hybrid attacks, disinformation. Look at what they're doing in Africa, in the Middle East, they're trying to destabilize everything we believe in. Everything we believe in. And therefore asking me, it's not enough to provide the Ukrainians with what they need to defend themselves, we have to provide them with what is needed so they can beat Russia and push Russia back. I think this has to be the main discussion on the table also in the coming days. (02:21:14) And you are right, when I came to office five years ago, we were spending 1.3 on defense, now we are spending 2.4. And if you ask me, are you sure it will be enough in the future? I cannot say yes because we have to put it the other way around. And let me just conclude by saying what you have said from US, for many years now to us in Europe, you have to be able to protect yourself, you have to spend much more money on deterrence and defense. You have been correct and we have to admit from a European perspective that we were depending on you, we are still depending on you and never leave us alone. Never. We have to fight together also in the future. But you were right that we have to be able to defend ourselves. And putting that question on the table, then you cannot say 2% is enough, then you have to put it the other way around.
Robert Vass (02:22:15): Exactly. So Ukraine is... And that's exactly the leadership we really need in Europe, to say that Ukraine is not only fighting for its sovereignty, it is fighting for the very basic principles of international law and of the principles of European peace and security. If we give up on these principles, who will believe us in the future? It's the deterrence of any other parts, not only of the NATO territory, but of our allies, starts in Ukraine. Absolutely. And winning in Ukraine. So thank you for that clear leadership. President Pavel, you are the President of Czech Republic who is leading a lot of international initiatives supporting Ukraine, especially the munition initiative that has really caught interest internationally, so Czech Republic is also pushing or punching above its weight. You also spent all your career in military, you were also chairman of the NATO Defense Committee and you will be hosting the next GLOBSEC summit in Prague, and we are very glad. Thank you for that. (02:23:36) But your voice has been among the boldest when it comes to helping Ukraine, defeating Russia and building strong Europe's military strength. But you also said several times that we need to manage expectations on the war in Ukraine. Your assessment was, and correct me if I'm wrong, was that we cannot expect Ukraine to liberate all its territory anytime soon, especially given that if we are not providing Ukraine with all that it needs to win. So my question is, we all say that we stand with Ukraine as long as it takes. Is it a winning strategy? Shouldn't we say whatever it takes? Do we have a consensus within NATO on what our short-term and long-term goals in Ukraine are? And most importantly, if we have these goals in place, do we have a consensus on how to achieve them and how to provide the means for Ukraine to win?
President Petr Pavel (02:24:39): Well, I'm not going to fight the words, if it should last forever or how long does it take, but I believe it's a matter of principle. It doesn't matter if we take it as a matter of liking or disliking Ukraine. It's about if we like to live in a world where rules matter or not. And this is what it is all about. I believe that supporting Ukraine is a matter of principle. We want to live in a world where also smaller countries are protected, where they have the guarantees to live up to their aspirations, and that's why we believe that it's necessary for our own interest to defend Ukraine. But of course, reality is different. We haven't given Ukraine anything they needed for successful defense from the beginning. There were some delays and gaps that cost Ukraine a lot of lives and some territory, but also some self-confidence when it comes to meeting their own goals. Right now we are trying to give Ukraine everything to defend their territory and not to allow Russia to progress because if, and under the circumstances that Russia has a chance to succeed, to progress, there will be no chance for stopping the war, for taking Russia to the table. (02:26:16) So right now what we need to do is to provide Ukraine with ammunition, armor, long-range artillery missiles, and especially air defense, to prevent Russians from successful attacks on civilian infrastructure as we saw it recently in Kiev and as we see it in Kharkov and many other cities. And at the same time, to come up with a lot of effort on a diplomatic and political arena to get support of as many countries as possible to push on Russia and China to sit at the table under the meaningful conditions, not conditions that were represented by Russia. Obviously we cannot accept that the territories currently occupied by Russia will be recognized as Russian because that would mean that we would go against the principles on which our societies are built. But we would probably realistically accept that there will be part of Ukrainian territory that will be temporarily occupied, that such a situation shouldn't prevent us from going on with Ukrainian integration into NATO or the EU and pushing on restoring their full sovereignty in the foreseeable future. But for that, Ukraine really needs our support and full determination in our own sake.
Robert Vass (02:27:51): Thank you. I've seen Prime Minister wanted to react.
Prime Minister Kaja Kallas (02:27:53): Yes, I wanted to react. I think everybody wants this war to end, so that is very clear. And what we have to do, I mean, of course, give military aid to Ukraine, but there's also one element that needs to be addressed and that is, we have the sanctions in place so that Russia wouldn't build its war machine really. But then if it is true that what was written in the media that the Russian missile that hit the hospital, children's hospital actually has Western elements in it, so they are not able to bomb if they are not using the western elements to build this. And this is very important. When I go to different European countries that are further away from the war and don't see Russia maybe the way that we do, then I see this will still to profit from it. I mean, yeah, it doesn't really concern me. I just want to do my trade and we see the circumvention of sanctions, but these are the same companies that are complaining that our businesses are hurt, our economies are hurt because of it. But actually, we need to concentrate our efforts, everybody. (02:29:19) And of course it's painful, it's painful, but if we do it, the war could be over sooner. Then when everybody's dragging their feet, they're thinking that, "Okay, it doesn't really concern me, I can still profit from this," And then eventually it'll go on longer than we want.
Robert Vass (02:29:40): Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Absolutely right. Let me move to Senator James Risch. You've been a very strong supporter of the alliance of Ukraine and of our collective security, and thank you for that, and all of the countries represented here at the NATO Summit have done their utmost to support Ukraine and to raise the bar when it comes to the defense spending. The EU has provided economic assistance to Ukraine and has put Ukraine on the track towards EU membership. Do you think we are doing enough? What can be done more?
Senator James Risch (02:30:24): Let me take that on. But before I do, I want to respond very briefly to what the Estonian Prime Minister said right at the beginning regarding the Baltics. Right after the invasion, a number of people from the Baltics came to see us here in America and they were concerned. NATO had become stodgy. We'd forgotten what it was formed for. NATO was formed for the exact circumstance we find ourselves in today. I told my friends from the Baltics, I said, "Look, Article five means exactly what it says. An attack on one is an attack on all." Not one square inch, whether it's in the Baltics, whether it's in London, whether it's in New York, not one square inch. Mr. Putin, listen. Article five means exactly what it says. I make that commitment now for the United States and the United States is there to meet that commitment if we ever have to. So let's take on that question. Are we doing enough? That's kind of a general question. I mean, enough for what? You've got to state what your objective is, and if the question is are we doing enough to reach the objective? Well, you reevaluate that every day, whether you're doing enough or not. I would say that we are a robust democracy in the United States, just like the European countries are, and there are people who dissent from the view that we should be doing something in Ukraine. In the United States, I think people are not as in tune with how we got to where we are as far as Ukraine is concerned. You have to go back to December the fifth of 1994 when the Budapest agreement was entered into. We made a commitment. On that date, Ukraine was the second largest nuclear armed country on the planet. And it was the policy of the United States then, it's a policy of the United States now and always has been that as few countries have as few nuclear weapons as possible so you have less of mischief on the planet. (02:32:44) We said to the Ukrainians, as did the British at the same time, give up your nuclear weapons, they're going to cause you a lot of troubles for a lot of reasons, and if something happens, we'll be there. We said that, we meant it and we have to keep that commitment now, and we have all the Europeans to help us do that because of Article five. So are we doing enough? We need to continue to do more. The people who are dissenters in the United States always point to the fact, "Well, the Europeans aren't doing enough." It depends on how you do the math. I mean, look, you can't penny this out, nickel and dime this out, but you certainly have to look at what the Europeans have done, way beyond what I think a lot of people's expectations were here. But secondly, not just on the military side, but also on the humanitarian side. I mean, it's stunning to me. When I went into Ukraine, I went through Poland and they were talking about the number of refugees they had there. (02:33:42) Never been in a country with 2 million refugees, but no refugee camps. Why not? They're all in people's homes and they're being taken care of. So look, we need to continue to do that. And one of the things I will say to our European friends and has been said over and over again, that 10 years ago in Wales, we all agreed two percent would be the number. It's been 10 years and fortunately we're up to 23 countries now out of our alliance. We got nine more to go. But if we want to silence the critics using that point of view, we need to all get up to 2%. And frankly, now that this has happened, and a lot of us always hoped this would never happen, but now that this has happened, 2% probably isn't enough. We have been stunned. I think all of us have been stunned by the weakness and the holes in our industrial production when it comes to defense. We're going to have to do more.
President Petr Pavel (02:34:51): All of us.
Robert Vass (02:34:51): Absolutely. Absolutely right. Mr. president, you wanted to react?
President Petr Pavel (02:34:55): Yeah, with my experience from NATO and especially NATO Military Committee, I would like to add an argument to what has been said on the account of defense spending. I think we should also pay attention not just to the figure, how many percent of our GDP are we spending for defense, but how do we meet our capability commitments, capability targets, because this is what matters for real and credible defense. Strategic commanders will not take a chart with the percents once they are confronted with the situation. They will count aircraft, ships, combat units at required readiness. And this is what we should focus on beyond this 2% line because we have serious gaps in meeting our capability targets. So if we really want to be credible in our deterrence, because I think no one would argue that Russia knows very well about the real estate of our armed forces, we should really do much more in meeting these capability targets.
Robert Vass (02:36:10): I will give you the word in a second, but I would like to follow up on what you said because we at GLOBSEC in several reports, we've been saying that there are several transatlantic gaps. One is in the defense spending that we are closing down, another one is in the efficiency, how we spend this money. In Europe, we have a huge potential still to increase the efficiency of that spent money. And the third transatlantic gap that is not closing down but is growing is the technology gap. US is much faster in the technological innovation than Europe, and Europe is lagging behind. This is going to create the serious troubles in the future if we don't act now. And NATO has started with the Diana, with the innovation fund, et cetera, but I think we need to speed up Europe that it's up to date. Prime Minister Frederiksen and then Kallas.
Prime Minister Federiksen (02:37:07): But that was exactly the point I wanted to make actually, because one thing is, of course, traditional deterrence and defense and we have to wrap up, especially on our industry, and I think it's quite clear. I mean, some of us have said for many months that we are able to finance more deliveries for Ukraine, but we don't have anything on stock on our own. But during the Czech initiative, we are very much engaged in that. We are trying to buy from third countries outside Europe because we don't have anything on our own, and of course that cannot be the situation in the future. So we need to invest much more on traditional capacities and capabilities. But talking about technology, that's another chapter. And what I see when I look at all of us, especially in Europe, is that China is going to win this race. I'm not afraid if the US is going to win the race, but if China is going to win this race, then I am afraid. And when I look at Qwanda, when I look at AI, when I look at the pillars that are not traditional security issues, but it is today security, energy and our industrial production and so on, it's all interlinked, and China is way ahead of Europe. (02:38:46) So that's why I'm saying are we sure that 2% will be enough? Because I think the 2% maybe can cover the traditional security questions, but if we are going to include technology, and we have to do that, and we are, as a country, very much engaged in Diana, especially on Qwanda, we have to, I think, invest much more and we have to build much stronger partnerships outside NATO. And that's why it's important that tomorrow we are going to see our friends and partners from Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand for the third time now in a row. We cannot do this on our own, but please be aware about China and let us not repeat the mistakes we have done about Russia in the future with China.
Prime Minister Kaja Kallas (02:39:37): I wanted to build on that because innovation is the key and I think there's actually also the possibility to take the costs down and be more effective. We have a very vibrant tech sector in Estonia, so what we did was to bring them together. So the tech sector that is very much into investing into defense and making these processes faster, more innovative, and more up to date and the traditional defense sector. So combining the two is actually the key. But of course, what is the question is the access to funding because we have defense investments are very much in the same category as pornography for the funds, private funds, so you can't really use the funds for those. So we need to open up those, we need to open up the public funds as well. And what I also wanted to say is that I've been meeting with the defense industry and it's a bit the chicken and egg issue. So the defense industry says that we don't have orders, we have slogans, but we don't have orders from the governments, whereas the government say that from richer countries. (02:40:57) One prime minister asked me that, "Where can I spend? I want to spend 2%, but nobody's selling me now because they don't have anything." If you have a defense company that says that you buy 12 tanks, so I produce 12 tanks for the money that you present, not 16 or 13, but 12 because you don't take any risks. I think also both sides, also the defense industry should read the room and understand that you have to make and take some risks even if it is not the governments immediately showing the money because we have the decisions coming in many countries to invest more in defense, but there has to be something to really be able to invest immediately.
Robert Vass (02:41:51): You have opened up a very important question, which is the European defense industry, and how do we make sure that the defense industry is up to the speed? How do we get the necessary funds not only from governments, but banks? European Investment Bank, they were banned to invest into dual-use products, so I think there is a lot that needs to be changed on the European level in the European Union as well. And here the next European commission is going to be crucial in making sure that we are speeding up because Russia has already begun with the war economy and we are not there yet. And in long-term, it's going to cause a problem.
Prime Minister Kaja Kallas (02:42:32): Yeah, I think the understanding is there. The understanding is amongst the prime ministers of Europe, definitely, that we need to move faster, but the question is how?
Robert Vass (02:42:46): Mr. President, you wanted to react.
President Petr Pavel (02:42:48): Yeah, I wanted to use the opportunity to extend the comment of Mette Frederiksen about how all these problems are interlinked. I think if we look at the current security and international environment from broader point of view, it's not a separate problem of aggressive war of Russia against Ukraine, and on the other side, systemic challenge from China, it's all linked together because what we see now is a confrontation of two systems. On one side, there are democratic countries, being in NATO, EU or elsewhere around the world, including Indo-Pacific, on the other side, different forms of autocracies, mainly now represented by Russia and supporting countries, China, North Korea, Iran, but many others. And if we want to prevail in this global confrontation competition, we really need to approach our cooperation from a different angle of point. Because right now, we pretty much compete in the economic terms between the EU and United States, we are quite secretive when it comes to research and development. When we look at China, how they can combine resources, how they can focus on priorities, we are not doing the same. (02:44:16) I think if we look at it not only from the point of view that we need to support Ukraine so that they defend their territory, because if Ukraine fails, it doesn't only mean that the security in Europe will be worse, it'll be much worse globally because it'll also encourage China to be more assertive and aggressive. So the same way as we ask for United States being with us in solidarity in supporting Ukraine, we should be in a solidarity with United States to support them in their competition with China in all areas around the globe. And collectively, we should also strive to convince countries in Africa, Latin America, that we are a better option for cooperation than autocracies around the world.
Robert Vass (02:45:09): Quick reaction from Senator.
Senator James Risch (02:45:12): When you talk about our competition with China, it isn't just our competition with China, it's your competition with China.
President Petr Pavel (02:45:18): [inaudible 02:45:19]
Senator James Risch (02:45:19): Look what's going on with Russia. I think it's a warm-up for the rest of this century as we compete on the planet. China's the issue. China's going to be the... We're all talking about Ukraine here, and we should because that's the hot war going on, but this thing with China is going to go on for the rest of this century, and the United States and Europe will be able to compete with China if we join together. And there is no more obvious ally for us than you, and there's no more obvious ally for you than us. And we need to join together as we push back against China. And look, one thing that the war has brought out, the Ukraine war has brought out is the fact that what we've always known as an undercurrent, and that is the relationship between China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, the autocracies. It's there, it's real, and it's going to get stronger, only stronger as we go forward in this century. (02:46:28) I think the challenge for this century is going to be how we all occupy this planet without killing each other and compete with each other. We should be able to compete with each other without killing each other. We need to figure that out because this is not going to get better as we get forward. The autocracies are not going to change their belief as to what they think is best for their people, and the democracies are not going to change their belief as to what they think is best for their people. We are going to have to figure this out.
Robert Vass (02:46:57): You opened a very important question of China, and we will see that there is an increasingly clear voice that how China is supporting Russia in its war with Ukraine. It's a problem for us and it's a problem for NATO. There are many voices in the US as well that basically Ukraine is just a distraction from our main adversary, which is China in long-term, and it's decreasing our focus on the main challenge. Well, I like the argument of my friend Ben Hodges who said Ukraine is all about China because if we are sending a wrong signal now that we are not able to defend a country on our borders, who will trust us whatever we say in the future about Taiwan or anything else? So the future deterrence really starts here. So I would say even the future of the West is now being decided in Eastern Europe in the east.
Senator James Risch (02:47:51): Interesting you should mention that now because yesterday, there was released a document titled Next Steps to Defend the Transatlantic Alliance from Chinese Aggression. The author is one of the distinguished thinkers and actors in the 21st century, myself.
Robert Vass (02:48:16): Good, good.
Senator James Risch (02:48:16): This is a follow up to a report I did a couple years ago on the same subject and it is becoming a hotter and hotter item as we go forward. So I...
Robert Vass (02:48:27): Thank you for that commercial. We will all read it.
Senator James Risch (02:48:30): It is free.
Robert Vass (02:48:31): I want to move to a question from the audience, and I want to enlarge a question, but I've seen you really want to react on China.
Prime Minister Federiksen (02:48:39): It's just one thing is the signal, and I totally agree. Let's be honest. If we let Russia take Ukraine, that will, of course, invite many others to do similar things. That's one thing. I mean, that's basic knowledge. And no matter what, it's a bad idea to allow Russia to take a European country. So I mean, that should conclude the discussion about Ukraine actually. But the other thing, and I think that is extremely important, that the triangle between North Korea, Iran and Russia is something we have to have as top of mind now. There is nothing that integrates the three of them except for one thing, that they don't like us. That's what combined those three, and they are willing to do, I guess, what it takes to defeat us. And I think we cannot only look at the triangle, we have to see how China is connected to that triangle. This is the new reality. (02:49:46) It is good we are talking a lot about Ukraine, but we have to talk about Russia. Ukraine is just one example. It's a terrible example. And they're paying
Prime Minister Federiksen (02:50:00): The highest price ... I mean, they are losing thousands of good young men and women, so they're paying the highest price, therefore we have to talk about it, but it's just a part of something bigger, and I think we have to understand that is ... it's more question about Russia than it is a question about a single European country, unfortunately.
Robert Vass (02:50:22): And all of these conflicts are somehow connected-
Prime Minister Federiksen (02:50:25): It is. Everything [inaudible 02:50:25].
Robert Vass (02:50:25): ... and that's why we have this conversation. Exactly. So let me turn to the questions from the audience, an online audience who are watching and listening us. There's a question from Matt Burton. What measures are in place to counter the internal and external actors that continually work against the West and NATO with influential disinformation campaigns? So let me enlarge that question a little bit. We are seeing that the frontal attack on Ukraine that Vladimir Putin has started two years ago, is not only a frontal attack on Ukraine, but on all of us. He clearly said that his goal is to dismantle the Western-led world order, and he has opened several front lines. We are seeing the physical front line in Ukraine, but there is another front line of the same war inside of our societies in information space, is the same war, is hostile against us to divide us. There is another front line in energy, in economic dimensions. So we have to win in all of these dimensions to be able to help to Ukraine. We are seeing that Russia is increasingly active with its agents in Europe. We've seen bombings in Czech Republic, actually, in Vrbetice. We see a lot of hybrid war actions in Europe. Is this a new normal? Are we ... and, actually, are we a subject to the aggression, as well? Are we at war or is just Ukraine at war? Because hybrid war and information war is also war. And as my friend from UK said that if two parties are at war and only one recognizes it is at war, it tends to win. So shouldn't we recognize that there is a war that is waged against us in information space, hybrid, cyber and many other domains, because unless we clearly say that that's a situation, and we appreciate the long-term impacts of that, we are not going to be able to win it. So that's my question to all of you. Who would like to be?
Prime Minister Kaja Kallas (02:52:42): Well, there is a shadow war going on, that is clear, in all those domains that you mentioned. So the question for us is what is our response, really? I mean, because we see all these events all across Europe and the Western Hemisphere, but we treat those events as isolated events, and not connected to each other. I mean, there's a fire in a warehouse, so it's treated as a fire in the warehouse, although we have intelligence that, actually, Russians wanted to set the fire in that warehouse. So the question to us is, what is our response? (02:53:24) Because it could also be a provocation, because Russia wants us to react very strongly. So how to find the balance is a big question. I think we have to raise the awareness. We see this in our intelligence, but I'm not sure that everybody does see this in the same way. And then, the question is whether we are being the frogs that are being boiled, because every next time they're bolder, and we don't react. So how do we address this? And we have discussions going on in NATO about these things, but they are really very initial. It should start from the awareness, the same awareness of all the members in NATO.
Robert Vass (02:54:14): Thank you, [inaudible 02:54:15].
President Petr Pavel (02:54:15): To answer your question, I think it is not so important how do we see us, at what stage we are finding ourselves, because we are ... I heard a number of academic discussions, if we are in war or not, because we still work in the categories of peace, crisis and war. But for Russia, it looks different. They see, at a history, like continuous conflict where only intensity and tools differ. From time to time, they are using hard power. From time to time, they are using hybrid tools, which we see today. Since the times of, we call it Gerasimov Doctrine, but actually it came up earlier than Gerasimov. (02:55:07) But it was around 2010 when Russians came up, again, with their vision of non-linear warfare, where all the kinds from cyber, hybrid, disruptive operations, sabotage, up to hard war fighting are present. So, actually, what Russia is doing against us is a continuous conflict that they are using tools that are available, that are much cheaper, quite often more effective, than hard weapons. If you look at information operations that they are doing now, all these disruptive events within the hybrid warfare across Europe, they are to make us unsure, not trusting our institutions, and being always under pressure. So we need to take not only passive measures, but also active measures to defend ourselves against this kind of warfare, because this is the way how Russians see the world, and we have to see it from their perspective, not from ours.
Robert Vass (02:56:18): Prime Minister Frederiksen, and I would just follow up that. Of course, we need to watch, very closely, all the disinformation campaigns that are going on in several countries in Europe with the goal to divide us, and to also alter the political conversation. Also, there is a role for both NATO and the EU in protection of our critical infrastructure, because we are seeing that this critical infrastructure is under threat. So what do we expect from the NATO summit, and maybe also the next European Commission, in this regard?
Prime Minister Federiksen (02:56:58): Well, first of all, I think we have been spending too much time discussing what we can say about this war, and what we cannot say. What is the right wordings? I mean, if a foreign country is trying to destabilize Denmark by misinformation, I consider it as an attack against a democratic society. And the same way, when they use hybrid attacks, cyber attacks, and so on, so I think let's call it what it is. They are trying to destabilize all of us, and they are using different measures. If it's Ukraine or if it's Denmark or Estonia or Czech Republic, and therefore it's so dangerous what they're doing. And talking about ... one of the mistakes we have made, I think putting a lot of red lines on the table when you are handling a war is also a mistake. (02:57:55) I mean, it's simply giving the enemy two good cards on his hand when you are, all the time, telling Russia what we are not going to do, or what we are not going to accept, instead of putting it the other way around. That we are willing to do whatever it takes to defend Europe, and to defend our alliance, and to defend the world order that we believe in, and that we have built since the end of the second World War. I think the awareness is rising. I agree that we cannot see all these episodes as isolated. We have to see the system in it. Again, it's all interlinked, and therefore I think we have to take it more seriously, and maybe the most important question as NATO countries is, are we going to accept it? Are we going to accept that they are attacking us every day now in Europe with different measures? And I don't think we should accept it.
Robert Vass (02:59:04): Thank you. So we are running out of the time, and I have plenty of questions, but let me ask one. And that's that NATO has proved to be very vital 75 years. Politicians are coming and going. We have elections everywhere, and there is an important election coming up in the United States. And we've seen that many of the conversations in supporting Ukraine, NATO, et cetera, are also not only in US, but also in European countries are somehow domestic conversations about, and they're connected with domestic conversations on economy, et cetera. But my question is, what do you expect how the election campaign and the elections might change the conversation in the support for Ukraine and for NATO?
Senator James Risch (02:59:55): Is that for these guys? Well, I can give you a very clear answer to that. I don't know. Look, the United States has a treaty that is a NATO treaty. Now, admittedly, Ukraine is not part of that treaty. Nonetheless, the attack on Ukraine is clearly as close to that treaty as you can possibly get. We have taken great steps in the United States, already, to do what we should do in order to help Ukraine. I really believe that's going to continue. I don't think the election is going to change that greatly. (03:00:40) I know that at least one of the candidates has said that they're going to end the war. We haven't got an explanation as to how that's going to happen, but the candidate who says that, generally, gets done what he says he's going to get done. So I'll be anxious to see that. But look, I think people should not be wringing their hands over this. As far as the Congress is concerned, which is where I come from, the vast, vast majority, and it's only a small minority, are saying that we shouldn't be doing what we're doing. Look, this is the right thing to do. America, generally, does the right thing that should be done. And given that, I have confidence we'll be there.
Robert Vass (03:01:30): Thank you very much, Senator, and let me thank all of the panel, because this was a wonderful conversation, and this shows that we had US and three small countries of Europe who have shown the way how to raise up to the challenge, and how to support Ukraine. And I think there is an increasing understanding of the situation we are in, that we are to be in a difficult situation, but we all understand that we are stronger together, and that we need to do whatever it takes to secure Europe and Ukraine. So with that, thank you very much for the conversation, and I wish you a nice rest of the day. Thank you.
Prime Minister Kaja Kallas (03:02:18): So it's this way.
Shannon Vavra (03:02:24): Thank you so much to our panelists and our moderator for such an engaging conversation. They talked about some crucial questions of elections, and language, giving Ukraine what it needs to keep fighting to push Russia out, and keep Russia out. They talked about keeping pace with China, concerns about competition with autocracies around the globe, and challenges and gaps racking our defense industrial bases. We will now be viewing a second video from the NATO Youth Summit, which took place on May 14th in Miami, Florida in the US, and Stockholm, Sweden, with watch parties viewing around the world. The NATO Youth Summit delves deep into the most pressing global issues of interest to youth. Let us all now learn something from how the next generation will tackle the future issues of the alliance.
Speaker 7 (03:03:13): On May 13th at the NATO Youth Summit in Stockholm, I warned about the dangers of disinformation, and the imperative to tackle the challenge more robustly. The time to act is now. There is no need to wait for further reports and no time for half measures. We need to be decisive and commit ourselves collectively and without reservation to a much more assertive approach. Winning the information war is foundational to our security and, as NATO youth, we say, without hesitation, that our leaders must rise to the challenge.
Speaker 8 (03:03:46): In the 75th year of our Transatlantic Alliance, we celebrate our steadfast commitments to peace and to security. Our ability to maintain unity and effective deterrence is more crucial than ever, and our success in doing so will serve as the ultimate testimony to the strength of our common values. Emerging technologies can significantly enhance our defense capabilities, however, they also introduce new risks. Cyber attacks, AI-driven disinformation, and the development of autonomous systems all pose serious threats to global security, stability, and to the democratic ideals which unite us as allies.
Speaker 9 (03:04:26): With the rise of AI, cyber threats are becoming a more increased threat. Just like a double-edged sword, while AI enhances our capabilities, it also creates new security challenges. AI's ability to analyze vast amounts of data can strengthen our defenses, but can also be exploited by malicious actors. Therefore, NATO must adopt proactive strategies to create robust security measures.
Speaker 10 (03:04:50): Quantum computing, sensing, and communications could revolutionize defense cyber security, and help strengthen our deterrence against Russia and China, which has already made achieving quantum supremacy a national priority. What NATO's leaders should think about now is how the organization can become a facilitator to bring together the expertise and strengths of Allied nations to drive quantum innovation and empower its application in Allied defense. The time is now to make sure that NATO and member states remain at the forefront of quantum innovation and realize its potential.
Speaker 11 (03:05:23): When we talk military tech or innovation or countering disinformation, those are all reactive actions, or actions that will help us win a potential hot war. But the most important strategic question that we have to find the answer to and start working proactively with is, how do we change the will of the Russian people? If we really are committed to the desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, we have to change the will of the Russian people to stop being aggressive towards its neighbors, as well as funding international crime and terrorism, so that we can achieve a sustainable and stable peace, and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.
Speaker 12 (03:06:02): Our democratic values are victims of the self-imposed red lines. Our democratic values are victims of the appeasement of dictatorships. As we face the largest war in Europe since World War II, with Ukraine at its forefront of protecting democratic values and paying the highest price with the lives of its people, we find ourselves trapped by these self-imposed red lines. It's not time to appease the axis of evil any longer. Without adherence to rules, everyone's sovereignty and territorial integrity are under the threat. It's time to demonstrate the strengths and unity of democracy.
Speaker 13 (03:06:45): Ukrainians have been remarkable in defending their country, but they need your support. But do not support Ukraine just enough to survive, support Ukraine to win. We know that decisions in democracies take time, but time, in Ukraine, is not measured by days, hours, or weeks. It's measured in human lives. Therefore, do not let political games and individual interests get in the way of decision-making. Therefore, I urge you to be bold, to be brave, and to be decisive. The biggest gift for NATO's 75th anniversary would be a victorious and free Ukraine.
Shannon Vavra (03:07:23): Thank you. What a great way to highlight the individuals and issues that will be shaping tomorrow with our youths. Now, please join us for lunch where we will all be able to discuss these pressing issues before resuming our programming. For those of you joining us online, you will now hear a series of interviews, the first from His Excellency, Alexander de Croo, Prime Minister of Belgium. The conversation will be moderated by Alena Kudzko, Vice President for Policy and Programming of GLOBSEC. (03:07:51) Next, you will hear from His Excellency, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the Prime Minister of Greece, which will be moderated by Nadia Schadlow, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. And, finally, we'll be replaying the earlier conversation between Rachel Rizzo and Douglas Lute on the history and geography of NATO. Enjoy. And a few notes for our in-person audience, and those of you in the plenary room, we kindly ask that you refrain from saving seats as it is disruptive in the room, and impedes the flow of traffic. Also, please be mindful, and do not leave your personal belongings in the plenary room during pauses in programming. Our programming will resume at 1:15. Enjoy your lunch.
MUSIC (03:08:37): (instrumental music)
Speaker 14 (03:09:09): Decide in 6 out of the 10 domains that are of the general request of Ukraine. It is about military capacity, but it is also about reconstruction. It is also about humanitarian supports. It's a very broad scope. Of course, a lot of people talk about is the delivery of the F-16s. So we have committed to at least 30 F-16s that will be delivered between now and 2028. That is contingent on the deliveries of our new planes, which are the F-35s, and we hope that we would have deliveries ... I mean, we will aim to have deliveries this year of a couple of F-16s. We will do that. And there's not that many countries that do it. The Netherlands does it, Denmark does it, and Norway. We are already involved in the training mission with our planes, and we hope that we will deliver a few this year. With the 30 that we committed, we will be the biggest contributor to the fighter jet capacity of Ukraine.
Speaker 15 (03:10:10): And, of course, the sooner they arrive, the better.
Speaker 14 (03:10:13): Obviously, the sooner they arrive, the better. Of course, we have to maintain our own defense capacities. Our F-16s are being used today, for example, in the Baltics for Baltic air policing to protect NATO territory for almost daily trials from the Russian side to see how much we defend. So we really have to balance that. Well, the earlier the F-35s are delivered, the earlier we can deliver the F-16s.
Speaker 15 (03:10:38): And what's the timeline on those ones?
Speaker 14 (03:10:40): So we have four that we have now, for the moment, already. They are in United States here for training purposes for our pilots, and we will start getting those during the course of next year.
Speaker 15 (03:10:53): We are living, definitely, in very uncertain times. Everything is uncertain, and things are increasingly challenging given that half of the world is going through elections. And Belgium is one of those countries who just had elections. There is going to be a new government in Belgium, but people do want certainty. Both our populations want certainty to know that the governments can deliver, but also for Ukrainians, it's important to know that we stay committed to the course, and we deliver what we promised. Are you certain that your new government is going to stick to the pledges that you've made?
Speaker 14 (03:11:24): I really have no doubt on that. And we have a long history of these type of commitments, and these types of commitments were always maintained even if you get new governments. And really, the public debate that we've had over the past months, related to our election, about Ukraine, there was really almost no doubt, no difference between the different parties. So I am really confident that the agreement that we signed, and we signed that agreement, I mean that is something that needs to be respected, whichever government is there. So yeah, democracy leads to changing in governments. That's how democracy works. But stability and long-term commitments with our partners is something that we will respect.
Speaker 15 (03:12:14): This is very reassuring to hear. We all have a lot of doubts how long we can carry on for, that the public getting tired, but it's good to hear that, regardless of the government, Belgium can stay the course.
Speaker 14 (03:12:25): But you address an important element is, indeed, the support from our home citizens. And you can do all the public policy, all the foreign policy in the world, you can do all the military training in the world, you can only do that as long as you have the support of your home population. And this is something that I think we need to put much more effort on is to explain why are we supporting Ukraine, why it is so important to do so. (03:12:53) It is important, of course, for the Ukrainians, Ukrainians that are fighting for our values, for our security, but it's also a very important signal we give to the rest of the world is that we Europeans, we will defend our way of life, and we will do so together with our American friends, and other NATO friends. And it's more important than ever to explain what we are doing, and to maintain the support from our home population. I'm not saying that because I feel that it is under pressure, but the moment you lose it, it's too late.
Speaker 15 (03:13:28): And, of course, the other side is doing everything possible to make sure that there is no public supports, trying to sow doubt, and make sure that we do not stay committed. Support for Ukraine is one side of the dimension. The other side is, of course, our commitment to our own security, and that comes with defense spending, as well. A lot of allies are coming to Washington saying that they will deliver the 2% pledge this year. I think it's 23 out of 32 this year. Belgium is not there yet.
Speaker 14 (03:13:56): Not there yet.
Speaker 15 (03:13:57): How do you explain that, and are you going to get there?
Speaker 14 (03:14:00): So we're not there yet. We have increased our military spending with 30% over the past three years. So it is very significant what we have done. We have a path set out by 2030 and 2035. True, it will take us some time to get there, but, to me, that is ... that's one dimension, and it's one dimension that we need to deliver on. But besides what you would call an input metric, which is how much do you spend, we also need to look at output metrics, and output metrics is how active are you if there are requests. And there, Belgium has always been at the forefront. When there were requests to use our fighter jets, we were there. When there were requests to use our marine capacity, we were there. (03:14:48) So you really have to look at both dimensions. And I think it's important, then, when you increase your spending, that you increase your spending in a way that it builds an industrial supply chain. And we know that that today is the [inaudible 03:15:02] is spending more, but spending in a way that you develop an industrial capacity, that you develop technological capacity, that you also develop the human side of defense. Doing that in a well organized way, I think, is the main challenge with which the 32 countries are confronted.
Speaker 15 (03:15:22): I'm so glad you are bringing this up. I was, actually, very excited about the conversation with you. I know that you did MBA, actually, here in the United States, and this business mindset seems to be something that all leaders, political, but also military leaders, desperately need right now. So what is your recipe? What Europeans can do better to increase defense capacity? What kind of investments it needed? What kind of change of policy would it take to get there?
Speaker 14 (03:15:48): Okay. So, yeah, we have a long history of very national defense spending, and most of our militaries would mostly buy with their own industries, which has led to an incredibly fragmented supply chain. We see that now those borders are being broken, and you see that there is M&A activity that is happening across European borders, and that's a good thing. I think next to that, as you pointed out, we need more investment. There is a tendency to always look at public investment. Now I think public investment has a role to play, but the real volume of investment needs to come from private investment. And it's not that there is a lack of capital throughout Europe. I mean, we are a rich continent with people who have savings, and who want to invest their savings. (03:16:35) And so, we need to create a very attractive business case for our population to say, "Your savings can be used to invest in technology that will make us safer, that will help us to maintain our freedoms, our way of life." So that means that public investment has to play a role, but it, really, has to be merit-based. So not in the classic way where we say, "Okay, we have 10 billion, we're going to split it up within Europe, for example, across 27 countries." Let's look where the capacity is, let's look where the expertise is, and allocate it based on the merits and not just on an accounting principle. And that public investment should be used to leverage private investment, and getting the private investment going into those industries is how we will get there. So I'm not against public investments, but I think public investment should be something that is an accelerator to get private investment going.
Speaker 15 (03:17:34): Right. And it's a bigger problem in Europe where we have not particularly well-functioning capital markets, but also, when we are talking about investments in defense, we need to make sure that it complies with our own ESG standards. So there is a lot of work to do on this dimension.
Speaker 14 (03:17:47): There is a lot of work to do, and our ESG standards, of course, date a bit from another era, and the world has changed so rapidly. So, yes, we need to adapt to that. But, I mean, that is why ... the world is changing. I mean, if you look at NATO, what are the two pillars of NATO's success? And we are here to celebrate 75 years of NATO. The first pillar, obviously, is solidarity, is we say we stand shoulder to shoulder, and we will defend one another. But the second element, besides solidarity, is adaptability. The world has changed so much and so fast in the past 75 years, and an organization like NATO has only been successful, because it can adapt. And it's quite clear that, again, we will need to adapt to a new environment.
Speaker 15 (03:18:37): And I'm afraid we're running out of time, but I'll sneak in one last question. We've been covering a lot of ground here, but also at the NATO Summit. What do you think, though, is the blind spots, a particular challenge that we're not paying too much attention to, right now, but we will regret it in the future?
Speaker 14 (03:18:53): Well, so I think one of them was working on our own public support. That we addressed. I think a second one is what we would call the southern flank, is what is happening in the Sahel, for example. I'm convinced that if there would not be the war in Ukraine, and the dramatic violence in the Middle East, that we would be talking much more about what is happening in the Sahel. So this is something that we need to address. It's good that, at this summit, we've come up with an action plan. But I'm convinced that in the next years, we will be investing way more into stabilizing the Sahel, into creating economic development there. All of that is necessary for us. If we want to live well, we need to make sure that our neighbors are living well, as well, and that will need a big engagement from our side.
Speaker 15 (03:19:46): Thank you, so much, Mr. Prime Minister. I'm afraid I'll have to release you back to the NATO Summit negotiations. We appreciate your time here, and thank you, so much, everybody for being with us today.
Speaker 6 (03:19:57): Nine, eight.
Speaker 16 (03:20:07): Welcome back to the NATO Public Forum. I'm Nadia Schadlow, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, and it's my pleasure this afternoon to have an opportunity to have a conversation with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Prime Minister, it's really great to be here with you today. And since we only have a few minutes, I wanted to jump right in. When you became Prime Minister first in 2019, Europe looked different, and the challenges facing NATO seemed, perhaps, less intense than what we're facing today. Could you talk to us a little bit about whether or not NATO has been adapting enough since 2019, since 2022? I know Greece has been really in the lead in terms of modernization and adaptation, but I'd love to hear your views.
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:20:52): When I became Prime Minister in 2019, no one thought that we would be faced with a war at the heart of the European continent. But this is what we have to deal with after Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. And I do believe that the Alliance has adjusted, and has tackled this momentous challenge as successfully as it could. Back in 2019, we were still faced with a question of whether enough European countries would meet the 2% commitment, 2% of defense spending as a percentage of GDP. (03:21:29) Now most countries have already met that target, and those that haven't have made very clear pledges that they will do so. Greece has been one of those countries that has surpassed the 2% threshold, ever since, essentially, we joined the Alliance. We'll be spending 3% of our GDP on defense, significantly modernizing our armed forces, and thus contributing to the overall capabilities of the Alliance. So new challenges force us to think differently, also in terms of what this means for the collective European security as a pillar of the overall NATO integrated structure. And I think this discussion is advancing at a very fast pace in Europe.
Speaker 16 (03:22:11): Yeah. So you mentioned European security. How do EU defense measures complement NATO, or how do you see the relationship between EU efforts to increase, and substantially increase, its defense and NATO? Is the relationship complementary, and how so?
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:22:30): In my mind, it is fully complementary. We need to spend more, but we also need to be smarter about how we allocate our defense spending. When I look at the European defense industry, I see a lot of fragmentation. I don't see enough interoperability. I see a lot of sometimes, maybe, I would say ... I wouldn't say unnecessary competition, but certainly too many weapons systems that don't necessarily talk to each other. So we need to spend more, but we also need to be smarter about how we integrate our spending. (03:23:01) And, I guess, I do think that at a time when the Russian invasion of Ukraine poses an existential threat for Europe, we also need to be creative in terms of finding new sources of funding in order to support our defense spending. It is not just going to be enough to rely on national budgets, as we have done so far. And that is why I've been one of those strong proponents that we need some sort of European facility that will complement the defense spending that we undertake at the national level with more European funding. So this combination of public and private initiatives, in my mind, is going to be necessary if we build a solid European pillar when it comes to NATO's overall defense capabilities.
Speaker 16 (03:23:49): So would that be some type of European fund, or how do you envision that mechanism?
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:23:54): We have submitted, with President Donald Tusk, a proposal for
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:24:01): A flagship European project, which would essentially be a European iron dome that would complement the existing air defense capabilities that we have, which could be, again, I stress the word could be because we clearly don't have agreement at this stage, which could be funded through some sort of European joint borrowing. When we faced COVID back in 2020, we took the momentous decision to raise 750 billion euros to address the economic downturn that COVID caused to all of our economies. And this money is currently deployed, this was a European facility. So it seems to me that if we have raised 750 billion euros for the green of the digital transition, to support our competitiveness, to protect jobs, it would be reasonable if we could raise a significantly lower sum at the European level to strengthen our European defense initiatives.
Speaker 16 (03:24:54): Right. And that would get us beyond always a discussion about the 2%. Also, it's different, it's ways to get to the 2%, but also ways to increase capabilities and integrated capabilities across Europe.
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:25:06): And of course also ways to strengthen also our European defense industry at a time when we talk a lot about strategic autonomy, when the issue of competitiveness is at the top of our agenda, bolstering European defense co-operation, European innovation. We've made some first steps at the European level in that direction, but we clearly need to do more.
Speaker 16 (03:25:32): Right. And speaking of doing more, Greece has done an incredible amount for Ukraine. You're one of the leading states in terms of providing the Ukrainians with missiles, with ammunition. What more do you think NATO needs to do quickly and how can we get there? A key theme throughout this past year really has been speed and NATO's ability, or lack thereof to get things to Ukraine fast enough. And that's been a problem we've had in the United States too. How do you think things might shift over the next few months, or what could be most meaningful to get us to act faster?
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:26:04): Well, first of all, I think Europe has stepped up to the plate and has delivered. Back in 2022 I think many, including many in Moscow, would've placed bets on the inability of Europe to remain united when it comes to supporting Ukraine. They were wrong. Europe remains united. We are providing Ukraine with European financial assistance, 50 billion euros. It's a significant package that we agreed a few months ago. But also member states are providing Ukraine with defense capabilities to the best of our abilities, and we will continue to do so. And initiatives such as a Czech initiative, for example, have proven to be very efficient in terms of delivering aid to Ukraine as quickly as possible. (03:26:47) At the same time, we need to look at the holes this has created to our own defense capabilities. And as much as we talk about sophisticated systems, we also need to make sure that we have the basics. I mean, Ukraine demonstrated how important, for example, 155 shells are, and that not everything is going to be sort of as technology-driven in a modern war as many people thought. So making sure that we also streamline production, strengthen our stockpiles, while at the same time having the capability to support Ukraine. This is a challenge that we have to meet.
Speaker 16 (03:27:26): Right. Quantity matters.
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:27:28): Quantity and quality.
Speaker 16 (03:27:30): Can you tell us a little bit more about the Czech initiative that you just mentioned in passing?
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:27:34): Well, I think the Czech initiative has proven to be an efficient way of transferring weapon systems to Ukraine. Many countries have joined that initiative, and as you pointed out, now it's just up to speed and making sure that the necessary transactions, whenever they involve, for example, sale of equipment take place as quickly as possible. And it seems to me that this is one avenue which is worth exploring further.
Speaker 16 (03:28:08): So as we close, what is your hope for the 75th public forum? What would you like to see out of the 75th anniversary summit?
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:28:18): Well, first of all, I think it is important to take stock of what we have achieved. NATO has been successful because it has been able to adapt and occasionally even reinvent itself, and this is exactly what we need to do now. For me, the most crucial aspects of NATO has always been the strength of the Transatlantic partnership. And I think it is very, very important that we maintain this mutual commitment, but to also recognize that in an alliance, we all need to do our own own part. There are no free riders. And that is why meeting the 2% commitment is so important, at least for those countries that have always been very consistent with this target. And maybe at some point we will need to discuss about raising it. Maybe 2% is not enough. Maybe we need to get to 2.5% if we really want to deliver everything we want to do within the alliance. (03:29:11) But the one thing which is certain is that at a time of great uncertainty, being part of an alliance that is strong, defensive and capable of defending us all against external threats is as important as it has ever been.
Speaker 16 (03:29:28): Well, thank you so much.
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:29:29): Thank you.
Speaker 16 (03:29:30): It's been a pleasure. Thank you.
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (03:29:30): Thank you.
Rachel Rizzo (03:29:39): Good morning everyone from Washington D.C. at the NATO Public Forum. My name is Rachel Rizzo and I am a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Europe Center. And today I am thrilled to have with me Ambassador, Doug Lute, who served as the US Ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2017. (03:29:58) Ambassador Lute, thank you so much for being with us today for this interview.
Ambassador Lute (03:30:01): Well, it's great to be with you, Rachel.
Rachel Rizzo (03:30:03): Absolutely. So we're celebrating a huge milestone here in Washington for this NATO Summit 75 years. Now, you've talked a little bit about how there's three different versions of NATO, NATO 1.0, 2.0. 3.0. Can you talk a little bit about that and your ideas around what that looks like for NATO?
Ambassador Lute (03:30:22): Right. So 75 years is a long period of time to absorb. And so I think it's useful to unpack the 75-year history of the alliance, now the longest-serving alliance in modern history into these three periods. And 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 is sort of a nod to the next generation. (03:30:43) I count the first period, the first segment of NATO history marking from 1949 for 40 years to 1989, and obviously the fall of the Berlin Wall, and then the aftershocks of the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of '89, which eventually two years later saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union. And during NATO 1.0, it had the bipolar global standoff between the West and the Soviet Union, most prominently with the iron Curtain running north to south and dividing Europe itself. And this was a period of the zero-sum game. If something was good for one side, it was bad for the other. And it really spoke to the original purpose of NATO, which was the defense of the 12 allies itself. (03:31:34) I think that period ended in the '89 to '91 period. And the post-Cold war period or NATO 2.0 dawned with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I count NATO 2.0 as running for about 25 years. So from roughly 1989 to 2014, and in that NATO 2.0 period, we had some dramatic changes. I mean the cause, the original cause of NATO, the threat from the Soviet Union had disappeared, at least briefly. We'll come to that. And NATO began to question its purpose, its standing in the world and so forth. And it found its feet. It did so by first of all, enlarging its membership. So this was a period when the first Central and Eastern European countries joined the Alliance. Now the first three are celebrating their 25th anniversary, also simultaneous with NATO's 75th anniversary this week. (03:32:36) It also saw NATO look beyond its borders and make a very simple, logical statement, which is that the allies themselves are more secure if beyond our borders, our neighborhood is more stable. And this ushered in the of NATO partnerships. This began, of course in the early 1990s with Partnership for Peace. And now it's extended to some 40 partners that range geographically from Mauritania to Japan. And these diverse set of partners really bring a great value to the alliance. They give us not only insight into regions beyond our borders that are critical to NATO security itself, but they also gain by way of access to NATO military standards, essentially the gold standard of military interoperability, access to the NATO school system and so forth. So this two-way street of NATO partnerships began in this NATO 2.0 period. (03:33:41) And we even fashioned a partnership, as unusual as it may seem today, with the Russian Federation, the successor to the Soviet Union. And I think that that partnership was well-intentioned. It was exploring the potential that NATO could actually have meaningful, reliable relations with its largest geographic military neighbor. And I think that that experiment, that exploration actually marked the end of NATO 2.0 with the Russian seizing and illegally annexing Crimea destabilizing the Donbas and so forth. And so I think in 2014, we really began to see a move towards NATO 3.0, and that's the period we're still in. And much of the substance of this summit has to do with this transition from NATO 2.0 to NATO 3.0 and how NATO will continue to adapt as we face new challenges.
Rachel Rizzo (03:34:52): We're at 75 years, the longest military alliance in history. The next big milestone is going to be 100 years. What is that going to look like? There have been a lot of things written, a lot of discussions being had about how the US-European security relationship will have to fundamentally change as the US is pulled in multiple directions, as the US focuses more on the Indo-Pacific, that will ultimately mean that Europe will have to shoulder more of its own security burden. Is that what NATO 4.0 might look like? What's your idea on that?
Ambassador Lute (03:35:29): Well, obviously this is a pretty hazy crystal ball-
Rachel Rizzo (03:35:34): It is.
Ambassador Lute (03:35:34): ... in terms of gazing into the next 25 years. But I think there is a NATO 4.0, and it features a new security architecture, certainly in Europe, after peace is established in Ukraine and stability is established after the Ukraine war. I think it has to account for the fact the geographic reality that Russia will remain NATO's closest neighbor, nearest neighbor, most militarily capable neighbor and will have to settle on some sort of security architecture that provides stability on both sides. (03:36:15) And I think increasingly, as your question suggests, it's got to account for the fact that security is perhaps more than ever a global equation, a global dynamic, and will have to account for the rising, the looming competition with China, which NATO now formally recognizes by way of its strategic concept. And I think what that must mean is that European allies with US support, continued US, have to assume even more responsibility for security here in Europe. That doesn't mean the absence of the United States, but it means a more equitable balance from the roughly 70%/30% distribution that we see today. So if I were to predict 25 years, with some hazard, I'd suggest those are some cornerstones of NATO 4.0.
Rachel Rizzo (03:37:12): One of the major meetings that's going to happen at this summit is alongside NATO's Indo-Pacific partners, and there's sort of a debate happening in Washington about the role that NATO has to play in the Indo-Pacific. Secretary General Stoltenberg has made it clear that this is not about NATO pushing itself into the Indo-Pacific, but it's a response to China's inroads throughout Europe. But there's also another side of that debate where people say, look, NATO's main area, its main theater of operations is the European continent, its main adversary is Russia, and that's what it should be focusing on. What are your thoughts on how NATO should navigate this new geographical challenge when it comes to China and the Indo-Pacific?
Ambassador Lute (03:38:04): Well, I think the first point to make very clear is that the NATO Treaty itself lays out the geographic confines of the alliance. So it is the North Atlantic area. And so NATO doesn't have a treaty obligation beyond the North Atlantic, so not into the Indo-Pacific, for example. But it's undeniable that the looming, in fact, I would argue already ongoing competition with China will have a direct impact on not only Europe, but also North America. I mean, we're seeing this play out in so many ways. And I think Secretary of State Tony Blinken made this quite clear in his interview earlier today. (03:38:44) I think for European allies, one of the things that has to be of concern is the buying up by China of commercial infrastructure in Europe, which is actually not just civilian infrastructure, but dual-purpose infrastructure. So here you see this pattern, this trend of Chinese investment and purchasing of seaports, transportation infrastructure, energy infrastructure, mass communications infrastructure and so forth. And it's, I think, increasingly important that NATO and our partners at the European Union appreciate that these are dual purpose and that rail lines, for example, or ports used by commercial entities are also a part of the military equation. (03:39:31) So I think being more aware of Chinese attempts to influence Europe by way of commercial infiltration with the expectation that there's a political payoff down the road after these commercial investments are made, that's a place for us to be much more aware. And I think it illustrates China's endgame, China's long game, which is the Belt and Road Initiative leading to the marketplace of Western Europe, and with the idea of commercial infiltration leading eventually to political influence.
Rachel Rizzo (03:40:08): So we are here in Washington just blocks away from where the Washington Treaty was signed at the Mellon Auditorium back in April of 1949. There were 12 original NATO members, were now at 32. What do you think would surprise those original founders about where the alliance has been and where it is today?
Ambassador Lute (03:40:29): Right. Well, first of all, I think they'd be surprised that we're at 75. I mean, I don't think anybody does something today and imagines where he or she'll be in 75 years. So I think they would be surprised, the 12 founders would be surprised of the durability of the alliance. And I think that they would remark that the source of that durability is actually in the second sentence of the Washington Treaty that cites that all the signatories to the treaty will abide by and believe in three democratic principles, which I think are the glue of the alliance and largely account for how we made it to 75. And those three are democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. (03:41:14) Now, look, NATO was at 12 and is today at 32 a alliance of democracies, but there's 32 varieties of democracies here. And each of those I would offer and humbly as an American citing American democracy as well, each of them is a work in progress. But the fact that we're grounded on these core values, I think is part of the reason that we've been this durable, and I think that the founders would be proud of that second sentence. (03:41:46) I also think they'd have to be surprised at the geographic scope of the alliance. I mean, I don't imagine any of them could have thought of 12 becoming 32, and I think that they'd marvel at that. I think with the Washington Treaty being signed in Washington, that they'd be shocked that the only time Article Five has been invoked in these 75 years had nothing to do with an attack in Western Europe, had nothing to do with America responding to that attack and reinforcing our European allies, had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. But in fact, on the day September 11th, it was actually the inverse of all that, it was Europe coming to the assistance of America to include in part because of an attack here in Washington. So they'd be surprised about Article Five. (03:42:51) I'd also remark though these photos may clear that the 12 men who signed the Washington Treaty, I think would be surprised today at the role of women in leadership positions in NATO at multiple levels. So head of state and government, ministers, both foreign and defense ministers, the NATO staff, ambassadors and so forth. I would add there that today perhaps we should be surprised that there aren't more women in prominent roles in NATO. So I think there's a lot to be surprised at. One thing that they would not be surprised at-
Rachel Rizzo (03:43:31): Yeah, that's my next question.
Ambassador Lute (03:43:32): I'll preempt your next question. They would not be surprised that NATO today is rallying in the face of Russian aggression.
Rachel Rizzo (03:43:41): Yeah.
Ambassador Lute (03:43:42): That of course was the original forming cause of NATO, and today I think the founders would see a familiar Russia in terms of imperialist designs and aggression on its neighbors.
Rachel Rizzo (03:43:56): They probably would also be surprised that we're trying to get Germany to spend more on defense and do more and be more forward-leaning as well.
Ambassador Lute (03:44:05): Perhaps.
Rachel Rizzo (03:44:06): Perhaps.
Ambassador Lute (03:44:07): Maybe even the Germans, they're a little surprised at that.
Rachel Rizzo (03:44:10): Yeah. Yeah. There's a lot of surprise that has happened to us since 1949. Finally, one of the main headlines at this alliance or at this specific summit is what the alliance is delivering for Ukraine. There's a lot of talk about a bridge to membership that's well lit, that is short, but there's also been criticism that the weapons that we've been giving them have so many caveats on them that we're having Ukraine fight with one hand tied behind its back. What are your thoughts on the deliverables for Ukraine at this summit?
Ambassador Lute (03:44:40): Well, I think that the military deliverables and the political deliverables, these two parallel tracks or lines of effort for Ukraine are predictable and quite candidly, quite modest. I would've liked to have seen even more progress on military assistance and on fulfilling the commitment that Ukraine politically will eventually become a member. The bridge metaphor works in part, but I'm not sure it's completely satisfactory. (03:45:18) Look, I think everyone here at the summit this week was stunned by the blatant aggression of the most recent Russian attack on Kiev and other cities, to include the tragic attack on the children's hospital. It's important for us to remember two things. First of all, that attack originated from inside Russia, and the base from which that attack was launched is essentially in sanctuary because it is beyond the ability of Ukrainian indigenous capacity to strike it. And we have placed limits on the geographic range of the systems we've provided Ukraine. I know of no effective air defense program, which focuses solely on defense of the target site by way of air defense systems and so forth, and neglects the attack of the launch sites. Air defense is a two-way street, offense and defense. (03:46:26) So in particular, you use the words caveat. I think that the restrictions, the caveats that we've placed and others have placed on some of our systems are not justifiable in legal terms, these are legitimate military targets and they don't make sense in terms of military science.
Rachel Rizzo (03:46:47): Thank you for that clear answer and for your support of NATO and your support of Ukraine as well. And for this interview, Ambassador Lute, and to our audience watching online, tune in for another two days of programming here at the NATO Public Forum in Washington. Thank you so much.
MUSIC (03:47:04): (music)
Michal Baranowski (04:22:44): Welcome back. Welcome back to the Forum after a nutritious lunch, hopefully, for all of you and I would invite everyone to the front, slowly closing the doors. So we are back for the second half of the day. I hope you had a great first half of the day. Good conversations over lunch. Exciting part two of our program. Before we start with our next panel, I'm going to invite you to watch a video, one of our video productions, on the pressing issues of NATO's Eastern Borders. So please watch the video with us. Thanks.
Lt. Rafael de Carlos Alonso (04:23:27): As a fighter pilot, it's an honor to be here in the Baltic Air Policing mission in Lithuania, in Šiauliai Air Force Base. Especially this year, which is the 20th anniversary of the BAP Mission and the 75th anniversary of NATO, an organization which works for the freedom and security of all its members. I perform my part of the collective defense support of all allies just in order to deter possible aggressions and defend the population and territories of our alliance. This duty makes me feel very proud, and if required, and as a part of the deep commitment that all of the members have with this organization, I would love to be here again with my friends for the 25th anniversary of the BAP Mission and even for the centenary of NATO. Thank you.
Hanna-Stiina Tornius (04:24:16): I believe that for young people who have only ever known peace in their countries, the challenges that NATO is facing may seem distant and foreign. We must not create spaces for our enemies to sow fear and distrust, but we must ensure that our societies are prepared for the threats that we are facing.
Tomass Pildegovičs (04:24:37): As NATO reaches its 75th anniversary, the alliance has a lot to be proud of, yet its greatest accomplishment is providing security and defense to the former captive nations of the Soviet Union. Through the credible deterrence and security provided by NATO, the countries of the Eastern flank, including my country, Latvia, have been able to prosper, escape Russia's imperial orbit, and the iron curtain we see today. This mission, however, has not yet been completed. Our Ukrainian friends deserve the same.
Charly Salonius-Pasternak (04:25:11): This is the first big anniversary Finland is celebrating as a member of NATO, but NATO has been important to Finland for over 75 years. By keeping the peace in Europe during the Cold War and by preventing Soviet efforts to dominate Europe, NATO contributed to Finland remaining independent. Today, Fins across the political spectrum are determined to safeguard democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. And as allies, we are ready to do this across the transatlantic space. Finland has always been ready to defend itself. As one of some 900,000 reservists, I am so happy we no longer have to do it alone but together with our allies. Thank you.
Dr. Rumena Filipova (04:26:04): This larger occasion contains within itself the 20th anniversary of NATO's Eastern expansion in 2004. And this represented a major milestone in Bulgaria and Central and East Europe's process of Europeanization based on deep-seated military modernization and democratization of security policy. And moreover, as a country located on the southern and eastern flank of Europe, Bulgaria now enjoys an unparalleled level of security, which was, however, critically missing in its difficult past, defined by wars and foreign authoritarian domination.
Ruslan Trad (04:26:40): NATO should pay even more attention to the Eastern flank and encourage societies in member states to be proactive about their security and freedoms. The alliance can create a reflex against authoritarianism, something that is especially needed now. I believe that the Black Sea region is still not a priority, unfortunately, and this must change as soon as possible.
Sine Ozkarasahin (04:27:06): The ongoing Russian invasion in Ukraine is turning the Black Sea into an increasingly dangerous and [inaudible 04:27:12] for NATO. For Turkey, the Black Sea holds critical importance as a significant economic artery, a buffer between Russia and Ankara, and a critical security flank. In this summit, NATO should prioritize strengthening its A2/AD capabilities in the region, as well as strengthening regional collaboration mechanisms between literal states, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, under an allied framework.
Michal Baranowski (04:27:43): Great. I hope you enjoyed the video, and now we'll have a conversation that fits, of course, very well with the theme of European security transformed with, I must say, my favorite foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, not surprisingly, but one that will be moderated by a colleague from the Atlantic Council, Jenna Ben-Yehuda. Jenna, the floor is yours.
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:28:23): Thank you.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:28:29): Welcome back. We're delighted to have you all here at the NATO Public Forum. I'm Jenna Ben-Yehuda, executive vice president at the Atlantic Council. We are here to talk about Russia's brutal war in Ukraine and how it has fundamentally changed the security landscape in Europe. And to discuss these changes and the future of the alliance we have with us really tremendous speakers here today. To my right, we have his excellency, Gabrielius Landsbergis, Foreign Minister of Lithuania. Welcome. Prime Minister, excuse me, Foreign Minister, I almost promoted you, Radosław Sikorski of Poland. Thank you for being with us.
Radosław Sikorski (04:29:19): Prime Ministers watch these things.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:29:20): We'll see what we can do. And Mr. Micael Johansson, president and CEO of Saab. Welcome.
Micael Johansson (04:29:27): Thank you.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:29:31): We have 45 minutes together. The first half an hour will be in conversation, and then we'll come to all of you. So be thinking of your questions. We'll take them from online as well as here in the room. So we'll let you know when you can start queuing up. We've heard a big metaphor this week, and it's a bridge. It's a two-way bridge. It's a long bridge. It's a short bridge. What should the bridge look like?
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:29:57): Should I?
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:29:57): Please.
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:30:01): Okay. Well, I mean defining the bridge I think we shouldn't start with the... I mean, we are in a position where we have to say something, right? So we'll say that it's a bridge. It's understandable. What we're looking for, and enduring the whole negotiations process for the declaration, we've been looking for the end goal of the bridge. A very clear commitment that would find itself coming from NATO that we are serious about the invitation. The processes might take long. That's understandable. They might require reforms. It required for every country that joined, especially recently. That's understandable. But throughout the process, it was clear where we will end up, and this is the main thing that we've been looking for. Therefore, I'm not particularly keen on emphasizing the bridge itself, I'm still remaining a goal-oriented person.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:31:00): Would you agree with that?
Radosław Sikorski (04:31:01): I'm not sure I'm good at literal metaphors. NATO was founded to deter an aggressive Russia in the guise of the Soviet Union. NATO won the first time, and we need to win the second time. Russia is aggressive again. She has broken international law, her own voluntarily accepted treaties, Budapest memorandum, and many, many international documents. Putin should not benefit from his act of aggression, and it's our business to help Ukraine win this so that we don't have to spend the money and treasure, and worse, on doing the job ourselves.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:31:48): And so what does success look like in this context? What do you think is confidence building for Ukraine coming out of this summit?
Radosław Sikorski (04:31:57): Well, success is that Putin makes a phone call to his defense
Radosław Sikorski (04:32:00): ... defense minister and tells him to get out of Ukraine.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:32:10): Will that happen this week? I don't know. What does success look like within a summit context for each of you? Let me turn to you, Mr. Johansson. What can be achieved this week that is confidence building, that leaves folks feeling as though the 75th anniversary is not just a marker of what's been in the past, but a really strong future yet to come?
Micael Johansson (04:32:30): Many have said it, but I think as industry, we are doing everything we can to support our nations to donate and to raise capacity and all that, but to really make sure that we give them something that makes them win the war rather than not to lose the war, there's still a little bit of hesitation on that in terms of may it escalate or how do we treat that in terms of can we avoid to keep that stuff ourselves? So can we actually donate things? So if we can come to giving them really sophisticated things going forward to make the win the war, that's probably the best thing that can come out of this I think.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:33:10): We heard Secretary Blinken say from this stage just this morning that the F-16s are coming. This was reiterated by Secretary of Defense Austin last night. We heard President Biden say that Russia is losing this war, additional material support is on the way. Do you agree with that? Is Russia losing right now?
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:33:28): Well, I would not necessarily subscribe to narratives, especially when the situation on the ground is not agreeing with them. The situation is very difficult, and the security of Ukraine and security of Europe and the Transatlantic Alliance has not yet been defined, and it's being fought for in the trenches of Kharkiv. Today, right now when we sit here, there are men and women in trenches out there fighting for our security so that we, those who sit on the stage and those who listen to us, are able to celebrate today. And this passage of history has not yet been written, so we can help, and we are helping. And I hope that the things that we are doing today, that the decisions that we will make throughout these days will add to that passage as something of a course to the victory because there's no other alternative. If it's not the victory, then it's loss. If it's loss, it's our loss. It's not just Ukrainian or anybody else. Everybody who is here will lose that. (04:34:47) And for defining what could be a success of these couple of days in Washington, Putin sent a very horrible and bloody postcard to each and everyone here, what he thinks of us being gathered here, with a ultrasonic missile that attacked a children's hospital in Kiev. That's on us if we are going to react to that. If we're not, then it's out there behind our back left for these couple of days as a reminder, what is actually happening while we're here discussing. So I think that if I were to look for a successful answer, and I would add what Minister of Poland just said, that yes, that would be a very good victory sign so that Putin is forced to rethink or at least he's forced to pay for what he did to the children of Ukraine just a couple of days ago.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:35:46): Does payment look like F-16s this summer and additional air support, air defense mechanisms? What sends a strong message, Minister Sikorski?
Radosław Sikorski (04:35:55): Well, the Patriots are on the way. The effectors to the Patriots are being produced. The F-16s are on the way, the American packages on the way, so things are happening. The Russians have regained initiative on the ground. They're making incremental gains at huge personnel losses. I think last year there was an opportunity to push them much harder, and the confluence of Ukraine delaying its mobilization and the American package being delayed did not help. It was perhaps an opportunity to settle the war quicker. (04:36:37) But I believe that Putin has already lost in the sense that his original war aims are unachievable. He wanted to have all of Ukraine as a vessel state and I don't think he can take Kiev anymore. Even when he makes these outrageous demands that counter amount to Ukraine capitulating, he actually now talks about occupying chunks of Ukraine rather than all of it. So this is the real negotiation on the battlefield. Ukraine won the battle of the Black Sea. (04:37:21) Russian aviation cannot move freely over Ukraine, so Russia has advantage but not domination, and you have a few more apparent victories over places like Avdiika and Vovchans'k and others, and Putin will also run out of personnel, of troops. Plus, do not be misled by Russian propaganda about how their economy is doing. To measure what Russia is doing by GDP is silly. When you produce a tank instead of a motor car and you send that tank into battle and it gets destroyed, you have created a lot of economic activity, but you've also destroyed a lot of wealth.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:38:05): That's right.
Radosław Sikorski (04:38:06): Wars and in all kinds of ways. World War I ended for Germany when they ran out of resources and I think Putin is way on the way.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:38:16): This is a good place to pivot to a conversation on industry, Mr. Johansson. One of the defining moments of this war has been the totally revolutionized role of industry. How has it changed for you as CEO of a defense company? Is it easier for companies to move? Has the acquisition process changed in a meaningful way? We've talked about things are on the way, on the way, on the way. Part of the challenge has been fielding this and getting it into theater. What's your impression of how things have shifted?
Micael Johansson (04:38:51): Now, of course it's a huge wake up call and industry, if I look at Europe, have been optimizing their capacity and capabilities to more or less appease dividend sort of situation. And all of a sudden everyone wants everything from us at the same time everywhere, and then a little bit of the problem ends up in our lap. Why can't you deliver in short lead times? And we are investing heavily, my colleagues when I talk to them, all of us are investing heavily now to step up. And we start by boosting the capacity we have, the shifts and automation and production lines, and then we build new facilities and all that. This is not a walk in the park. It takes a bit of a time before we can actually raise the capacity. It has led to much more collaboration also in Europe between industries, but it's a whole ecosystem that we have to look at. (04:39:46) It's not only us as primes, it's a huge amount of companies that have to come with us, and also commercial companies to get us the components and stuff. And this is maybe something that industries in Europe especially can do a little bit better together to sort of help the ecosystem come with us and not to saturate them in terms of we need powder, all of us, to do ammunition, and it's the same supplier or powder and that means it's a problem. But we are definitely stepping up. The problem is are we doing enough as industries? Probably not. So the big discussion is now what do we need long-term, guarantees? What kind of guarantees do we need to actually take the really big investments? Because I think we have a paradigm shift here in front of us, not a step-by-step approach. But I can honestly say the last three years has been nothing like I've ever experienced before.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:40:46): Certainly.
Micael Johansson (04:40:47): It's crazy in terms of [inaudible 04:40:49]
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:40:49): No doubt, and the numbers certainly bear that out. And if I could draw you out a little bit, you are also Swedish, so you are here as part of Sweden's first fully exceeded summit in that way, although Sweden's been a long-time partner. Minister Sikorski, of course of Poland. You talked about the gains in the Black Sea. Let's move to the Baltic Sea. There is an opportunity for Nordic Baltic cooperation, which is obviously dramatically strengthened by the accession of Finland and Sweden. What do you see as the capabilities between your nations, and what is first out there that you really want to see in the next 6, 12, 18 months as a result of accession? What can the Baltic do now that it couldn't before?
Radosław Sikorski (04:41:35): I don't think we have a problem in the Baltic at all anymore. Russia has these two narrow points of access to the Baltic. There are eight nations now around the Baltic. If you look at what Ukraine without a navy has done to the Black Sea, think of what we can do to the Baltic fleet. They have a problem.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:42:02): So it's a NATO lake.
Micael Johansson (04:42:04): Yeah, I agree. It's a NATO lake. I think though that we could do a bit more to have the deterrence that we need going forward, even though we have a lot, and of course Poland and Sweden and Finland and the Baltic states can sort of do this together. I strongly believe that what we lacked because we were inside the bubble, many of us are, of the Russian bubble of the threats that they have, so we need an integrated air missile defense system of real sophistication level like an onion with several layers. That would probably be the best thing to invest in going forward now.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:42:45): One of the big conversations here in Washington, and I'm sure each of you have heard this this week, is the talk of 2% and who is hitting that threshold? Poland has been there for 20-odd years. You're at 4% ,heading on five. There is still a number of NATO members, although fewer than before, who haven't yet met that threshold. We often talk about how we make the case about the imperative for Ukraine to be victorious in this war beyond Europe. What do you say to partners who aren't yet meeting that commitment within Europe?
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:43:14): Well, the only thing that we can say is offer our example, and as Poland did, as you mentioned with already in the past, we've just reached 3% in Lithuania by actually adding even some additional taxes to the people because there is no other way how we can fund the procurement that is needed for our country. But when you look at the Nordic Baltic region, the countries around the Baltic, you would see that there is no big debate whether we should be funding our defense, so that tells you something. That means that political decision-makers do understand the threat, that there is most likely a huge and wide support by the population and it is geographic. That means that for us, the threat is very real and very tangible. So with that, when we're trying to influence a debate that is taking place here, for example today in Washington, it's not that we're saying, "Look, let's all of us find a way how to finance," we're saying, "Look, we are already doing this." (04:44:25) A tiny Lithuania is 3.03%. Estonia is there, Latvia is there. We talked about Poland. Others are getting there also to big numbers. It's not just empty political words. It's something that is very, very tangible, and here it connects to the industry. What is the biggest problem with the industry? They've seen how we went through COVID, where everybody said, "Look, you just produce as many vaccines as possible because they will be needed years and years and years into the future." Many of them invested and a couple of years later, suddenly, basically boom, there's no big need. And many of industries, defense industries are thinking exactly the same thing. Oh yeah, so you're talking that you're going to spend three, 4% right now. What will happen in a couple of years? (04:45:16) The geopolitical situation might be very different because not everybody's saying that, "Look, this is a huge change, historic change that we're seeing globally and this will stay for us for decades." But industry is very practical, and they're saying, " Can we trust you that those three, 4% will stay there?" And this is up to us, to politicians to convince not just the public, but also the investors who are planning their investment and building new factories, new lines of production, that yes, Russia is going to be a threat, other dictators are being emboldened. And unfortunately for many of us, we are entering an unstable period in our history and we have to be prepared for that, and that's why we are going to invest. And we are going to invest, we are going to devote money, and you can invest into this or that factory.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:46:06): I think this is a really important point. Mr. Johansson, I'd love for you to respond to this. It requires massive capital investments to produce the kinds of systems that SAAB is known for. Can you walk us through some of the decision-making as president and CEO of this company that you think about? What kind of investments will be there? What does the market look like years down the road? And does the EU align with this with NATO requirements or is there a gap there?
Micael Johansson (04:46:36): Many questions at the same time, but let me try and say that of course our industry comes from a peace dividend period. So of course there is some hesitation on how long term will this be in terms of how can we trust that you will never dismantle again the critical mass that we need to keep call it a lukewarm production capacity even if times go in a different direction? So of course that's the owner's perspective. Return on investment is what we need to understand, so this is a business case. We're taking much more risks today than we did three, four years ago in terms of what the board approves and what the owners approve. So we're getting there, but we actually do not understand the aggregated demand situation that the politicians and the countries are looking for. What are the NATO new requirements on capabilities in different regions? It hasn't been fully settled yet. If we knew that in a 10 to 15-year time period, of course the investment perspective would be much more different. (04:47:43) Looking at EU and Europe, of course what EU is doing is great in terms of initiatives, financial incentives to start having companies and countries collaborating. I support that 100%, but they don't put any money in this. You can compare it to the pandemic, when you put like 700 billion euros in a fund or something to make companies work on that, and they did. But you put one and a half billion euro in something, which is important, you say. That is, sorry, peanuts. If we really are serious about this long-term, we have to show that, and then EU cannot guide what capabilities we need in Europe. That is a NATO responsibility, is my perspective. We have to be completely aligned. So member states, sovereign decisions, and being part of the alliance is important planning here and we need to understand the aggregated demand. But of course, EU can step up and put a huge amount of money in that fund, more than 100 billion euros, and then you will see things happening. That's what I'd like to see.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:48:52): So the rhetoric needs to be met by action and by resources. Minister Sikorski, we've heard a lot of rhetoric about the role of China. Europe is now fighting this battle to help Ukraine win against Russia, China has been a not insignificant player in this process. You heard the president last evening talk about that China can't have it both ways. You had Prime Minister Modi of India in Russia earlier this week during the hospital attack, I believe. Should India get a pass too? What does it look like for some of these partners who are engaged in providing dramatic material support, especially for purchases of Russian energy? What should NATO be saying about that kind of extra-regional engagement?
Radosław Sikorski (04:49:49): I'll solve the China in India problems for you in just a second, but let me just say that Napoleon Bonaparte, who is in our national anthem, said that a country that doesn't feed its own army is doomed to feed a foreign one. In Poland, we have a somewhat similar saying that every country has an army, either your own or a foreign one. Your own is cheaper in the long run. We are spending over 4% of GDP on defense this year, we have the 14th biggest defense budget in the world, and next year we'll go higher. We will do whatever it takes not to be a Russian colony again, irrespective of what anybody else does. (04:50:50) India, I think, sees its role as the leader of the non-aligned movement, traditional. And by buying Russian oil for rupees, I hope it is making President Putin realize that he's lost his most lucrative market for his oil and gas, which is the biggest sanction that we have imposed. China is also driving a very hard bargain in terms of the gas price. China is respecting our thickest red line, namely is not supplying actual weapons or ammunition to Russia. Components, yes, dual goods, yes, UAVZS, but actually it's selling them to both sides because I've personally seen Chinese drones on the Ukrainian side. China I think is getting a vessel on the cheap. My friend and mentor here in Washington, [inaudible 04:51:52], used to say that Russia's choice is to be either an ally of the west or a vessel of China, but to be an ally, you have to respect some rules like not invading neighboring countries.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:52:04): Details.
Radosław Sikorski (04:52:07): And if I were a Russian nationalist, I would be furious at Putin for putting Russia into this position vis-a-vis China. And I hope they recalculate in future because I think China is taking over the Russian market. They're cut off from apps, so they're now using Chinese apps, Chinese white goods, Chinese everything. I don't think that's good for Russia in the long run. And also, the two countries have a history of territorial claims, unequal treaty of Beijing of 1860, under which Russia got Outer Manchuria and the port of Vladivostok, which the Chinese now call Haishenwai. If I were a Russian general, I would be very concerned about all that.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:53:06): Let's pull back to some of the broader nature of the conflict. We've heard a lot about these gray zone attacks, those acts short of traditional warfare. We have commercial air traffic that has been grounded in Finland because of GPS jamming, we've seen massive waves of cyber attacks by Russia across Europe. Is NATO doing enough to respond to this dynamic? What should be done and what does success look like? How do you really wrap your arms around this? Because it feels like a drip, drip, drip on a national level, but collectively is generating dramatic losses.
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:53:48): Well, that's a very good question, and I'd like to focus on some specific events that took place in my country and in some of neighboring countries. These are, we call them sabotage, but basically it's arson against civilian objects in my country. And I'm not sure whether it can be called just hybrid events or gray zone event any longer because it's quite clear a terrorist attack sponsored by a hostile neighboring country against one of the NATO countries. The problem is at this stage that when you're saying this, you immediately have to say what you're going to do about it. (04:54:38) And this is currently, and I'm happy that it's being addressed right now in the summit. It is the first time that we are going to address this in that respect that we have to find an answer. And Putin has to be notified as we're just not just seeing, we're not just registering, but we are going to act. And in this, I'd like to remind that the only time that Article V was invoked was because of a terrorist attack., so we have to be very clear that we'll make no definition. When it comes, when we'll decide that it's needed, we'll do it and there will be an answer. So
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:55:20): Should these attacks be called terrorism?
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:55:23): If it is terrorism, definitely. Burning down a shopping mall and paying a person to do that and the money is coming from Russia, then yeah. How else can you call it?
Radosław Sikorski (04:55:37): They're sending death squads that kill people. That's definitely terrorism.
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:55:42): Yeah. And in our case, a Russian opposition representative in Vilnius was attacked. So it is clear, and I would not shy away from calling what it is, naming very clearly what we're going to do about it because if we don't do that, we have two problems. One is that Putin will escalate because every time we keep silent, he takes it as a weakness and pushes forward. The second thing is that countries will be forced to formulate their own strategy, because this is what our people in our countries will demand. You cannot just expect people just to be okay with something happening in your country. So therefore, this is one of the reasons why we're in this alliance and we have to have a common answer to this.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:56:30): Please.
Radosław Sikorski (04:56:31): One footnote. I expect the worst from Putin but on the GPS signal, we had a brilliant briefing at the Council of Baltic Sea States by a finished specialist. I'm no specialist, so correct me if I'm wrong, but what he told us is this, that the GPS signal is in fact very weak coming from satellites just above background, so it's actually very easy to interfere with.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:56:57): Yes. It's a pretty dumb instrument, if you will.
Radosław Sikorski (04:57:01): And so if the Russians are protecting their own bases and assets, say around St. Petersburg, from these long-range Ukrainian strikes, which are sometimes very successful, that would have a spillover effect pretty widely and is not necessarily deliberate. And Ukraine, of course, does it too. So when I was last in Kharkiv delivering pickup trucks to the front last year and there was a Russian drone attack on Kharkiv, the Ukrainians would switch on GPS jamming in order to make that job more difficult, and your Google maps suddenly go crazy and you have no idea how disorienting it is.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:57:46): Of course. Well, you raised a really important point, which is that there is an element of this where attribution becomes pretty fuzzy, and we see this in cyber too, which is part of what makes it effective. It's damaging the system, but its origins may be unknown, and what I'm hearing is that naming it is critical. Is there some kind of proportional response element that needs to be clarified as well?
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:58:11): Well, I think that what wouldn't work probably is that if every time Russia does something, we go against every single event because, and they've shown that, their capacity is vast and they can wreck havoc in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland ,wherever they want because with social media, they can reach very wide audiences and find people who would do their job for them in those countries. But we have to create a very clear deterrence for these sort of events so that then the next time they start planning, they know that there is an answer ready, prepared, signed on the table, and if you do this, this will be the answer. (04:58:56) And now currently, the easiest way, I've got this question so many times, what would you suggest? How do you manage this sort of escalation? Now we have a country that's willing to manage escalation for us. They're actually asking here in Washington today, "Allow us to strike deeper into Russian territory. We will manage your escalation for you." They're saying, "Look, no, no, not right now." So I think that this is a mistake. If we cannot find any other reason, no other reason, no children's hospital, no kindergarten, nothing for why to allow them to attack deeper into Russian territory, then at least this.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:59:34): Absolutely.
Gabrielius Landsbergis (04:59:34): If they attack us in any way that they think of, then less allow Ukrainians to attack them.
Radosław Sikorski (04:59:49): I understand that a final communique we'll refer to Russia as a multi-domain threat to the alliance. We have to have an answer to them in every-
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (04:59:58): In every domain.
Radosław Sikorski (04:59:59): ... one of those domains.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:00:00): Yes. Folks, it's time to start queuing up. I'll take the first question from Anna Maria Boss. "Making money available for new equipment is one thing, but how are NATO countries going to find the necessary personnel when many people don't want to serve?" Huge manpower issues even within Ukraine, how do you respond to that?
Radosław Sikorski (05:00:20): Well, in Poland, we are beginning to train the first Ukrainian brigade composed of volunteers from inside Poland. We have up to a million Ukrainians of both genders, and several thousands of them have already registered for their draft. And interestingly, many of them do want to serve and rotate their compatriots, but they say, "We don't want to be thrown into the battle without being properly trained and equipped," and we are going to do this for them and they will then be available to the Ukrainian government as a unit with the right to return to Poland after they've done their rotation. If every European country did that, Ukraine would have several brigades.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:01:07): Yes. I want to take us to the future, but first go back just to this morning. We heard from General Cavoli on this stage that NATO's transition from out of area operations, Afghanistan and the like, to fighting now on the European continent, reshaping those plans, thinking about those capabilities represents a really dramatic shift for the alliance and it's taken years to get there. So in this moment now, what is the next big moment we should be planning for? What is the blindness that you feel we have now that we will look ahead to 25 years from now and think boy, we really missed that?
Gabrielius Landsbergis (05:01:54): Well, the blindness would be, I'm not necessarily saying that it is there, is the expectation that somehow this Putin will stop. And I have a sense that it is in the room in some cases, this expectation that one day there will be negotiations and we'll prove to Putin that he cannot continue. That if he does continue, then blah, blah, blah. We were unable to prove that in 2008, we are unable to prove that in 2014. I don't think that we have any difference in our position to prove it now. That means that he will continue. (05:02:39) And and I'm returning back that this is the message to the industry. This is the message to the electorate in each and every country, and this is a message to all of us that look, we are in this for a long run and we have to prepare for this. This won't be over in two years where we'll be back into some pre-war reality with Ukraine calm, us calm, and again, all business as usual. That's it. There's no longer business as usual, or there is business as usual in our case, in the Baltic case, where we've seen Russia for what it is. Yes. So for us, it is quite a natural state of mind, but it has to be wider. If we're expecting this, that is blindness. If we're expecting this, this is a mistake.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:03:28): Mr. Johansson and then I'll come to you, Minister.
Micael Johansson (05:03:30): I would say that if you look, I agree, NATO is coming back to regional defense capabilities and many of the countries, of course, Sweden now being new kid on the block, are waiting eagerly to get our capability targets from NATO. Now, there are two port that I think I would like NATO to discuss more, and that is looking at security of supply as a capability target, meaning that NATO could decide where will we have in our geography capabilities to ramp up production or production of drones, or who should take that responsibility? Because today you give different capability targets. I would like to see that as you give them security supply type of capability targets. That would be great.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:04:22): More coordination, more in line with-
Micael Johansson (05:04:24): More coordination on that in terms of setting up a regional defense again. Then of course, the interoperability question is huge. If we cannot come to a new architecture where there is a real multi-domain operation capability, which everyone in NATO can book up into, it will never work. So that's also a big thing going forward to make that happen. Those are the two things I'm thinking about.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:04:48): Minister?
Radosław Sikorski (05:04:49): Deterring Putin is a major job in Europe, and if we stay the course, I believe we can source him out in a couple of years. The emerging threat, I believe, is in Africa. The Wagner Group has now been renamed Africa Corps, and Africa Corps is trying to take Tobruk again. The Russians have no business in meddling in Libya and switching on and off the mass migration to try to destroy the European Union from within through the political process. This business of Russian mercenaries taking over goldmines and other African resources and then destabilizing Africa using their own money, this has to end. But I believe that this is a job that could be done by the European Union, that we don't need to beg the United States to solve every problem for us. We should have a reinforced brigade operational as an EU rapid reaction capacity
Radosław Sikorski (05:06:00): ... in a couple of years. And from what I hear from the Pentagon, that at last they see the logic of relieving the United States for other jobs in other theaters.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:06:11): You made this argument in Foreign Policy magazine recently. This is the 5,000.
Radosław Sikorski (05:06:17): Up to 10.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:06:18): Up to 10. And you think this could be operational within the next few years?
Radosław Sikorski (05:06:24): This is what we've pledged ourselves to do.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:06:26): Yes.
Radosław Sikorski (05:06:26): We have a crisis center, we'll soon have a joint operations command. We have a defense budget of the European Union, wonderfully called the European Peace Facility. And I believe in the new commission we need a defense commissioner to ramp up production mostly for the defense industry. Europe as Europe should not be completely helpless.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:06:58): This brings me to another question, and then we'll turn to you, ma'am. How confident are you in US leadership? And what does the US need to do to reinforce confidence in American commitment to European security?
Gabrielius Landsbergis (05:07:15): I think that a lot has been done to reinsure that US is interested in European security. Now what we need to do is we need a common approach from Europeans and United States when it comes to how do you ensure that it stays stable, the end goal, and it's the note that you hear throughout the conversation here. How do you make sure that Putin is no longer able to do and to repeat the things even in more brutal way? So this is yet what we need to achieve, and to find consensus. I don't see any other way. I agree with Minister Sikorsky, what he says, that Europe has to play a stronger role on its own, and that's definitely a fact, but Europe cannot act alone. And I don't think that any other major conflict globally, wherever that would happen, that US could act alone. That means that we need these two pillars of transatlantic alliance working together either in Europe or anywhere else to support stability.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:08:31): If you had to make the argument to the American people about why its investments in Ukraine matter for American security, Mr. Sikorsky, what would you say?
Radosław Sikorski (05:08:41): Well, I could make it crude and say that you're selling us a lot of weapons made in the United States, but I would make it more strategically by saying that if Putin captured Ukraine and used the resources of Ukraine, both human and industrial to go further, then the price of deterring him would rise. And Ukrainians are doing our fight so that Americans don't have to go to Europe in greater numbers. And also, if Ukraine wins, it'll send a powerful signal to the far east that recovering what you might regard as a renegade province is much harder than you think, so don't do it.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:09:26): Ma'am, please give us your name and your affiliation.
Erin Osborne (05:09:28): Hi, thank you so much. Erin Osborne with Radio Free Europe. And we've heard from Seker Covoli and Secretary General Stoltenberg today that there will be a Ukrainian information exchange or joint training center in Poland, so a question to you, Minister Sikorski. Well, thank you all so much for being here, but to Minister Sikorski, how will that help deter Russian aggression and make sure that Ukraine is ready to stand on its own two feet? Thank you.
Radosław Sikorski (05:09:55): Well, I'm very pleased that JTEC, the Joint Analysis and Training Center, is coming to my hometown in Poland, which will be a second nature institution in Bydgoszcz. And we need it. It won't be big, but it's an analysis center. This is the most up-to-date war and it's reevaluating many of our assumptions. The role of drones has been transformational in this war, and we need to study it and then apply the lessons. And I believe that the people who will be, in future it will won't be us training the Ukrainians. Ukrainians will be teaching us.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:10:35): Yes indeed.
Radosław Sikorski (05:10:36): And JTEC I hope will serve that.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:10:39): Sir, I'll come to you.
Adam Dudash (05:10:40): Yes, thank you. My name is Adam Dudash from Tilburg University. First of all, thank you for the insightful discussion. You've discussed the impact of Finnish and Swedish recession on the Baltic and its waters, but what about the high north? Does NATO need to reevaluate his strategy in the Arctic in light of melting ice cracks that are going to allow or are already allowing Russian naval assets to move more freely in these waters?
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:11:04): Yes, the melting arctic.
Radosław Sikorski (05:11:06): Well, Henry Kissinger once said that there is never a shortage of opinions in Poland, so let me give you my piece of wisdom on this. What a fool Putin is. With these Houthi attacks on the Red Sea, with the problems in the Suez, he would now be making a lot of money servicing the northern route, the shortest sea route from Europe to the far east, and instead he's ruining his country.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:11:35): Mr. Hanson, would you like to respond? And Ms. Saab has some technology that's weather built.
Micael Johansson (05:11:40): I think we are moving in the direction of looking at much deeper collaboration between the Nordic country, so to say, in terms of how to at least have 24/7 coverage of what's happening there in terms of airborne early warning and all that. So we are doing a lot in that area, and we do have the expertise on how to operate in that Arctic condition. So us coming into NATO, being the alliance, I think will mean a lot, and we're already seeing movements in that direction. So that's one of the capability targets that I hope that now we as countries in the Nordic will get. So yes, we will provide technology to do that.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:12:21): We are almost at time. I want to turn to each of you for a quick final word. What do you want folks to take away? What should they remember from this summit in this moment? What do you think is the key message that you want them to know from you?
Gabrielius Landsbergis (05:12:31): Very easy. Ukraine has to win.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:12:33): Ukraine has to win.
Radosław Sikorski (05:12:35): NATO prevailed in the confrontation. With a much more powerful soviet union, we can prevail again.
Micael Johansson (05:12:44): Now, give Ukraine what they need to win the war, and the industry is there to support. And the industry needs to give and sell and do contracts with Ukraine directly. We cannot only do donations. But I'm prepared to give everything we have to make them win the war.
Jenna Ben-Yehuda (05:13:02): Please join me in thanking.
Radosław Sikorski (05:13:02): Thank you.
Michal Baranowski (05:13:13): Thank you Jenna, thank you ministers for this fascinating, wide-ranging conversation focused on victory at the end. Looking forward to seeing you all. Don't run too far. I saw a lot of determination, a lot of leadership in the last conversation and it was very well summed up by a statement of we'll do whatever it takes not to be a Russian colony again. We are all having fun here, but we have another great panel coming, so please take your seats or set up conversations a little bit... Oh yes, this is great. Please take your seats, take your seats, because we will now focus on a specific issue of Russia's ability to reconstitute its forces. And this conversation will be led by a good friend of mine, Henry Foy of Financial Times. Henry now serves in Brussels, but he has very good Polish roots, that's why he's my favorite FT journalist. Henry, the floor is yours.
Henry Foy (05:14:40): Hi.
Baiba Braze (05:14:42): Are we good?
Henry Foy (05:14:43): Yes, we're good. Hello everyone. Good afternoon. It's really nice to be here and enjoy your air conditioning. It's tremendous to be out of that other room. We only have a short amount of time, so I'm going to get straight to it. We're very lucky today to have a great panel, two formidable women. Baiba Braze is the foreign minister of Latvia and of course, the former ASG at NATO. Dara Massicot is the senior fellow at the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (05:15:16) We're going to talk about Russian force reconstitution, which is a real tangible thing. It's a real thing that's happening. It's a really important issue that I think doesn't get enough coverage at the moment while we talk about more theoretical ideas. Baiba, you have a frontline view of what's happening across the border. When you look at what Russia's doing to reconstitute it's armed forces two and a half years after the full scale invasion, what do you see? What are they doing differently now that they weren't doing before February 2022?
Baiba Braze (05:15:51): I think the big picture is pretty clear, that there is not one element, one instrument of power in Russia that would not be orientated towards the war.
Henry Foy (05:16:02): Right.
Baiba Braze (05:16:03): So Russia's policy is war. And when we look at the military instrument of power, economic, politics, religion, education system, anything, it's all about war. Media, public, anything. So in that respect, I think it's on us to understand and to integrate that in our thinking and to really, and again, I will repeat what I said already yesterday at the dinner with our Ukrainian friends, is very clear that our problem is not support Ukraine. We'll get there. Our problem is Russia, and this war policy of Russia is not going to get away. So it's upon us to deal with that and to find a way how to degrade the military capability, economy and so on and so forth. Because ultimately, what the leaders have said is that the strategic objective would be returning Russia to peace, peaceful state. So if we put that in front of us, then of course in interim measures, whether it's containment, constrainment, whatever we will find in the declaration using our instruments of power to achieve that objective. So that is ultimately, when we look at the big picture, is what is there. And then of course we are seeing that yes indeed currently we have quite a number of bases at the NATO borders are not back where they were before the war. Russians are fighting down in Ukraine. So in the short term, what we are saying is that there is no direct military threat to us, it's true, but it doesn't mean that Russia is not learning. Russia is learning and it is integrating its lessons in Ukraine, it is changing its ambition, it is returning to a different command structure, at least on the paper we know [inaudible 05:17:59]'s doctrine, the numbers, and so on and so forth. But for now, for the short term, there is no direct military threat to the allies and helping Ukraine, strengthening our own deterrent defense, degrading Russia's capability is something that we just need to do.
Henry Foy (05:18:18): Dara, you see bandied around five to seven years, end of the decade, as a rough idea for when Russia might be able to get back up to a level where it was before. But are we missing the point when we think about numbers, we should actually be thinking about structure capabilities? How's Russia going about it differently now?
Dara Massicot (05:18:36): So reconstitution is a little bit of the numbers and there's also some qualitative aspects that I think we should discuss. So just for everyone, reconstitution is restoring a force to a sufficient level of combat capability. It's not just counting tanks coming off the line, it's also about personnel, it's also about proficiency in what they can do. So it's not how fast will Russia restore to 2022 levels, and if we only count the tanks in the artillery, we're missing some of the story. We should also be asking ourselves, not asking ourselves, are they reconstitute or are they not? The question is reconstitute to what? For another attack on Ukraine? For an attack on NATO? For a power projection into Libya? There are different requirements. (05:19:21) But if we were to talk about the timelines, I think about three aspects. If we look at the equipment, based on their loss rate right now, based on the choices that they've chosen and the capacity that they have right now, I think seven to eight years is a good median estimate. It changes a little bit depending on if you're talking about tanks, which is longer. Armored vehicles may be a little bit shorter. The personnel question, yes, the lines are stable because they're using convicts, they're using foreign fighters. After the war they're going to have some unresolved questions for recruiting and retention. (05:19:51) And then there's the issue of proficiency and learning and that's happening right now, but it's very much for survivability and lethality. The longer proficiency is something we'll know later. But I think last point, we should not assume that they're going to go back to what they were before the war. It's going to be different. They have changed, Ukraine has changed. We have all changed in various ways.
Henry Foy (05:20:12): Yeah. It's interesting, do you agree with that assessment, seven to eight years? Is that what?
Baiba Braze (05:20:20): Different services have different assessments. There are those who look at the shorter term. Again, as Dara rightly says, it depends what you look at as a point of reference. They won't be going back to the spring of '22, it'll be a different force. So it can be three, it can be five, it can be seven depending what you take as an estimate, but again, it does depend on the success of Ukraine on the battlefield, and that depends on us.
Henry Foy (05:20:50): So the reason we care of course is we have to be able to defend against what they might be able to do. We keep hearing that the war being fought in Ukraine is not the 21st century war we all thought it would be, it's more like a 20th century war. Is Russia preparing for both in the future and are we doing the same? Can we? Is it possible that NATO can prepare for both the 20th century war and the 21st century war? How do we balance those two?
Baiba Braze (05:21:12): Well, it's both the first world war, second world war and the future war because what we are seeing, I think it was the chair of military committee who said it's both modern blood and bits and bots on the battlefield as we see it. So we see the use of most modern future technology and our companies know it very well because quite a bit of modern tech, dual use tech, whether it's drones or targeting or munitions and so on and so forth are provided by our companies and they are really working very closely with our Ukrainian friends and partners on that. (05:21:46) So again, integrating that into our future thinking I think is crucially important. There is no past battlefield at all if you take that into account, so you can have visuals that look like the past, but they will all be equipped with very modern tech. So the electronic warfare has been taken to a new level, lots of capabilities related to that have been taken to a new level. Private sector involvement, open source involvement, it's a totally different war, and that is quite likely what we have to look at depending on the threats that we see. (05:22:29) So for that, I think we might need some adjustments among the allies. I don't think we are as flexible and as able and agile as Ukrainians. Still so many bureaucratic structures, procedures, standard operating procedures that we have, that we have to look at that also. So it's not just about the stuff, about the data, about the connections that we have, but also about the procedures and processes and TDPs, as you said.
Henry Foy (05:23:01): That's really interesting because I remember people talking about whether Russia was learning those lessons. Dara, have you seen examples of that, that Russia has actually become more flexible now in terms of how it deploys forces?
Dara Massicot (05:23:12): It is. So we've seen them make a lot of unexpected mistakes in the first six months of the war, and then that learning phase kicked in. So I think something that we need to keep in mind, the Russians and the Ukrainians are coping with this every day, is just the pervasiveness of reconnaissance. Neither side can safely mass forces and attack each other. It's very difficult to even do rotations at this point, they're being disrupted. We are talking about food and water being delivered by drone. (05:23:42) And the nature of warfare is at least in the ground, domain is changing so rapidly. Electronic warfare is something I think we're still grappling with. NATO equipment works very well. It works very well at keeping crew alive, the precision is amazing, but it is very susceptible to electronic warfare jamming, and we're all learning that, our enemies are learning that about us, and we have to move forward from that.
Henry Foy (05:24:05): I wanted to pick up on that, this idea that Russia's got a pretty good look at a lot of the weaponry that we're using because giving it to Ukraine to use, but we're also getting a pretty good look at Russia's weaponry. When you had to assess the level of who's learned the most, where would you say we are, to both of you? Maybe Dara, if you want to start.
Dara Massicot (05:24:24): Sure. So from a strategic intelligence level, I think that Ukraine and NATO far and away have the advantage just in terms of our understanding of intentions and how things are playing out in the battlefield. That advantage, just like all intelligence work, is not guaranteed. You have to fight to maintain it, you have to fight for that access. Tactically, both Ukraine and Russia, they're learning about each other and the cycles of adaptation and countermeasures are compressing, they're very rapid right now. And just like we as NATO are benefiting from what Ukraine is showing us and teaching us, we have to think about the other side as well. Russia's allies and their partners are learning from them, and this is now a currency that Russia has to give to Iran, China, North Korea, that learning of our equipment.
Baiba Braze (05:25:08): Exactly.
Dara Massicot (05:25:09): When people, observers are looking at this, I don't know that there's any real surprises here that Russian equipment is not very good at keeping its crews alive, but it is quite rugged and quite durable and it's inexpensive. And so for people looking for that kind of capability, they like what they see.
Henry Foy (05:25:27): Do you agree with that, Baiba?
Baiba Braze (05:25:31): Yes and no. But I want to pick on a different point, that actually there is quite a bit we can do, that we have done, and we need to do, and that relates to Russia's ability to sustain the warfare. So again, there are different angles to that, Russia its pushing its propaganda that its economy is doing very well, that it'll last and so on, so forth. And when you look and scratch of that propaganda, it's actually not. And that does depend on us because Russia is financing the war from the budget. The income in the budget has significantly decreased its own taxes, rationale taxes, the tax base is much narrower. (05:26:12) They depend on the oil largely for the income in the budget and other exports. And that is indeed upon us, how to deal with the oil cap, how to lower it, how to implement it, how to make it more efficient, plus all the other enabling capacities that it gets for its missiles. We saw the Cage 101. It was FT that puts a nice table out on the components in that missile, largely western, so there are elements across the board that we can actually really address, both the income in the budget, the ability to sustain the war, but also the components on the battlefield, what it fights. Yes, China is trying to replace it, but again, there are limits also to that.
Henry Foy (05:27:01): And in terms of this reconstitution, are we seeing, Baiba mentioned it there, this reliance on Iran, China, other countries supplying weapons to Russia, or parts I should say? No confirmation that China has sent weapons. Is that changing the nature of the way the Russian military industrial complex works or is it still so tiny amounts that there is still the same mega lift that it always used to be? How is that changing how they build weapons?
Dara Massicot (05:27:29): The Russian defense industrial base has different quirks to it, to put it lightly. So they had to basically purchase a capability from Iran and now they're building it in Russia and they're scaling it up with respect to the Shahed drones. There's still many aspects about it that do remain mired somewhat in the Soviet past, but I think about what could change from the pathway that they're on right now that would cause them to reconstitute faster. Right now Russia is choosing to maximize the factories that it has, it is not constructing new ones to refurbish tanks and artillery and things like that. That could change if that was important enough to Putin, but right now he's managing a lot of different economic considerations and labor shortage situations.
Henry Foy (05:28:11): Sorry, so Russia has not built a single new arms factory since.
Dara Massicot (05:28:14): With the exception of drones. If we're talking about tanks, artillery, things like that, they are working triple shifts around the clock to maximize what they can put out. And the estimates are anywhere from 200 new tanks a month to upwards of 600-ish armored vehicles of various types. But most of the equipment going into Ukraine right now, 75% of it is refurbished Soviet era materials being pulled out of bases in Siberia, and they're burning through that stockpile very quickly.
Henry Foy (05:28:43): Wow. By the way, we hear a lot about rhetoric from the Kremlin about every time the EU or NATO does something they deem to be escalatory, they'll reposition troops near to Finland or reposition troops near to the Baltic States. Do you see that happening in real time or is this all just total bluff?
Baiba Braze (05:29:01): You mean the Russian troops or troops our side?
Henry Foy (05:29:03): Correct, the Russian troops.
Baiba Braze (05:29:09): It's largely empty. I mean, it's open source information, so I'm not really revealing any secrets here, but-
Henry Foy (05:29:15): Feel free to reveal secrets if you want.
Baiba Braze (05:29:17): ... to our border and further down at a helicopter base, Scof, Luga. It's largely maintenance of facilities and some minor stuff. There is no increase, there is no significant operations. That can change. Again, it doesn't require. Luga is 200 kilometers from our borders with the armored vehicles tanks 50 kilometers per hour that if they want to fill it up and get to the border, that's four hours. So we are always on the watch out there together with the allies and the investments that NATO has done with the new military strategy. And here I would like to pay the highest respect to our military colleagues who were the ones initiating and turning around the whole NATOs military instrument of power and creating the new military strategy and the DDA, what Secure was talking today about, the defense plans, the exercises, the command structure, everything. (05:30:25) So that allows us to be pretty sure that not only troops in place that we have now, but also the ability to have that situational awareness on the oral threat, and if necessary to have those rapid reaction forces are there to deter, and if necessary, defend. So our task is to ensure that we don't relax, but also that we apply our instruments of power to make sure that Russia does not succeed, because at the end it's about NATO security. It's not something abstract. Peace is not an abstract term for us.
Henry Foy (05:31:00): Well, that's what I wanted to ask and we're running out of time, but there's obviously a difference between capability and intent, and we talk about seven to eight years time to build up capability. Are there ways, Dara, to look at the way Russia is reconstituting and trying to derive intent?
Dara Massicot (05:31:19): Well, if we are talking about replacement rates for armored equipment, right now that is not sufficient to attack NATO in a very large way, but it could be sufficient to make another attempt at Ukraine. And this is the pathway that Russia's on, and I want us all to be aware that probably within the next six months, maybe early 2025, the Russians are going to announce their 10-year rearmament program. And they're signaling that they want a larger army and they're signaling that they want more drones and more first person munitions. There's things that they can do to compress that timeline if they're willing to take domestic risks. So I think we should hold seven to eight years because nothing ever quite goes right in Russia even when they want it to, but there are choices that they can make if they wanted to take that risk and go faster. (05:32:04) So I think that to end on a philosophical point if I may, this is a quote from a long time ago but I think about it often right now, is that no man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man. And I think about that with the Russians and I think about that with NATO. We're not the same that we were two years ago, Ukraine's not the same, Russia is not the same. We've learned so much about each other and we need to update some of our assumptions and our war plans and our procurement and our intelligence and our focus.
Baiba Braze (05:32:34): And the policy actions that we do. You reside in Brussels. The packages at the EUs that we do on restrictive measures, so-called sanctions on Russia, take miserably long. The negotiations at the groups that people have to go through is just pathetic, I'm sorry, really. The 26 ships that we designated now carrying Russian oil, and I commend both your journalists who have done a fabulous job in bringing it out, the whole issue on the oil shipments that are insecure but also violating the oil cap, all the rules, but also all the other work done by open source researchers on that. (05:33:22) So we just need to get our act together and we can actually make a difference. We are a border country. We see in our statistics everything that is going out and in through our borders. We see how the sanctioned goods decrease to Russia and increase proportionately to Belarus. That's why we did the sanctions packages to Belarus. Not enough. Not enough. So there is more that we can do, it's about our security. And as far as long as I'm foreign minister, my colleagues, foreign ministers, knows that I will be at it with them and it's not going to stop.
Henry Foy (05:34:05): There we go. It's a great mess. Thank you so much, we've run out of time, and there are sadly no questions from the audience on this session. But thank you both to Dara and to Baiba. It was brilliant.
Baiba Braze (05:34:18): And thank you to the work your colleagues do.
Henry Foy (05:34:21): Pleasure.
Baiba Braze (05:34:21): I mean, all you matter. You matter. You matter.
Henry Foy (05:34:24): We all love each other. Great. Have a good forum. Shall we?
Michal Baranowski (05:34:33): Henry. Thank you Henry, thank you panelists. Another fascinating conversation with the closing questions about the capabilities which we know Russia will have versus the intent. Someone from my side of the world could remind everyone that Putin gave us very clear list of demands in the winter of 2021, what he wants to achieve. So I think we have also some notion of his intent. But to explore these issues in more details, I now would love to invite Luke Coffey from the Hudson Institute for conversation both with the president of Slovakia and then for the panel. Luke, the floor is yours.
Luke Coffey (05:35:25): Thank you. Good afternoon, and for those of you watching online in Europe, good evening. Welcome to this event on NATO's policy towards Russia at the NATO Washington Summit Public Forum. My name is Luke Coffey and I'm a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Russia's large scale invasion of Ukraine changed the geopolitical landscape in the transatlantic community in a way not seen since the second World War. In its 2022 strategic concept, NATO described Russia as, and I quote, the most significant and direct threat to the alliance. To discuss NATO's approach to Russia, we have a very distinguished panel. However, before that, to kick us off with a scene setter, we are honored to have his excellency, President Peter Pellegrini, the sixth president of the Slovak Republic, here to offer some opening remarks. So please join me in welcoming President Pellegrini to the stage. Thank you so much.
Peter Pellegrini (05:36:37): Thank you. Thank you very much. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is really my pleasure to be here with you today, shortly after my inauguration, on the occasion of the Washington Summit that takes place in the changing, rather unpredictable and thus increasingly dangerous world, as we commemorate the 75 years of this most successful defense alliance in our history. I am proud that Slovakia has been a reliable ally for the past 20 years. And we will be so in the years to come for the sake of security of our nations, of our neighbors, our continent and the world. Our historical experience taught us that there is no better option to guarantee our safe place, security, economic and social development than this alliance. The engine of our success has been and remains as a commitment to democracy, freedom, and human rights with a clear understanding where we belong. Our present and future is in and with NATO and European Union. (05:37:56) Strong transatlantic bonds built on a fair share by the European allies is the best collective approach to preserve peace and deter any aggression. My country's strategic interest has always been based on full respect for international law and rules, shared values and norms, commitments and obligations. In February 2022, following the aggression by Russia, which we have condemned as a clear violation of the UN charter and international law, we stood by Ukraine. Our citizens opened their homes to people escaping Ukraine and many of them remained on our soil. Ukraine must survive and preserve its own national identity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. And as any other country, Ukraine must have the right to choose its own security arrangements. We will never agree with change of borders by force. For us in the NATO eastern flank, an eventual collapse of Ukraine would have a very negative consequences. (05:39:12) Without any Hollywood announcement, Slovakia provides significant and stable support to Ukraine in many ways. We do it through NATO and European Union, but also bilaterally. We still belong to the biggest contributors of assistance to Ukraine, calculated per capita. As the only country, we have organized joint meetings of the Slovak and Ukrainian governments and developed a joint action plan of cooperative projects. And we just agreed a few days ago to have soon yet another meeting of the two governments on the Ukrainian soil. We are one of the most important providers of electricity to Ukraine, so crucial
Peter Pellegrini (05:40:00): ... crucial after the continuous attacks on its vital infrastructure. And as our electricity production doesn't depend on wind or sun, our supplies can and will continue, also during the next winter. On top of supplies of non-lethal equipment like demining machines, we have increased production of our own defense industry, including ammunition or howitzers. Also, for the need of Ukraine. To endure our collective support, we need the Slovak and the European public on our side. What are the lessons learned out of the recent European elections? How can we better prepare for the forthcoming elections, including here in the United States in this regard? We need to invest more into wide international understanding that we are not trying to disintegrate Russia, but to change its behavior to the one that fully respects its obligation under the UN Charter and international law and its OSCE commitments. And this will be also a powerful message also to G20 and BRICS members. (05:41:18) Let me make clear, supporting peace, ladies and gentlemen, does not mean supporting the aggressor. It is up to Ukraine to decide on this, but a just, a sustainable peace acceptable to Ukraine, is badly needed. And a just and sustainable peace can only be a peace based on international law. I wish to stress, to safeguard peace shattered by the Russian aggression, we, the alliance, must work on all options to be ready for all possible scenarios. Until peace can return to Europe, the alliance must be up to the task and responsibilities. It has to be the guarantor of peace, yet remaining through to its purpose of the defensive alliance. (05:42:14) I am convinced the answer to today's topic, NATO's Russia challenge, lies with us. The future of security on our continent and our own deterrence and defense will be built on our own strength, on the ability to project power to deter any potential opponent to test our resolve. But we must be honest to ourselves, there would probably be only few allies meeting the 2% GDP goal if there was no war in Ukraine. The Article 5, combined with the strength of the United States, made us more relaxed on our commitments in the past. We have largely ignored the fact it is not only Article 5, but also Article 3 we need to invest in to be able to defend our countries until we can execute a collective action. This is where we need to deliver more. (05:43:17) Imagine Russia would not attack Ukraine, but one of our allies. The question is, were we really ready for the collective defense at that moment? We have done a lot in the meantime, an unprecedented strengthening of our collective defense, but it is enough. There are still gaps such as air and missile defense that we must fill in to make our defense up to the task, especially in the eastern flank. (05:43:50) We have here several defense ministers, and I wish to ask them, is our defense industry ready to ramp up the production? If we speak about air defense, we may have plans, but how realistic are they? Can we build it in five years or 10 or more? How much time does it takes to produce, for example, to produce and sell five Patriot systems? Russia has managed to restart its defense industry. How much time do we need? It is evident, two and a half years have not been enough. We need to turn plans into reality, as our opponents do. (05:44:36) And let us also not forget about the new, what are the lesson learned from this war? Drones, electronic warfare, keeping the technological edge and the hybrid warfare that accompany this aggression. Are we already implementing this aggression? Are we already implementing these lessons into our plans and our forces? We have been meeting the 2% commitment already, but will this be enough? Is there a true political will to do the necessary? (05:45:12) All those question may be sensitive, uncomfortable, and absolutely necessary, and we need to find the answers and deliver on them, including in Europe, to send a strong signal to the United States that we are paying our bills and we are a solid ally. And, ladies and gentlemen, we should not shy away from the sensitive and maybe unpopular ones, including how to restore peace in Europe, how to make everything possible to have, again, peace in Europe. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Luke Coffey (05:46:10): Great. Well, again, good afternoon. We are now here with our very distinguished panelists to take this conversation another step forward to assess what the Russian threat is, what NATO needs to do about it, and how we can best be prepared to do this in the 21st century. To do this, we have immediately to my left, your right, Andris Sprūds, the Minister of National Defense for Latvia. To his side, we have the Right Honorable John Healey MP, Secretary of State for Defense for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. And last but certainly not least, we have Lieutenant General (Retired) Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army Europe and Distinguished Fellow with GLOBSEC. (05:46:59) I'm going to turn to Secretary Healey first. You've been the Secretary of State for Defense since July 5th, five days. I'm told you haven't slept yet. No, I'm kidding.
John Healey (05:47:20): That's true.
Luke Coffey (05:47:21): In this time you have already been to Ukraine, which I want to touch on that a bit later, but you've also ... You're here now at the 75th Anniversary NATO Summit, is truly hitting the ground running. (05:47:37) I want to ask you first though about Russia and the new Labour government in the UK. How will the new government deal with the challenges and threats posed by Russia? And I know you don't want to get ahead of any defense review, but Prime Minister Starmer said that a review will be carried out. Can you give us a flavor on what you think or how you think Russia might be factored into the thinking with this strategic review?
John Healey (05:48:06): Thank you. I'm slightly awestruck actually to be in this chamber with such an audience because the collective experience and knowledge in front of me is so much greater than my own. So bear with me, but thank you for inviting me. I'm really grateful. (05:48:27) The Russian threat, well, for those of you from the US, your president said at the NAC about an hour ago that Russia is our greatest threat that we face as an alliance. It has its sharpest, most immediate challenge in Ukraine. My first priority, the first priority of this summit and center stage, is Ukraine. It's my first priority, was why I went in my second full day in the job to Odessa and spent the afternoon with President Zelensky and his team. (05:49:06) But the Russian threat isn't just directed at Ukraine. You know this very well. In fact, we all, in our own countries, have had warnings of this. We've all had knowledge of this and experience of this for a number of years. So we face wider Russian aggression directed at our own democracies, from hybrid attacks to threats in the High North. (05:49:33) And I think this is why this NATO summit in many ways is so important at this time. This is the first time that we've had a NATO summit meeting with 32 members, which I think shows that NATO is bigger, stronger, more united than ever before. We meet also with the involvement of Ukraine and the IP4, which I think shows that as NATO nations, we stand together in support of Ukraine. And it shows also I think for me, the growing indivisibility between security and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic and security and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. (05:50:18) And then finally I suppose, for the UK, the new UK government at this summit, you'll hear Keir Starmer, you'll hear David Lammy as our foreign secretary, I'm afraid you'll hear from me as well as the defense secretary, that we will be a government that sets out determined to fulfill our NATO obligations, to secure our role as the leading European nation in NATO, and to make Britain democracies' most reliable ally across the world. So to link that to your I think third question in your set of questions, which was-
Luke Coffey (05:51:04): My third question and my one question.
John Healey (05:51:07): We will follow up this NATO summit by launching a strategic defense review. That's the way that we get to grips with the threats that we face, the capabilities in the UK that we've got, the real state of our forces, the state of our alliances, and for all of us as governments also the state of the public finances we've got to work with. That will be launched by the Prime Minister shortly after the summit. We'll do that at pace, we'll do that properly, but that will be the way that we then set out the approach that we'll take to defense and security of the UK and our alliances for the years beyond that. And it will have a NATO-first commitment right at the heart of it.
Luke Coffey (05:51:58): Thank you. Mr. Sprūds, a conversation about Russia at a NATO summit would not be appropriate if we did not include the important voice from the Baltic region. So that's why I'm very grateful that you've taken time out of your schedule to come here to speak to us today. (05:52:15) Now for years, of course the Baltic States, including various Latvian governments, have been warning the rest of the alliance about the threats that Russia poses to the transatlantic region. But it wasn't until 2014 that the alliance started to get serious about this, and frankly, it wasn't until February of 2022 that we started to see real action. Once again, the Baltics were right. We should be listening to the Baltics more. (05:52:45) Looking at it from your point of view in your region of Europe, how do you assess the threat that Russia poses, not only to the region, but also to the alliance as a whole, and what should NATO do about this?
Andris Sprūds (05:52:58): Thank you so much. Thank you for having me in I think a very symbolic anniversary summit, and also here in the public forum. I've been participating in public forums for years, and a think tank representative, community representative, now I switch sides, but of course I'm always very glad and grateful to come back and of course discuss those very important issues for all of us. (05:53:22) Yes, indeed, the Baltic voice is important, and thank you for including the Baltic voice as well in this discussion. We've been advocating taking a strict position in Russia for years. We ourselves have been experiencing hybrid attacks from Russia for decades, so that's why the threat has been quite clear what we're facing. We are facing Russia, the country, which can change in every five years, in every 10 years dramatically, but nothing changes in 100 years. So we pretty much see the same Russia. It's expansionist, it's imperialist, regardless what kind of regime we are dealing with. (05:54:06) On the one hand we might say that it is Putin's Russia, but we might also say that it's Russia's Putin. Basically it represents those long-term resentments, ambitions, the expansionist moods, what we have and seen experienced for years. That's why certainly we have to have a mindset that we have to deal with Russia, which is imperialistic and expansionist in a long-term perspective. So the long-term perspective approach, the mindset, is important. And I think we are there because we start always with a basis of how we think about, how we analyze, how we assess. I think the threat assessment absolutely is the basis how we built our policies up. (05:54:56) Additionally, to this, apart from mindset, I would say another layer of mindset is that we should approach Russia, and I would say not only Russia, we should approach the challenging transformative world, also from positions of strengths. Let's not underestimate ourselves. Let's not underestimate the strengths of our unity. Let's not underestimate the strengths of our democracies. Let's not underestimate the strengths what we can also put on a battlefield if we need to. We are the most successful collective defense alliance in the history, and I can fully agree with those assessments. But that's why, of course, understanding and believing and also acting from positions of strengths with Russia absolutely is important. (05:55:40) What we should do practically, of course that's also what NATO Summit is about, invest. And it's about political investment, it's about financial investment, it's about investment, of course, in our armed forces, in our military industrial capacity, it's about societal resilience. So of course we open also other domains as well, hybrid security, cyber security. Being resilient against illegal immigration, being resilient against any incidents against critical infrastructure. What we experience also in the Baltic Sea region, also in the Baltic countries. So that's why of course these 360-degree approach is pretty much also should be there how we deal with strengthening ourselves, our own capacities, but of course also how we deal with Russia. (05:56:26) When we deal with Russia, I would say the words like containment, constraining, countering, contesting, that we should of course constrain what Russia can do militarily. That it is not able to attack its neighbors, it's not able to undermine international rules-based order, that we are able also to contest globally. So when contest not militarily, but also politically, also in terms of information, also in terms of strategic communication. Because at the very end it's also about the global fight for the hearts and minds of the people, so the strategic communication absolutely here is a must as well. And it's not only with Russia, it's also with other authoritarian states which actually support Russia in its aggressive and assertive resentment to geopolitics, and aggressive geopolitics. (05:57:16) And of course, also the countering, so we should be active how we deal with those things. It's not just about being passive and reacting, but also basically moving out and clearly defining those strategies. And last, but not least, of course, now supporting Ukraine. Then now the international rules-based orders being defended in Ukraine, the values of democracy, the values of freedom are being defended in Ukraine. So that's why of course support for Ukraine, imposing strategic defeat on Russia in Ukraine is a must, what we should achieve and what we should aspire. And we should once more not underestimate that we cannot do it, we can do it. Thank you.
Luke Coffey (05:57:57): Thank you, absolutely. Yeah, well done. For all the think tankers out there, there is hope. Some that you're sitting out there, you might be right here.
Andris Sprūds (05:58:08): But don't worry, I will move back at some point.
Luke Coffey (05:58:12): General Hodges, you bring a unique perspective to this debate. You took command of US Army Europe soon after Russia's first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. You were instrumental in leading some of the very early efforts to shore up deterrence along the eastern flank, and for starting the early days of the training and the assisting of the Ukrainian armed forces soon after that illegal annexation of Crimea. (05:58:42) But now you're a civilian. You view this perhaps differently from the outside, so to speak. You're not constrained as you would be being an official. So can you tell us your candid view about what the Russia threat is and what NATO should be doing about it?
Ben Hodges (05:59:03): Russia is at war with us and we need to wake up. We need to acknowledge that they are at war with us. It may not be T-72s or Sukhois that are striking NATO countries, but they are absolutely at war. The GPS jamming, the sabotage, the interference in our elections, complete disregard for international law. Selling oil on unseaworthy, unsafe unregistered ships that they sell to India and China, which gives them money to keep buying ammunition and drones from North Korea and Iran, that then they use to kill innocent Ukrainians. (05:59:39) They are absolutely a war with us, but yet somehow we have a lot of people, including in this city, that are like, "Oh, Russia, it's a great power. It would be terrible if the regime collapsed and they might use a nuclear weapon." And so our policy towards Russia seems to be avoid escalation, when the policy should be defeat Russia. Help Ukraine defeat Russia, knock them back. (06:00:04) And that does not require one single American soldier, British soldier, Latvian soldier. Not one, not one, but it does require the political will of my president, all the other heads of state and government of the alliance, to say this is not about helping Ukraine. Our policy should be protecting our strategic interest, which is to defeat Russia, make them live within their own borders, otherwise it's absolutely ... We're going to have a continuation, exactly what the minister said, three years from now. We'll think we'll have a peace, they know that we'll lose interest, and will be back at it.
Luke Coffey (06:00:45): Absolutely. Secretary of State Healey, I mentioned you just returned from Ukraine, I think on day two you were in Ukraine, you met with President Zelensky in Odessa. Anyone who's been to Odessa recently knows that it's a very difficult time in the city with the airstrikes and the impact on the electrical grid and just day-to-day life for the Ukrainians that live there. (06:01:10) Prime Minister Starmer has made it clear that Britain's leading support for Ukraine will continue. And in fact, I believe you said that you're going to look at ways to expedite existing support and commitments to Ukraine to try to get that material to the front lines faster. Can you tell us a little bit about this and why coming into government you believe that a Ukrainian victory is important to the United Kingdom?
John Healey (06:01:41): General Hodges just said, "Look, we need to view Ukraine in our own strategic interest." He's a general, he's got that strategic insight. I'm a politician. I'd put it plainly because I don't think our public and our people fully and properly understand what's at stake here. (06:02:02) And so some of the arguments I try to make in the UK are, especially on the campaign trail which we've just finished, defense of the UK starts with Ukraine. And that's true for us, it's true for most of the European nations. It's relevant also to America's interest as well. And that's the case because we know that if Putin prevails in Ukraine he's not going to stop there, that's even before we get ... The truth that General Hodges just said, that Putin, without deploying the military against us, is already at war with all of our countries. (06:02:48) There's a wider importance as well because if Russia does prevail, then it says to other big countries around the world, "You've got the scope too to try and redraw international boundaries by force," which reinforces the instability, and the danger to us all. So fundamentally, that's a public argument we need to make more forcefully. Certainly in my country, that may be true in other parts of the alliance as well. (06:03:22) For a UK perspective, we've been bipartisan from the start. It was just five weeks before Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that David Lammy, now Foreign Secretary of the UK, and I, together went to Kyiv and we were discussing the risk then of the threat of the invasion. And we told them then, if Putin invades, the UK will stand united with Ukraine. And I'm proud that that's the case in my country. I'm proud of our government, the previous government, not ours now, and the leadership that you've mentioned on Ukraine. And Keir Starmer and I are dedicated to developing that. (06:04:13) So that's one of the reasons that I wanted to be out in Ukraine at the first opportunity having been appointed. And I was able to say to President Zelensky two days in and his team there, first of all, we will speed up the delivery of the equipment and military aid that's already been pledged by the UK. We will do that, we will complete that delivery within 100 days. So the big Rishi Sunak pledge in April, the largest UK package to date at that time, will be fully delivered within a 100 days with a Starmer guarantee. (06:04:51) The second is that I was able to require a immediate stock check of what we could offer, and we've been able also to provide an extra package of equipment, the sort of kit that they're using day-to-day and need in battle. I can give you some of the details. It's not big, but it's an important sign I think for the Ukrainians that the UK commitment continues, and there may be a change of government, but there'll be no change in the UK's determination to stand with Ukraine or confront Russian aggression or indeed pursue Putin for his war crimes. The third is, I said to him we will now work with Ukraine and we'll work with allies to work out how we can step up what we do to support. My view is that we need to see this in a much bigger picture, the sort of picture you were drawing of the Russian aggression. Because too often we're focusing on the immediate military battle, the immediate military equipment needs, when if Ukraine's hand is going to be strengthened by us as allies it isn't just the military help that we can provide, it's the political, diplomatic, economic support and pressure that we can put in Putin. And if Ukraine's going to be in a position to judge that the time may be right to pause the fighting and try and find some settlement, it needs to have the strongest possible hand in the strongest possible position, and that's our responsibility. (06:06:23) And that finally, I think is why, again, this NATO summit is so important. The unanimity behind very significant long-term multi-year commitments to support Ukraine, not just militarily but also industrially, is so important. And if we do what we say, if we deliver what we promise, then we will be playing a big part in making sure that Putin in the end does not win.
Luke Coffey (06:06:59): I think that is music to our ears, hearing that in 100 days this equipment will be expedited, as very much needed, of course. Keeping on the theme of Ukraine, Minister, I've heard you say a number of times and just five minutes ago, say that Russia needs to receive a strategic defeat in Ukraine. Can you explain what that is? What is that strategic defeat, what does it look like?
Andris Sprūds (06:07:23): Yes, of course. Again, one step back, we must remember what are the consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and what are the consequences of how the war goes and what will be the outcome of it. The consequences that if Ukraine loses, it's undermining the international rules-based order, it's undermining our credibility, it's undermining our security. So I think the stakes are high, and this should be always remembered. (06:07:55) Which also means that we must have a very clear strategic goal what we want to achieve together with Ukraine. We, as a transatlantic community of democracies of like-minded, what is the strategic goal? And strategic goal is not Ukraine not losing the war, the strategic goal is Ukraine winning the war and imposing strategic defeat on Russia. (06:08:18) What does it mean? I think it's again clear, it's restoring territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is taking those war criminals accountable for their crimes, what just we've seen a few days ago as well with brutal attacks against the children and innocent civilians. It's also about financial repercussions, using the frozen assets. And at the very end, strategically it's also about Ukraine becoming the 33rd member of NATO, and it will become the 33rd member of NATO. (06:08:53) How to achieve it? Of course, keeping the strategic ambition in mind, yes, we have to make also practical steps. Practical steps providing military support. And I think the financial commitments here also shows how seriously we take it. Now Latvia, both the countries, we allocated the committed zero 25% of GDP for military support to Ukraine. It is quite a considerable amount. It is for Latvian military or defense budget almost 10% of our military defense budget goes in supporting Ukraine, and I think we should still consider even providing more. (06:09:35) It is also, of course, coordinating all those different activities what we have. We have a lot of activities. We are co-leading together with UK a drone coalition, and I think it's excellent coalition. There are other capability coalitions. What we realize that we should also take steps faster, a more [inaudible 06:09:57] approach. Well, but we are also democracies with our procedures, so unfortunately sometimes things take longer than they expect. (06:10:04) Last but not least, we should be ready to support Ukraine as long as it takes, being ready that the conflict must be or can be protracted as well. So be ready for it and support Ukraine. And I think the strategic goal of imposing strategic defeat on Russia will be quite realistic.
Luke Coffey (06:10:22): Absolutely. General Hodges, you've been one of the most outspoken supporters of assisting Ukraine, arming Ukraine. You were leading-
Ben Hodges (06:10:31): Obviously not very compelling.
Luke Coffey (06:10:33): Well, we have seen some progress on your focus regarding the long-range strikes, ATACMS, missiles, trying to isolate the Crimean Peninsula. We've seen steps in the right direction. We haven't gone as far as I think many of us would like. We haven't gone as quickly as we would like. (06:10:54) But practically speaking, what does NATO, and you can talk about the US or individual countries inside the alliance, what do we need to be doing more of and faster to help Ukraine win on the battlefield?
Ben Hodges (06:11:10): If President Biden would come out tonight when he's hosting all his heads of state and government guests at dinner, if he would say, "Ladies and gentlemen, it is the policy of the United States, it is our strategic objective that Ukraine defeats Russia. And we're going to do every damn thing that they need so that they can do it." Not this empty, "We're with you for as long as it takes," but, "We're going to do everything they need.," That right there would be the seismic change that would lead to Ukraine actually winning, and that would be a crushing strategic defeat for the Kremlin. So far, they've been confident that the American president would not do that. The German Bundeskanzler would never do that, and unfortunately a few other heads of state and government. (06:11:51) The first step is to say, "That's our objective." If you don't even say that's the objective, then you end up with, I must say, really bad policy decisions such as, "Okay, well, finally, after two years, you can have ATACMs, but you cannot use them against airfields from which murderous attacks are emanating against Ukrainian cities." That's terrible policy. Or this drip, drip, drip, drip. Everything that we are providing Ukraine right now ... You can see why I'm retired. Everything that Ukraine has right now from the United States, with the exception of Javelin, was a no for the first months of the war. I mean, you can remember, Luke, there was a time-
Luke Coffey (06:12:36): Absolutely.
Ben Hodges (06:12:36): ... where, "We shouldn't provide Stinger because what will happen if a Ukrainian soldier shoots down a Russian helicopter with an American Stinger, they might use a nuclear weapon." I mean, that was the thinking. And so we've had this taken two and a half years and tens of thousands of lives to get to where we finally are, and we're still underestimating Ukraine's ability to integrate new equipment. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, make it our policy. This is our objective, strategic objective. And I mean, look, eight months when nothing came from the United States. Eight months Russia achieved nothing. All they could do is continue attacking Ukrainian cities. So they could not even exploit for over half a year, despite having other advantages, they'd lack the ability to knock Ukraine out of the war. They can't do it. (06:13:27) Imagine if we had been providing everything that was needed with an aim to helping Ukraine actually win and if we used all of our economic tools. I cannot understand why they are still able to get ammunition from North Korea, drones from Iran, parts from China, and your ships loaded with oil going through the Baltic Sea, which we control. Black Sea, we should still be able to stop it but unfortunately we're not able to do that. And that oil goes to India and China. You saw the
Speaker 17 (06:14:00): ... the graph that came out the other day, the top 20 countries that are buying Russian oil, India, China, but also 10 European countries, including Germany, still buying Russian oil. Unbelievable. And that money is what pays for that Kinzhal missile that slammed into that children's hospital, so we're not serious. We have to declare that we want Ukraine to win because it's in our interest.
Luke Coffey (06:14:28): Yeah, it comes down to we have to start wanting Ukraine to win more than we just hope that Russia might lose this war, and we need to start acting that way. Now these gentlemen have very busy schedules. They rushed over here from the NAC and they're going to be rushing directly back to the NAC as this ends, and I'm very mindful of the time and I don't want to make their schedules delayed. So with that, please join me in thanking our three panelists.
Michal Baranowski (06:14:56): Ministers, thank you very much. I must say that this perhaps was one of my favorite sessions because it was a very clear-eyed assessment of the threat from Russia, also an assessment of the long-term nature of the threat, and of course, we could count on General Ben Hodges to give us very specific ideas of how to deal with this threat. Right now, if you are watching us online, stay tuned for a couple interviews with NATO veterans as well as a conversation with Senator Roger Wicker. And for those of you here, please join us for well-deserved coffee break. See you back here in half an hour. See you.
Lt. Col. Melanie Lake (06:16:13): Good afternoon. We were asked today to come and share some perspectives from the ground level as veterans of NATO operations. And although we can only share our limited perspective from our own personal experience, we want to do this in honor of all of those who have served on NATO operations and sacrificed over 75 years providing security for our one billion population. (06:16:36) My name is Lieutenant Colonel Melanie Lake. I am a combat engineering officer in the Canadian Armed forces. I had the privilege of serving three tours in Afghanistan with NATO's International Security Assistance Force and most recently commanded Canada's training mission in Ukraine Operation Unifier just prior to the full-scale invasion. I currently work with Canada's Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security and I'm really honored to be here today with my distinguished colleague, Mario. Mario, can you introduce yourself?
Mario Marquez (06:17:07): Sure. Thank you. My name is Mario Marquez. I'm a retired Marine sergeant major with 31 years of service. I first entered Marine Corps at the end of the Cold War, so 1989, and I served all the way through the end of December of 2020 when I retired and I stayed here in the Washington, D.C. area. I currently serve as the American Legion's National Security Director, America's largest veteran service organization. My time in the Marine Corps took me to places like Kosovo under NATO forces. I also served four tours in Iraq. I served in two earthquakes in Japan, 1995 and 2011, and I also served in the Middle East under central command and I retired out of III Marine Expeditionary Force in the Pacific. (06:17:48) I'd like to close out my remarks by saying that I am grateful to the alliance for invoking Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks when I was a young 31-year-old Marine in solidarity for the United States, and on behalf of our nation, we are grateful for that and we will never forget. So thank you. I'm glad to be here for this opportunity.
Lt. Col. Melanie Lake (06:18:08): It's interesting that you start with 9/11. I was a young fourth-year officer cadet at our Royal Military College in my last year on that terrible morning when we watched as aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In those moments, I mean, all of us, all we could think was, how do we help our American partners in this time when they're under attack? And I had a very similar feeling on the 24th of February of 2022 watching as Russia launched its full-scale invasion to Ukraine, into Ukraine, where I had been just four months earlier, feeling that we need to do everything we can to help our Ukrainian partners as they defend their democracy and ours and to enable victory and defeat of this unprovoked aggression. (06:18:57) I was struck really recently by these images of President Zelensky meeting with a US veteran on the shores of Normandy during the 80th anniversary of D-Day and seeing them recognize that commonality in their fights against evil and oppression and the courage needed to face it, and face it decisively. And I think we're reminded of how critical that is right now after seeing this horrible attack on Monday against the children's hospital in Kyiv. (06:19:29) As soldiers in the alliance, I think that those of us at ground level, we've always understood and accepted that great sacrifices might be required of us in the defense of our values, our democracies, protecting other nations' rights to self-determination and deterring others who might be aggressors. And we stand very willing, very willing to do that and ready do that. Finding ways to contribute for me when things go wrong in the world gives me a way to counter some of that frustration and anger that I think many young people are feeling right now watching world events. Mario, I know you have immense operational experience. What have you learned on your many tours working with allies and partners?
Mario Marquez (06:20:20): Thank you, Melanie, for that. I talked about my time in Kosovo, and that was my first exposure to NATO in a formal capacity. I was the operations chief for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and we quickly moved from our ships into Greece, Macedonia and we began operating across southern and southeastern Kosovo. Our German, Austrian and Swiss partners swiftly integrated us. They brought us on board and we seamlessly began operations as if we had been working together for years. And I will never forget that because we worked out so well initially that we began to do other things such as interoperability, training or staff engagements, marksmanship training, other types of humanitarian work that we were not planned for. And so what that did is the camaraderie and the bond that we build with our partners from the alliance and enabled us to just service the people of Kosovo much better, and I took a lot from that. (06:21:21) I think the second thing, and probably the most vivid memories that I remember, is being in a convoy, in many convoys, and riding in the front seat, and we would share the roads with civilians. Well, why would we share roads with civilians? Because the country was mined. There was mines everywhere. So the civilians would put their lives at risk by walking on the road between these big vehicles and feared stepping off into the dirt because not every minefield was marked. And I never forgot those images. It was powerful and it taught me to be compassionate and understanding. And then we would go into villages and we would provide humanitarian aid and the mothers would look at us with fear but hope in their eyes that there would be peace and stability in their future, and the children would smile with kindness and just hope that they would also maybe grow up in a better place one day. That's what I took away. It made me a better Marine, it made me a better service member and human, and I employ all of that today, all of the time.
Lt. Col. Melanie Lake (06:22:19): That's impressive, Mario. It was actually seeing that mine threat in the theaters like where you were operating that inspired me to become a combat engineer. I joined the military not long after the Ottawa Treaty was signed to ban anti-personnel landmines, and that was something I knew I really wanted to be a part of. (06:22:38) On my first tour in Afghanistan, I felt like I was able to do something that mattered at a local level when we were able to destroy some landmines, clear some of the explosive threat in some small villages south of Kabul. I have a lot of positive and difficult memories from three tours in Afghanistan. The camaraderie and that connection with the local population certainly stands as a positive, and it was remarkable seeing how we work together as allies, that allies and partners, that reassuring feeling of having air support come online, and it didn't matter what country it was from-
Mario Marquez (06:23:18): That's right.
Lt. Col. Melanie Lake (06:23:18): ... you knew that aircraft had your back. ISAF and the war in Afghanistan, that was a really defining period for soldiers of my generation, but also had a profound impact on Canadian society as we were losing soldiers in combat. (06:23:35) I did see there that NATO, as an organization, that we have this ability to collectively learn. And one important example I think was the evolution of our approach to mitigation of civilian harm. I personally struggled with memories of the fear on young children's faces that we encountered during some of the night raids that I participated in on suspected insurgent compounds, and I think through these difficult lessons and experiences, we realized that protection of civilians went beyond this need to adhere to the laws of armed conflict, that it was a strategic imperative, really core to our mission success, but also central to our legitimacy and our credibility as responsible military forces, and I think these are lessons that we can draw upon as we look next year to revamp our policy on protection of civilians. I think this is also really important as we're shifting our focus to deterrence and defense on our own territory amongst our own populations. (06:24:43) Seeing the images of Bucha and Irpin, understanding what even temporary occupation under Russian forces looks like, I think that we have to reconsider some of these military concepts in defense like trading space for time. When Kabul fell to the Taliban in 2021, I was in Ukraine and I found it really powerful seeing how the veteran community and serving members around the world mobilized for those who mattered in that really dark time. So many of us who served there were left questioning, what was this all for? And it was Afghan women who gave me the clearest answer on this. They said to me that, "This gave us 20 years to pursue our education, get jobs, be a part of public life here, and we've seen what our country could be and we're not willing to go give up on that." RAnd right now, they are the fiercest resistance that the Taliban is facing both at home and in exile around the world, and I think we really need to continue that support to them in this fight. (06:25:49) Now pivoting back to you, Mario, this week, the Secretary General published an op-ed that said, "NATO's main purpose is not to fight war but to prevent it." And our experience taught us that the best way to maintain peace is to be prepared for war, that credible deterrence and strong defense. How do we get there?
Mario Marquez (06:26:08): Sure. First I'd like to comment on your last segment you just spoke of. I'm really proud to hear of your experience. It brings back a lot of memories. It's healing, it's soothing to know that other people have witnessed many of the things that veterans from across the alliance have seen and felt and suffered and worked through. (06:26:23) To answer your question, for me, I've heard a lot of fantastic briefs not only during the summit and the forum but throughout, and I think it's important to discuss all those things. They are all matters of urgency. But my advice and my recommendation to every leader that is listening today, both partner nations and the alliance, is to invest in your non-commissioned officer corps. Because without that mid-level leadership who is competent, able to make tough decisions in a decentralized manner, carry out commander's intent, whether it's in humanitarian missions or combat, those are the critical aspects of any successful military organization or alliance. You will never achieve your full aim without a competent non-commissioned officer corps.
Lt. Col. Melanie Lake (06:27:05): I couldn't agree with you more. A big part of the training we were doing in Ukraine was focused on the professionalization of the NCO corps, and to them, that was a really important part of their journey, of their reforms towards NATO interoperability. I think, I mean, those senior NCOs have showed us without a doubt the value of that on the battlefield. From Canada's experience, as we stood up our enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia, which is now growing to brigade with 14 countries all working together, we're working through many of the complexities that come with interoperability. I mean, there's a lot of challenging technical aspects like, how do you get your radios to talk? How do you work through language barriers? How do you get your resupply? How do you resupply each other when you have all different systems? But we're doing a lot of work on this right now, figuring out how we really work together effectively and getting through those challenges so that we can work together effectively in crisis. (06:28:04) And although there are many challenges, there's so much strength that comes in this many countries working together united by a common purpose. It was a young master corporal on my training mission in Ukraine when we were training the fourth Rapid Reaction Brigade who, he had just arrived and we were training and he said to me, "Ma'am, I will go to war with these soldiers tomorrow." And I looked around and all of our soldiers were wearing Ukrainian flags on their arms, all the Ukrainians had Canadian flags. And it struck me that the foundations of interoperability, they truly start at that most basic level with human relationships, friendships, bonds, and that understanding that comes from working side by side. (06:28:47) One final note on this. I think that another lesson from is around civil society and citizens, how they're integrated with their military, and I think there's a ton that we can learn around civil military cooperation in total defense from Ukraine to strengthen our own resilience, and a shout-out to the incredible role that women in civil society are playing to that. We're down to two minutes. Do you have any final thoughts?
Mario Marquez (06:29:14): I'm just blessed to be by your side. I really am. Look, for the leaders out there, the alliance, the partners, and even other people watching this throughout the world: we need to do a better job about incorporating our veterans from military to civilian life. If we start doing that, our veterans will be more productive citizens. We have a powerful voice. We impact and influence policy and decision-making at the highest levels. We need to do a better job about that globally. There's this thing called a military recruiting crisis. It's not an America problem, it's a global problem. And until the world starts taking care of veterans and including and showing them the value, including veterans and showing the world the value of our service, then we're going to continue to have those problems. Thank you.
Lt. Col. Melanie Lake (06:29:54): I totally agree. And I think it's the thousands of small acts every day interlinked together that create security. This is all about people and our connections. (06:30:04) As a final thought, I think that our values within NATO are actually our strategic advantage. Our human rights, liberty and freedom, gender equality, these things are actually our best weapons and the biggest threat that we pose to authoritarian regimes, the fact that everyday life for our citizens is better in democracies, that governments are accountable to their people and that our citizens are invested in their countries. But in order to defend these values, we have to live up to them. We have to be willing to defend them and fight for them even when that's most difficult, but I think that's when we're truly at our best. We're seeing more conflicts around the world than at any period in my lifetime with devastating consequences for civilians I believe that with this alliance, by courageously living up to our own values and defending them, we have the ability to change this, to be a force that stands in the starkest contrast and opposition to authoritarianism and the defense of freedom. (06:31:02) Thank you so much on behalf of both of us for this time today. We truly honor the service of all those who came before us, those who continue to serve, and we never forget those who gave the ultimate sacrifice for all of us. Thank you.
John Walters (06:36:10): Welcome to the NATO Public Forum. I'm John Walters, President, CEO of Hudson Institute. I am very pleased to be joined by United States Senator Roger Wicker of Mississippi. He sits on the Committee on Armed Services in the United States Senate, and most of all, I think he has been the author of this report, Peace Through Strength, which is an analysis of the needs of the United States military, how to meet those needs with actual budget numbers. So we're not talking about talk, we're talking about actual dollars and building capacity. Thank you for being with us.
Senator Roger Wicker (06:36:45): Thank you, John. Glad to be with you.
John Walters (06:36:45): Thank you for your work. You released this report on how to maintain 21st-century peace through strength. Can you give us a little idea about the key parts of this plan, because you're the author?
Senator Roger Wicker (06:36:59): Well, the key parts of this plan are getting us back to 5% of gross domestic product, just like Ronald Reagan did. During the Reagan years, we stood the Soviet Union down by saying we're going to be strong enough that nobody's going to take us on. That's called peace through strength. That was Reagan beginning in 1981. So my plan is modern-day peace through strength. And really it's based on everything we see in the news, but also the specific testimony that we've gotten from defense leaders and from people who actually are tasked within the Pentagon and within the administration to keep us safe and get the job done.
John Walters (06:37:47): As a think tank head, I read a lot of reports, government and so forth. A lot of them are not interesting. They're not as specific. They're not very general. I urge everybody, read this report. It's online. It gives you detailed analysis of weaknesses and how to fix them, which is most important.
Senator Roger Wicker (06:38:03): Thank you very much. Well, we did put a lot into it, and I have to credit my staff for working through the minutiae, but these are specific plans to build our Navy up where it should be, to rebuild our shrinking Air Force, and also to get us where we need to be on our munitions. There's so much that needs to be done. Of course, this interview is taking place in connection with the NATO Public Forum, so we need to work with our allies and the great alliance we've had.
John Walters (06:38:38): What do you see as the biggest shortfalls and where do we need to make up deficits? The nice thing about the report I think is also it does near-term needs and threats and building a base for longer term.
Senator Roger Wicker (06:38:51): Well, the principal shortfalls are in the Indo-Pacific, but also, this report asks us to recognize, and excuse me for my voice, that we are facing an axis of aggression between Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. And in regard to what we are being challenged by and what's going on in Ukraine, for example, it's Russia on the attack, but there's no question Iran is helping, North Korea is even sending assistance to Russia, and certainly Xi Jinping is doing everything he can to keep the West tied down in Ukraine so he can continue to build up in the Indo-Pacific.
John Walters (06:39:53): This NATO summit is on the backdrop of burden-sharing discussions, burden-sharing and what allies actually owe each other and how they work as allies, and not as dependents or protectorates, and that's a big debate in the United States. You've been a part of that debate. Can you say a little bit about how you think... where we stand? Are we making progress on burden-sharing? How do we deal with this, given the threat environment, it becomes more critical?
Senator Roger Wicker (06:40:21): It is absolutely important, essential that our NATO allies keep their promise that they made several years ago at a NATO conference that each country would spend at least 2% of their gross domestic product on national defense. Now, at first there were only a handful, really single digits of all the NATO members, and that was indeed troubling. Now we're up in the 20s, but there are some notable exceptions, and quite frankly, the leadership of the Senate, me included, met with Prime Minister Trudeau, our northern neighbor and one of our closest allies yesterday, and we pointedly mentioned that they are one of the laggards when it comes to putting in money on their national defense so they can help the alliance. It's only about 1.5% in Canada. (06:41:24) I can report to you that Prime Minister Trudeau said that they were going to unveil a plan later on this week, and perhaps it will come Thursday, Friday, but before the end of the week, to get Canada to 2% of GDP within a decade. Within a decade. So that will be helpful. Clearly, we're making progress. Clearly not, we're not where we need to be, but it is, I would have to say, the strong rhetoric, perhaps hyperbole on the part of President Trump during his term of office and during the course of this election has been a wake-up call for our NATO allies. And so they're headed in the right direction. A lot more needs to be done.
John Walters (06:42:17): Since the context here allows speaking to the American people as never before, and a reminder, what is the importance of NATO as you see it? You have to look at the appropriations for the US military, you have to work with our allies, but you see the overall threat situation. When you look at that, how do you tell your constituents what the importance of NATO is?
Senator Roger Wicker (06:42:38): Well, the question is, who will lead the world in the rest of the 21st century? Will it be dictatorships like Iran, Russia, Communist China, North Korea, or will it be the great democracies of the West and people like them, like we're beginning to form alliances with in the Indo-Pacific, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines even, and Australia. So someone is going to lead in the world. Will it be the dictatorships of Putin and Xi Jinping or will it be the United States and our allies? And that will determine what kind of world we live in. (06:43:25) I don't want to turn this country over and the rest of the century over to my grandchildren in a world that is ruled by dictators. Democracies don't invade their neighbors. Look around. The countries that threaten their neighbors and try to change the borders by violent aggression and armed forces are the dictatorships of this world. And chief among them are this war criminal named Vladimir Putin. Absolutely, if Russia were a democracy, they'd be tending to their own business, seeking to internationally recognize borders that the rest of the world has agreed to abide by. Since we've had NATO, we've had a relatively peaceful Europe, and that has meant a relatively peaceful Atlantic alliance, including the United States and Canada.
John Walters (06:44:31): Yeah, I think people forget that the combined GDP of America and its European allies, when they worry about being swamped by the economic power of China and others, we dwarf them out as far as you can see. We'd have to let them not wreck that.
Senator Roger Wicker (06:44:45): True, except for this: China is increasing their defense spending dramatically, and that's why we have this report. We are being overtaken by the dictatorships of this world. They don't have to spend money on school lunches, on social spending, on retirement programs. We need to be absolutely mindful of what the witnesses in this year, last year and the year before have told us, and they tell us this is the most dangerous era that we have faced in half a century or more.