Pentagon Press Briefing on 9/10/24

All right, good afternoon, everyone. I do have quite a bit to pass along at the top today. So, thanks in advance for your patience, and then I’ll get right to your questions.

(08:40)
Tomorrow, Secretary Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General C. Q. Brown, Jr., will host an observance ceremony at 9:00 AM at the National 9/11 Pentagon Memorial, in honor of the 184 people who were killed in the 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon. The Pentagon observance ceremony, which is not open to the public, allows the family members of those lost in the terrorist attack to observe the memory of their loved ones, and for us to honor and never forget the sacrifices of those we lost that day. Prior to the ceremony, during sunrise at 6:46 AM, the American flag will be unfurled down the side of the Pentagon in the same location where a flag was unfurled by firefighters and soldiers on September 12th, 2001, to demonstrate our resolve and resilience in the face of the horrific terrorist attacks on our nation. Today, it remains a symbol of the prevailing spirit of endurance, freedom, and hope.

(09:35)
Turning to the Middle East, DOD continues to monitor the situation across the region, and remains postured to support the defense of Israel, and protect US troops and assets in the region. Secretary Austin had the opportunity to touch base with his Israeli counterpart over the weekend to get an update on IDF operations, and we remain intently focused on de-escalating tensions in the Middle East, while also remaining focused on securing a ceasefire as part of a hostage deal to bring all of the hostages home, and to end the war in Gaza.

(10:07)
And staying in the CENTCOM AOR, as announced earlier today by Secretary of State Blinken, the United States has confirmed reports that Iran has transferred shipments of Fateh-360 close range ballistic missiles to Russia, which we assess could employ them within weeks against Ukraine, leading to the deaths of even more Ukrainian civilians. To echo our State Department and White House colleagues, this is a deeply concerning development, as this partnership between Iran and Russia threatens European security and illustrates how Iran’s destabilizing influence reaches beyond the Middle East and around the world. Additionally, Russian support for Iran is destabilizing as well, as Moscow is sharing technology that Iran needs. We’ll continue to monitor these developments, alongside our allies and partners across Europe and the Middle East, and remain steadfast in our support to Ukraine’s defense from the threat these missile systems may pose to the people of Ukraine. Moving over to the Indo-Pacific Theater, yesterday, September 9th, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, held a video teleconference with General Wu Yanan, the commander of the PLA’s Southern Theater Command. The call was a deliverable from the bilateral meeting held in November 2023 between President Biden and PRC President Xi Jinping. During that meeting, both leaders agreed to resume high-level military-to-military communication between the Department of Defense and the PLA, and to hold conversations between US INDOPACOM and the PLA’s theater commanders.

(11:38)
During the call, Admiral Paparo underscored the importance of sustained lines of communication between the US military and the PLA, noting that such discussions between senior leaders serves to clarify intent and reduce the risk of misperception or miscalculation. Admiral Paparo expressed hope that this discussion with his PLA counterpart would be the first of many such conversations, and noted the necessity of continued dialogue on issues of concern with General Wu, as well as counterparts in other PLA theater commands.

(12:10)
Additionally, I’d like to address an upcoming naval exercise by the Russian Federation. In mid-September, Russia will conduct its scheduled Okean-2024 exercise, including naval assets from across its fleets. While Russia prefers to include foreign participants in such exercises, we believe China will be the only true participant, with a few other countries only observing. The US has been tracking this planned exercise for some time: it poses no threat to the US homeland or the NATO alliance, and we’ll continue to monitor and remain in close communication with our NATO allies and partners.

(12:45)
Separately, the third INDUS-X Summit between the United States and India kicked off yesterday at Stanford University in California. INDUS-X, or the India-US Defense Acceleration Ecosystem, was launched just over a year ago in June 2023.

2023. The initiative aims to facilitate partnerships among US and Indian defense companies and innovators of all types. On the Indian side, the INDUS X initiative is supported by the Indian Ministry of Defense’s Innovations for Defense Excellence and on the US side by the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit and the office of the Secretary of Defense.

(13:21)
In the words of Secretary Austin, the INDUS X summit will allow American and Indian partners to co-produce cutting edge military capabilities that will safeguard a free and open Indo-Pacific. And with that, I’ll be happy to take your questions. We’ll go to AP, Lita.

Thanks, Pat. Just a couple of things on the Iranian missiles, can you give us a broad estimate of how many you think have been delivered, even if it’s dozens, hundreds or whatever? There has been statements that dozens of Russians have been trained, so I would assume you have at least some sort of ballpark idea how much of this is getting into Russia? Have you seen any of them used yet or being positioned to be used? And then what do you think Iran is getting in exchange?

I’m able to address a few of those things. So as you highlight, we do believe that dozens of Russian military personnel were trained in Iran to use this missile system. I’m not able to get into the intelligence in terms of the specific number of missiles. Needless to say, this is a concerning development as I highlighted. And the thing about the missile is that it is a short range or a close range ballistic missile system. We estimate it has a maximum range of about 75 miles. So what this does is it would enable Russia to employ this capability while preserving its longer range capabilities for use throughout the battlefield, thus deepening Russia’s arsenal and also again giving it the ability to strike the kinds of targets that we’ve seen them striking, to include Civilian targets.

(15:09)
And so we have not seen them employ them yet, but are obviously keeping a close eye on that. And as you heard the State Department say earlier and the White House, there are sanctions being applied to include sanctions from our European allies.

What do you think Iran specifically has gotten in exchange for this specific?

Again, without me go into specifics, we see them sharing information as it relates to nuclear programs, space and other technological capabilities that Russia has, that countries like Iran wants.

(15:52)
Carla?

Thank you, Pat. Three quick ones. Did the Houthis shoot down a US drone as they have claimed?

We’ve seen those reports, Carla. I don’t have anything to provide on that right now. Obviously, looking into that but I’d refer you to CENTCOM.

Okay, thank you. And then, are US forces pulling out from federal Iraq by September 2025 and the Kurdistan region by September 2026 as the Iraqi defense minister has said?

Yeah, I’ve seen a lot of press reporting on that. Again, nothing new to announce from here. Again, when we have updates, we’ll certainly provide them to you.

Okay, and then last one, so the NCTC’s Brett Holmgren said this week that al-Qaeda was kicked out of Afghanistan and they have a small footprint there. But the FDD’s Long War Journal is saying pretty much the opposite that al-Qaeda leaders are serving in the Taliban’s government. And that al-Qaeda is running training camps in at least 12 of the 34 provinces. What’s the Pentagon’s assessment of the al-Qaeda threat in Afghanistan right now?

Yeah, I don’t have a detailed assessment in front of me, Carla, so I’d refer you back to the NCTC for further details on their comments. I mean, clearly al-Qaeda remains a threat at various locations throughout the world and so we continue to stay focused on that. But I don’t have a detailed assessment on Afghanistan to provide from here.

(17:13)
Natasha?

Thanks, Gen. Ryder. Do you all have an assessment of whether this is the only shipment of ballistic missiles for now that’s going to be sent or is this the first in a bigger kind of shipment that’s going to be continued? And then secondly, in terms of force posture in the Middle East, do you have an update on where the USS Georgia is at this moment?

Yeah, so on your first question, the short answer is I’m just not going to be able to predict the future. I would say, the concerning aspect of this again is the developing relationship between Russia and Iran. And you also see Russia developing a relationship with the DPRK where they become essentially a supplier of capability. So one has to assume that if Iran is providing Russia with these types of missiles that it’s very likely it would not be a one-time good deal. That this would be a source of capability that Russia would seek to tap in the future. And it’s also, again, indicative of the supply challenges that Russia is facing as it prosecutes this campaign, not only from munitions, but also from personnel. And so it’s something that we’re going to continue to keep a close eye on. As far as the Georgia, the Georgia has transited into the CENTCOM AOR. And I’ll just leave it at that.

(18:40)
Konstantin?

Thanks, Pat. Senator Tommy Tuberville said that he’s holding up the promotion of Lieutenant General Ronald Clark for what he says are failings of the Pentagon to sort of hold itself accountable in the wake of Secretary Austin’s hospitalization. Do you have a reaction?

So just a couple of things. So, first of all, I would just say up front, General Clark is a highly qualified senior officer, a leader. He was nominated for this critical position because of his expertise and his strategic level experience. When you look at the experience that someone like General Clark has, leading at senior commands throughout the world at all echelons, he’s exactly the kind of leader that we need and our priority theater leading US forces. And so we would urge the Senate to confirm all of our qualified nominees. And as we’ve seen before, these kinds of holds really can undermine our military readiness.

And just a quick follow up. He’s set to relieve General Flynn I believe. How long can General Flynn stay in that position?

I don’t want to get into timelines. Obviously, the confirmation process needs to work itself. Clearly we, as a military, are used to managing the leadership of our commands throughout the world. But again, I just can’t speak highly enough of General Clark and his qualifications for this position. And back to your earlier comment bout the concerns here that are being expressed. I would just highlight again, when we did our review, it was clear that at no time was there a gap in the chain of command. And so, again, we would just urge the Senate to confirm all of our qualified nominees. Let me go to the other side of the room here.

(20:41)
Tony?

More of a geopolitical question on Afghanistan. The report yesterday, the GOP report implies that the United States should actually still be in Afghanistan. It didn’t directly say it, but it had all these ramifications of us leaving. It implied we should still be there even though former President Trump said in June of 2021, 21 years we think is enough. 21 years. You painted today a world with a lot of conflict. If the United States had retained 2100 troops in Afghanistan and we fast-forward today, can you give a feel for the strain on the force both readiness-wise and money-wise, force structure-wise, all the things you laid out on top of that we would have troops being attacked in Afghanistan by the Taliban?

Yeah, thanks, Tony. Well, I mean, as you highlight, just as a reminder here, the February 2020 Doha agreement left only 2500 US troops on the ground in Afghanistan and called for the complete removal of all US forces by May of 2021. So the options at the time were either to withdraw all US forces in accordance with the agreement or send in more American troops to resume the fight with the Taliban. But the reality is that we didn’t keep forces in Afghanistan. So I’d be speculating in terms of the potential implications on force posture or readiness were we to have kept forces in Afghanistan.

(22:19)
And so while that would be an interesting discussion and a thought experiment, I’m going to stay focused on the facts in front of us and the missions that we have today. Broadly speaking though, I would say the one thing that has not changed is our determination to take the necessary steps to safeguard the homeland and our national security interests. And you can see that as you highlighted around the world in terms of where our forces are currently postured and our efforts to work alongside our allies and partners to address mutual security challenges.

Chairman McCaul yesterday was asked and he did say we’ve lost the ability for over-the-horizon strikes in Afghanistan. We’ve lost a lot of intelligence capability because we pulled out. We have no way to monitor ISIS K. Is that a fair assessment going three years later?

Well, I won’t address the senator’s comments specifically. Obviously I’ll let those stand on their own. But what I will say is that we do maintain robust intelligence capability around the world. Of course we can always use more wherever we’re at. But as you’ve seen, as the situation in Europe or the Middle East have heated up, we’ve been able to put the resources where we need them. And we do maintain over-the-horizon capability when it comes to counterterrorism. And we’ve demonstrated that over and over again. Thank you. Let me go to Joseph. I’ll come back to you.

Thanks. Just on Gaza and the West Bank, you mentioned the secretary spoke to his Israeli counterpart over the weekend. One, could you tell us, did he get any updates on what the Israeli army was doing or is doing in the West Bank? And then on Gaza, it seems from Open Source reporting that the Israeli defense minister is at odds with Netanyahu. Without getting into internal Israeli politics and dynamics, is the Pentagon satisfied with how the Israeli army is carrying out its campaign in Gaza when it comes to, one, civilians and reducing civilian casualties? And two, with their endgame or their goal in the conversations that you guys have had?

Yeah, thanks, Joseph. As I highlighted, the secretary did get a chance to touch base with Minister Galant and get an update on IDF operations. I’m not going to have any more specifics to provide on that aspect. But broadly speaking, as you know, the secretary has spoken with Minister Galant many times about their operations in Gaza, about their operations in West Bank. And the secretary has made clear our concerns about ensuring that civilian safety is taken into account, and particularly to prevent any type of escalation or incitement of violence in the West Bank.

(25:13)
As far as their operations in Gaza go, again, I think we’ve been very clear that it’s important that Israel have the ability to defend itself and to prevent the kinds of attacks we saw on October 7 from happening again, while at the same time doing everything possible to mitigate civilian harm to get humanitarian assistance into Gaza. And as I highlighted at the top, right now, the focus is on securing a ceasefire so that we can get the hostages released and we can end this war in Gaza. So I’ll just leave it there.

I’ll just ask one more on Iraq and the US troop withdrawal. A senior US official was on the record telling Reuters that an agreement had been reached, but you guys were just waiting to announce

… Can you just at least confirm if an agreement has in fact been reached?

Yeah. Again, I appreciate the question, Joseph. Right now, I just don’t have anything to announce. So, let me go to Janne, and then I’ll come back to you, Charlie.

Thank you very much, General. Two question on North Korea and Russia. First question, North Korea, Kim Jong-Un unveiled a new larger mobile launcher to enhance its ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. Do you think this poses a threat to the United States missile defense?

Well, look, again, we don’t necessarily look at one particular system. We look at the entire array of capabilities, and most importantly at the intent. And so again, we’ll continue to consult closely with our allies in the region to deter potential aggression, but most importantly, work towards regional security and stability throughout the peninsula and the broader region.

The second question, Russian President Putin said he would no longer talk to Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry recently announced the revision to its nuclear doctrine that would allow for the use of nuclear weapons. Could this be a sign of possible nuclear use?

So again, this is something we keep a close eye on all the time. Right now we have not seen anything that would cause us to change the posture of our strategic forces. Thank you. Charlie.

Charlie. Two questions. With the Iranian missiles now, the introduction of these Iranian missiles into the region, do the Ukrainians have sufficient defenses to take those on? And is it under consideration that perhaps the United States and other allies might provide them with the weaponry to take that on? And my second question is, I know that we’re reluctant to talk about the future and force posture, but as my understanding is the Roosevelt is supposed to come to the end of its extension, I think it’s tomorrow. So if that is extended, or if they chop out, will that announcement be made in the next few days?

So on your first question, I mean, air defense has been something that we’ve been very focused on for a long time now when it comes to Ukraine. That has been a priority for the Ukrainians, and therefore it has been a priority for us. I’d point you back to the UDCG almost year and a half ago, where Secretary Austin highlighted how critical this was. And from the very beginning, we’ve been working to get them a variety of systems to address both near-term missile threats as well as longer-range missile threats. Building that integrated air defense capability for Ukraine has been going on for a while now. And so we’re not going to let up. And again, there was discussion of this at the UDCG, and how allies and partners can work together to make sure that we continue to get Ukraine the air defense systems that it needs, and the munitions associated with that. So that’s not going to change. And these missiles, while they certainly are going to present a threat, we’re going to work with Ukraine to ensure, to your point, that they have the capabilities needed to defend against these missiles and other missiles that Russia’s using to include drones.

(29:39)
As far as the Roosevelt goes, as I’m sure you can appreciate as a matter of policy, we’re just not going to talk about deployment timelines. And so when we have things to announce, we’ll certainly do that, but I don’t have anything to provide from the podium.

Can I just follow up with the short-range missiles? I guess what I was trying to ask is does it present a more unique threat than what they have been dealing, in terms of their air defenses? Does the fact that they’re close range, or where they’re launched from, are they more difficult to intercept because they fly shorter distances?

I think a combination of things here, Charlie. I mean, first of all again, is the fact that Russia is now receiving these ballistic missiles from Iran, a supplier of capability that can be used against civilian targets, for example, especially as we go into winter. Of course they present a threat, but that said, we’re going to continue to work with Ukraine to try to make sure that they have what they need to protect against them. Volume, in and of itself, and the capacity and the ability to conduct sustained attacks, is something that has been a challenge all along, and that’s why we’re so focused on this. Thanks. Let me go to the phone here real quick. WTOP, JJ.

Good afternoon. Thanks, General, for the question. Two really quick questions for you. In terms of the Russians that have been trained or being trained by the Iranians, can you say how long ago that training started? And the second thing is, talking about Russia getting this extra capability. How does that impact, and I recognize that these are short range missiles or shorter range missiles, 75 miles and under, but I wonder how that impacts their request to get US and Western permission to use the capabilities they’ve gotten from you, to strike deeper into Russia to stop this.

Yeah, so on your first question, JJ, I don’t have anything to pass along in terms of the specific training timeline for the Russians. And as far as our policy as it pertains to the use of US-provided munitions, long-range strikes, that policy hasn’t changed.

Okay.

Yep.

Can Ukraine use the current ATACMS to go after these short-range missiles?

So our policy on long-range strike is that they can use that capability within sovereign Ukraine territory, right? Now, again, I don’t want to necessarily get into a discussion here about battlefield tactics, but ATACMs are a long-range capability that can be used to strike significant operational and strategic targets. And again, leave it to the Ukrainians and how they employ those, within their conflict and their operations, under the current policy that we provided. But-

75 miles is well within the range of an ATACM.

Is it feasible? Absolutely, it’s feasible. But again, the question is would you want to employ that kind of capability on something that’s up to the Ukrainians to decide. But okay, let me go to you, and then I’ll come to you. Yep.

Thank you very much, General. Both of my questions are follow up questions to my colleague’s questions earlier, the rise of al-Qaeda and their camps, my colleague earlier asked, and the confusion there is in that region. To add further confusion to it, Pakistani army chief two days ago urged the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to not help the TTP guys, the terrorists, the Taliban regime in Pakistan, not to help them.

(33:43)
On the other hand, we have a deputy prime minister who has been accused for corruption since last two decades for dozens of charges. He says that the former ISI chief should have not been in Kabul the day US was doing a withdrawal form of Afghanistan. Me being a journalist from Peshawar for 25 years, I am totally confused as to what’s going on. What’s your US policy? I’m confused about Pakistani policy, and I agree with my colleague here that terrorism in that region is indifferent. International terrorist organization are increasing in much faster pace than State Department and you both are expecting or your analysis on it.

Okay. You’re asking me what my analysis is of it?

Further to my colleague’s question that she’s raised that there are 12 al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan operating. I am saying that beside al-Qaeda, the local terrorist organization, including Taliban, they expansionism, which I’ve been raising in State Department, is at very fast scale right now.

So understanding that I won’t get into any discussion of domestic Pakistani politics writ large, we’ve known for a long time that there are terrorist threats throughout the region, to include in Afghanistan. And that exists today. And this is why for many, many years, since 9/11, we’ve been working closely with regional partners and allies throughout the world to address those threats, and particularly as they pertain to affecting our ability to protect the United States and our national security interests around the world. And so as we’ve demonstrated time and time again, if those interests are threatened, we’ll take appropriate action. We do have the ability to conduct over-the-horizon strikes, or collect intelligence should we need to, if threats are developing. And I’ll just leave it at that.

My second question is, my other colleagues related Mr. McCaul’s report that was released in yesterday and yesterday I asked this question to Vedanta as well. My 25 journalism is purely about international in that region. I’m not into Republican and Democrat. That’s not my focus.

(36:03)
My one thing that I’ve been raising since last two years as State Department, and I want to raise it to you, sir, as well. President Biden took over January 20 2021st, the last ambassador, his name is Bass. He had left in January 23rd. Chargé d’affaires took over. Mr. Ross was acting ambassador in Afghanistan. On August 15th, the embassy was officially closed. Why was no diplomatic relations there on ground, and US troops were left there by themselves? Is the diplomat life more important, or is it more precious than why those soldiers were left over there? And this is the issue. I’ve been raising it for two years now as a journalist from that region that I don’t think it’s fair. And that’s why I’ve been continuously asking that the last day of those 13 Marines that were killed, investigation should be done about them.

Yeah. So there was a very thorough investigation done by US Central Command, and as you know, they did a supplemental review of that investigation that looked at all of that, and found that there was no information drawn from that that would’ve changed any of the findings of the original investigation. And to your comment, do we prioritize certain aspects of our government over others? The answer to that is absolutely not. We obviously are going to take care of our folks whether they’re working for the diplomatic service, military, I’ll just leave it there. All right. Yes, sir. I promised you I’d take your question. Then I’ll get over here.

Thank you, sir. Two questions, please. One, India is trying to use its influence to end the war in the Middle East. And also, Prime Minister Modi was recently in Ukraine to bring the peace between Russia and Ukraine, or to use his influence. And if Defense Minister of India when he was here, Mr. Rajnath Singh, if he had discussed anything of these things? And also, what do you think about Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Ukraine to use his influence to bring the peace in that region?

Yeah. On the defense minister’s visit, it was a fantastic visit. We did issue a readout on that, so I’d point you to that for details about the discussion. As for the Prime Minister’s visit to Ukraine, certainly we welcome that dialogue, and any support that can be provided to Ukraine to help them to protect their freedom and sovereignty is always very welcome. Let me-

Second… Sorry. Second, sir, I bring a tribute from my Indian American community as far

… as far as 23 years of 9/11 tomorrow. Hundreds of thousands of men and women from this building is protecting America and also peace around the globe. My question is that what message secretary have for those who were sponsoring and financing Osama bin Laden and his network in Afghanistan and also in Pakistan, anything has changed?

(39:27)
And now, because the United Nations General Assembly is also coming up in the next few days and next week, and dozens of prime ministers and presidents, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi and also President Biden will be there. Anything change after 23 years of this?

Well, I’d encourage you to listen to the secretary’s remarks tomorrow during the 9/11 memorial. And of course, that will be live streamed on our website. And I think you’ll find that very poignant and important.

(40:00)
So, let me go to Alex.

Thanks, Pat. So, back to Ukrainian air defense. So it looks like the Ukrainians are moving the wrong way when it comes to the health of their defense, strikes in Poltava and Kramatorsk and Kyiv and elsewhere. Can you give us a sense of what the US is doing in terms of future PDAs to help in that?

(40:23)
And when it comes to Central Command, post October 7th, what does the pressure on increased air defense in the Middle East have on your ability to give both systems and munitions for air defense to Ukraine?

Yeah. So, a few things on that. So, first of all, as I mentioned to Charlie, air defense has been a priority for the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and for the United States when it comes to Ukraine for a long time now. And I don’t see that changing.

(40:56)
And in addition to the short-term requirements as far as rushing munitions, getting additional systems, for example, what was announced during the NATO summit, we’ve also stood up these eight capability coalitions which look at the long term requirements for Ukraine and their future defense needs. And so, what you have is that combination of supporting both short term urgent requirements and building the capabilities and, importantly, the ability to sustain those capabilities to include air defense in the long term.

(41:33)
Key to all of that is working very closely with industry not only in the United States but around the world to look at how we can partner in terms of our defense industrial bases to be able to ensure that Ukraine has what it needs in terms of air defense, but also other very important capabilities, armor, information, technology, drones, all those kinds of things. And of course, the Air Force Capability Coalition.

(42:04)
So going forward, that will continue to be the focus. But as I highlighted as well, when you’re dealing with air defense, you’re talking about an integrated air defense that can look not only at protecting close in, but you’ve got those broader threat rings in terms of medium and long range. You’re also protecting strategic centers of gravity. And I won’t go over those from the podium here, but broadly speaking, population centers, energy infrastructure, defense capabilities and things like that. All that’s being looked at holistically with our allies and partners and Ukraine to help them as we go forward.

When it comes to CENTCOM, can you talk about how that’s a variable to your decisions on what to-

Yeah, so, as far as CENTCOM goes and I wouldn’t necessarily say it’s just CENTCOM, but that is obviously a very important and critical theater. But we, the Department of Defense look holistically when it comes to requirements throughout the world. And particularly from a global integration standpoint of looking at how what we’re doing in one theater affects another theater and what those requirements are going to be. And that of course all goes into the National Defense Strategy and budgeting and ensuring that we have the capabilities where we need them when we need them to support those requirements.

(43:25)
And so air defense within the CENTCOM AOR is no different. We do have the ability to surge capabilities should we need to do that. But again, we’re always going to be looking at how we prioritize resources and how we make sure we have what we need, where we need it, so.

Quickly on the West Bank, Secretary Blinken said that the IDF’s rules of engagement must change after they likely killed an American who was protesting. The State Department is not the experts of the rules of engagement, you guys are, so what assessments and what advice recommendations are you providing to the State Department for that guidance?

(44:03)
And two, is this an opportunity for you guys to put meat on the bone on actions and consequences when it comes to what aid you’re providing? Is this an opportunity for you to be a little bit more emphatic and forceful with the Israelis about what they receive and how they conduct themselves?

Yeah, well, in terms of the Israelis, I mean, from the very early days, I mean, I’d point you back to Secretary Austin’s comments in Tel Aviv shortly after October 7th. He has highlighted the importance of taking care of civilian harm mitigation, making sure that that’s a critical element in planning and operations. And he’s continued to have that conversation with his Israeli counterpart going forward.

(44:47)
As far as the West Bank, again as I mentioned earlier, the secretary has spoken to Minister Gallant about the importance of taking civilian safety into account, as well as making sure that actions being taken don’t inflame tensions and result in a wider conflict. And so again, they’ll continue to stay focused on that.

(45:08)
I would gently push back a little bit. I think State Department does have an understanding of international humanitarian law and rules of engagement writ large. And as you know, they assess accusations of violations of international humanitarian law. And I know those assessments are ongoing. In the meantime, we are going to continue to encourage and expect our Israeli counterparts to take civilian safety into account.

(45:38)
Okay, I’ve got time for just a few more. Yes, ma’am.

Yeah. Can you clarify the call between INDOPACOM commander and the southern theater commander? Was this part of a new framework or is it one of the three that two of them have been resumed and one has not? Is it a new framework or can you just clarify that?

I’m not sure I understand what you mean, but it was a result of, as I highlighted, the discussion between President Biden and President Xi in terms of re-initiating those contacts, one of which was between the Chinese theater commanders PRC theater commanders and the Commander of INDOPACOM.

(46:17)
As you know, Secretary Austin has also engaged with his counterpart. And we hope to see those conversations continue. Thank you.

(46:25)
I’ll go to you, you, and then we’ll close it out with Heather. Yes, sir.

Okay. Thank you, general. Two quick questions on Middle East. Do you have an update on the current discussions with Iraqi partners, the negotiations that are discussed by the High Military Commission?

Again, no announcements to make. We’ll keep you updated.

And you know the US has military presence in Syria. Will their role continue as long as ISIS remains as a threat or that depends on the presence of Russians in Syria?

Well, as it pertains to the global coalition and Operation Inherent Resolve, again that’s the discussions that have been happening in terms of the transition from that global coalition to a US-Iraq bilateral security cooperation. So certainly as it pertains because it’s part of the Defeat ISIS mission, Syria would certainly be a part of that discussion. But again, I just don’t have anything to announce right now. Jared?

How many Iranian SRBMs to Russia, beyond the threat to Ukraine, I believe Secretary Blinken and I think you alluded to it earlier as well said that this poses a threat to quote “all of Europe” because this provision allows Russia to dedicate longer range BMs to other targets. I’m wondering, I mean the US is known for months that Iran’s government was considering sending these. I wonder if you could elaborate on any steps that DOD has taken with its allies to sort of shore up European defense in case this has happened?

Well, I mean as a member of NATO, I mean, where to start? We’ve done lots of things in terms of relocating or deploying additional forces into the European AOR. We conduct multiple exercises with our NATO partners. And the secretary is regularly engaging with NATO defense ministers to talk about what we can do to work together to ensure our collective security as it relates to Europe. Never mind the fact that the UDCG also provides a forum where they can talk about these kinds of things. Thanks.

And if I could just follow up? You mentioned the Russian government sharing technology with regards to nuclear programs with Iran. Is this technology that could potentially be involved in weaponization initiatives? Does it potentially shorten Iran’s weaponization breakout time?

Yeah, I just don’t … I’m not going to be able to provide any more details on that. Thanks. All right, last question. We’ll go to Heather, USNI.

Thanks so much. Two questions. First, can you give an update on the tankers that the Houthis hit? And then second, during Admiral Paparo discussions, did anything come up about the recent actions between the Chinese Coast Guard and the Philippines over Sabina Shoal?

Yeah, thanks, Heather. I’m assuming you’re referring to the Delta Sounion, to my knowledge still on fire. It appears that the internal oil tanks so far are secure. I think I had mentioned earlier that we had indications of oil leak. So, it would appear that that was probably from like the engine room or some type of chemical leak.

(49:40)
But clearly, that presents the potential for a significant environmental disaster. And I know that there are third parties that are looking at how to salvage that and get the oil tanker out of there. But again, just an indication of the kinds of malign activity that we’re seeing from the Iranian backed Houthis.

(50:03)
And then, I’m sorry, your last question was?

During Admiral Paparo’s call, did anything come up about the Chinese Coast Guard in the Philippines over Sabina Shoal?

Yeah, I’m just not going to have anything more to provide beyond what I had in my topper. And I would refer you to the readout from INDOPACOM.

(50:22)
All right, thanks very much everybody. Appreciate it.