Chairman Comer (07:26): Director Cheatle (02:08:00):
This hearing of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability will come to order. I want to welcome everyone here today, and I know we also want to welcome Speaker Johnson who is also in attendance today. Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any time. I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening statement. But first, without objection, Representative Mills of Florida and Representative Miller of Ohio are waived onto the Committee for the purpose of questioning the witness at today's hearing. Without objection to order. (08:03) Good morning. Today's hearing is for the American people who are seeking answers about the attempted assassination of President Trump. A little over a week ago, Americans watched in horror as a shooter attempted to assassinate President Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. The gunman nearly succeeded. The bullet that struck President Trump's head was less than an inch from taking his life. President Trump survived but one rally goer, Corey Comparatore, tragically did not. Two others were seriously injured. It was a horrifying moment in American history. The horror was exceeded only by the bravery of the law enforcement agents who threw themselves in harm's way when shots were fired, the bravery of a crowd unwavering in its refusal to panic and the bravery of a bloody President Trump refusing to run. While we give overwhelming thanks to the individual Secret Service agents who did their jobs under immense pressure, this tragedy was preventable. The Secret Services protective mission is to protect US and visiting world leaders and safeguard US elections through protection of candidates and nominees. The Secret Service has a zero fail mission. But it failed on July 13th and in the days leading up to the rally. The Secret Service has thousands of employees and a significant budget, but it has now become the face of incompetence. The committee has a long track record of providing oversight of the Secret Service. Our predecessors, both Jason Chaffetz and Elijah Cummings, among others, worked together to issue warnings and recommendations to address obvious shortcomings in the agency's makeup and operations. (09:59) Unfortunately, those warnings and recommendations have gone unheeded. A former president and current candidate for president was shot in the head by a sniper within 500 feet of the podium. This is unacceptable. And we are concerned the Secret Service lacks the proper management to keep protectees safe from bad actors. (10:23) Americans demand answers, but they have not been getting them from the Secret Service. We are instead learning about new facts about the events surrounding the attempted assassination every day from whistleblowers and leaks. Americans demand accountability, but no one is yet to be fired for this historic failure. Today's witness, Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle, is here under subpoena to answer questions about how the agency failed President Trump and the victims who attended the rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. It is my firm belief, Director Cheatle, that you should resign. However, in complete defiance, Director Cheatle has maintained she will not tender her resignation. Therefore, she will answer questions today from members of this committee seeking to provide clarity to the American people about how these events were allowed to transpire. We will ask these questions, because the Secret Service and its parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security, have been unwilling to provide answers to the American people. DHS has sought to push this hearing to a different time, Secret Service has suggested the hearing occur without media presence, and both agencies have provided only shallow explanations to Congress about what happened on July 13th. Indeed, DHS and Secret Service's, lack of communication with the Oversight Committee required me to issue a subpoena compelling Director Cheatle to attend today, and still DHS requested more time to prepare. It shouldn't take this much time or preparation, Director Cheatle, to tell the truth and to be transparent with the American people. I'm thankful to the Ranking Member, Mr. Raskin, for joining me and insisting that Director Cheatle appear today. God knows the Ranking Member and I disagree on many things, but that does not matter today. The safety of Secret Service protectees is not based on their political affiliation, and the bottom line is that under Director Cheatle's leadership, we question whether anyone is safe, not President Biden, not the First Lady, not the White House, and certainly not the presidential candidates. (12:40) The July 13th assassination attempt is one of the darkest days in American political history. It represents the ugliest parts of what American politics has become, hatred of each other, and a dangerous turn to extremism. Before we are Republicans or Democrats, we are Americans. If we place our political affiliations above our duty and love of country, we cannot maintain a country. We must ensure our republic is strong. And our republic cannot be strong when our leadership, our elections, our institutions and our candidates are threatened by extremism and violence. (13:19) Today, Director Cheatle will answer questions about why she deserves to continue to play a critical role in preserving this country's safety, and at the very least, what led to the catastrophic deadly events on July 13th in Butler, Pennsylvania. Again, I do not believe Director Cheatle deserves to maintain her position as head of the Secret Service, but members of the America and the American people will make their own decisions based on her answers today. I urge Director Cheatle to be transparent and forthcoming in her testimony today, Americans deserve no less. We have a duty to find out how this happened and to ensure it never happens again. I now yield to Ranking Member Raskin for his opening statement.
Ranking Member Raskin (14:03): Thank you kindly, Chairman Comer. Elijah Cummings, whose beautiful visage looks down upon us, taught us that the way to find common ground in a crisis is to look for the higher ground. And last week Chairman Comer and I came together to reach for that higher ground. We made a joint statement condemning the mass shooting and assassination attempt against former President Trump as a grave assault on our democracy. As we wrote, "We are united in condemning all political violence." I join the good Chairman in expressing condolences to the family of Corey Comparatore and in sending healing wishes to the wounded victims also of this atrocious act of violence. (14:45) Some are calling it a miracle that former President Trump escaped this AR-15 attack, unlike so many thousands of our fellow citizens who have been killed or seriously wounded in other AR-15 shootings. Whether this miracle is of divine provenance or of an adventitious nature will be up to each of us to ponder. But our job in Congress is not simply to marvel at miracles or count on good luck, but to act as public policy legislators to do whatever we can to prevent future political violence, attempted assassinations and mass shootings. (15:21) The Chairman and I are thus determined to get to the bottom of the stunning security failures that enabled this 20-year-old lone gunman who borrowed his father's AR-15 to perpetrate a mass shooting and assassination attempt at an event protected by the Secret Service as well as state and local police. We'll ask hard questions of Director Cheatle today in order to identify and understand the shocking security failures that occurred and to help transform the operations of the Secret Service to prevent anything like this from happening again. (15:54) But we can't let ourselves off the hook either, dear colleagues, what happened in Butler, Pennsylvania was a double failure. The failure by the Secret Service to properly protect former President Trump and the failure of Congress to properly protect our people from criminal gun violence. We must therefore also ask hard questions about whether our laws are making it too easy for potential assassins to obtain firearms generally, and the AR-15 specifically. (16:21) Mr. Comparatore, former President Trump and the other rally attendees wounded Butler are now members of a club no one wants to belong to, the thousands of people who have fallen victim to mass shootings. Last year we had 655 mass shootings in America, defined as four or more people being shot or killed in a single event, not including the shooter. 712 people died and nearly 2,700 people were wounded in these attacks in 2023. (16:49) Mass shootings are commonplace. They happen at political rallies and constituent meetings, in our elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools, in churches, synagogues, and mosques, and movie theaters, and parades, in nightclubs, and grocery stores, in concerts and on street corners. Here are the worst mass shootings in the last 11 or 12 years. The list is a grim reminder of the horrific damage and death wrought by assault weapons, and the AR-15 in particular that have taken the lives of our children, parents, colleagues, and neighbors. This is a very partial list. (17:27) Mass shootings have become so frequent that we don't even hear about them anymore. Since the mass shooting in Butler, there have already been at least 10 additional mass shootings in America, two of which took place the same day that former President Trump was targeted. One of the mass shootings on that violent Saturday, July 13th happened at 11:00 PM at a nightclub in Birmingham, Alabama where four people were shot dead and 10 others wounded. This means amazingly that the Butler attack was not even the deadliest mass shooting to happen in America on that day. (18:05) A weapon that can be used to commit a mass shooting at an event under the full protection of the Secret Service together with dozens of state and local police is obviously an intolerable threat to the rest of us who do not receive such protection, and obviously does not belong in our communities. It's time to pass universal background checks and build on this administration's work to ensure that we permanently close the loopholes in the Brady Law for gun show purchases, online purchases, and private sales to prevent those weapons from getting into the hands of people we know to be a threat to others. (18:40) What happened in Butler shows why even closing these loopholes however, will not keep assault weapons out of the hands of potential assassins and mass murderers. Under federal law and in the vast majority of states, even young people not old enough to buy a beer legally can legally purchase and own the AR-15 and carry it in public. The shooter in Butler used his father's AR-15. We have to find the courage and resolve to pass a ban on the AR-15 and other assault weapons. A ban is broad support. Even the New York Post loudly endorsed such a ban in 2019. (19:15) We have passed an assault weapons ban before. Republicans and Democrats together passed it in 1994. Alas, in 2004, we allowed the ban to expire. We know this weapons ban worked. One study found that in the decade that followed the ban's lapse, mass shootings went back up 183% and deaths from mass shootings went up 239%. But even as we change the Secret Service and act to ban weapons of war like the AR-15, we still will have fallen short of our duty if we fail to denounce every instance of politically motivated violence in whatever form it takes. (19:53) Republicans and Democrats again have come together to denounce this assassination attempt just as we did the violent attempts on the lives of our colleagues, Representative Stephen Scalise and Representative Gabby Giffords, and on Paul Pelosi, the husband of Speaker Nancy Pelosi who was attacked and brutalized in his home. And in the immediate aftermath of the January 6th mass violence waged against Congress and the Vice President and the constitutional transfer of power, Democrats and Republicans alike, including Senator McConnell, Chairman Comer, and other colleagues, all denounced this violent assault on our democracy that wounded approximately 140 officers from the US Capitol Police and the Metropolitan Police Department, and I commend them for acting to denounce that attack just as Democrats move swiftly to denounce the attack on Congressman Scalise. (20:48) Political scientists tell us that authoritarian attacks on democratic institutions begin with political parties refusing to disavow or openly embracing political violence. We have to reject that on a strong bipartisan basis, as Chairman Comer and I have done, even as we ensure our Secret Service is up to its vital task of protecting presidents and candidates, and as we work to ensure that America, the streets of our country are free from the violence of weapons of war. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back to you.
Chairman Comer (21:18): Thank you. Gentleman yields back. Today we are joined by Kimberly Cheatle, who was sworn into office on September 17th, 2022 as the Director of the United States Secret Service. Prior to her appointment, Director Cheatle was senior director of global security at PepsiCo. Before her role at Pepsi, she served 27 years in the Secret Service. Pursuant to Committee Rule 9G, the witness will please stand and raise her right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Let the record show that the witness answered in the affirmative. Thank you. We certainly appreciate you being here today and look forward to your testimony. We normally limit testimony opening statement to five minutes, but take all the time that you need, obviously the rules that we will abide by when you're finished with your statement, we will then turn to questions. Each member will have five minutes. And just a note to the members, I'm going to strictly adhere to the five minutes. Once five minutes is up, I will hit the gavel. If the Director is in the process of answering a question, we'll certainly let her finish her answers and then we'll move on. We're going to have about 100% attendance here today plus a few additional add-ons, so this will be a very lengthy hearing and we want to make sure every member gets their five minutes uninterrupted to be able to ask these important questions in this very bipartisan hearing today. I now recognize Director Cheatle for your opening statement.
Director Kimberly Cheatle (23:04): Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Comer, Ranking Member Raskin and distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Kimberly Cheatle and I'm the director of the United States Secret Service. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. The assassination attempt of former President Donald Trump on July 13th is the most significant operational failure of the Secret Service in decades, and I am keeping him and his family and my thoughts. I would like to offer my sincerest condolences to the family of Corey Comparatore, a former fire chief and a hero who was killed in this senseless shooting. I would also like to acknowledge those who were injured in Butler, David Dutch and James Copenhaven, and I wish them a speedy recovery. I would be remiss if I did not also extend my condolences on the passing of your colleague, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee. Ms. Jackson Lee was always engaged in the oversight of the Secret Service, and her passing is a great loss to this body. (24:03) The Secret Service's solemn mission is to protect our nation's leaders. On July 13th, we failed. As a Director of the United States Secret Service, I take full responsibility for any security lapse of our agency. We are fully cooperating with ongoing investigations. We must learn what happened, and I will move heaven and earth to ensure that an incident like July 13th does not happen again. (24:32) Let me state unequivocally, nothing I have said should be interpreted to place blame for this failure on our federal, state, or local law enforcement partners who supported the Secret Service in Butler. We could not do our job without them. We rely on the relationships built over years of working together to secure events and conduct investigations. Our agents, officers and support personnel understand that every day we are expected to sacrifice our lives to execute a no fail mission. As witnessed on July 13th, our special agents shielded former President Trump with their own bodies on stage while shots were being fired, selflessly willing to make the ultimate sacrifice without hesitation. (25:19) I am proud beyond words of the actions taken by the former president's detail, the counter sniper team who neutralized the gunman and the tactical team who was prepared to act. I will be transparent as possible when I speak with you, understanding though at times that I may be limited in providing a thorough response in this open setting due to associated risks with sharing highly sensitive protective methodologies. I do not want to inadvertently provide you today with inaccurate information. (25:51) Since January 1st, 2024, the Secret Service has successfully secured over 7,500 sites. Every protective advance comes with its own set of challenges and requires a customized mitigation strategy, including specific assets. Security plans are multi-layered, providing 360 degrees of protection. These layers include personnel, technical and tactical assets, which are our force multiplier for our protective posture. During every advance, we attempt to strike a balance between enabling the protectee to be visible and our protective requirements to be secure. (26:29) I know this because I have spent 29 years in this agency. I came up through the ranks. I've secured events for every president since President Clinton, supervised on Vice President Cheney's detail, led our training center, oversaw all of the investigations and protective visits in the state of Georgia, supervised on Vice President Biden's detail, and the agency's entire protective mission during the Trump administration. The comprehensive advance process involves collaborative planning between our Secret Service, the protectee's staff, local law enforcement partners. And the level of security provided for the former president increased well before the campaign and has been steadily increasing as threats evolve. (27:14) The security plan included a full assessment of the Butler Farm showgrounds to identify security vulnerabilities and craft a security plan for the protectee, attendees and the public. Immediately following the assassination attempt, I directed the activation of my crisis center, I assembled my executive team to begin surging more protective resources to the former president, and to ensure the wellness of our people post-incident, all while securing an active crime scene. I immediately ordered a reevaluation of the Republican National Convention security plan, and I increased the security posture in the National Capital Region for all permanent protectees and sites. At the same time, I initiated a mission assurance investigation within our agency. (27:58) I have instructed my team that all necessary resources will be dedicated to investigating these manners. We will not rest until we have explored every option and we will leave no stone unturned. But I want to be clear, I am not waiting for these investigations to be completed prior to making changes. Over the past two weeks, we successfully led the planning and execution of the 75th NATO Summit and the Republican National Convention. Over the next few months, we will implement security plans for the Democratic National Convention, the United Nations General Assembly, and have already begun planning and coordinating the 2025 inauguration. It is now more important than ever for the men and women of the Secret Service to remain resilient and to focus on what is necessary to carry out our critical mission. (28:44) Our agency needs to be adequately resourced in order to serve our current mission requirements and anticipate future requirements. The Secret Service currently protects 36 individuals on a daily basis, as well as world leaders who visit the United States, like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who arrived in Washington, D.C. today. The coming years will bring an unprecedented heavy protection tempo. I have no doubt that the processes that I have implemented during my tenure as director, in addition to my nearly 30 years of experience in this agency, have positioned the Secret Service to be stronger. Our mission is not political. It is literally a matter of life and death, and the tragic events on July 13th remind us of that. I have full confidence in the men and women of the Secret Service. They're worthy of our support in executing our protective mission. I will now answer any questions that the committee may have.
Chairman Comer (29:39): Thank you very much, Director Cheatle. We'll now our five minutes questions, and I will begin. Just for the record, the Secret Service has an annual budget of around $3.1 billion, and I believe around 8,000 employees. Is that correct?
Director Kimberly Cheatle (29:55): Yes, sir.
Chairman Comer (29:57): Obviously, there were many security failures on the day of the attempted assassination and leading up to that day. Let's start with the building that the shooter used to shoot President Trump from. At any point Saturday, did the Secret Service have an agent on top of that roof?
Director Kimberly Cheatle (30:14): Sir, I'm sure as you can imagine that we are just nine days out from this incident and there's still an ongoing investigation, and so I want to make sure that any information that we are providing to you is factual.
Chairman Comer (30:25): So you can't. Okay. Can you answer why the Secret Service didn't place a single agent on the roof?
Director Kimberly Cheatle (30:33): We are still looking into the advanced process and the decisions that were made.
Chairman Comer (30:37): All right. All right. Okay. Okay. Wasn't that building within the perimeter that should be secured? Do we agree with that?
Director Kimberly Cheatle (30:46): The building was outside of the perimeter on the day of the visit, but again, that is one of the things that during the investigation we want to take a look at and determine whether or not other decisions should have been made.
Chairman Comer (30:58): One of the things that you said, I believe in an interview, that there wasn't an agent on the roof because it was a sloped roof. Is that normal, and do you fear that that immediately creates an opportunity for future would be assassins to look for a slanted roof? I mean, this is a huge question that every American has. Why wasn't a Secret Service agent on the roof? And there have been reports that agents were supposed to be on the roof, but it was hot that day and they didn't want to be on the roof. Can you answer any of those questions, Director?
Director Kimberly Cheatle (31:30): Sir, I appreciate you asking me that question, Chairman. I should have been more clear in my answer when I spoke about where we place personnel in that interview. What I can tell you is that there was a plan in place to provide overwatch, and we are still looking into responsibilities and who was going to provide overwatch. But the Secret Service in general, not speaking specifically to this incident, when we are providing overwatch, whether that be through counter snipers or other technology, prefer to have
Director Cheatle (32:00): Of sterile rooftops.
Chairman Comer (32:01): Did the Secret Service use any drones for surveillance that day?
Director Cheatle (32:06): So again, I'm not going to get into specifics of that day in itself, but there are times during a security plan that the Secret Service does deploy an asset like a drone.
Chairman Comer (32:15): There were reports that the shooter used a drone just a few hours before the rally start time. Is that accurate?
Director Cheatle (32:23): I have heard those same reports, and again, am waiting for the final report.
Chairman Comer (32:28): If you can't answer the question, that's your answer, but can you answer this. Do you know? Do you know? I'm not asking yes or no, but do you know if the shooter used a drone before the shooting?
Director Cheatle (32:44): That information has been passed to us from the FBI.
Chairman Comer (32:48): How many Secret Service agents were assigned to President Trump on the day of the rally?
Director Cheatle (32:53): Again, I'm not going to get into the specifics of the numbers of personnel that we had there, but we feel that there was a sufficient number of agents assigned.
Chairman Comer (33:01): There are reports that several agents assigned to the rally on July 13th were temporary agents, agents not normally assigned to President Trump, is that accurate?
Director Cheatle (33:12): What I can tell you is that the agents that were assigned to former President Trump are Secret Service agents that provide close protection to him, and that was what was actual on that day.
Chairman Comer (33:23): How many temporary agents were there that day?
Director Cheatle (33:27): Quite frequently, sir, during campaign events, the Secret Service utilizes agents from HSI or the Department of Homeland Security.
Chairman Comer (33:35): You don't know how many...
Director Cheatle (33:37): Supplement our plan.
Chairman Comer (33:38): Have the investigators reconstructed the shooters precise movements over the past days, weeks, and months?
Director Cheatle (33:46): So, again...
Chairman Comer (33:48): We need to have confidence that if the FBI is leading this investigation, that they're leading a credible investigation because there's some of us sitting up here today that don't have a lot of confidence in the FBI. So I will repeat the question. Have the investigators reconstructed the shooters precise moments over the past days, weeks, and months?
Director Cheatle (34:08): I understand your question, chairman, and I share your concerns about wanting to make sure that we have factual information. The FBI is conducting a criminal investigation. The Secret Service is conducting an internal investigation. There are a number of OIG investigations and there is the external investigation the president...
Chairman Comer (34:25): Last question for me. Before July 13th, had the Trump detail requested additional resources?
Director Cheatle (34:33): What I can tell you is that for the event on July 13th, the assets that were requested for that day were given.
Chairman Comer (34:44): Okay. My time has expired. Chair now recognizes his ranking member asking for five minutes.
Ranking Member Raskin (34:48): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's been reported that before former President Trump got up on the stage at around six P.M. on Saturday, July 13th, that the local police had identified and even photographed a man who was acting suspiciously, and this man who turned out to be the gunman had been flagged as a potential threat. Is that accurate?
Director Cheatle (35:12): What I can say is that the individual was identified as suspicious.
Ranking Member Raskin (35:18): So he was known to be suspicious before former President Trump took the stage.
Director Cheatle (35:25): That is the information I have received.
Ranking Member Raskin (35:27): Why was he allowed to take the stage with a suspicious person having been identified in the crowd?
Director Cheatle (35:34): So I appreciate the question and I'd like to make two points. If the detail had been passed information that there was a threat, the detail would never have brought the former president out onto stage. That is what we do and that is who we are. We are charged with protecting all of our protectees.
Ranking Member Raskin (35:52): So you distinguish between someone who is suspicious and someone who's threatening. Is that right?
Director Cheatle (35:57): We do. There are a number of times at protective events where suspicious people are identified, and those individuals have to be investigated and determined what is it that identifies that person as suspicious.
Ranking Member Raskin (36:10): So did you deny a request for additional resources that had been made by the Trump campaign?
Director Cheatle (36:17): There were no assets denied for that event in Butler on the 13th.
Ranking Member Raskin (36:24): I see. So you're saying there were requests made for additional assistance for other specific events rather than for the campaign as a whole. Is that right?
Director Cheatle (36:33): I'm sorry, I'm not understanding.
Ranking Member Raskin (36:34): Well, you seem to say that there were not additional resources requested for that event. And forgive me for being unfamiliar with this, is it requested event by event or is it requested just in general for the campaign?
Director Cheatle (36:50): So if I can explain the advanced process. When an event or a venue is identified by, in this case, campaign staff, then the campaign staff works together with Secret Service agents who go out and conduct an advance. Generally that is a five-day time period where those discussions are had about what the perimeter is going to look like, what the size of the event is, what the venue is, and then from there there is a request made to mitigate potential risk and threat. And I'm saying that on that day the requests that were pushed forward were granted.
Ranking Member Raskin (37:26): So the Secret Service did not know that the gunman actually had a weapon before President Trump was allowed to get up on the stage?
Director Cheatle (37:33): To the best of our knowledge and the facts that we have at this point, that is correct.
Ranking Member Raskin (37:39): Can you answer this question, which I think is on the mind of most Americans thinking about this? How can a twenty-year-old with his father's AR-15 assault weapon climb onto a roof with a direct 150 yard line of sight to the speaker's podium without the Secret Service or local police stopping him?
Director Cheatle (37:59): So again, sir, I will say we are nine days out from this event and I would like to know those answers as well, which is why we are going through these investigations to be able to determine that fully.
Ranking Member Raskin (38:11): Okay. It's been reported that the shooter was not carrying a driver's license or any form of identification. They had no idea who he was, but then he was quickly identified, I think, within 30 minutes by using the serial number on the AR-15 under a tracing system that is now controversial. Some people say we should get rid of it, some people want to keep it, but is that right that the serial number was the key information which led to the identification of the shooter?
Director Cheatle (38:46): That is my understanding, sir. Yes.
Ranking Member Raskin (38:48): Okay. If an American citizen were just to stop you and say, "Director Cheatle, we support your work to the tune of billions of dollars and thousands and thousands of employees, what went wrong?" What would you say?
Director Cheatle (39:07): Again, knowing that we're nine days out, I would say, as I have said from the very outset, I accept responsibility for this tragedy. We are going to look into how this happened and we are going to take corrective action to ensure that it never happens again.
Ranking Member Raskin (39:23): Well, I appreciate that and I hope you'll act with vigor and focus and intensity and it seems you understand the gravity and solemnity of this to the American people. Millions and millions of Americans don't feel safe with all the AR-15s out there, we thought at least the president of the United States or a former president of the United States would be safe, but now that's not even clear. Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.
Chairman Comer (39:45): Gentlemen yields back. Chair now recognizes Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Mr. Jordan from Ohio.
Mr Jordan (39:50): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Director, were you guessing or lying? The day after President Trump is shot, Secret Service spokesman, Anthony Guglielmi, said, "The assertion that a member of the former president's security team requested additional security resources that the US Secret Service or the Department of Homeland Security rebuffed is absolutely false." The next day, secretary Mallorca said, "That is an unequivocally false assertion. We had not received any requests for additional security measures that were rebuffed." But five days later, the Washington Post said this, "Top officials repeatedly rejected requests from Donald Trump's security detail for more personnel." The next day the New York Times said this, "Mr. Guglielmi acknowledged that the Secret Service had turned down some requests for additional federal security assets for Mr. Trump's detail." So which is it? Because both statements can't be true. Were you guessing or lying when you said you didn't turn down requests from President Trump's detail?
Director Cheatle (40:51): Neither, sir. And I appreciate the question.
Mr Jordan (40:54): Well, what were you doing? Because those statements don't jive.
Director Cheatle (40:58): So what I can tell you is that for the events in Butler, there were no requests that were denied. As far as requests...
Mr Jordan (41:06): Well, maybe they got tired of asking. Maybe you turned them down so darn much, they said not worth asking. How many times did you turn them down ahead of that?
Director Cheatle (41:15): I think that it is important to distinguish between what some people may view as a denial of an asset or a request was not...
Mr Jordan (41:23): Was Mr. Guglielmi your spokesperson? He said he acknowledged the Secret Service had turned down some requests. I'm asking how many?
Director Cheatle (41:32): A denial of a request does not equal a vulnerability.
Mr Jordan (41:36): Well, tell me what it is.
Director Cheatle (41:37): There are a number of ways that threats and risks can be mitigated with a number of different assets, whether that be through personnel, whether that be through technology or other resources.
Mr Jordan (41:51): Well, tell the committee which it was. They asked for additional help in some form or another, you told them no. How many times did you tell them no and what'd you tell them no to?
Director Cheatle (42:02): Again, I cannot speak to specific incidents, but I can tell you in general terms the Secret Service is judicious with their resources based on...
Mr Jordan (42:12): What does some requests mean? How many times? Some indicate requests is plural. So more than once they ask for additional help and you turned them down. What they ask for and how many times you turn them down? Pretty basic questions.
Director Cheatle (42:24): So again, without having all of the details in front of me, sir, what I can tell you is that there are times...
Mr Jordan (42:29): You didn't get briefed on how many times you turned down the Trump detail when they asked for additional help?
Director Cheatle (42:34): I'm sorry...
Mr Jordan (42:34): You didn't get briefed on that before you came to this hearing knowing you were going to get asked that question?
Director Cheatle (42:39): What I can tell you is that in generic terms, when details make a request, there are times that there are alternate ways to cover off on that threat or that risk.
Mr Jordan (42:50): But that's not what he said. He said they were denied certain requests. Some requests. This is your spokesperson, not me talking. This is the Secret Service talking. And what it changed from absolutely false, unequivocally false to, "Oh, by the way, there were some times where we didn't give them what they wanted." That's a huge change in five days, and the fact that you can't answer how many times you did that, that's pretty darn frustrating not just for me but for the country.
Director Cheatle (43:16): I hear your frustration.
Mr Jordan (43:18): Let me ask you this. Were any of those requests denied to President Trump's detail after you knew about the Iranian threat?
Director Cheatle (43:25): What I can tell you, again, I don't know the specifics, is that there are times when we can fill a request. It doesn't necessarily have to be with a Secret Service asset or resource, we can fill that request with locally available assets.
Mr Jordan (43:41): You spoke to anyone at the White House since July 13th?
Director Cheatle (43:44): Yes, I have.
Mr Jordan (43:45): Who'd you talk to?
Director Cheatle (43:46): I have briefed the president and the vice president.
Mr Jordan (43:49): Talked to the First Lady?
Director Cheatle (43:51): No, I have not.
Mr Jordan (43:51): Talked to the White House staff? Anyone in the White House communications?
Director Cheatle (43:55): No, I have not.
Mr Jordan (43:56): Have you talked to the counter sniper who took the shot that took out the bad guy?
Director Cheatle (44:00): Yes, I have.
Mr Jordan (44:01): And can you tell us about that conversation?
Director Cheatle (44:04): I would not want to reveal conversations that I've had with my employees.
Mr Jordan (44:07): But that's exactly the kind of information the American people want to know, American people who pay your salary.
Director Cheatle (44:12): I understand. This is an ongoing investigation and I...
Mr Jordan (44:14): Who's all doing the investigating at Secret Service? I know the Inspector General, but is there also an internal investigation in addition to the Inspector General?
Director Cheatle (44:21): We are conducting a mission assurance investigation internally. Yes.
Mr Jordan (44:26): You know what it looks like, director? It looks like you won't answer some pretty basic questions. It looks like you got a 9% raise and you cut corners when it came to protecting one of the most important individuals, the most well-known individuals on the planet, a former president, likely the guy who's going to be the next president. Looks like you guys were cutting corners. That's what it looks like to me. Is that true?
Director Cheatle (44:42): I am here today because I want to answer questions, but I also want to be cautious.
Mr Jordan (44:47): You might want to, but I don't think you've answered one question from the chairman, the ranking member or me. We got a lot of other people ask and we'll see if your record improves, but right now you haven't answered, I don't think, any questions. I yield back.
Chairman Comer (44:59): Gentlemen yields back. Chair now recognizes Ms. Norton from Washington, D.C.
Ms Norton (45:04): Thank you, Mr Chairman. In the summer of 1963 as a law student, I traveled to the South to work in the Civil Rights Movement. When I arrived in Jackson Mississippi, I was met by a civil rights activists who showed me around town and tried to convince me to work in Jackson that summer. I recall talking with him and his wife about the raw atmosphere in Jackson. Later that day, he took me to the bus station for my trip to my assignment. That night, he was assassinated outside his home. His name was Medgar Evers. I condemn the political violence. It is a threat to democracy. I want to discuss one of the roots of political violence, guns. For years, Republicans, including a member of this committee, have introduced legislation and amendments to repeal or block the District of Columbia Gun Violence protection laws, including its bans on assault weapons and large capacity magazines. (46:09) The shooter at the Trump rally used the mass shooters gun of choice, an assault weapon, specifically an AR-15 style rifle, and presumably a large capacity magazine, which is defined in DC as a magazine that can hold more than 10 bullets. Under current DC law, DC does not recognize concealed carry permits issued by other jurisdictions, but it does issue concealed carry permits to both residents and non-residents. However, DC imposes a number of requirements on concealed carry applicants, including suitability, such as not having exhibited a propensity for violence or instability. Moreover, DC residents restricts where the guns can be carried, such as a political demonstration near the White House and Naval Observatory or near people under Secret Service Protection provided the permit holder has been given notice. This week, the house is expected to consider the fiscal year 2025 financial services and general government appropriations bill. (47:39) This Republican drafted bill would allow an individual with a permit to carry a concealed handgun issued by a state or territory to carry a concealed handgun in DC regardless of that jurisdiction's permit requirements. A Republican has filed an amendment to that provision to allow such an individual to carry a magazine of any size with that handgun. In short, the pending bill and amendment would allow any person with a carry permit issued by another jurisdiction to carry a concealed handgun with a magazine of any size in any location in the district of Columbia. The Secret Service is responsible for protecting a large number of people and facilities in DC. Director Cheatle, would secret Service protectees in DC be safer or less safe if people who have exhibited a propensity for violence or instability could carry a concealed handgun in DC?
Director Cheatle (49:05): I think being a secret service agent and an officer or a law enforcement officer in any state is difficult. They're required to make decisions and snap judgments in the blink of an eye, and I think that the officers and the agents that work here in the DC area do a great job of monitoring the public and reacting to threats as appropriate when they arise.
Ms Norton (49:33): Would Secret Service protectees in DC be safer or less safe if people in DC could carry concealed handguns with large capacity magazines?
Director Cheatle (49:48): I think, ma'am, that we work in parameters where we travel around North America and the rules on open carry and concealed carry are different from state to state, and that is part of what the Secret Service takes into account when we develop a security plan. Obviously anyone that comes into one of our protective sites, we would establish magnetometer support, metal detectors that personnel would have to process through eliminating that potential.
Ms Norton (50:16): Would Secret Service protectees in D.C be safer or less safe if more people could carry handguns in D.C?
Director Cheatle (50:26): I think, again, as I stated ma'am, we want to make sure that we provide a safe environment for all of our protectees and whatever measures we would need to put in place for a secure site, we would do so.
Ms Norton (50:38): I yield back.
Chairman Comer (50:39): Gentle lady's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Mr. Turner from Ohio.
Turner (50:45): Director Cheatle, your opening statement indicates that the Secret Service constructed a security plan for the site in Pennsylvania. I'm assuming that security plan would also include the security footprint for the site, but it also would be based upon a threat assessment for the risk threats associated with Donald Trump and the crowd in attendance. Would it not include a threat assessment?
Director Cheatle (51:05): Yes, it would.
Turner (51:06): So that threat assessment, as we know, basically would've started with, there's a generalized threat against Donald Trump because he's a presidential candidate, then it would've gone to, he's a former president and he gets security coverage just as Bush, Clinton, Carter and Obama do, and then you also have the heightened political environment. Even for those, it's clear that the security footprint, that the threat assessment was insufficient, which permitted that a twenty-year-old to actually enter with a weapon and shoot Donald Trump. But I want to ask you about two other aspects of the threat assessment. It is known and public that Iran is a threat risk for Donald Trump, they're a threat risk for John Bolton, former Secretary of State Pompeo and Donald Trump because they have indicated they want to assassinate them as a result of retaliation for the killing of Soleimani. And for Iran, a generalized threat, they're targeting these individuals, but also most recently, a specific threat to Donald Trump himself. (52:07) Now, I want to enter into the record by [inaudible 00:52:10] a Department of Justice Public Affairs release, a CNN article, an article from Fox News and an article from CBS, all of which acknowledge.
Chairman Comer (52:21): Put that objection to order.
Turner (52:23): That this threat exists for Donald Trump from Iran and that there are specific threats most recently that have been acknowledged. Director Cheatle, have you read the intelligence of the generalized threat to Donald Trump by Iran as a result of their desire to retaliate for the killing of Soleimani?
Director Cheatle (52:45): I have.
Turner (52:47): Have you read or been briefed about the intelligence of the specific recent threat to Donald Trump from Iran?
Director Cheatle (52:55): Yes, I have.
Turner (52:57): Director Ray, when we were getting our briefing, indicated that he thought the threat assessment should have included this threat from Iran. Is it your testimony today that the threat assessment, since you've read this intelligence, was sufficient to protect him from this threat from Iran?
Director Cheatle (53:16): My testimony today is that the information that we had at the time was known that...
Turner (53:22): Was it sufficient? Director Cheatle, was it sufficient for the Iranian threat that you said you have read the intelligence briefings for?
Director Cheatle (53:30): That information was passed to...
Turner (53:33): Well, I'm not asking the bureaucratic issue of who did it get passed around to. Director Cheatle. Was it sufficient for the specific and generalized threat to Donald Trump's life from Iran?
Director Cheatle (53:44): Yes, I do believe it was.
Turner (53:46): Director Cheatle, is an Iranian assassin more capable than a twenty-year-old?
Director Cheatle (53:53): Sir, I think we've acknowledged that there was gaps and a failure that day. We are not...
Turner (53:58): When I raised this issue with Director Ray, he was incensed. He was shocked that the threat assessment of Iran did not seem to be as weak and, I discussed, baked in to your security footprint and your threat assessment. And he went on to say that the generalized threat that he has told the whole country that we are under from a potential terrorist threat. He has said we're under the highest threat level since 9/11, that the lights are flashing red. And he has specifically indicated that people have crossed the southern border as a result of the Biden Administration's policy and that there are, in our country today, terrorists and individuals who are affiliated with terrorist groups and organizations. That would be a heightened threat environment, director Cheatle, would it not?
Director Cheatle (54:43): Yes.
Turner (54:44): In his public statements, he has said he is making these statements because he wants people to take them into consideration in threat assessments specifically. Now, that would be a threat not just to Donald Trump, but it would also be a threat to the crowd there, wouldn't it?
Director Cheatle (55:00): Yes.
Turner (55:01): Are Isis terrorists and Al-Qaeda terrorists and international groups and terrorists more capable than a twenty-year-old in pulling off their mass shooting or an assassination of Donald Trump?
Director Cheatle (55:14): Sir, again, there was clearly a breakdown and a failure that day.
Turner (55:17): Have you read the intelligence of the terrorists that are currently in the United States that Director Ray speaks and those individuals that are here that are affiliated with terrorist groups and organizations that are in the process, as Director Ray said, of representing a significant threat of a terrorist attack occurring in the United States?
Director Cheatle (55:34): I have read reports that apply specifically to the Secret Services mission.
Turner (55:40): Director Cheatle, because Donald Trump is alive, and thank God he is, you look incompetent. If Donald Trump had been killed, you would've looked culpable. There is no aspect of this that indicates that there has been any protection to Donald Trump. The threat was identified before he took the stage and the shooter was only killed after Donald Trump himself was killed. Not only should you resign, if you refuse to do so, president Biden needs to fire you because his life, Donald Trump's life and all the other people which you protect are at risk because you have no concept of the aspect that the security footprint needs to be correlated to the threat. I yield back.
Chairman Comer (56:20): Chair now recognizes Mr. Lynch from Massachusetts.
Lynch (56:23): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Cheatle, there were multiple security failures at the former President's rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. First of all, there was a failure to isolate the podium from exposure to direct fire. Do we know who made that decision to allow that rooftop to remain as an unprotected area? Do we know who came up with that security plan that omitted that?
Director Cheatle (56:59): Sir, I don't have a specific person to identify for you.
Lynch (57:03): Okay, well that's what I'm looking for so let's move on. There's also a breakdown in security in failure to confront the shooter over an hour before the former president began his remarks when the shooter was identified as a person of interest. What particularly allowed agents or law enforcement to identify him as a person of interest?
Director Cheatle (57:31): So I appreciate the question. And again, I will say that we are nine days out and there are multitude of interviews that are still taking place.
Lynch (57:38): Okay, so did he have a range finder? There were some reports that the individual had a range finder. That would certainly raise my suspicion. Did he have a range finder?
Director Cheatle (57:50): Yes, he did. But may I explain that at a number of our sites, especially when you're at outdoor venues, a range finder is not a prohibited item. It is sometimes an item that is brought in by individuals if you're going to be in the back...
Lynch (58:03): Did anybody confront him on that? Anybody ask him questions? "What are you doing with the range finder?" Anybody confront him on his presence where he was in proximity to the President?
Director Cheatle (58:16): So again, to my knowledge, I believe that that was the process that was taking place was to locate the individual.
Lynch (58:21): Did they confront him? Did they go up to him? Did they talk to him?
Director Cheatle (58:26): I do not have those details at this time.
Lynch (58:27): Yeah, those are important details. It was also a failure to communicate between law enforcement to act quickly upon information provided by either local law enforcement or rally attendees that the suspect was positioned on the roof. There were minutes of delay before any meaningful action was taken, even though he was several hundred feet from the podium. And this was obviously minutes before the shooting. Let me ask you. There was considerable delay in removing the president from the podium after the shooting began. He got shot in the ear, it was still over a minute before he was removed from the stage. Meanwhile, this shooter had multiple clips, several clips. He got off eight shots and he had the capacity and the ability, if he was not neutralized, to basically mow down that whole Secret Service detachment as well as the president. What, from your own investigation, caused that delay under the circumstances?
Director Cheatle (59:47): What I can tell you is that when the agents identified that the shooting was taking place, in under three seconds, they threw themselves on top of the...
Lynch (59:58): I understand that there was heroism there. No question about it. No question about it. But protocol would indicate, and these are the opinions of various former Secret Service agents, people who have done this work in the past, that over a minute of exposure on that podium with a shooter with a high capacity weapon who had already wounded the president and could have got off, we don't know, how many more rounds, and yet the president remained exposed even though he was joined in that exposure by the Secret Service in their heroic acts. I don't know if there's a good explanation for that.
Director Cheatle (01:00:48): Our personnel created a body bunker on top of the president.
Lynch (01:00:51): I get that.
Director Cheatle (01:00:52): Shielding him.
Lynch (01:00:53): Yeah, this was an AR-15 style weapon that would've made pretty quick work if he was determined and able to do so. This is not the first investigation that we've had of the Secret Service during my time here on this committee. And the last one we had, our previous investigation determined that the Secret Service was experiencing a staffing crisis that poses perhaps the greatest threat to the agency, and that's a quote. Is that staffing crisis still in place? Is that still something that you deal with on a daily basis?
Director Cheatle (01:01:27): As of today, the Secret Service has just over 8,000 employees. We continue to hire knowing that we need to ensure that we keep pace with a...
Lynch (01:01:36): What would be the full complement of...
Chairman Comer (01:01:38): And gentleman's time has expired, but please answer the question.
Lynch (01:01:41): Yeah.
Director Cheatle (01:01:42): I'm sorry.
Lynch (01:01:43): What would be the full compliment that you're looking for? You've got 8,000 and how many would be a full compliment for the service?
Director Cheatle (01:01:49): So we are still striving towards a number of 9,500 employees approximately in order to be able to meet future and emerging needs.
Lynch (01:01:59): Okay. Thank you Mr. Chairman for your courtesy. I yield back.
Chairman Comer (01:02:01): Chair recognizes Dr. Fox from North Carolina.
Dr Fox (01:02:04): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Cheatle, what grade would you give the Secret services performance in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13?
Director Cheatle (01:02:16): As I've stated, ma'am, this was clearly a failure. I would grade the agents and officers who selflessly threw themselves in front of the president and neutralized the threat an A. I think that we need to examine the events that led up to and prior to that day.
Dr Fox (01:02:37): You stated in 2021 that the Secret Service has a zero fail mission. It's clear that the events of July 13 show a cascade of failures that caused Corey Comperatore his life, nearly caused former president his life and injured David Dutch and James Copenhaver. When an agency fails spectacularly at its mission, those responsible must be held accountable and the problems must be fixed so they cannot happen again. Why should the American people or the officials you're responsible for protecting have confidence in your ability to lead the Secret Service after such a spectacular failure?
Director Cheatle (01:03:18): I appreciate the question and I am committed to finding answers so that we can make the agency stronger after this.
Dr Fox (01:03:26): You said on July 15 that the buck stops with me. How are you taking accountability for the Secret Services failures during the July 13 assassination attempt on President Trump?
Director Cheatle (01:03:39): I have taken accountability and I will continue to take accountability. I am responsible for leading the agency and I'm responsible for finding the answers to how this event occurred and making sure that it doesn't happen again.
Dr Fox (01:03:52): So I would like to explore how you got the job as Director of the United States Secret Service.
Ms. Foxx (01:04:01): Is it typical for the director of the Secret Service to be recommended for the role at the behest of a president's family and senior staff, perhaps at the request of Joe Biden or Anthony Bernal?
Director Cheatle (01:04:14): I got the job as a director of the Secret Service, because I spent 27 years in an agency with a mission that I absolutely love. I started my career in Detroit. I worked my way up through investigations and protection.
Ms. Foxx (01:04:29): Was there competition for the position?
Director Cheatle (01:04:33): You would have to ask those who were involved in the interview process.
Ms. Foxx (01:04:38): But you think you are the best person in the country to head the Secret Service?
Director Cheatle (01:04:45): I think that I'm the best person to lead the Secret Service at this time.
Ms. Foxx (01:04:50): The Secret Service receives billions in funding each year, as has been explained by my colleagues here. In fact, you've had an increase in real terms of 55%. As you're no doubt aware, staffing levels for those assigned to protect the president, former presidents and other senior officials has decreased by about 350 between 2014 and today. Clearly, a lack of financial resources not to blame for the staffing shortage. In 2022, the Secret Service on nearly half its workforce leave in one year. During the same year, it was ranked dead last among law enforcement agencies in the best places to work in the federal government. Can you explain why your agency was so poorly rated and why so many staff left in just one year?
Director Cheatle (01:05:45): With all due respect, I dispute the statistic of half of the employees leaving in 2022. I think that that has been inaccurate data that's been reported out there, but what I can tell you is as I have returned as the director of the agency, we have had an increase in hiring and staffing and an increase in resources and we are committed to continue to hire, so that we can be staffed appropriately to meet the dynamic mission that we have.
Ms. Foxx (01:06:14): Well, you may want to dispute it, but it's out there. Given the high profile failures and rotten culture at the Secret Service during your nearly two-year tenure, why should the American people have any confidence in your ability to lead the Secret Service to perform its zero fail mission to protect their senior leaders?
Director Cheatle (01:06:41): The Secret Service has an incredible culture. Our men and women place service over self. They come in everyday willing to risk their lives for our protective mission, and they work investigations that thwart people who would do harm to children, child exploiters. We have an incredible mission and our culture is we will get the job done no matter what.
Ms. Foxx (01:07:03): Well, those on the front lines certainly have a great culture and they were willing to risk their lives for President Trump, but I'm not sure the leadership at the agency has this right kind of culture. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman (01:07:17): Chair now recognized Mr. Connolly from Virginia.
Mr. Connolly (01:07:20): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, I hope the American people do appreciate the incredible daily risks Secret Service agents take on our behalf. You mentioned there are 36 regular clients you've got that you protect constantly, but I was participating in the NATO Summit just two weeks ago. We had 32 heads of government and heads of state, plus visiting heads of state and heads of government. Presumably, you provided protection for all of them.
Director Cheatle (01:07:53): That is correct.
Mr. Connolly (01:07:55): Just saying. Help us understand. However, I will stipulate that there's an ongoing investigation. You don't want to go into too much detail on that until you've been able to ascertain all the facts and analyze what they mean. You can understand, however, the anxiety we and the American public have about how could this happen and how can we ensure it can't recur. Now, there are some things, my friends on one particular side of the aisle, don't really want to talk about, like AR-15s and access to them by a 20-year-old or anybody for that matter. Presumably, Director Cheatle, the ubiquity of weapons, guns in America, especially assault weapons or semi-automatic weapons; that's helped your job and the mission of your agencies, right? It's made it less complicated. Isn't that true?
Director Cheatle (01:08:58): I'm sorry, I'm not understanding your question.
Mr. Connolly (01:09:00): Real simple. More guns, especially dangerous ones, have made your job protecting people easier. Is that not right?
Director Cheatle (01:09:11): I think from everything-
Mr. Connolly (01:09:13): Director Cheatle, this is simple English. More guns, do they make your job more complicated or less complicated in protecting these 36 clients and visiting heads of state and heads of government that come to Washington?
Director Cheatle (01:09:28): I think the Secret Service needs to take into account the state that they're in...
Mr. Connolly (01:09:32): I didn't ask that. I'm sorry. I asked a simple question, which deserves a simple answer. The ubiquity of guns, dangerous weapons in America like AR-15s, has that made your job, that is to say the mission of the Secret Service, easier or more difficult?
Director Cheatle (01:09:50): I think the threat environment for protecting our Secret Service protectees is always difficult and that's dynamic and it's always evolving.
Mr. Connolly (01:09:59): We stipulate it's always difficult. Again, this is a simple one. Does the ubiquity of guns make your job easier or more difficult today?
Director Cheatle (01:10:13): I understand the Second Amendment rights of individuals.
Mr. Connolly (01:10:16): I didn't ask that question. I'm not questioning the Second Amendment. I'm asking a simple analysis, Director Cheatle. I can tell you, you're not making my job easier in terms of assessing your qualification for continuing honest director. Please answer the question. You're the head of the Secret Service. You're speaking on behalf of 8,000 members who put their lives on the line. We just had a failure by your own admission. Do guns make your job easier or harder?
Director Cheatle (01:10:47): I think the job of the Secret Service is difficult on every day and we need to make sure that we are mitigating all threats, whether that be weapons or personnel-
Mr. Connolly (01:10:56): That isn't my question. That is not my question. Now, I think you're evading the answer, which is not a hard one.
Director Cheatle (01:11:05): I am sorry that you feel that way, sir.
Mr. Connolly (01:11:07): How else could I feel, Director Cheatle, when you're clearly avoiding a direct answer to a very simple declarative question? We almost lost a presidential candidate the other day. A 20-year-old had access to his father's AR-15 and got on top of a roof within 500 yards or feet of the podium. I'm asking you, did the availability of that AR-15, which is replicated all across America, make your job harder or easier. You are not willing to answer that question and you wonder why we might have a lack of confidence in your continued ability to direct this agency?
Director Cheatle (01:11:50): I understand your question, and that's the environment...
Mr. Connolly (01:11:52): Well, if you understand my question, why not answer it?
Director Cheatle (01:11:54): Because it's the environment that the Secret Service works in every day.
Mr. Connolly (01:11:59): That doesn't tell me anything. That's the environment we work in. I had an attack in my office a year ago. I know a little bit about violence too. He came to kill me. When he couldn't, he beat one of my staffers eight times with a baseball bat on the head. We live with the threat of violence, but a simple answer from the director of the Secret Service would be helpful. I'm sorry you've chosen to evade it. I yield back.
Mr. Chairman (01:12:32): Chair now recognize Mr. Grothman from Wisconsin.
Mr. Grothman (01:12:38): Thank you. When this guy took the shots, he climbed a ladder to get on the roof. Correct?
Director Cheatle (01:12:47): I'm unable to answer details of exactly how the individual accessed the roof at this time.
Mr. Grothman (01:12:56): If he did use the ladder, do you know when the ladder was placed? There was a ladder there two days before? Just the night before? Do you have any information at all as to when the ladder got there?
Director Cheatle (01:13:07): I would like to be able to answer those questions. The FBI is still conducting an investigation.
Mr. Grothman (01:13:12): How did the rifle get to the roof?
Director Cheatle (01:13:16): Again, sir, at this time, I'm unable to answer questions to provide clarity.
Mr. Grothman (01:13:20): Have they cleaned the roof since the assassination attempt?
Director Cheatle (01:13:26): Have they cleaned the roof?
Mr. Grothman (01:13:28): Right. Has anything done to the roof? Is it just like it was, whatever, 10 days ago or not? Has anything been done to the roof?
Director Cheatle (01:13:38): I don't have an answer for that.
Mr. Grothman (01:13:41): Okay. Were President Trump's normal agents normally assigned to him there that day?
Director Cheatle (01:13:49): Yes.
Mr. Grothman (01:13:51): These were the same agents that were always there, right?
Director Cheatle (01:13:55): Yes, sir. The people that are assigned to his detail were working on that day.
Mr. Grothman (01:14:00): Okay. There's stuff on the internet that says they were not there that day, but these are the same agents who are routinely there?
Director Cheatle (01:14:07): Yes, sir.
Mr. Grothman (01:14:08): Okay. Do we know which agents fired the shots that finally took down the potential assassin?
Director Cheatle (01:14:17): Yes, sir. I do.
Mr. Grothman (01:14:19): Can you give us those names or background of those agents?
Director Cheatle (01:14:23): I would not offer their name up in this setting, but it was one of our technical officers, our counter snipers.
Mr. Grothman (01:14:31): Okay. Can we privately get those names? The committee?
Director Cheatle (01:14:35): I am certain that we can make names available privately.
Mr. Grothman (01:14:38): Okay. Do we know where all the shots landed? First of all, how many shots did the potential assassin... How many shots came out of the rifle?
Director Cheatle (01:14:50): Again, I would hesitate to offer that information as the FBI is conducting an investigation.
Mr. Grothman (01:14:57): Have we got the bullets from all the shots?
Director Cheatle (01:15:00): Again, that would be the responsibility of the FBI to collect that evidence.
Mr. Grothman (01:15:11): Okay. Do we have the correspondence from the shooter? Has that been recovered from his phone, whatever?
Director Cheatle (01:15:20): Again, I would have to defer you to the FBI for details on that investigation.
Mr. Grothman (01:15:24): Okay. You spent some time trying to change the makeup of the Secret Service. Okay. You feel there are, whatever, too high a percentage of men. Does this affect at all who you are hiring for the Secret Service?
Director Cheatle (01:15:48): I've spent my time as the director trying to increase the number of people that we hire in the Secret Service so that we have the best and the brightest, and that's been my concentration as the director.
Mr. Grothman (01:16:01): Okay. You ever hiring... Not hiring men because of your desire to hit certain targets?
Director Cheatle (01:16:11): I am hiring the best qualified candidates that put in an application that want to work for our great organization.
Mr. Grothman (01:16:17): Okay. Next question. The shooter obtained a direct site of President Trump from the position on the rooftop. I assume that is not something that should ever happen. It should never happen. Do you want to elaborate a little on how that happened or what you wish you had done differently or would do differently next time there's a Trump rally?
Director Cheatle (01:16:46): Again, sir, the facts of this particular event are still unfolding. Nine days, there have been a number of reports that have been out there, so I do not want to provide an information that perhaps would contradict something that has been erroneously reported or is not factual, but there clearly was a mistake and we will take every effort to make sure that this never happens again.
Mr. Grothman (01:17:11): Could you elaborate why you want one third of the Secret Service to be women?
Director Cheatle (01:17:19): I've never stated that I want one third of the Secret Service to be women.
Mr. Grothman (01:17:23): Thirty percent or something. You had some target? No? Okay.
Mr. Jordan (01:17:28): Mr. Grothman, you yield?
Mr. Grothman (01:17:30): Sure. I yield.
Mr. Jordan (01:17:32): Director, what was erroneously reported you said? To Mr. Grothman's question, you said something was erroneously reported. What are you referring to?
Director Cheatle (01:17:37): I'm referring to...
Mr. Jordan (01:17:40): This question was in the context of the shooter using a ladder to get on the building, what was erroneously reported? Because you won't tell us anything, but you'll tell us something that wasn't reported accurately.
Director Cheatle (01:17:49): I'm saying, sir, that there have been a number of reports that are out there that have been speculation. Until we have the actual facts, I don't want to report anything that would contradict speculation that has been out there.
Mr. Jordan (01:18:03): Thank you, gentlemen. I'll be yielding.
Mr. Chairman (01:18:05): Chair recognizes Mr. Krishnamoorthi from Illinois.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:18:09): Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you Mr. Ranking Member for bringing us together this morning. One question I get asked a lot from my constituents is what can Congress actually do to stop this from happening again? Now, I'd like to share a graphic from a very recent study conducted by Professor Robert Pape, a world-renowned expert in combating political violence. The graphic shows that 74% of Americans want this Congress to come together to denounce political violence of all stripes. You can tell it's across party lines. (01:18:41) I commend the chair and ranking member for putting out the statement the other day, condemning political violence. To further this effort, I'd like to ask all my colleagues to join Dr. Brad Wenstrup and me in introducing a resolution that we think can secure unanimous house passage in deploring and condemning political violence and we'll be circulating that resolution shortly. Director Cheatle, as you know, the shooter began shooting at 6:11 p.m. Eastern on July 13th. NBC reported that at 5:51 p.m., 20 minutes before the shooting began, the state police informed the Secret Service of their concern. Now, the rally was not paused at that point, correct?
Director Cheatle (01:19:25): No.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:19:27): According to NBC, just two minutes later at 5: 53 p.m., the Secret Service notified its snipers about the gunman. The rally wasn't paused at that point either, correct?
Director Cheatle (01:19:40): No.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:19:41): Let me show you some video footage by rally goers. If you could play the video on the screen up here. This was taken two minutes before the shooting started. If you could turn up the volume.
Speaker 1 (01:19:57): Right up here. He's on the roof. He's [inaudible 01:20:03]. Right here, right on the roof. He's getting off now. He went right on the roof again.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:20:12): Ma'am, that doesn't look like suspicious behavior. That looks like threatening behavior to me, and the rally wasn't paused at that point either. Correct?
Director Cheatle (01:20:20): I can tell you as I stated earlier, sir, that the moment that the shift surrounding the president, we're aware of an actual threat.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:20:29): That's a threat right there. The guy's on the roof and everybody's yelling at him.
Director Cheatle (01:20:33): Yes.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:20:34): And directing the officer's attention to him. The rally was not paused at that point, correct?
Director Cheatle (01:20:39): We are currently still combing through communications and when communications were passed.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:20:45): Well, I can point you to this communication. It's two minutes before the shots started ringing out. Director Cheatle, yes or no, was there ever a moment where the Secret Service actually considered pausing the rally?
Director Cheatle (01:20:57): The Secret Service would've paused the rally had they known or been told-
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:21:02): The answer is no?
Director Cheatle (01:21:03): ... that it's an actual threat.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:21:04): The answer is no. Correct?
Director Cheatle (01:21:09): I can speak to you in generalities.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:21:11): No. No. I don't want generalities. I want specifics.
Director Cheatle (01:21:13): I don't know all of the communications...
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:21:15): The answer is no. You did not consider pausing the rally, correct?
Director Cheatle (01:21:18): The people that are in charge of protecting the president on that day would never bring the former president out if there was a threat that had been identified.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:21:27): Well, they did. Because we've now identified three points in the 20 minutes before the shooting that the threat emerged. Let me point you to something else, which is the building that the shooter was perched on seen here. This building is called the AGR Building. I'm sure that you're familiar with it. It's no more than 150 yards from the stage where Donald Trump stood, yet the security perimeter was drawn such that the AGR Building was placed outside of it. Director Cheatle, according to the Washington Post, the AR-15 styled rifle used in the shooting had a range of 400 to 600 yards, and therefore the AGR Building was clearly within rifle range of the stage, correct?
Director Cheatle (01:22:15): Yes.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:22:16): NBC News has reported that in the days before the rally, the Secret Service had identified the building as a vulnerability that required special attention. Correct?
Director Cheatle (01:22:27): That's reporting from NBC?
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:22:28): Yes.
Director Cheatle (01:22:30): I am still looking into an active investigation.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:22:32): I know, but it's been nine days. You should know that, right? Yet, despite the fact that the AGR building was in rifle range of the stage and it was flagged as a vulnerability, this building was put outside of the Secret Service's security perimeter. I respectfully submit the Secret Service must expand its security perimeter to account for the kinds of weapons that can be used outside the perimeter to endanger the protectees inside the perimeter, ma'am. Let me turn your attention to some conspiracy theories that have been circulating and ask you to comment on them. First, you have not found evidence that the incident was a staged shooting, right?
Director Cheatle (01:23:17): Correct.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:23:18): You haven't found evidence that this was a result of a conspiracy of high ranking government officials, correct?
Director Cheatle (01:23:23): Correct.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:23:23): You have not found evidence that this incident was in fact directed or perpetrated by a foreign state or entity, right?
Mr. Chairman (01:23:29): That's the last question, but I'll let the director answer that, please.
Director Cheatle (01:23:32): Not at this time.
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (01:23:34): Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Chairman (01:23:35): Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognize Mr. Cloud from Texas.
Mr. Cloud (01:23:39): Thank you. I just wanted to confirm there was only one counter sniper who took one shot. Is that...
Director Cheatle (01:23:46): We had multiple counter sniper teams available that day.
Mr. Cloud (01:23:48): Yeah. On the premises, but only one took one shot. Is that correct? Or only one?
Director Cheatle (01:23:53): Correct.
Mr. Cloud (01:23:54): Okay. How many spent shell casings were found on the roof?
Director Cheatle (01:23:59): Again, I would have to defer you to the FBI's criminal investigation.
Mr. Cloud (01:24:02): Okay. Word is, is that the car was ruined with explosives?
Director Cheatle (01:24:06): Again, sir, I'd have to defer you to the FBI's investigation.
Mr. Cloud (01:24:10): Okay. You're not curious about... You don't communicate with them? No? Okay. CNN reported that Secret Service did not sweep the building the shooter was used to shoot President Trump and other attendees. Is that true or false?
Director Cheatle (01:24:26): We are conducting a mission insurance investigation and we'll depend on the information that we obtain from our investigations.
Mr. Cloud (01:24:34): Okay. Secret Service knew there was a suspicious person anywhere from eight minutes before president walked on stage to 30 to 60 minutes. We have different reports. Was President Trump or his team notified of the threat?
Director Cheatle (01:24:48): I think there's a difference and a distinction between suspicious and threat.
Mr. Cloud (01:24:52): Suspicious person. Yeah.
Director Cheatle (01:24:53): We are going back and looking at communications to know when the information about a suspicious person was passed to Secret Service personnel.
Mr. Cloud (01:25:04): Okay. Was President Trump or his team notified?
Director Cheatle (01:25:07): Again, we are going back and looking to make sure that we have the exact information of when those notifications were made and who those notifications were made to.
Mr. Cloud (01:25:16): Okay. I think it's troubling for a lot of us that the number one question everyone in America is wondering is why was the roof left open? After nine days, we should at least maybe have a little bit of that information. When you come to this committee hearing and you don't have anything to say about that, it's very, very troubling. Did you review the security plan for this event?
Director Cheatle (01:25:40): I personally do not review security plans for events that take place across the country.
Mr. Cloud (01:25:48): Any of them?
Director Cheatle (01:25:50): We have a number of events that take place-
Mr. Cloud (01:25:52): Who's the top level official who reviews the security plans?
Director Cheatle (01:25:55): There's a number of people that review security plans as they unfold.
Mr. Cloud (01:26:00): Who's ultimately responsible for signing off on a security plan?
Director Cheatle (01:26:03): It's a conjunction of personnel. There are people on the ground. There are supervisors on the detail. There are people at headquarters.
Mr. Cloud (01:26:10): There's not one person who says, "Okay. This is good. It's copacetic. We're going for it?"
Director Cheatle (01:26:15): I think much in the way that we build our security plans where they are multi-layered...
Mr. Cloud (01:26:19): No doubt, there's teams working different aspects of it. But ultimately, isn't there an individual who signs off on the plan?
Director Cheatle (01:26:25): Much like how we design our security plans, rhere are multiple layers of the-
Mr. Cloud (01:26:30): There's no accountability.
Director Cheatle (01:26:33): There is accountability, sir.
Mr. Cloud (01:26:34): This is whether it's the FBI or Fauci or it's time after time after time, these multiple layers of accountability turn into layers of plausible deniability and agency after agency after agency, that's got to be fixed because you keep coming here and expecting... Yes, you're saying, "I'm responsible," and you're accountable for it, but then there's nothing. What do you mean by that? You're saying you're going to keep your job, right?
Director Cheatle (01:27:05): I assure you, sir, that if we determine through the course of our investigation that someone or people need to be held accountable, we will do so.
Mr. Cloud (01:27:17): If President Biden, God forbid, had been shot and killed, would you think that was worthy of resignation?
Director Cheatle (01:27:26): I would do the same thing that I'm doing here where I would want to make sure that we are conducting an investigation, that there is continuity in that investigation and that we could find the answers to what happened.
Mr. Cloud (01:27:37): You do not think the assassination of somebody under your detail's worthy of resignation?
Director Cheatle (01:27:41): I think that this event was tragic and deserves answers.
Mr. Cloud (01:27:45): The thing that you've said so far is that you want to make sure that this never happens again. The thing is everyone in America knows that's not the job description that you're tasked with. The job description you're tasked with is to make sure it never happens. Period. One of your goals in the strategic plan is to champion diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. You've accomplished the accessibility part. Do you keep the same standards for all applicants and all... Does every Secret Service agent meet the same qualifications or do you have different standards for different people?
Director Cheatle (01:28:22): Yes, sir. Everyone who moves through the application process has to meet the same standards to become a special agent.
Mr. Cloud (01:28:30): Okay. The trouble I think we're having with right now, so far, you gave a lame excuse for sloped roof. You said that local law enforcement's job was to cover up the building before backtracking on that. We were told that President Trump's team did not ask for security before you backtracked on that. You haven't provided the audio recording that this committee, the chairman requested that it was due Thursday. You didn't give us advanced copy of your opening statement, but yet there was reporting on it somewhere else. There seems to be more information from YouTube videos than you're able to provide for us. It begs the question to anyone, you're in charge of the investigation of your own failure, so how is anybody in America supposed to be able to trust the results of that investigation as being anything transparent and genuine?
Mr. Chairman (01:29:23): That's the last question, but please feel free to answer the question, director.
Director Cheatle (01:29:26): Sir, I've been a Secret Service agent for nearly 30 years. I have led with integrity and I follow our core values of duty, justice, honor, loyalty, and courage. I am doing that in this case. I assure this committee that I will provide answers when we have a full and complete report in addition to cooperating with all of the other investigations that are ongoing.
Mr. Chairman (01:29:51): Chair now recognize Mr. Khanna from California.
Mr. Khanna (01:29:54): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank the chair and the ranking member for convening this hearing on a bipartisan basis. I joined them in condemning the horrific assassination attempt on the former president. I am relieved for the sake of the country that he wasn't seriously hurt and that he survived and my thoughts with him and his family during such a traumatic event. I also want to express condolences to Corey Comperatore's family and recognize his heroism in saving his daughter's lives and to the victims of that awful event. Now, Director Cheatle, would you agree that this is the most serious security lapse since President Reagan was shot in 1981, of the Secret Service?
Director Cheatle (01:30:47): Yes, sir, I would.
Mr. Khanna (01:30:50): Do you know what Stuart Knight did when he was in charge at the time of the Secret Service? Do you know what he did afterwards?
Director Cheatle (01:30:58): He remained on duty.
Mr. Khanna (01:30:59): He resigned. He resigned. Stuart Knight was not a Democratic appointee or Republican appointee. Look, I'm not questioning your judgment and I just don't think this is partisan. If you have an assassination attempt on a president, a former president or a candidate, you need to resign. That's what Stuart Knight did. He was a Republican appointee and he took responsibility. I think you need to reflect. This is not a question of you, it's a question of the American people. You cannot go leading a Secret Service agency when there is an assassination attempt on a presidential candidate. I would say that about anyone who is running. I guess my question to you is what's the difference between your position and what Stuart Knight did?
Director Cheatle (01:31:55): What I will tell you, sir, is that I'm dedicated to finding the answers to what happened. Like every Secret Service agent, we don't shirk from our responsibilities. I will remain on and be responsible to the agency, to this committee, to the former president and to the American public.
Mr. Khanna (01:32:12): Is there a reason you wouldn't just do what Stuart Knight did after the Reagan assassination attempt?
Director Cheatle (01:32:19): I believe that I provided an answer.
Mr. Khanna (01:32:22): There's nothing more that you have to say? Do you really believe at this moment, given how divided the country is and the questions asked that your service in this role, is the best for the nation? I am not saying you can't do public service again. You can't do something else again. Do you really genuinely, in your heart, believe that you being in this role is what's right for America at this moment? Do you think there are people who are Trump supporters who have confidence in you? The one thing that... We've got to have agencies in this country that are transcend politics, that have the confidence of independents, democrats, republicans, progressives, conservatives. Do you really believe that the majority of this country has confidence in you right now?
Director Cheatle (01:33:01): I believe that the country deserves answers, and I am committed to finding those answers and providing those answers.
Mr. Khanna (01:33:09): Well, look, I believe, Director Cheatle, that you should resign. I think there are colleagues on both sides of the aisle who believe that, and I hope you'll consider it. I yield back.
Mr. Chairman (01:33:23): Chair now recognizes Mr. Palmer from Alabama for five minutes.
Mr. Palmer (01:33:28): Director Cheatle, did local law enforcement ESU teams have compromised authority to engage a perceived threat?
Director Cheatle (01:33:38): Yes.
Mr. Palmer (01:33:40): Why do you think they didn't use it?
Director Cheatle (01:33:42): I believe that they follow the same use of force that our agency-
Mr. Palmer (01:33:47): When you have compromised authority, you don't have to get permission if you perceive a threat. Not just the ESU units, but there were local law enforcement that had line of sight on the shooter before the shots were taken. One of my questions is there was supposed to be a briefing with the Secret Service sniper units, your counter assault team members with the contract team, with the local ESU teams. That didn't take place. Why was that?
Director Cheatle (01:34:21): I have been told that there has been a briefing. There was a briefing that took place.
Mr. Palmer (01:34:25): I've been told that there wasn't one.
Director Cheatle (01:34:27): Again, we are still looking into the facts of the investigation, so we can-
Mr. Palmer (01:34:31): Let me ask you this. When were you informed that there was a credible threat against former President Trump? When did you learn of that?
Director Cheatle (01:34:42): Sir, the former president has a number of threats.
Mr. Palmer (01:34:45): I didn't ask you that. There was a credible threat from Iran. When were you informed of that? Answer the question.
Director Cheatle (01:34:52): We have been monitoring the threats for the former president.
Mr. Palmer (01:34:54): You knew before the rally, okay? Right? The site security plan is generally drafted by the site supervisor and the site agent probably out of the Pittsburgh district office. Did they take into account the credible threat against President Trump?
Director Cheatle (01:35:18): Our personnel take into account the threats that are out there.
Mr. Palmer (01:35:20): Then, why would they leave a building? I will correct the distance that's been quoted. It was about 140 yards with clear line of sight to the president. Why was that building not occupied on the roof? You could have put Barney Fife on the roof and kept somebody from getting up there. Why wasn't that done?
Director Cheatle (01:35:39): The plan that was developed that day encompassed a number of security mitigations.
Mr. Palmer (01:35:44): No, ma'am. The issue is the site supervisor, the site agent and the special agent in charge, who I think signed off on the plan, did not include that in the inner perimeter and
Mr. Palmer (01:36:00): ... and they didn't have a plan to secure the building. As I understand it, the Butler County ESU unit was situated on the second floor of a building next to that, but they didn't have a clear line of sight of the roof. The angle was too severe. The photograph that was taken of the young man, of the shooter, when he had the range finder was taken at 5:15. It wasn't until 5:38 that that photograph was transmitted to the Secret Service sniper units. I don't understand the lack of interoperability here and the communication process. I don't understand why people didn't perceive that as a credible threat. The video that Mr. Christopher Morphy had shown there was clearly a credible threat. So how is it that all of these mistakes could be made? How many explosive devices were found on or near the site?
Director Cheatle (01:36:56): Again, I would have to defer you to the FBI details.
Mr. Palmer (01:37:00): Madam, I believe they were in his car. And I think there might've been one near a main gas line. It wasn't just the fact that he had a rifle. It was the fact that he had the ability to inflict enormous harm, enormous numbers of casualties had those devices exploded. (01:37:22) I want to know also, when your agents conduct a site review, are they fully informed of all of the threats that are being made against the principle that they're protecting?
Director Cheatle (01:37:43): What I can tell you is that when our agents go out to conduct an advance, their whole goal is to ensure safety and security.
Mr. Palmer (01:37:49): I understand what your goal is. The failure to secure that building not only put the former president's life in danger, it put the lives of individuals in the crowd in danger as well. I mean, the Reagan shooting, there were other people shot at that time as well. And the Secret Service members' lives were in danger. So I don't understand how you can continue to stay in the position you're in when this was a failure of historic magnitude. 43 years without anything like this happening and you failed, in this case, in a spectacular way. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Palmer (01:38:36): Gentleman yields back. Chair recognizes Mr. Mfume from Maryland.
Mr. Mfume (01:38:42): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to commend you and the Ranking Member on your joint statement and for holding this hearing that we might all at least attempt to try to get some answers. (01:38:52) Some of us, Ms. Cheatle, grew up in an era not too unlike what we see today in terms of political violence. And some of us remember the November 22nd, 1963, assassination of President Kennedy. Some of us, like myself, remember two days later when Jack Ruby on live TV shot and killed Lee Harvey Oswald. We've seen over and over and over since that time these kind of attempts, whether it was the assassination of Martin Luther King or Bobby Kennedy or the attempted attack on George Wallace and Laurel Maryland, the shooting in 1981 of Ronald Reagan, our friend and colleague Steve Scalise shooting here in DC, and the unfortunate attack on Paul Pelosi, and now this matter regarding former President Trump. (01:39:46) Let me try, if I might, to take another walk at this. People just assume that whoever is in charge takes full responsibility when there's never been, at least on this magnitude and scale, this sort of failure. So when members ask you, are you going to resign, and you say you have no intention to, they are perplexed like many people who watch what's going on. And there's some things I just don't understand. Why was the building, the ARG building, placed outside of the perimeter when clearly it was close enough for someone to launch an attack?
Director Cheatle (01:40:31): So again sir, we are looking into all of the details of how the advanced was comprised, but I can tell you that there was Overwatch on that building provided that day.
Mr. Mfume (01:40:41): By a drone?
Director Cheatle (01:40:43): I'm not going to get into the specifics of technology or assets that were used in this forum.
Mr. Mfume (01:40:47): Okay. Okay. Well, I think it's fair to say the Overwatch failed because the shooter got up on the roof and stayed there for a while and people had pointed him out. So do you think that your Overwatch was a failure in that case?
Director Cheatle (01:40:59): I think that we need to know the full details to understand how this occurred.
Mr. Mfume (01:41:03): And why was the rooftop left naked to begin with? Can you tell us that? Considering it was within the line of sight and so very close.
Director Cheatle (01:41:13): Again, I can't speak to the specifics of this particular event site, but what I can tell you is that when the Secret Service develops an advanced plan, they take into account a number of factors when they're building their advance. If there are buildings or areas of concern and Overwatch is one of those mitigations that they want to put in place, then they will cover off areas of responsibility.
Mr. Mfume (01:41:41): I understand that, but the shooter came to the attention of your agency 52 minutes before the former president got to the stage. Did anybody get assigned to watch or cover that individual who had already been seen with a advanced finder on him? And other suspicious matters, was anybody assigned to track him?
Director Cheatle (01:42:03): So what I'd like to clarify is that a suspicious individual-
Mr. Mfume (01:42:07): I got that part. It's not a threat. I know. I know.
Director Cheatle (01:42:08): ... was brought to the attention of our personnel. And again, having a range finder at an outdoor event-
Mr. Mfume (01:42:16): Well, let me ask you this. When the suspicious person was brought to the attention of the Secret Service, was anybody in the detail ordered to follow and stay with that suspicious person just because they might become a threat?
Director Cheatle (01:42:30): So we have a number of teams that are on the ground. And again, we are trying to verify the timelines of when those notifications were made to our personnel so that they could assume the responsibility of trying to track that individual.
Mr. Mfume (01:42:44): Ms. Cheatle, there has been a lot of discussion, some of which raised itself earlier in this hearing about poor staff morale within your agency. And I have the July 17th report of government executive, which is a credible reporting service for the federal government for employees. And the 2023 ranking of places to work within the federal government showed, and this is through the Office of Personnel Management, that the Secret Service came in 413th out of 459 subagencies and agencies. Can you explain that?
Director Cheatle (01:43:26): Certainly. What I can tell you is the Secret service is a difficult job. It challenges our employees daily. It's holidays, it's weekends, it's no leave periods-
Mr. Mfume (01:43:37): But Madam, people come to work knowing that. You do explain that when you hire somebody. They know that. It's the same with other agencies. They miss holidays, they come to work at odd hours. But to be one of the worst places to work within the federal government, 413 out of 459, I just need an explanation. What do you think as the director there?
Director Cheatle (01:44:04): I think that-
Mr. Palmer (01:44:05): And that's the last question, but please answer Mr. Mfume's question.
Director Cheatle (01:44:08): I think that this is a challenging job. I think that it's a challenging environment to be in law enforcement. And we do have a no-fail mission. And our folks are tasked with that every day, 365 days of the year. But I can tell you I've also taken a number of measures since I've been the director to recruit and retain and stem the tide of attrition in our agency, which will hopefully alleviate some of that.
Mr. Mfume (01:44:31): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palmer (01:44:33): Chair now recognize Mr. Sessions from Texas.
Mr. Sessions (01:44:36): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I join in the calls above all of our members to say thank you for doing this hearing on a bipartisan basis. (01:44:46) Director, I'm not going to sit here and say you ought to resign, but I am going to say that you have not given us confidence that you have the ability to understand what happened, to take the responsibility in terms of understanding. You've spent a number of years. How many years do you say you've been with the agency?
Director Cheatle (01:45:07): 29.
Mr. Sessions (01:45:07): Well I spent 16 years with AT&T, moved seven times with them, and had a really good feel about their operations, how they worked, what was acceptable, who was responsible. And I've heard you say today numbers of times, "Well, you've got to wait. Well, you've got to wait. Wait for the final report." When is the final final going to happen?
Director Cheatle (01:45:34): I am very-
Mr. Sessions (01:45:35): How long do we have to wait before you can give us credible answers? You've been there 28 years. You've had a few days to be able to draw your own analysis of this. You should understand the entire process. You talked about being on the team, perhaps in Georgia. You have talked about your experience in this. You've talked about the professional nature of the agency. That I don't doubt. But the director, just like it was when I ran my operations at AT&T, was responsible for making sure they worked. And in business, it either works or it doesn't work. There's no in between. It either works or it does not work. And your job as the, in essence, administrator, the director, is to make sure it looks right and works. And I've not heard you say one thing about, "My analysis is..." I have asked these questions. It's always, "I've got to sit back and wait for someone else to decide that." So I'm going to ask you a question that maybe you can answer. Have any employees been disciplined for their role in Butler PA incident?
Director Cheatle (01:46:45): No sir. Not at this time. I am asking those questions. I'm sure-
Mr. Sessions (01:46:48): So no employee has been disciplined and no employee has been placed in any position that would place their job in jeopardy nor their standing in the agency.
Director Cheatle (01:47:02): We are still in the process of interviewing people-
Mr. Sessions (01:47:04): That's not what I asked. You're the person that runs the place. You're the person that knows right from wrong, good from bad. You've had a number of days and now you come before this committee knowing you're going to be before us and you've got to slough it off to someone else. Do you see where there was something that went wrong as a professional agency for 28 years? Or do you have to count on someone else to give you the final report?
Director Cheatle (01:47:34): I see that something went wrong and I've acknowledged that something went wrong.
Mr. Sessions (01:47:37): Then what went wrong? Was the special agent charge not doing their job? Was the shooter given extra time? Was the sniper doing their job? I mean, these are things that people who've been around for 28 years can analyze quickly. I watched it live on TV. And then within minutes saw a number of facts and factors that would have and should have been known by people who were there. You've got 28 years, you're showing up here telling us and the American public, "Well, I've got to wait for the final answer." What is your evaluation?
Director Cheatle (01:48:16): I'm asking those same questions.
Mr. Sessions (01:48:17): Well no, you're before the committee. Tell us what went wrong, a special agent in charge, the person who was there. Tell us and don't try and play a shell game with us. Do you have the ability to effectively, as the director of this agency, to understand what went wrong and at least tell us, "I do or don't know what I'm doing"? (01:48:42) And I'm not asking for you to resign. I'm asking for you, if you've got this experience, then you should be able to say to us, "We know what we did wrong. It was a failure in our system and we're immediately making these corrections." That's why you're having a difficult time with this group of members of Congress because we saw it too. We've seen the things. But you are the 28-year expert. You are the person and only you that can make the changes. And I hear you say, "Well, I've got to wait for a final report before I, at 28 years experience." That is why we think what you're doing, the answers you're giving us are not correct and you are not using your professional expertise. Mr. Chairman, I will allow her to respond.
Director Cheatle (01:49:37): I am asking those same questions, sir. And I assure you, when I have a full and complete report of exactly what happened, there will be accountability and we will make changes.
Mr. Palmer (01:49:51): Before I recognize the question, just out of curiosity, Director, it's been nine days. Every American wants these questions answered. Do you have a ballpark estimate of when what Mr. Sessions asked you would be able to answer?
Director Cheatle (01:50:07): So I can tell-
Mr. Palmer (01:50:08): Time-wise?
Director Cheatle (01:50:08): I can tell you on our mission assurance internal investigation, we are targeting to have that completed within 60 days. There's also an external investigation that is going to be taking place. There are a number of Office of Inspector General Investigations as well and we are working in concert. And then of course there is the Department of Justice, FBI, criminal investigation.
Mr. Palmer (01:50:30): Chair recognizes Ms. Ocasio-Cortez from New York.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez (01:50:33): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Cheatle, respectfully, what you had just laid out about 60 days, we are currently in the midst of an especially concentrated presidential campaign in the moment that is also paired with of course elections happening across the country that are happening in about 100 days. So the notion of a report coming out in 60 days when the threat environment is so high in the United States, irrespective of party, is not acceptable. And I think it's very important to understand that. This is not theater. This is not about jockeying. This is about the safety of some of the most highly targeted and valued targets internationally and domestically in the United States of America. So the idea that a report will be finalized in 60 days, let alone prior to any actionable decisions that would be made, is simply not acceptable. (01:51:43) It has been 10 days since an assassination attempt on a former president of the United States, regardless of party. There need to be answers. Again, this party, this committee, this is not a moment of theater. We have to make policy decisions and we have to make them now. We do. And that may require legislation. That may require policy that we must pass in the immediate term. And without that, we are flying blind. So the lack of answers and the lack of report is just simply not something that we can accept here. (01:52:21) Director Cheatle, is there a standard perimeter that the Secret Service establishes around an event? Or are those perimeters independently determined per event and scenario?
Director Cheatle (01:52:32): There is no standard. Every event and every venue is different and treated as such.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez (01:52:39): So each event has a different perimeter that is established depending on the logistics of that event. Now, you established earlier that the building upon which the shooter operated from was outside of that established perimeter, correct? For the Butler Pennsylvania event.
Director Cheatle (01:52:58): It was outside of our secure perimeter, yes.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez (01:53:00): Now, that building was I believe 500... How far away was that building from the president?
Director Cheatle (01:53:11): It was approximately 200 yards.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez (01:53:12): 200 yards. Now the individual used in AR-15 in order to act out his assassination attempt. An AR-15 has a range of about 400 to 600 yards. My question is, why is the Secret Service protective perimeter shorter than one of the most popular semi-automatic weapons in the United States?
Director Cheatle (01:53:49): There are a number of weapons out there with a number of ranges. Again, an advance was completed. The determination of the perimeter, I'm not going to speak to specifics, but there are a number of factors that are taken into account when we determine our perimeter. Some of it has to do with terrain, some of it has to do with building, some of it has to do with assets and resources that are available.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez (01:54:11): And so, what I'm hearing is that a perimeter was not established outdoors in an outdoor venue that would prevent an AR-15, which is one of the most common weapons used in mass shootings, from being able to be within the range of Secret Service protection.
Director Cheatle (01:54:32): A perimeter was established. And even though there were buildings that were outside of that perimeter, it wasn't just that building, there were a number of buildings in the area. And there was Overwatch that was created to help mitigate some of those buildings.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez (01:54:48): Respectfully, Dr. Cheatle, as well, as a person who has experienced an enormous amount of threat incidents, including incidents that have never been reported publicly, there is a common pattern that happens here, whether it's Secret Service, FBI, Capitol police, local departments. After a critical security failure, we often hear there will be an independent investigation. That independent investigation gets set up. Usually, the expectation is between two to three months after the incident, and then nothing really occurs from there. The report is usually not satisfactory to the questions that are usually being raised here. And most importantly, corrective action is rarely taken. (01:55:39) If I were to state anything that I think is profoundly important, is that we need to have answers to the public. Ideally, I would encourage you and the agency to be more forthright with the members that still have yet to have their questioning because the public deserves to have full confidence. And the stakes are too high. The violence that could break out in this political moment, regardless of party, in the event of someone getting hurt, constitutes a national security threat to the entire country. Thank you, and I yield back.
Director Cheatle (01:56:15): Could I go back to something you said?
Mr. Palmer (01:56:17): Yes, please feel free, Director.
Director Cheatle (01:56:18): Ma'am, if I could just speak to something you said at the outset when you started your questioning, I want to assure you and everyone on this committee that I'm not waiting for a report to take action. We have been conducting analysis all along and we have been adding additional features to our security details since this incident occurred.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez (01:56:41): And I had hope you can highlight and eliminate what some of those are in the event of other members questioning as well.
Mr. Palmer (01:56:48): Very good. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Biggs.
Mr. Biggs (01:56:53): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I request unanimous consent for that photo to go into the official record.
Mr. Palmer (01:56:58): Without objections ordered.
Mr. Biggs (01:56:59): Thank you. Director, your agency has a no-fail mission. And on Saturday, July 13th, your agency spectacularly failed. The failure resulted in the death of Corey Comperatore and serious injury to two other rally attendees, David Dutch and James Copenhaver, besides the injuries to President Trump. It is unfathomable that a 20-year-old on the radar of Secret Service and local law enforcement before President Trump went on stage, was able to climb onto the roof of a building with a rifle and fire off multiple rounds before he was neutralized. Was Mr. Crooks acting alone?
Director Cheatle (01:57:35): Again, I would have to refer you to the FBI's investigation.
Mr. Biggs (01:57:39): Was he just a lone gunman?
Director Cheatle (01:57:42): I would have to refer you to the FBI's investigation for motive.
Mr. Biggs (01:57:47): What did the technical services division determine was going to be the event perimeter?
Director Cheatle (01:57:52): Those are questions that we are asking and we are still-
Mr. Biggs (01:57:55): I mean, you're sitting here today. Come on, Director. Everybody said this. You knew you were going to be asked that question because it's been asked multiple times. So this is an easy one. What did they determine was going to be the event perimeter? So you should know that. I mean this is not, "Gee, I got to wait until someone else tells me." What was it?
Director Cheatle (01:58:17): Again, I don't want to speak to specifics of the event that took place.
Mr. Biggs (01:58:21): Okay, this is a specific.
Director Cheatle (01:58:22): I understand.
Mr. Biggs (01:58:23): This is a specific that you ought to know. As someone who said, "The buck stops with me, I'm going to stay in my job, I'm going to give the answers to the American people and I know what happened," except for you're not going to tell us and you're not going to tell the American people. And you yourself said in an interview that that foments this notion of conspiracy theories. Guess what? When you sit here and repeatedly tell people, "Hey, I have to wait" as frustrated everybody on this committee, guess what? It undermines your credibility and whether you're really going to get to it. So I'm going to ask you again, what did the Technical Service Division determine was going to be the event perimeter?
Director Cheatle (01:59:07): We are still gathering reports. We are interviewing individuals.
Mr. Biggs (01:59:10): You know what it is though now. You're just not going to tell us, right?
Director Cheatle (01:59:12): When I have those details, I will most certainly share those.
Mr. Biggs (01:59:15): Was the gun already on the roof or did the shooter carry the gun up with him?
Director Cheatle (01:59:20): I do not have that information at this time.
Mr. Biggs (01:59:23): Well, when was the last sweep of that roof done prior to the rally?
Director Cheatle (01:59:29): I do not have that information at this time.
Mr. Biggs (01:59:32): So how many holds... I mean, so most of us here have been in events and Secret Service has been there. There's been security. I can't tell you how many times we've said, "There's going to be a security hold right here." So we're going to wait. And we wait to one or two or three minutes. And yet we're hearing from you apparently that there were no holds in place, ever instituted here with President Trump's going on stage. And you said, and this is I think connected with this, you said they hadn't adjudicated the shooter to be a threat. He was adjudicated to be a suspicious person even though he got some dynamic video that Mr. Christopher Morphy put on the video for us. So I guess my question for you is, and I think you answered this, I just want to see if you're consistent with what you said about an hour and a half ago, what do you do if a suspicious person is identified by the agency?
Director Cheatle (02:00:32): So at a number of our events, it is not unusual.
Mr. Biggs (02:00:35): I know it's not unusual. What do you do?
Director Cheatle (02:00:38): Those individuals that are identified as suspicious, we will send teams out to-
Mr. Biggs (02:00:45): Was a team sent out here then?
Director Cheatle (02:00:47): There were teams that were sent to identify and interview that individual.
Mr. Biggs (02:00:53): They were sent to interview the individual who's scampered up in camo on top of a roof within 130 yards of his target. And did your team get there? When did your team get there to conduct that interview?
Director Cheatle (02:01:10): I don't have the details on the timeline. It is my understanding-
Mr. Biggs (02:01:14): So if they did send a team and they're going to interview him, and you described that earlier as an investigation, why didn't they put a security hold on President Trump going on stage at that rally?
Director Cheatle (02:01:30): At a number of our protective sites, there are suspicious individuals that are identified all the time. It doesn't necessarily mean that they constitute a threat.
Mr. Biggs (02:01:41): Of course not. But here you got a guy scampering up the side of a building on top of a roof. It's identified to you and you said you sent a team there and you can't answer that. (02:01:52) And this gets to one of my finer points, Mr. Chairman, if I can make it. And that is, we can have these kind of interview sessions, five minutes, everybody gets a kiss at the pig, five minutes and she gets to stonewall us, not deliver answers. So we say, "Okay, we're going to put together a congressional committee or blue ribbon committee." Same crap will happen. And I'll support that. But I will tell you this, I am calling on the speaker to give us and put together a truly independent commission of qualified former Secret Service agencies, presidential and VIP Protective Services, people who can actually conduct this kind of investigation and give us freelancers because I don't think you're going to give us those answers. You should have come today ready to give us answers. I call upon you to resign today. Today. And I also would say I've got a bunch of UC requests if I can go ahead, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palmer (02:02:54): Proceed with the request.
Mr. Biggs (02:02:56): Thank you. I apologize. It might take-
Mr. Palmer (02:02:59): That's all right. Go ahead.
Mr. Biggs (02:03:01): It might take a moment.
Mr. Palmer (02:03:01): Very important.
Mr. Biggs (02:03:01): So Anthony Guglielmi, the Secret Service spokesman, one from him.
Mr. Palmer (02:03:06): Without objections ordered.
Mr. Biggs (02:03:07): Article. "US Secret Service says it previously denied Trump request for additional resources," New York Times reports.
Mr. Palmer (02:03:12): Without objections ordered.
Mr. Biggs (02:03:13): Secret Service says it denied earlier Trump request for more federal resources.
Mr. Palmer (02:03:16): Objections ordered.
Mr. Biggs (02:03:17): Secret Service acknowledges denying some past requests by Trump's campaign for tighter security.
Mr. Palmer (02:03:21): Without objections ordered.
Mr. Biggs (02:03:22): Preliminary findings by Senator Ron Johnson and his committee.
Mr. Palmer (02:03:26): Without objections ordered.
Mr. Biggs (02:03:31): Articles entitled, "Notice anything different about Trump's Secret Service detailed." Next, "Former Biden official corrects himself after saying Dems must turn their fire on Donald Trump to beat him. Secret Service Director says Buck stops with her, but she will not resign. Disney Star Wars' Mark Hamill cracks joke about Trump's ear bandage following assassination attempt." Biden, "I haven't engaged inciting rhetoric Trump has. I'm just talking about threat to democracy." Piece called, "Who is Secret Service Chief Kimberly Cheatle?" Charlemagne, "The God says Trump solely responsible for violent rhetoric that led to attempt on his life." (02:04:06) Video actress Amanda, "SEALs pushes conspiracy theory. Donald Trump assassination trip was staged." Report, "Secret Service identified rooftop as a penfield vulnerability days before the rally." (02:04:17) "Watch BlackRock removes ad showing former president Donald Trump's would be assassin." (02:04:21) "Why does the Biden administration have 100% confident Secret Service after assassination attempt?" (02:04:27) Secret Service director, "We didn't put snipers on the roof because it was kind of sloped."
Speaker X (02:04:31): [inaudible 02:04:32].
Mr. Biggs (02:04:32): "Here's what Thomas Matthew Crooks did in the days leading up to Trump assassination attempt."
Mr. Palmer (02:04:37): "Secret Service director under scrutiny for diversity initiatives after Trump assassination attempt." (02:04:41) "The official story on Trump's shooting makes no sense at all." Andrew McCabe says Trump assassination [inaudible 02:04:46]-
Speaker 2 (02:04:46): Mr. Chairman. Point of order. I'm happy to ascend to all of them. I just so to facilitate our proceedings-
Mr. Biggs (02:04:52): You don't want me to read... Is it too tedious?
Speaker 2 (02:04:54): Well, we're not even really hearing them anyway. So if we could... It's up to you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palmer (02:05:00): [inaudible 02:05:02].
Mr. Biggs (02:05:02): You would like me to slow? I'll slow it down. I was probably going too fast. (02:05:04) "Secret services explanations for security failures ahead of Trump assassination temp are not adding up." (02:05:11) Us reportedly received intel of Iranian plot to assassinate President Trump. "What? WTH. Secret Service's now saying that they didn't put any agents on the roof because slight slope was too dangerous." (02:05:25) Report. "US officials received intel of Iranian plot to assassinate Donald Trump before crook's attempt." Exclusive GOP Rep Cloud, "Homeland Security Agency is interfering in House's assassination investigation." (02:05:37) "Why Trump's raised fist surviving assassination attempt is triggering the liberal media." (02:05:43) "Questions swirl over the security lapse at Trump rally reviving old concerns about Secret Service." (02:05:49) "Secret Service scrambles to shift blame after Trump shooting as backlash hits hard." (02:05:54) "Nobody contacted me." (02:05:56) "Must see six cameras split screen of assassination attempt captures everything. Shooter was in open two plus minutes." (02:06:05) Maria, "Five reasons you should be angry." (02:06:08) Breaking, "Shooter spotted up to 30 minutes before firing, reported multiple times. Pictures taken, no one stopped him." (02:06:15) "Cheatle calls the 30 minutes between noticing and neutralizing shooter a very short period of time." (02:06:22) "Secret Service Director says, 'Buck stops with me' on Trump assassination attempt but won't resign."
Mr. Palmer (02:06:29): Mr. Biggs, we'll stop right there. We can retake them on the next one. I know there are more.
Mr. Biggs (02:06:34): Okay.
Mr. Palmer (02:06:34): But without objection, we'll enter into the record all of those and we'll take up the others after the next speaker. (02:06:39) Chair now recognizes Ms. Brown from Ohio for five minutes.
Ms. Brown (02:06:42): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to highlight certain comments from Ranking Member Raskin, my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, President Biden and Vice President Harris, and that is political violence is completely unacceptable in this country, fullstop. It is an assault on our democracy itself, and I am devastated by this attack on a candidate for the president, for the office of the highest office in the land, and continue to pray for the victims of the shooting and their families. (02:07:13) As someone who has known gun violence firsthand, no one should have to experience the pain of losing a loved one to weapons of war. It is deeply unfortunate political violence has become far too common. Whether it is the deadly attack on the Capitol on January 6th, the assault on Speaker Pelosi's husband, or the threats of violence against election workers, we all must work to condemn political violence and tone down the rhetoric. (02:07:45) So Director Cheatle, on behalf of the hardworking men and women of the Secret Service, can you give us some perspective as into what goes into securing an event like the rally? Like how much time do you have to prepare?
Director Cheatle (00:00): Thank you for the question. Generally, when we receive notification that there's going to be an event taking place at a venue, the advance team assignments are made and there is a five-day process to conduct walkthroughs, coordinate with staff, local staff, and whether it be campaign staff or the protectee staff, and then with local law enforcement, on where the perimeter is going to be, the size and the scope of the event, how many attendees there are going to be, if it's an indoor rally, outdoor rally, what sort of assets are available locally, what sort of assets the Secret Service can bring to bear, and what the scope of the event that the staff is trying to accomplish.
Ms. Brown (02:08:43): So to that point, how many agents were recommended or requested as opposed to how many were assigned?
Director Cheatle (02:08:50): So I'm not going to get into specifics of how many were assigned, but those numbers that were requested were provided.
Ms. Brown (02:08:59): And how many local agents were involved in the preparation, if you will, that you talked about, that five-day preparation?
Director Cheatle (02:09:07): So there were a number of local agents from the local office, as well as agents from the former Trump detail that were involved in that advanced process.
Ms. Brown (02:09:17): Do we have a number?
Director Cheatle (02:09:19): I do have a number. I'm not going to release that number in this setting.
Ms. Brown (02:09:24): You're not making this easy for us. This is a shocking incident on the former president's life, and an appalling instance of political violence and a threat to our democratic values. I'm thankful that the former president is on the mend. And again, I'm grieving for the family and friends of Corey Comperatore, who lost a loved one in this shooting, and now know the unbearable pain of gun violence. I really hope this serves as a reminder about our responsibility to attack policies, not personalities, to be honest and truthful, and to treat one another with dignity, respect, and thoughtfulness. And with that, I yield my remaining time to Ranking Member Raskin.
Mr. Raskin (02:10:07): Thank you, Ms. Brown, for those very powerful and moving remarks. Director Cheatle, we don't want to lose a presidential candidate to an AR-15 attack. We cannot lose a presidential candidate to an AR-15 attack, and we can't lose any more citizens to AR-15 mass violence, mass shootings. And we certainly don't want an attempted AR-15 assassination or assassination attempt to set off political violence or riots in America. So this is deadly serious business. The vice-ranking member pointed out that a report in 60 days won't do it for us, because we have a responsibility, members of Congress have a responsibility to take action now if there's anything we can do to prevent this. (02:11:07) So my question for you is what is informing your operational decisions right now, that you've invoked without a report? Can you tell us what are the preliminary judgments, or if you don't want to foreshadow the report, fine, what are your personal, professional judgments informing the operational decisions you're making right now?
Director Cheatle (02:11:33): Certainly, and I appreciate that question. I don't want to make any preliminary judgments on what happened on this particular day, but I can tell you that we have looked at, as we did immediately in the aftermath, what the security plan for the Republican National Convention was going to be, and we made adjustments to the interior of the perimeter there. We looked at the protectees that we have here in the Washington DC area, and our protective sites, and we did make some adjustments to their security posture. And as we continue to move through the next several weeks, even yesterday with the announcement of the president no longer running, we have made adjustments to the vice president's detail. We are already prepared for an eventual VP nominee, and we continue to make those assessments. I think it just shows how dynamic the environment is that this agency works in every day.
Mr. Raskin (02:12:28): So you've made the same kinds of common- sense judgments and intuitive recommendations that members of the public and members of Congress are asking about right now?
Director Cheatle (02:12:40): Yes. Yes.
Mr. Raskin (02:12:40): Okay. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman? Thank you.
Chairman Comer (02:12:43): And before I recognize Ms. Mays, I have to say, Director, we're pretty close to the halfway point during this. You answered more questions with an ABC reporter than you have with members of Congress. We have a lot more questions. The American people are demanding that we get answers to those questions, and that's what the purpose of this hearing is today. So I'm sure a lot of the questions that have already been asked are going to be asked again, and hopefully we can get some answers to those questions. I strongly implore you to answer those questions. You're here with a subpoena, and we expect you to answer the questions. Chair now recognizes Ms. Mace from South Carolina.
Ms. Mace (02:13:23): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Director Cheatle, the American people are watching, and they're wondering if there are any questions you can answer honestly today. So Director Cheatle, I have a series of questions, very specific questions. I want very specific answers. Most of my questions are going to demand a yes or no answer. Do you understand?
Director Cheatle (02:13:45): I do.
Ms. Mace (02:13:46): Okay. My first question, both sides of the aisle today have asked for your resignation. Would you like to use my five minutes to draft your resignation letter? Yes or no?
Director Cheatle (02:13:56): No, thank you.
Ms. Mace (02:13:59): Was this a colossal failure?
Director Cheatle (02:14:02): It was a failure.
Ms. Mace (02:14:04): Yes or no? Was it a colossal failure, is the question. Yes or no?
Director Cheatle (02:14:08): I have admitted this is a terrible-
Ms. Mace (02:14:09): This is a yes or no series of questions. Was this a colossal failure? Yes or no?
Director Cheatle (02:14:15): Yes.
Ms. Mace (02:14:16): Was this tragedy preventable? Yes or no?
Director Cheatle (02:14:20): Yes.
Ms. Mace (02:14:21): Has the Secret Service been transparent with this committee?
Director Cheatle (02:14:26): Yes.
Ms. Mace (02:14:27): Would you say the fact that we had to issue a subpoena to get you to show up today as being transparent, yes or no?
Director Cheatle (02:14:35): I have always been eager to come and answer questions to the committee.
Ms. Mace (02:14:36): Yes or no. You didn't want to answer the question. We had to issue a subpoena to get you to show up today. That is not transparent by the way. You stated earlier, Secret Service is not political. Is that correct?
Director Cheatle (02:14:47): Yes.
Ms. Mace (02:14:48): Okay. Would you say leaking your opening statement to Punchbowl News, Politicos Playbook, and Washington Post several hours before you sent it to this committee as being political? Yes or no?
Director Cheatle (02:15:03): I have no idea how my statement got out.
Ms. Mace (02:15:06): Well, that's bullshit. So Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record articles by Punchbowl News, Politico Playbook, Washington Post, all done at 5:24 AM, 6:12 AM, 6:34 AM, a solid three to four hours before this committee got your statement.
Chairman Comer (02:15:25): Without objection to ordered.
Ms. Mace (02:15:29): Okay. Is the Secret Service fully cooperating with our committee?
Director Cheatle (02:15:35): Yes.
Ms. Mace (02:15:36): Okay. You say you're fully cooperating with this committee. On July 15th, this committee sent you a list of demands of information that we wanted. Has the Secret Service provided this committee a complete list of all law enforcement personnel that were there that day? Have you done that? Have you provided a list to the Oversight Committee? Yes or no?
Director Cheatle (02:15:55): I'll have to get back to you on that.
Ms. Mace (02:15:57): That is a no. Have you provided all audio and video recordings in your possession to this committee, as we asked on July 15th? Yes or no?
Director Cheatle (02:16:05): I would have to get back to you on that.
Ms. Mace (02:16:06): That's is a no. You're full of shit today. You're just being completely dishonest.
Mr. Mfume (02:16:10): Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Mace (02:16:11): Come on.
Mr. Mfume (02:16:11): We have to maintain decorum in this committee no matter how upset we get.
Ms. Mace (02:16:20): Have you provided any and all memos to this committee that we've asked you on July 15th? Have you provided all memorandums within the Secret Service?
Director Cheatle (02:16:26): I would have to get back to you on that.
Ms. Mace (02:16:27): That is a no. You are being dishonest or lying. You're being dishonest here with this committee. These are important questions that the American people want answers to, and you're dodging and talking around it in generalities. And we had to subpoena you to be here, and you won't even answer the questions. We've asked you repeatedly to answer our questions. This isn't hard. These are not hard questions. Have you provided us all communications from the Secret Service related to that day in that rally? Have you provided this committee? We've asked for this information on July 15th. Have you provided any of this information that this committee has asked of the Secret Service, any of it?
Director Cheatle (02:17:05): I'll have to get back to you on that.
Ms. Mace (02:17:06): Have you even read this letter that we sent you? Did you even read this?
Director Cheatle (02:17:11): Yes.
Ms. Mace (02:17:12): Okay. And you have said you don't know, you have no idea. The answer is no. We haven't gotten a single document or piece of information or data from you or your agency in related to the rally that we have asked you for. So was this attempted assassination of Donald Trump a failure of training, or execution, or both?
Director Cheatle (02:17:37): I think that those are answers that we need to examine.
Ms. Mace (02:17:40): Training, execution, or both? Which one?
Director Cheatle (02:17:42): I think those are answers we need to determine.
Ms. Mace (02:17:44): All right. How many Secret Service personnel have lost their jobs due to this colossal failure?
Director Cheatle (02:17:50): At this time, none.
Ms. Mace (02:17:52): How many Secret Service personnel have been required to take a refresher course on how not to let people shoot Donald Trump?
Director Cheatle (02:18:01): Our personnel are currently operational. We are examining the facts of this investigation, and we will make the changes necessary.
Ms. Mace (02:18:08): What time did law enforcement become aware that there was an individual on the roof, with a clear line of sight to President Trump?
Director Cheatle (02:18:14): I am still verifying timelines.
Ms. Mace (02:18:17): Of course. Nine days in you have no answers. How many minutes went by between the time law enforcement saw and took photos of Crooks and the shooting? How many minutes?
Director Cheatle (02:18:26): I am still verifying timelines.
Ms. Mace (02:18:28): 57 minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Chairman Comer (02:18:32): Gentle lady yields back. Before I recognize Ms. Stansbury, I believe I want to recognize Mr. Mfume for a unanimous consent.
Mr. Mfume (02:18:38): Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I beg your indulgence, I meant to do this earlier. I'd like to have unanimous consent that it be submitted for the record, the 2023 ranking of best and worst workplaces in the federal government, compiled by the Office of Personnel Management, which shows the United States Secret Service coming in again as I said earlier, 413th out of 459 sub-agencies. And this appears in the July 17th edition of Government Executive.
Chairman Comer (02:19:12): Without objections, ordered. Chair now recognizes Ms. Stansbury from New Mexico.
Ms. Stansbury (02:19:17): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by just saying that part of why you have bipartisan agreement here on the dais about the severity and importance of this hearing is because this is not just a single shooting. This is about national security and the security of our democracy. It's not just one operational failure. This is about are our public officials safe, and what does that signal to our country and to the world about American security and the ability of our officials to do their jobs safely? So I want to start by saying thank you to all of our brave men and women who are in the uniform, whether it's the Secret Service or local law enforcement, who put their lives on the line. I think obviously we honor their service, but this is really about operational failures and what it means for our country at large. (02:20:10) And I also want to reaffirm that we must condemn unequivocally political violence of any kind, violence of any kind, not just political violence, and that it cannot be tolerated in this democracy. And also, to offer my prayers for the slain Fire Chief Corey Comperatore, and also prayers for those who've been injured. Now, I think the tone of this hearing is how is it that a 20-year-old young man with a gun that was legally purchased by his father, could on the day of a rally go to a gun shop, legally purchase ammunition, show up to a secured site, and then not only attempt an assassination of a political figure, but kill and injure to others? How could this happen? I'm not asking yet. I think we've had a lot of testimony here today. (02:21:10) I want to talk a little bit about the timeline. Now, here's what we know. And I know, Director, you were also on the call that we had a few days ago with the FBI and other law enforcement. So I respect that you are not able to share, based on your testimony, some of the details that are currently being investigated. But I know you were on the call because I heard you on the call and you heard them too. So I'm going to lay out the timeline a little bit. On July 3rd, the rally was announced that it was going to be in Butler. On July 6th, three days later, we know that the shooter searched for dates for Trump and DNC events. On July 7th, so this is four days after the announcement, the shooter went to the site. He actually physically went to the site. On July 12th, the shooter went to a gun range where he and his dad regularly go, and practiced shooting. And the next day, on July 13th, he went to the site again before the rally began. (02:22:12) We know that he then went and searched online for a gun store, where he went and he purchased 50 rounds of ammunition, went home, got his father's AR, which was legally purchased, and returned to the venue. At 5:00 PM that evening, this is more than an hour before Donald Trump actually took the stage that evening, local law enforcement were made aware that there was a suspicious man. In fact, at 5:20, local law enforcement flagged that he had a range finder, and they radioed their concerns and sent around pictures of the individual. At 5:40, 20 minutes before local law enforcement actually identified the shooter, and at 5:51 Secret Service was notified of the suspicious person by the state police. And one minute later, they distributed that information. That was before Donald Trump even took the stage. That was 11 minutes before he took the stage. So the Secret Service was aware that there was a suspicious person. (02:23:23) At 6:03, he took the stage. At 6:09, rally goers, as was shown in the video, identified this gentleman climbing on the roof. At 6:11, three shots were heard, three rounds of shots. And of course, the president and the other victims were shot. This shooter was a 20-year-old young man. No criminal record, legally purchased gun and ammunition, who for days in the lead up to this shooting was searching mass shooters. He even had a picture of a mass shooter on his cell phone the day of the shooting. He searched for explosives, he searched high-level officials. So the American people want to know how did a 20-year-old young man with access to a military-style weapon actually bring it onto an unsecured perimeter, who for days had been planning a mass shooting event. And I think that, Madam Director, with all due respect, the answers that we've received here in this hearing today are completely unsatisfactory. (02:24:38) How could this happen? We need answers. We need answers not just for the family members of the gentleman who was killed and those who were injured, but we need answers for our democracy. Because as others have stated here today, we are in a highly politically charged environment right now. We are only weeks away from one of the most significant presidential elections in American history, and it is clear that our public officials' safety has not been secured. And it is not just a matter of one shooting, it is a matter of national security. So I hope that you will take our comments to heart, I hope that there will be accountability, and we need answers. And with that, I yield back.
Chairman Comer (02:25:34): Chair now recognizes Mr. LaTurner from Kansas.
Mr. LaTurner (02:25:37): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Cheatle, I have a question just right off the bat. Something that you've bragged about repeatedly is that you've increased protection for the 36 individuals that the Secret Service is also entrusted with. Is that correct?
Director Cheatle (02:25:50): I think I stated that we currently have 36 protectees, and that we continue to make evaluations on where those levels of protection are provided.
Mr. LaTurner (02:25:59): You've mentioned specific increases in protection that you've provided for some of those individuals, correct?
Director Cheatle (02:26:04): Correct.
Mr. LaTurner (02:26:05): Based on what?
Director Cheatle (02:26:07): Well, some of it has been as a result of the tragic incident that occurred on the 13th. We went back and reassessed where we were at in providing protection, and wanted to make sure that we were not overlooking anything considering this most recent incident.
Mr. LaTurner (02:26:23): So the Secret Service needed to learn that allowing a rooftop 150 yards away from a protectee, not putting that in a perimeter, not having someone guarding that roof, that information is new to you, and it's caused you to increase protection to other folks that are under your care?
Director Cheatle (02:26:41): I think it is prudent after any incident that occurs, to go back and take a look at your current practices and see if there is anything that needs to be done differently.
Mr. LaTurner (02:26:51): It's inconsistent. Because what you said earlier to Mr. Turner was that the protection that you were offering to President Trump was in line with the current threats. Him being a former president, him being a nominee of a major political party, the threats from Iran, the protection that you're providing him was adequate. Do you stand by that statement?
Director Cheatle (02:27:09): Yes.
Mr. LaTurner (02:27:10): Okay. Do you think it's a problem that the Americans trust in the federal government is an all-time low? Do you think that's a problem?
Director Cheatle (02:27:21): I think that it's unfortunate.
Mr. LaTurner (02:27:24): I don't know why you're quibbling with my word. Is it a problem or is it not?
Director Cheatle (02:27:27): I think the American public deserves to have trust in their federal government.
Mr. LaTurner (02:27:30): Okay. I don't know why you're being difficult. It's a simple question. Are you concerned about the increasing prevalence of conspiracy theories going on out there right now?
Director Cheatle (02:27:41): Yes.
Mr. LaTurner (02:27:42): I am too. You've been incredibly inconsistent with your answers before this committee today, and what you are willing to reveal. You've acknowledged that the shooter was identified with a rangefinder, that President Trump's detail was sufficient for the threats he faced from Iran, that certain details were erroneously reported, in your words. But you haven't been willing to provide any information about the decision to place the building in question outside the perimeter, the explosives placed in the shooters vehicle, the use of a drone by the shooter, or when exactly the Secret Service identified the shooter as a threat rather than merely suspicious. (02:28:18) What is your standard today for what you are willing to answer and what you are not, because you've been inconsistent?
Director Cheatle (02:28:25): I'm certain that you can understand that some of the information that's been provided to you thus far has come from the FBI's investigation, and has come from information that we have released. I want to make sure that information that is being provided to this committee is consistent and is factual.
Mr. LaTurner (02:28:41): The question about the drone that the chairman asked at the beginning of the hearing, he said, "Do you know this information?" And you acknowledge that yes, you do know the information, you just don't want to tell us. I guess my question is, is that if you wanted to wait until the end of the investigation to draw conclusions, which you've acknowledged you're not, you're drawing conclusions right now and making changes, but if that was your standard that you want to wait until the end of the investigation to draw conclusions, okay, at least you would be consistent in that. But what we're wanting to know today and what would dispel some of the conspiracy theories out there, what would increase trust with the American people is for you to let facts out, for you to tell us what you know. And I want to understand from you, why is that a problem? Why is it inconsistent with a quality investigation to release to the American people today, at least the information that you know for sure? Because you certainly know for sure more information than you're willing to give us today.
Director Cheatle (02:29:38): I have released that there was a failure, and that there are gaps that we need to make sure that they don't happen again.
Mr. LaTurner (02:29:47): That's not acceptable, that's not enough. That doesn't quell any conspiracy theories out there. In your 27 years of experience, would you have been concerned about an elevated location within 150 yards of a protectee that did not have a Secret Service presence? Just based on your experience.
Director Cheatle (02:30:04): What I can tell you is that every site and every venue is advanced differently.
Mr. LaTurner (02:30:07): No, no, no. I'm asking for your experience. Looking at this situation, would that have been of concern to you? Or would you have agreed that it's fine, it doesn't need to be covered?
Director Cheatle (02:30:16): What I have explained to today is that there was-
Mr. LaTurner (02:30:18): You're not going to answer. Is it true that at 5:45 PM, approximately 18 minutes before President Trump took the stage, the Beaver County Emergency Services Unit noticed the shooter on the roof and photographed him? Is that a fact or not?
Director Cheatle (02:30:30): That is the information that I have from the FBI's report, yes.
Mr. LaTurner (02:30:33): You haven't been willing to share whether or when this was communicated to the Secret Service? So I'd like to get into the difference between suspicious activity and threatening activity. Is it suspicious or threatening if an individual is seen around the perimeter with a rangefinder? Is that just suspicious?
Director Cheatle (02:30:50): That could be termed as suspicious.
Mr. LaTurner (02:30:52): If that same individual with the rangefinder is found on a rooftop, is that still just suspicious, or is that considered threatening?
Director Cheatle (02:31:02): That could be termed still as suspicious.
Mr. LaTurner (02:31:04): All right, my time is over. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Comer (02:31:08): Thank you. Chair now recognized Mr. Frost from Florida.
Mr. Frost (02:31:11): Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. Obviously want to start by stressing that political violence is always unacceptable, and acknowledging that this is still an ongoing investigation. But oversight hearings like this are essential components of an investigation, and I want to thank the chair for pulling this together. Madam Director, I appreciate you for being here. The events of July 13th raise serious questions about the efficacy and of the security protocols in place. The gravity of the fact that an unsophisticated gunman was able to secure his perch and take a shot at a former president, despite multiple layers of security and intelligence, are not lost on me. Before I came to Congress, I used to work advance for a major political candidate ,and have interacted with many different law enforcement agencies on large political events like the one that just happened. How many times was the Secret Service alerted about a suspicious person at the July 13th campaign event, prior to the first shot being shot?
Director Cheatle (02:32:09): I don't have an exact number to share with you today, but from what I've been able to discern, somewhere between two and five times, there was some sort of communication about a suspicious individual.
Mr. Frost (02:32:24): To the Secret Service specifically?
Director Cheatle (02:32:25): Mm-hmm.
Mr. Frost (02:32:26): According to reports, the shooter was photographed twice by security officers prior to the shooting. A police officer saw the shooter on the ground and reported him with a photograph as a suspicious person. Multiple local law enforcement officers identified the shooter, radioed that he was acting suspiciously, near the event's magnetometers. A local law enforcement tactical team saw the shooter on a roof, and notified other security services, and also photographed him. One police officer who photographed the shooter, saw him scoping out the roof and carrying a range finder. My question is, and you've answered this, but why... Or you haven't answered this. Why wasn't the event paused right then?
Director Cheatle (02:33:10): Again, I'm not clear on the timeline of when the Secret Service shift and the counter sniper were notified-
Mr. Frost (02:33:18): But earlier, Madam Director, earlier you said that the Secret Service would have paused the rally if they identified a threat.
Director Cheatle (02:33:25): Correct.
Mr. Frost (02:33:26): So why wasn't it paused?
Director Cheatle (02:33:30): Because I have to assume that they did not know that there was a threat when they brought the president out on the stage.
Mr. Frost (02:33:37): I feel like this is a breakdown in communication between local law enforcement, you all, and other actors at the rally. And again, as someone who's worked on these, I understand that there's multiple people with the ability to make different decisions on the ground. Over the last week, I've spoken with a lot of folks in local law enforcement in my district and across the country that I've worked with before. And other people have brought up concerns around being able to communicate with Secret Service during these big events, and having their flags taken seriously. I do believe that if Secret Service believed that there was a legitimate threat, that they would've paused a rally. My concern is before that, that something was flagged and it wasn't taken as seriously as it should have been taken. (02:34:26) So I think this shows an issue with communication. I want to know, Madam Director, what you intend to do to fix that, not in 60 days, but now. We are in the middle of a presidential election. Obviously a former president who had an assassination attempt, another rally goer who was killed due to this gun violence. We now have a presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party who's also historic first black woman to be running for president. And so I am worried about everybody's life. What do y'all intend to do to fix this communication breakdown, and making sure that you actually take what local law enforcement, local folks are saying more seriously?
Director Cheatle (02:35:08): We take what local law enforcement relays to us seriously. Let me just be clear on that. As far as the communication-
Mr. Frost (02:35:15): But not this time.
Director Cheatle (02:35:17): We always trust our law enforcement partners and have a great relationship with them. We are looking at whether or not there was a communication breakdown. If that was the case, we will take steps to ensure that we correct that, because to your point, we cannot have a communication breakdown.
Mr. Frost (02:35:34): Madam Director, you've mentioned that the perimeter of the event did not include the rooftop where the shooter was. Does your responsibility and the Secret Service's responsibility to protect a principal stop at the perimeter of an event?
Director Cheatle (02:35:51): Our responsibility is to ensure the safety and security of the event itself, and the protectee who is attending that event, and the personnel who are protected.
Mr. Frost (02:36:00): So you would say the fact that the rooftop was outside the perimeter is not an excuse for what happened, saying that it was outside the perimeter of the event?
Director Cheatle (02:36:07): I am not offering that as an excuse.
Mr. Frost (02:36:09): Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Comer (02:36:11): Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes Mr. Fallon from Texas.
Mr. Fallon (02:36:15): How did a 20-year-old loner with a week's notice, pick the absolute best location to assassinate President Trump when the entire Secret Service missed it? Director Cheatle, in your leadership, your agency got outsmarted and outmaneuvered by a 20-year-old. How can we have any confidence that you could stop a trained professionals from a nefarious nation-state?
Director Cheatle (02:36:37): Those are absolutely questions that we need to have answered.
Mr. Fallon (02:36:42): I know they're questions, but the fact of the matter is we can't have that confidence. Director, do you have the ability personally, do you have the authority to beef up security of any of your protectees?
Director Cheatle (02:36:48): Yes, I do.
Mr. Fallon (02:36:51): Okay. So were you also aware there was a credible threat President Trump was facing? He was facing a heightened security threat to a foreign adversary?
Director Cheatle (02:37:00): Yes.
Mr. Fallon (02:37:01): Okay. So given that there was an increased threat to President Trump's life, was he provided a full security complement akin to what a sitting U.S president would receive?
Director Cheatle (02:37:10): He was provided a full complement of security based on the threat assessment that we had-
Mr. Fallon (02:37:17): That's not my question.
Director Cheatle (02:37:18): And the venue.
Mr. Fallon (02:37:19): My question is, if he'd been the sitting president, would he have had the same security he had on July 13th or would it have been beefed up?
Director Cheatle (02:37:24): There is a difference between the sitting president-
Mr. Fallon (02:37:27): So your answer is he didn't?
Director Cheatle (02:37:29): And continuity of government and the responsibility that we had.
Mr. Fallon (02:37:32): So he did not. Okay. There wasn't a CATT team, a full CATT team on site, there wasn't counter surveillance teams on site. But this is the thing, you just said you had the ability to beef up the security, you knew about the threat, and you didn't. And that's as telling as it is chilling. We have satellite images from the Butler Fairgrounds. Have you visited the site?
Director Cheatle (02:37:52): No, I have not.
Mr. Fallon (02:37:53): Nine days and you have not visited the site. You should have been there that night. That evening, did you talk to the team, the heroes that surrounded the president? Did you call them that night?
Director Cheatle (02:38:04): They were still operational, working for protection of the president.
Mr. Fallon (02:38:07): The answer is no. Did you call them the next day?
Director Cheatle (02:38:08): Yes, I spoke with them.
Mr. Fallon (02:38:09): You called them the very next day, not the day of. Or was it 72 hours after?
Director Cheatle (02:38:14): I don't know the timeline, but I spoke with them immediately-
Mr. Fallon (02:38:15): Okay, because you're under oath. I think it was 72 hours after. You waited three days. What is immediately clear is that there are a number of structures that need to be secured. Of these, Director, other than the first immediate four, what's the most dangerous site that should have been secured? Because you know security 101, you got to mitigate the high ground.
Director Cheatle (02:38:33): Yes.
Mr. Fallon (02:38:34): Okay. Do you know what the next most dangerous site, what was the closest structure to the president, other than the four immediate ones that you had your counter sniper teams on?
Director Cheatle (02:38:44): There are a number of structures around that event site.
Mr. Fallon (02:38:48): The shooter knew. The shooter has visited the site two more times than you have, and he had a drone, and he picked the AGR Building. So you said, do you remember in an ABC interview you did, that you didn't have people on the roof of the AGR Building because you were worried about safety because of the slope?
Director Cheatle (02:39:04): I recall that statement.
Mr. Fallon (02:39:05): Okay. Does the Secret Service have written policy you can share with us about slope roofs?
Director Cheatle (02:39:13): No.
Mr. Fallon (02:39:14): Okay. So why'd you act like there was one? Because is it your practice to comment on events of enormous national implications when you're ignorant of the facts? That's rhetorical. So here's this thing with the slopes. You go all up to like 18 12, you can go to a one 1 12, which is about as flat as you can get without it being completely flat. And you're saying that there was a danger, safety concern there. But the problem is, Director, you put your counter snipers on a 3 12 roof, which is steeper than the 1 12. And by the way, the 1 12 is ADA compliant. You can build a ramp for a wheelchair on a 1 12 roof. So these are nothing but pathetic excuses, and they make no sense and they're a bunch of cow dung. All the law enforcement I've spoken with over the last
Mr. Fallon (02:40:00): ... last nine days are amazed that the AGR rooftop was not secure. And you want to know why? Because it's dangerous. I have never had any long gun training in my life. I own an AR-15, and last time I shot it... I shot it one time my whole life. It was six years ago. That isn't until Saturday where we recreated the events in Savoy, Texas where we recreated what happened to Butler. I was lying prone on a sloped roof at 130 yards, at 6:30 at night. And I knew that he had a scope. I didn't know what kind, red dot or magnified, so I shot eight rounds from both. You know what the result was? 15 out of 16 kill shots, and the one I missed would've hit the president's ear. (02:40:38) That's a 94% success rate and that shooter was a better shot than me. It is a miracle President Trump wasn't killed. Corey Comperatore's life is over because that shooter made it on the roof. And it wasn't the roof that was dangerous, it was a nut job on top of the roof. You know what else is dangerous? I believe you're horrifying ineptitude and your lack of skilled leadership is a disgrace. Your obfuscating today is shameful, and you should be fired immediately and go back to Garden Doritos. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Speaker 3 (02:41:09): Chair recognizes Ms. Lee from Pennsylvania.
Ms. Lee (02:41:12): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd like to thank the chair, the ranking member for coming together and holding this hearing, but I have to say I don't think any of our concerns have been addressed today, and what little we've learned has not inspired much confidence. I will just say that we obviously can't allow the violence we're seeing in this country become the norm or a commonplace, but that seems to be where we're heading. On this occasion, it was, very shockingly, a former president and current political candidate at a rally that we all assume is one of the most secure places we can be, but the violence we saw last Saturday is the same culture of violence that makes too many of our kids in our community members feel unsafe to play outside or to go to class, or to simply live their lives each day. But again, this was a political rally and it is supposed to be one of the most secure places, so we do have very specific questions about that. (02:42:05) Director Cheatle, I'd like to start by following up on some of my colleagues' questions. My colleagues, Mr. Krishnamoorthia and Mr. Frost, highlighted a number of points that showed the shooter presenting an active threat. So I'd like to ask you, Director Cheatle, to clarify what the protocol is for postponing or canceling an event based on the threat and how the events on July 13th didn't meet those standards.
Director Cheatle (02:42:26): So again, I think we're talking about the distinction between suspicious behavior and a threat. And at the time that this individual was identified, they were displaying suspicious behavior. I'm still waiting for interviews from the FBI to determine what it was that identified that individual as suspicious and what those behaviors were.
Ms. Lee (02:42:48): To that question, is suspicious behavior... Does suspicious behavior vary between different events? For instance, if we have an event with a president, would there not be a heightened standard for suspicious behavior? I think that
Director Cheatle (02:43:00): There are a number of ways that someone could be identified as suspicious, and it doesn't matter whether it's at a rally or an indoor event or who the protectee is. I think it's up to law enforcement or citizens to identify someone as suspicious.
Ms. Lee (02:43:17): Okay, thank you. According to the Associated Press, at least six different agencies, including two Sheriff's Office, local police, state police, as well as fire and emergency rescue officials were involved in securing the rally in Butler. When there are so many teams that are collaborating, who takes the lead, and how is that determined?
Director Cheatle (02:43:33): The Secret Service is responsible for the security of the site and the coordination.
Ms. Lee (02:43:37): And that was the case on July 13th?
Director Cheatle (02:43:39): Correct.
Ms. Lee (02:43:40): Okay. Changing gears, in 2024's appropriations budget, the Secret service was given a little over 3 billion, which was about 78 million above what was requested. For 2020 five's budget, you've requested yet another increase. How much of these funds goes towards training and improving protection procedures?
Director Cheatle (02:43:59): I would've to get back to you on the training aspect of it, but about 30% of our budget is for protection and facilities and training.
Ms. Lee (02:44:11): But clearly the problem can't be a lack of funding. So what exactly do you see as the core problem that led to this failure that led to your agency being outgunned by a 20-year-old using his father's gun and acting on his own without a particularly sophisticated plan or technology?
Director Cheatle (02:44:27): I think that we are waiting to determine exactly what those failures or failure was so that we can make sure that the Secret Service is stronger after this.
Ms. Lee (02:44:39): So we've heard a lot today that you can't answer because it's an ongoing investigation, that you're still figuring out the details, and that you won't answer basic questions. You've said 60 days for the investigation, but I simply don't think that's acceptable. Do you really plan to keep avoiding questions and the American People's questions, ours and the American people's questions for the next 60 days?
Director Cheatle (02:45:01): I'm not avoiding questions. I want to make sure that I am providing factual and accurate information.
Ms. Lee (02:45:07): Certainly, but is there no in-between, between what is obviously a fact and what you can surmise from the details that you already have?
Director Cheatle (02:45:17): I assure you, when I have a full and complete report of what took place on that day, I will certainly come back and make that available.
Ms. Lee (02:45:25): Certainly. Studies indicate that the United States is experiencing increasing levels of political violence intention. Does the Secret Service see increasing political violence as a threat to its work? And if so, how was the Secret Service adapting its strategies and protocols to account for increasing political violence?
Director Cheatle (02:45:41): We are constantly evaluating the threats that we receive and monitoring that, and we make adjustments on a daily basis to our protectees based on what those threats are and what actions we need to take.
Ms. Lee (02:45:55): Yes or no, do you believe that stricter on the availability of assault weapons would make it easier for the Secret Service to fulfill its missions of protecting public officials?
Director Cheatle (02:46:03): I think the Secret Service is tasked with providing a safe environment, which is why we put into place a number of mitigation factors
Ms. Lee (02:46:10): Certainly, but do assault weapons make it easier or harder for you to do your job?
Director Cheatle (02:46:15): I think that any weapon makes it difficult for us to do our job.
Ms. Lee (02:46:17): Okay. I yield back.
Speaker 3 (02:46:21): Chair do recognizes Mr. Donalds from Florida.
Mr. Donalds (02:46:25): Thank you, Chairman. Director, real quick, at what time was Secret Service aware of the active threat against President Trump? Director, what time?
Director Cheatle (02:46:41): So the Secret Service was aware that there was an individual who had been identified as suspicious, and that that individual was attempting to be tracked down.
Mr. Donalds (02:46:54): At what time?
Director Cheatle (02:46:54): I don't have a specific timeline other than to tell you-
Mr. Donalds (02:46:57): Director, it's been nine days.
Director Cheatle (02:46:58): I understand that.
Mr. Donalds (02:46:58): At what time?
Director Cheatle (02:46:59): I want to make sure that I give you factual information, sir.
Mr. Donalds (02:47:03): Director, have you talked to the agents on the ground that day?
Director Cheatle (02:47:08): Yes, I have.
Mr. Donalds (02:47:08): You've talked to all of them?
Director Cheatle (02:47:10): Mm-hmm.
Mr. Donalds (02:47:10): Your senior team has talked to every agent that was on the ground that day?
Director Cheatle (02:47:14): Yes, we have.
Mr. Donalds (02:47:15): Have they all corroborated the same time they identified the shooter or they were made aware of the shooter, either by attendees in the crowd or local police department?
Director Cheatle (02:47:24): There are a number of reports of when those times were made.
Mr. Donalds (02:47:28): Was it five minutes before the first shot rang out?
Director Cheatle (02:47:33): No.
Mr. Donalds (02:47:33): Generally speaking, was it 10 minutes before the first shot rang out?
Director Cheatle (02:47:36): No, it was less.
Mr. Donalds (02:47:37): Was it 15 minutes before the first shot rang out?
Director Cheatle (02:47:39): It was less than that timeframe when it was identified as a threat.
Mr. Donalds (02:47:44): How many days before the shooting took place at Secret Service actually do their advance work to secure the facility that the rally was going to be held at?
Director Cheatle (02:47:52): Five days.
Mr. Donalds (02:47:53): In the five days prior, when the security advance team did their work, did they identify the rooftop as a potential threat?
Director Cheatle (02:48:03): Again, I'm pulling those reports and that information to conduct those interviews.
Mr. Donalds (02:48:06): It's been nine days, Madam Director. Did they know that? Did they notice a rooftop 150 yards away? That was a potential threat? Yes or no?
Director Cheatle (02:48:14): I am certain that the rooftop was noticed. I am pulling the reports.
Mr. Donalds (02:48:17): What was the security parameters around securing that rooftop?
Director Cheatle (02:48:23): There-
Mr. Donalds (02:48:24): What did they do?
Director Cheatle (02:48:24): There was overwatch provided for that rooftop?
Mr. Donalds (02:48:27): Did overwatch fail?
Director Cheatle (02:48:29): I am waiting to hear what the results of the investigation were so that I can identify where the failure was.
Mr. Donalds (02:48:38): Who did you talk to that was on the ground that day that was responsible for Overwatch? What are their names?
Director Cheatle (02:48:46): I'm not going to provide their names in this setting.
Mr. Donalds (02:48:49): Did you talk to the people that were providing overwatch that day?
Director Cheatle (02:48:52): I've talked to the people that conducted the advance that day and that we're working the shift, and were the counter snipers on that day.
Mr. Donalds (02:49:00): So you talked to the counter sniper team, you talked to the people who were providing overwatch that day, and you talked to the advance team, correct?
Director Cheatle (02:49:07): Yes, sir.
Mr. Donalds (02:49:08): What did they tell you?
Director Cheatle (02:49:11): We are putting together a comprehensive report so that I can identify exactly where the gaps and the failures.
Mr. Donalds (02:49:17): When the counter sniper team was on the roof and they identified that there was suspicious activity on the roof in question, what was the chain of commands orders around the person on said roof? Because I'm quite sure somebody saw, under your organization in Secret Service, I'm quite sure somebody saw the shooter on the roof. So what was the communication through the chain of command to deal with said person.
Director Cheatle (02:49:49): What I can tell you is that when the individual was identified by the counter sniper, they took one shot and neutralized that individual.
Mr. Donalds (02:49:59): But that was after the shooter already took a shot, is that correct?
Director Cheatle (02:50:03): That is correct.
Mr. Donalds (02:50:04): So what you're saying now is that the Secret Service did not see the shooter on the roof until after the shooter took a shot?
Director Cheatle (02:50:14): I do not have all of those details at this time.
Mr. Donalds (02:50:16): If you don't have those details after nine days director, then what you're telling me is that you guys didn't see it. Is that correct?
Director Cheatle (02:50:24): I am telling you I don't have all the details of the sequence at this time.
Mr. Donalds (02:50:27): Director, it's been nine days. Either you have the information or you do not. Is that correct?
Director Cheatle (02:50:34): We are still in the process of conducting interviews and an investigation.
Mr. Donalds (02:50:38): Some of my colleagues have texted me over the last couple days, bipartisan, about whether you should lose your job, and I've been quiet on that question because I wanted to see what you were going to do today. In my opinion, you do need to be fired immediately, and it is because this is gross incompetence. And the fact that it's been nine days, and these are simple questions to answer... I'm quite sure if I asked any one of my kids, if they got in trouble and I told them to give me the details, I would get more answers from them than I'm getting from you right now. And that's what's frustrating on a bipartisan basis, on a nonpartisan basis. This is a joke. And director, you're in charge, and that's why you need to go. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Speaker 3 (02:51:23): Chair now recognizes Mr. Goldman from New York.
Mr. Goldman (02:51:27): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director, I want to follow up and just understand a little bit why there is so much information about this out in the public, including some from you and your communications team, and yet you're here pursuant to a subpoena under oath in front of and you're unable or unwilling to answer some of those same questions. Can you just explain why you are answering so many fewer questions here than you have to the media?
Director Cheatle (02:52:08): I'm answering the questions that I'm able to answer based on the fact that there are multiple ongoing investigations.
Mr. Goldman (02:52:15): But you have answered some of these questions previously, correct, to the public, to the media?
Director Cheatle (02:52:24): Which questions?
Mr. Goldman (02:52:25): Well, did you have an interview with ABC News?
Director Cheatle (02:52:29): Yes, I did.
Mr. Goldman (02:52:30): Okay, and did you explain the interaction between local law enforcement and the Secret Service and that local law enforcement was responsible for securing the perimeter of the building where the shooter was?
Director Cheatle (02:52:43): I said that the Secret Service is responsible for designing and implementing and executing the security plan and that we rely on the assistance of our local law enforcement partners to assist us with that plan.
Mr. Goldman (02:52:57): Let me ask you something. Were you given any instructions about what you can and cannot answer here today?
Director Cheatle (02:53:05): My ability to answer questions is solely reflective of the fact that there are multiple ongoing investigations, and I want to make sure that I provide accurate information that doesn't conflict with any of those investigations that are going on.
Mr. Goldman (02:53:21): So is it your view that you can't talk about anything that happened that day until those investigations are completed?
Director Cheatle (02:53:27): My view is that I want to make sure that this committee and the American public gets correct and actual information.
Mr. Goldman (02:53:35): And so is it your view that that can only happen after the completion of the investigation?
Director Cheatle (02:53:41): It is my view that when the investigations are complete, that we will be able to share that information.
Mr. Goldman (02:53:48): And how about before that?
Director Cheatle (02:53:50): If I have factual information that I can share before that, I absolutely will.
Mr. Goldman (02:53:55): I'm guessing you have factual information as to when the photograph of the suspicious person was relayed to the Secret Service. There's a time stamp on that text message or whatever it was, correct?
Director Cheatle (02:54:14): Sir. I'm sure you can understand that when you're dealing with text messages, emails and other communications, the timelines don't always match up.
Mr. Goldman (02:54:27): Not really if they're time stamped, but let me move on because you have acknowledged that this was a major security failure. Is that right?
Director Cheatle (02:54:35): Yes.
Mr. Goldman (02:54:35): Do you acknowledge that it was a major security failure not to secure the rooftop of the building that the shooter shot from?
Director Cheatle (02:54:46): I believe at this time that the rooftop was provided overwatch. I acknowledge that we are unaware at this time how the individual was able to access the roof.
Mr. Goldman (02:54:58): Overwatch meaning from other counter sniper, other higher points?
Director Cheatle (02:55:04): Correct.
Mr. Goldman (02:55:06): And so was it a failure then that when that shooter was on the rooftop, that overwatch did not identify him before he fired his shots?
Director Cheatle (02:55:16): I don't have the timeline of how the individual accessed the roof, where they accessed the roof, or how long they were on the roof.
Mr. Goldman (02:55:27): Let me ask a couple things quickly. You have testified here about all the resources that the Secret Service needed to deploy to protect the NATO Summit and all of the leaders here. Is that right?
Director Cheatle (02:55:41): Yes.
Mr. Goldman (02:55:43): Did you have to rely more on local law enforcement because of the NATO Summit for this event?
Director Cheatle (02:55:50): The Secret Service routinely works with local law enforcement at every event. It doesn't matter whether it is a NATO Summit NSSE, the DN... I'm sorry, the RNC in Milwaukee.
Mr. Goldman (02:56:02): But that's not my question. Obviously, there's a natural give and take as to, I'm sure, how many agents you deploy and how much you rely on local law enforcement. Did you have to rely more on local law enforcement because there were fewer Secret Service assets available because of the NATO Summit?
Director Cheatle (02:56:23): No.
Mr. Goldman (02:56:26): I hope we get answers before the completion. I don't like the fact that the media has received far more answers than Congress has. If this is a function of getting your ducks in a row, I assume you have access to a lot of these reports and a lot of this information, and you should have come prepared here today. And I would just want to flag, Mr. Chairman, before I yield back, that I want to just point out one thing that my colleague from Texas was talking about when he said he recreated the shooting twice with an AR-15, and he had a 94% success rate, 15 out of 16 shots. I don't know why that doesn't convince him that we should get rid of AR-15, but clearly we need to do something about the prevalence of AR-15s and weapons of war on our streets. And I yield back.
Speaker 3 (02:57:23): Chair now recognize Mr. Perry from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry (02:57:26): Thank you, Chairman. Director, I guess 60 days is the time of the investigation. Is that the information that you've put out? Or where did that come from, 60 days? Or is that just information that the committee members are talking about?
Director Cheatle (02:57:40): I stated that earlier today. I've asked mt team.
Mr. Perry (02:57:42): Okay, 60 days. So are you receiving regular updates? You're in charge of the Secret Service. This is about organization, what happened nine days ago. Are you receiving regular updates from the FBI on their investigation?
Director Cheatle (02:57:56): Yes, I am.
Mr. Perry (02:57:56): So you know some things are true, some things are probably not true. We want to talk to you about the things that we're hearing about and find out if they're true. You've been in contact with the FBI, then you're getting updates on a daily basis, right?
Director Cheatle (02:58:09): Yes.
Mr. Perry (02:58:10): Based on what you said. Okay, so and are you confident that the person in question, Mr. Crooks, was the only person firing that day against the president or the crowd? Is he the only one? I'm not asking you yet if he acted alone, but is he the only one? Can you say that with certainty to the American people?
Director Cheatle (02:58:29): That is the information I have at this time, yes.
Mr. Perry (02:58:31): Okay. Does it appear he acted alone?
Director Cheatle (02:58:35): That's the information we have at this time.
Mr. Perry (02:58:37): Okay. Now let's talk about the fact that he was noticed as a person of interest, of concern, suspicion, as you say. Your PI team, how do they stay in... There's a sea of people. How does the PI team get to that individual that's in question in the sea of people. How's that individual tracked?
Director Cheatle (02:59:01): Our protective intelligence teams that work at our sites are paired up with a local police counterpart, and so they work in conjunction together.
Mr. Perry (02:59:10): They just follow them around, or... Let me ask you this. Looking at the site, you have multiple perimeters, right? You have the inside perimeter, you have multiple secure or multiple perimeters. Was the AGR so-called building the highest location affecting the site of the rally? Was it the highest location?
Director Cheatle (02:59:31): I believe the highest location at the site was where our counter snipers were positioned.
Mr. Perry (02:59:35): What about the water tower adjacent? How high is the water tower?
Director Cheatle (02:59:40): I don't have the height on the water tower.
Mr. Perry (02:59:42): Okay. It seems like water towers are pretty high, at least in the photo. It looks like it might be. There might actually be a building right behind the AGR building that is even higher than the building that Crooks fired from. You're familiar with cover, concealment, and defilade, right? You're familiar with those terms?
Director Cheatle (02:59:59): Yes.
Mr. Perry (02:59:59): So how would your sniper team or your PI team track the individual and give vectors to Secret Service on the PI team to get to that individual to question them. And how would you cover the defilade, the cover and concealment of low areas that you can't see from where your sniper team immediately, adjacent to the president, were cited? How would you do that if you're not up on the high ground?
Director Cheatle (03:00:26): So when our counter sniper teams go out and conduct in advance, they have a methodology and provide a grid system that are response teams are able to vector in if they see something that is troubling.
Mr. Perry (03:00:40): So when Mr. Jordan asked about the assets that were... Let me just ask you about assets requested. Were aerial assets requested for this event from either the Secret Service or state police or anybody else, drone, manned, otherwise? Aerial assets, were they requested?
Director Cheatle (03:01:01): I can't speak to what the local police-
Mr. Perry (03:01:02): Just asking if they were requested.
Director Cheatle (03:01:03): May have conversations with the local police, but I can tell you that the assets that were requested from the Secret Service for the site that day were all granted.
Mr. Perry (03:01:13): But were aerial assets requested? I didn't ask if you used them or what you used. Were they requested?
Director Cheatle (03:01:21): Overwatch was requested, and that was provided.
Mr. Perry (03:01:23): Aerial. Was that aerial? Because overwatch could mean on the water tower or not on the water. Can you be specific, ma'am? I'm running out of daylight here.
Director Cheatle (03:01:31): I understand if you're asking me about specifics, whether or not there was-
Mr. Perry (03:01:35): Is it not clear what I'm asking you? Were aerial assets requested by the president, by Secret Service, by anybody? Were they requested?
Director Cheatle (03:01:44): The Secret Service, we felt that we had a good plan in place.
Mr. Perry (03:01:47): Okay. Okay, fair enough. How about canine assets with bomb sniffing or explosive sniffing capabilities requested? Didn't say they were present. Were they requested?
Director Cheatle (03:01:58): Those requests were fulfilled?
Mr. Perry (03:02:00): They were requested and fulfilled?
Director Cheatle (03:02:02): Mm-hmm.
Mr. Perry (03:02:03): So was the Crooks vehicle inside any of your perimeters?
Director Cheatle (03:02:08): No, it was not.
Mr. Perry (03:02:08): It was not. How did you... Okay, so it was not within the... So was there a device located on Mr. Crooks' body to detonate the vehicle?
Director Cheatle (03:02:20): That is the information that I have.
Mr. Perry (03:02:21): So what would be the point of detonating the vehicle if it was not inside the perimeter?
Director Cheatle (03:02:27): I have no idea what Mr. Crooks motivation was.
Mr. Perry (03:02:30): Ma'am, the fact that you haven't, I'll close with this, Mr. Chairman, haven't even visited the site. I understand there are other things going on, but the culture of your organization, the culture that doesn't... Do you know how tall the president is? How tall is the president? President Trump, how tall is he?
Director Cheatle (03:02:46): He's over six feet tall. I don't know [inaudible 03:02:48]
Mr. Perry (03:02:48): Okay, so do you assign agents based on their ability to cover physically and carry and carry, if necessary, the president of the United States, when you assign them to this mission? Is that a parameter that is considered?
Director Cheatle (03:03:03): I assign agents to work our protectees that are capable and have been trained by the Secret Service.
Mr. Perry (03:03:10): I understand they're trained, but if you're not tall enough... It has nothing to do with... We're not mad at you, but if somebody's seven feet tall and you're five feet tall, there's going to be a Delta there that is problematic in protecting the protectee. And I'm asking is that a consideration when these agents, not saying you, but when they're assigned to the protectee?
Director Cheatle (03:03:32): The agents that are assigned to our protectees are perfectly capable of providing-
Mr. Perry (03:03:36): Okay, ma'am. So the culture is what I'm concerned about because the primary objective here seems to be something other than securing the site, securing the principle, and securing people at the site, and that's the concern based on the answers that you've given today so far. With that, I yield, Mr. Chairman.
Speaker 3 (03:03:51): Chair now recognizes Mr. Moskowitz from Florida.
Mr. Moskowitz (03:03:54): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. I want to thank the subpoena that you sent. I want to thank Ranking Member Raskin in your work, the letter you sent to the committee, and I also support the creation of a commission to get to the bottom of what happened. Director, I just want to give you an honest assessment of how this is going for you today. Did you happen to catch the hearing many months ago in education where there were a bunch of university presidents and Elise Stefanik asked a very easy question and couldn't get an answer? Did you see that hearing?
Director Cheatle (03:04:35): No, I don't think I did.
Mr. Moskowitz (03:04:36): Okay. Well, let me tell you, it didn't go well. And the short end of that story was those university professors all resigned. They're gone. That's how this is going for you. This is where this is headed. Okay? I don't know who prepared you for this. I don't know how many times you've testified in front of Congress, but a president was almost assassinated live on television, not just for Americans, but for the world to see. And this being your first opportunity, I understand there's an ongoing investigation, I understand there's things that you can not talk about, but the idea that we're getting less than you did on television is something that Democrats, independents, or Republicans are going to find unacceptable. My high school, Marjorie Stoneman Douglas was on the list of mass shootings that Representative Raskin held up. That very day, the school resource officer, a police officer, did not run into the building. (03:05:36) He hid in the stairwell while the shooter was in the building. He stayed outside, never helped. Okay. He also directed other officers who showed up on the scene not to go into the building. When it was determined that the failures in response and training and that the sheriff fired nobody in his agency, Governor DeSantis then removed that Sheriff. I supported the removal. So here's my question. You said there's going to be accountability. I understand you don't want to give us names. When you say that, are you telling the committee that once it's concluded, you're prepared to fire the people on the ground who made poor decisions that day?
Director Cheatle (03:06:15): I'm prepared to take the actions necessary.
Mr. Moskowitz (03:06:17): No, no, that's nonsense. Okay. Accountability. The failure was human. That doesn't mean they're bad people. It means they failed that day, and a former president was almost assassinated. Okay. Are you prepared to fire the human failure on the ground? Yes or no? When you have the names of where those failures were... (03:06:39) They're people. It's not like a piece of technology failed. It was people who failed that day. (03:06:43) ... are you prepared to fire them?
Director Cheatle (03:06:47): I don't have an answer as to whether [inaudible 03:06:49]
Mr. Moskowitz (03:06:49): Well, then how can there be accountability if you're not prepared to fire someone? And the reason why your name is going to be the person who's held accountable, the reason why members in this committee are calling for resignation, and I join in that, or for the president to fire you, is because you're saying there's going to be accountability, but you can't commit that people are going to get fired. Let me ask this question a different way. If Trump had been assassinated that day, if the gunman had succeeded, okay, would you have come and tendered your resignation?
Director Cheatle (03:07:23): I would still be sitting here because I would want to ensure the integrity of the investigation moving forward.
Mr. Moskowitz (03:07:28): Totally understand. That's a fair answer that you would've set up that process, but would you have had the honor to come in front of the committee and say, "A former president was assassinated on my watch. There should be new leadership."
Director Cheatle (03:07:41): I think that I have admitted that there was grave failure-
Mr. Moskowitz (03:07:43): No, no, that's what I'm asking. Would you have tendered your resignation if he had been killed?
Director Cheatle (03:07:46): ... that occurred on my watch, and I am accountable for that.
Mr. Moskowitz (03:07:49): Okay, but would you have tendered your resignation if he had been killed?
Director Cheatle (03:07:54): I think that I've admitted that I've taken accountability and will take responsibility.
Mr. Moskowitz (03:07:59): Okay. Well, let me ask a... I want to follow up on Representative Connolly's question in which he asked about guns, and you were not willing to commit that that makes your job harder. This is not about the Second Amendment. If there were over 400 million guns on the streets, if all of those guns were machine guns, would that make your job harder to protect people?
Director Cheatle (03:08:21): Again, I think weapons that are out there [inaudible 03:08:24]
Mr. Moskowitz (03:08:24): If all of those guns were rockered propelled grenades, would that make your job harder?
Director Cheatle (03:08:27): Yes, sir.
Mr. Moskowitz (03:08:30): Yes. Okay. Thank you. Perfect. This is not a trick question. Thank you. Okay. I won't ask the other 15 things I was going to do. I was going to do drone strikes, but it's okay. So that's all we were asking. It creates a challenging environment. It has nothing to do with the Second Amendment or people's rights, but it does make your job harder, so credit to Representative Connolly for asking that question. One last thing, Mr. Chairman, and I'll conclude. There was a question asked, is an Iranian assassin more capable than a 20-year-old. And I have been tough on Iran, I probably have more resolutions on Iran than almost anyone in Congress, but I can tell you it isn't Iranians walking into schools and grocery stores and movie theaters and churches. It is 20-year-olds, right? And some of them are mentally unstable and they have access to guns, and they're domestic terrorists. Someone talked about Christopher Wray. Christopher Wray has talked about domestic terrorism. (03:09:21) And so yes, we collectively come together on foreign threats. And I am not at all debasing the fact that there are foreign threats here and abroad, but there are domestic threats, and we have to get to the bottom of how we stop domestic terrorism because it was a twenty-year old who walked my high school and killed 17 people. He was plenty capable, and he was an Iranian. Thank you.
Speaker 3 (03:09:47): Chair. They recognizes Mr. Timmons from South Carolina.
Mr. Timmons (03:09:51): Thank, Mr. Chairman. Director Cheatle, we've asked you a lot of questions and haven't really got a lot of straight answers. I have Intentionally created a line of questioning that I think that you can't answer. So the first question is, do you agree that the allocation of Secret Service resources should correspond with the risk profile of any given event? A higher degree of risk at one event should get more resources. Is that fair?
Director Cheatle (03:10:13): That is fair.
Mr. Timmons (03:10:15): Okay. And when two events occur at the same time in the same geographic vicinity, that the risk profile of each event should be taken into account in whichever event is greater risk should receive greater resources?
Director Cheatle (03:10:29): That is correct.
Mr. Timmons (03:10:31): Okay. So I'm going to go over the Trump event. So this was publicly announced July 3rd, Butler, Pennsylvania. The venue is an outdoor fairground, open-air, no existing security. The crowd size was expected to be tens of thousands and ended up being over 20,000. There were general and specific threats from foreign adversaries. As the Chairman of Intelligence remarked, Iran has said they want revenge, as well as when President Trump was in office, he made a lot of people mad, terrorists to be included, all over the world. And President Trump is the former president and the future president, so I would say that that is a fairly high risk event. Would you agree?
Director Cheatle (03:11:11): Yes.
Mr. Timmons (03:11:12): Okay, let's conversely... The First Lady had an event at a casino in Pittsburgh just a few dozen miles away. It was a dinner for the Italian Sons and Daughters of America. It was publicly announced on July 10th. What's interesting is that the casino is actually extremely secure. They already have magnetometers existing prior to this event even being announced. It was in a ballroom. And the size of the crowd, a mere 400. There were no specific threats. There may have been general threats, and the asset is the first lady. Those seem like there's a huge disparity relative to risk. Would you agree?
Director Cheatle (03:11:56): Yes.
Mr. Timmons (03:11:57): Okay, thank you. Multiple
Mr. Timmons (03:12:00): ... Whistleblowers and various media outlets have reported that the Pittsburgh Field Office of the Secret Service allocated 12 additional post standards to the first ladies event and three additional post standards to the Trump rally. Is that correct?
Director Cheatle (03:12:15): There were no assets that were diverted from the first ladies-
Mr. Timmons (03:12:19): So no, no, no, no. This is a very simple question. I'm not asking anyone who was diverted. Did the first ladies' event that was relatively secure, especially compared to Trump's rally, get 12 assets... And did the first ladies' event get 12 assets and Trump's get three from the Pittsburgh field office. That's a yes or no. If you don't know, don't answer it. I mean if you don't know, don't answer it.
Director Cheatle (03:12:42): The number personnel that were allocated to both of those events were comparable to the risk at both of those events.
Mr. Timmons (03:12:50): Wow, really? So you think that the Pittsburgh Casino 400 person in a ballroom with ingress egress through probably a very well guarded parking garage was four times more dangerous than a 20,000 person rally in open field with the former president, future president. You think that that's four times more dangerous? The casino with them.
Director Cheatle (03:13:11): I didn't say that at all.
Mr. Timmons (03:13:12): Well, they got four times the resources from the Pittsburgh Field office who was likely in charge of the final walkthrough for both events. I mean, we've continually highlighted the failures of the Secret Service at the Trump rally and you have the former and future president getting shot. You have multiple injuries, one fatality, and I would have to think that if we had nine more post standards, nine more individuals that have the training and the integration into the Secret Service defense of Trump at that rally, that I have a feeling that crooks would've had somebody come say hello to him before he fired a bunch of shots. Do you think that's possibly true?
Director Cheatle (03:13:52): There were significantly more assets and resources available at the former president's event than there were at the first-
Mr. Timmons (03:13:58): Who made the decision to deploy 12 post standards to the casino where the first lady was having a 400 person dinner and only three people from the Pittsburgh Field office to the 20,000 person plus Trump Rally, who made that decision?
Director Cheatle (03:14:17): There were additional Secret Service resources available at the former President Trump's event day.
Mr. Timmons (03:14:22): Who made the decision to deploy 12 to the First lady's event in three to the Trump event?
Director Cheatle (03:14:29): The allocation of resources is decided based on the availability of personnel and their location and where they are, but there were sufficient resources.
Mr. Timmons (03:14:37): What did you just say?
Director Cheatle (03:14:38): That were given to-
Mr. Timmons (03:14:39): Did you just say there were sufficient resources? President Trump got shot, someone got killed. There were not sufficient resources clearly.
Director Cheatle (03:14:46): There was a gap.
Mr. Timmons (03:14:46): It doesn't take 27 years of experience to know that and whoever made that decision, it probably wasn't you, needs to be fired and then you need to resign because this is absolutely unacceptable and you've lost the trust of the American people. With that Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Chair (03:15:00): Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognize Ms. Tlaib from Michigan.
Ms. Tlaib (03:15:04): Thank you so much Mr. Chair. Thank you director for being here. When we hear the headline, A 20-year-old young man with access to an assault weapon commits act of mass violence. I mean, we've heard this before over and over again. But the unfortunate thing is that my residents don't get a committee hearing. We have not had one committee hearing about the over 260 mass shootings that we've had killing hundreds of people, injuring hundreds, changing their lives forever. And don't get me wrong to many of my colleagues, I mean I watched and even the pool of blood, the screams, it was horrific, but it made me think about the images I saw after mass shootings at schools, grocery stores. (03:15:54) I mean, I think of Buffalo, New York at a supermarket where a racist gunman killed 10 shoppers with an AR. And El Paso AK-47 style assault rifle killed 22. And Florida and Parkland, Florida 17 students and teachers murdered again with an AR. In Pittsburgh at a place of faith, Tree of Life synagogue 11 murdered and don't get me about Newton, Connecticut, which still breaks my heart. 26 murdered including 20 elementary school children. This year in Michigan we've had Mr. Chair, two mass shootings, 21 shot in Detroit, one of the most horrific shootings we've seen, two killed. At a splash pad in Rochester Hills, Michigan, eight shot there. Again, an assault weapon used, but the difference here is the former president gets a hearing in his attempt to [inaudible 03:17:01], but our residents don't get a hearing about mass shootings, about gun violence in our country. (03:17:12) Mr. Chair, I asked this wholeheartedly, they don't have Secret Service to protect them. They don't. I don't have these mass agencies protecting our kids in the schools or the supermarket, movie theaters or going to a block party in Detroit, I don't have that. We don't have that. But I can't believe we're just going to focus on that and not the fact that we're hearing yet again in the headlines, A 20-year-old young man having access to an assault weapon, a weapon of war, many of my veterans say they have to be trained to use, but he can get it, wasn't safely stored by the parent, grabbing that gun and innocent lives are lost. Director, I know you got asked about this and I think it's important though for us to hear this, but how difficult is your job when there's such easy access to assault weapons in the streets?
Director Cheatle (03:18:14): I think the job of a Secret Service agent and officer is incredibly difficult. I think the environment we deal with every day and the dynamics of the threat environment is incredibly difficult. These are brave men and women who put their lives on the line and a day like we had on July 13th is a day that no one in my agency ever wants to have as their responsibility. It is an incredibly difficult job.
Ms. Tlaib (03:18:40): Yeah, I immediately thought of the children in the audience. I mean, when you think about going to rally with your family, again, their lives are forever changed. The incident wasn't... Are never isolated. I really believe these incidents are never isolated and I know Detroit Free Press had reported that the 20-year-old Pennsylvania shooter looked up the 2021 Oxford High School shooting in Michigan. Can you comment on what information this shooter was looking up in regarding the tragedy of Oxford High School where it took four of our high school youth there?
Director Cheatle (03:19:13): I'm sorry, I'm not able to. The FBI has those details.
Ms. Tlaib (03:19:16): So you can't even tell us... I mean, was he looking at the type of weapon? How many-
Director Cheatle (03:19:21): Yeah, unfortunately I don't have those details.
Ms. Tlaib (03:19:23): I mean, did they share that with you though?
Director Cheatle (03:19:26): I don't have the full content of what his searches were. I think that they're still in the process of examining all of his devices.
Ms. Tlaib (03:19:34): Okay. Again, the impact... I want to be really serious about this, the impact on our families is more than just this political rally, Mr. Chair. We have to talk about this even if we're in disagreement, let's talk about it because I've seen statistics that show that we could be saving lives now if we ban these weapons of war from being able to buy it at the local store down the street. I mean, we just can't continue to allow this to happen. And unfortunately my residents are not former presidents of the United States. They don't get a hearing. They don't get Secret Service, any of that. And even among those that are expressing the failed in the system, they just deserve better. They truly do. Thank you. And I yield.
Mr. Chair (03:20:15): Chair now recognize Mr. Burchett from Tennessee.
Mr. Burchett (03:20:17): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Cheatle, the shooter was set up on the roof of the AGR International building as we know. Was the roof identified as a potential vulnerability days before the rally?
Director Cheatle (03:20:27): To my knowledge, yes it was.
Mr. Burchett (03:20:29): Were agents or officers inside the building? If so, what floor were they on?
Director Cheatle (03:20:35): We had local police officers inside the building.
Mr. Burchett (03:20:39): The roof looks like it's a tin roof. How did no one inside that building hear someone moving on top of a metal roof?
Director Cheatle (03:20:46): I don't have the details of all of the interviews that have been conducted yet.
Mr. Burchett (03:20:50): When will you have those?
Director Cheatle (03:20:51): I have been asking and I want to have that information as soon as you do-
Mr. Burchett (03:20:57): Okay. Why did Secret Service fail to block the line of sight from that roof?
Director Cheatle (03:21:02): I think that the Secret Service put together a plan where they were counting that roof in as part of their overwatch and that was the plan that they had put in place that day.
Mr. Burchett (03:21:10): If you weren't going to put a security personnel on the roof, why not at least use drone technology or aerial surveillance to monitor the rally?
Director Cheatle (03:21:18): There are a number of times that we do use drone technology. I'm not speaking specifically to this event and what was utilized or not. There are times when drone technology is available and helpful at events and there are times when it is not appropriate.
Mr. Burchett (03:21:34): Do you personally use signal to communicate with any official from the White House? Signal on your phone.
Director Cheatle (03:21:42): Oh, on occasion. I'm sure that there are people that use signal, yes.
Mr. Burchett (03:21:46): Okay. Do you use it to speak with the White House? Use signal?
Director Cheatle (03:21:52): No, I do not.
Mr. Burchett (03:21:53): Okay. When was Thomas Crooks first identified as a person of interest? Let me help you, at 5:10, he was spotted with a range finder at 5:51 and when did Secret Service notice him?
Director Cheatle (03:22:11): Again, I don't have those specific timelines, but it was a relatively short period of time.
Mr. Burchett (03:22:15): Let me help you, 5:52. Ms. Cheatle, why was President Trump allowed on stage 10 minutes after the Secret Service spotted a suspicious individual? That seems to me to be the worst thing of all. All the breakdown in all this communication, all the BS you've been feeding us here today or not feeding us. That seems to be the question.
Director Cheatle (03:22:36): As I've stated before, there are a number of events where suspicious people may be identified that doesn't necessarily-
Mr. Burchett (03:22:43): Ma'am, I submit to you, you got a guy who's going to be the next President of the United States. He's on stage. I've been to these events. We've all been to these events. A car backfires and there's a 15 minute dadgum wait, that's not acceptable. Did the Secret Service tell President Trump they'd spotted a suspicious individual before he was shot?
Director Cheatle (03:23:04): I am unclear as to what the communication was with the former president at that time.
Mr. Burchett (03:23:09): Okay, I'll take that as a no. Did y'all deny President Trump's request for more security? Yes or no? And when was the most recent request for additional security?
Director Cheatle (03:23:22): The rally request for security, all of those requests were fulfilled.
Mr. Burchett (03:23:28): And were there any personnel redirected to Jill Biden's rally?
Director Cheatle (03:23:32): No.
Mr. Burchett (03:23:33): Who made the decision on the direction of agents at either one of those rallies?
Director Cheatle (03:23:40): I'm unclear as to your question on the direction of the agents.
Mr. Burchett (03:23:44): I said who directed those agents to be at Ms. Biden's rally or President Trump's rally? The specific agents.
Director Cheatle (03:23:53): So there is a methodology in which agents are available for assignments and they are assigned based on either geographic location or logistics or-
Mr. Burchett (03:24:03): Ma'am, I appreciate all that, but that methodology about got President Trump killed. Was the security detail guarding President Trump a temporary detail?
Director Cheatle (03:24:12): The personnel who are assigned to the former president's detail are assigned to him-
Mr. Burchett (03:24:17): Why was there a different detail on the opening night of the convention than the detail that was guarding him in Pennsylvania?
Director Cheatle (03:24:24): The president has a very large permanent protective detail assigned to him. They work shift work and so it could be that the people you saw at the rally were not working the same shift the day that he was-
Mr. Burchett (03:24:38): I can assure you ma'am, somebody that's a lot shorter than the president was not at the convention and the people that were carrying down behind the mass of agents that were on top of the president were not in the convention hall. At least I didn't see them. You can't seem to answer a single question about an ongoing investigation ma'am and you don't know when the information will be released publicly. Are you waiting for the administration to sign off?
Director Cheatle (03:25:05): No. I am waiting for the results of the investigation at which time-
Mr. Burchett (03:25:08): Okay, let me ask you one more question. You found explosives in the shooter's possession, is that correct?
Director Cheatle (03:25:14): The FBI found explosives.
Mr. Burchett (03:25:16): Do we know who directed this young man how to make those explosives?
Director Cheatle (03:25:21): I believe that the FBI is still looking into that on their investigation.
Mr. Burchett (03:25:25): Ms. Cheatle, you said that the buck stops with me and I agree. I don't think you should resign, I think you should have been fired. Ma'am, you are a DEI horror story. I've told my daughter multiple times, my wife and my daughter, we talk to her all the time about how she's going to succeed in life. She'll succeed in life by achieving. Ma'am, you have not achieved today. You've let the American public down. If it was up to me, you'd be gone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chair (03:25:51): Chair now recognize Ms. Crockett from Texas.
Ms. Crockett (03:25:53): Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. And let me just pick up where my colleague from Tennessee left off. Director Cheatle, was the incident on July 13th due to DEI or rather systemic failures in communication and potentially safety protocols?
Director Cheatle (03:26:12): The incident on the 13th has nothing to do with DEI. The incident on the 13th has to do with a failure or a gap either in planning or communication.
Ms. Crockett (03:26:23): Thank you so much. In fact, I have a few articles that I will enter into the record once I wrap up that actually acknowledge a number of women specifically for their valor in their service, whether it's been in various levels of law enforcement. But I want to stick here for just a second because earlier you had a conversation in which there was a discussion about training. I want to talk about training and I want to talk about the fact that there's been a little bit of dancing around as it relates to this being a suspicious person and this being a situation that was perceived to be a threat. And it seems as if there's a different analysis that takes place. One of my questions has to do with if you have any bias training that your officers undergo. And the reason that I ask that because as a civil rights lawyer, I have learned so many times in having to deal with law enforcement that there usually is not a perception of a threat when it is a young white male, even if they are carrying a long gun. (03:27:32) Yet a lot of times, at least in this country when it comes to law enforcement, there is a perceived threat just by somebody having a little bit more melanin in their skin. So I'm curious to know because a lot of times one of the things that we have consistently pushed for on my side of things and when I say my side is once we are looking at a tragedy in which law enforcement made an error is the bias training and whether or not our officers are getting it. So I'm curious to know in some of the training that you talk about that is part of your budget, has bias training been part of that?
Director Cheatle (03:28:03): Yes, it is.
Ms. Crockett (03:28:04): Okay, thank you. I know that today is a rough day and on that day in Pennsylvania it was a rough day. And the reality is that I understand it and you may or may not know the answer to this question. In the space in which this event took place, it was a open carry space. Is that correct?
Director Cheatle (03:28:23): That is correct.
Ms. Crockett (03:28:24): Okay. So I hail from the state of Texas and interestingly enough, I was serving in the State House right after there was a mass shooting in El Paso. We had an opportunity to do right by our citizens in Texas, but we did not. Instead, they passed Permitless Carry. And what my colleagues kept trying to get you to answer, because we want to come up with solutions, we don't want to keep pointing the finger and right now you've got a bunch of fingers that are pointed at you. But our job is to solve problems for the American people. And to be perfectly honest, the numbers are clear. I had I think almost every major law enforcement agency come forward and say that they were against Permitless Carry because they said that their jobs would be made more difficult. (03:29:11) Unfortunately, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle in the state of Texas decided that they would ignore those warnings and they passed the law instead. And right after they passed that law, we ended up with Uvalde and we heard the stories of those officers that were scared to go in and save those babies because of the firearm in which that in that case 18-year-old had in his hands. They also were given an opportunity to say, Hey, raise the age and make it to where at least you have to be 21 before you can possess this type of weapon. And they chose not to and we have the facts. It shows, and I'll enter this into the record as well, if there is no objection, Deaths from firearms keep climbing in Texas decades after lawmakers began weakening gun regulations that is from the Texas Tribune.
Mr. Chair (03:29:58): Without objection [inaudible 03:29:59].
Ms. Crockett (03:29:59): Thank you so much. The last thing that I'm just going to make a point of saying is that we all care about this issue because we know that there has been a spike in violence, political violence in this country. Are you aware of the fact that the numbers are higher right now?
Mr. Chair (03:30:16): Yes.
Ms. Crockett (03:30:16): Okay. In addition to that, and I'm going to point a little blame at ourselves because right now you got all the fingers pointed at you. But the reality is that we have a number of congressional members that are consistently engaging in violent rhetoric and it needs to be toned down. The reality is that people are listening and they're paying attention. But unfortunately another thing that is happening because we're not getting answers from you today, is the conspiracy theories, they have already began. Have you heard of any of the conspiracies?
Director Cheatle (03:30:44): Yes.
Ms. Crockett (03:30:45): Okay. The problem with these conspiracies is that when people believe that, say the President of the United States ordered a hit or they believe it was an inside job or whatever conspiracies they believe because they don't have any facts in front of them that potentially incites the next level of violence at the next event in retaliation for this. So we are only begging for your job as it relates to being the director as well as the men and women that you are protecting as their director, that you keep them safe by making sure that the American people have the information that they need so that they can feel as if Secret Service is on the side of the American people. And ma'am, I don't doubt the Secret Service is on the side of the American people, but right now, so long as these conspiracy theories continue to fester, it is going to make your job that much harder. Thank you so much. And I yield.
Mr. Chair (03:31:33): Chair now recognizes Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene from Georgia.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:31:36): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Cheatle, I'd like to remind you that you're under oath. The site team has a senior supervisor, an advanced team, a protective intelligence team, a counter sniper element and detail. Who was the agent in charge? How long has she been the agent in charge and what is her Secret Service background?
Director Cheatle (03:32:01): So I'm not going to provide a name.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:32:03): Why not? You're here to answer our questions.
Director Cheatle (03:32:06): In this forum, I'm not going to provide names of-
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:32:07): You stated in your testimony. You said I am here today to answer your questions.
Director Cheatle (03:32:14): That is correct.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:32:15): Answer the question.
Director Cheatle (03:32:17): I'm not going to provide names of our personnel.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:32:21): Why not?
Director Cheatle (03:32:22): Today.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:32:23): The American people are demanding these answers from you today. Ms. Cheatle.
Director Cheatle (03:32:27): I will do the best to provide you accurate information based on the facts that I have at this time.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:32:33): You're not answering our questions. The advance element coordinates with other intel or law enforcement partners identifies threats and weaknesses at the sites and movements. We'd like a copy of the advance report, have you brought it here with you today?
Director Cheatle (03:32:46): We will comply with the request for the documentation that has been requested.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:32:50): When will that be Ms. Cheatle? Because you should have brought it today.
Director Cheatle (03:32:53): I am certain that our personnel are working on obtaining all of that document.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:32:58): I don't believe you and neither do the people watching this hearing. You're not doing well as [inaudible 03:33:04] informed you. You have been sitting here for over three hours and I have you know the entire country is demanding you resign and demanding that you be fired if you do not resign. Things are not going well for you. You need to answer the questions. Was there a protective intelligence team and what technical resources were utilized for that event, specifically drone or helicopter assets?
Director Cheatle (03:33:29): There were a number of technical assets that were deployed for that event and there was a protective intelligence team that was assigned to that event.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:33:38): Why was Crooks able to fly a drone over the entire area of the day of the rally and the day of his assassination attempt?
Director Cheatle (03:33:47): To my knowledge, he did not fly the drone over the entire area.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:33:51): How did he fly a drone over the area period? Any part of the area?
Director Cheatle (03:33:55): Again, I would have to go back and check the timeline of when that took place and when the event-
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:34:00): Why didn't you bring the timeline with you today to answer our questions?
Director Cheatle (03:34:03): I don't have all of the answers on the timelines based on the criminal invest-
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:34:08): Were you not prepared today to answer our questions?
Director Cheatle (03:34:12): I am prepared to answer the questions based on the information and wanted to be able to provide-
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:34:17): Do you have a timeline that you... Do you have a timeline at all from any of the day?
Director Cheatle (03:34:23): I have a timeline that does not have specifics.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:34:29): That's shocking. That is absolutely unacceptable. That means you are a failure at your job. Let's talk about things that are prohibited in Trump rallies and I've been to a lot of Trump rallies. Backpacks and bags, bicycles, firearms, any type of weapon or any other item determined to be a potential safety hazard like a range finder would be one. At 5:10, Crooks is first observed by one of the snipers, AGR sniper 1 at the building, 5:10. President President Trump was shot in the face at 6:11 PM. (03:35:14) 5:28, AGR Sniper 1 takes a picture of a bicycle and two bags. Those belong to Crooks. 5:32, AGR Sniper 1 spots Crooks looking at his phone and using a range finder. 5:55, Butler ESU command confirms receipt of photos and states they have been relayed on. 6:05 PM, AGR Sniper 1 later communicates that Crooks has seen moving northeast in direction of sheets and that Crooks has a backpack. Two minutes before the shooting, while President Trump has been allowed to take the stage, people see Crooks laying on his stomach in a sniper position on the roof and they're yelling he has a gun and they are trying to alert law enforcement and Secret Service. Why was crooks not shot by the snipers? Why was he allowed to be there?
Director Cheatle (03:36:17): As soon as the individual was identified as a threat, they were-
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:36:21): No, no, no, no, no, no. What do you consider to be a threat? A man with a gun laying in a sniper position, a man that had a backpack, a man that had a bicycle, a man that had a range finder. At what point is he determined a threat?
Director Cheatle (03:36:41): An individual with a backpack is not a threat. An individual with a range finder is not a threat.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:36:45): What about a man laying on a building that has direct line of sight of President Trump with a gun that people are screaming and pointing out? Is that a threat, Ms. Cheatle?
Director Cheatle (03:36:58): Once that individual was identified, they were neutralized.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:37:02): No, they were neutralized. Crooks was neutralized after he shot President Trump in the face, Ms. Cheatle. Is he only a threat once he fires the weapon?
Director Cheatle (03:37:14): As soon as the counters sniper identified that individual, they were able to neutralize them.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:37:19): How were people in the crowd... Okay, then let's just take it this way. People under your command did not consider him to be a threat, yet people in the crowd knew he had a gun and considered him to be a threat. That means that you are a complete failure as the director of the Secret Service. That people under your command don't perceive a man laying on a roof with direct line to the president with a gun, they don't perceive that to be a threat yet the people in the crowd do. How is that possible?
Mr. Chair (03:37:51): That's the last question, but please answer the question, Ms. Director.
Director Cheatle (03:37:54): I'm not certain at this time how the information from the people in the crowd was relayed to any law enforcement personnel.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:38:01): No. You knew, everyone knew. The people there knew that there was a danger. They knew there was a threat to President Trump and it was allowed to happen. Was there a stand down order, Ms. Cheatle? Was there a conspiracy to kill President Trump?
Director Cheatle (03:38:16): Absolutely not.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:38:17): Then how did this happen and why are you still sitting here not turning in your letter of resignation?
Mr. Chair (03:38:24): Last question, but please answer and then I'll recognize Ms. Pressley, but please answer the question.
Director Cheatle (03:38:28): That is what we are investigating to determine.
Ms. Marjorie Taylor Greene (03:38:31): We are waiting for your letter. We are waiting for your letter of resignation and you really need to consider doing that before you leave today.
Mr. Chair (03:38:40): Chair now recognize Ms. Pressley from Massachusetts.
Ms. Pressley (03:38:43): Thank you. No one, absolutely no one should fear for their life at a political rally, in a classroom, in a faith house, or in their home. We must do something about political violence in all its forms and gun violence in all of its forms. Now, director Cheatle, you have noted that numerous investigations are ongoing related to the Secret Service response and that we can expect a report in the next 60 days. With the election nearly 100 days away, that is an unacceptable timeline and it makes people less safe. It also allows my colleagues across the aisle, Republicans additional time to spread dangerous misinformation, which also puts people in harm's way. Some Republicans have exploited this moment to continue to attack progress towards racial justice and gender equity in America. Disappointing but not surprising. I hesitate to repeat their racist and sexist tropes, but in summary, Republicans have wrongfully and shamefully stated that hiring women and people of color hindered the response to the shooting. (03:39:57) Now this is part and parcel of Republican strategy to constantly attack necessary diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts to undermine the contributions that women, people of color, the disability community, and others make to this country each and every day. And it is disgraceful. In the wake of gun violence and tragic loss of life, Republicans are ignoring solutions like gun safety reform and instead trotting out sexist tropes. Can't say I'm surprised. I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record reporting from CNN titled Right Wing Media Figures Blame Women in Secret Service and DEI for security failure in Trump shooting.
Mr. Chair (03:40:43): Without objection to order.
Ms. Pressley (03:40:45): This article quotes members of Congress and others that plainly accuse DEI and the hiring of women as a liability for the Secret Service. Women have been an integral part of the agency since 1971 and are held to the same standards as their male counterparts. To use them as a scapegoat during a time of crisis is shameful and it is dangerously divisive. In fact, based on recent publicly available demographic data of the agency, the largest demographic groups among special agents are white and male. But to right wing extremists, the truth doesn't matter. The lies they tell to advance their anti diversity agenda, which is a key theme throughout Project 2025, will only make the American public less safe and more divided. And every day, Director Cheatle that you fail to give us answers, they are given more oxygen to make their baseless claims that women and people of color are responsible for tragic events and that is dangerous too. Thank you and I yield my remaining time to Ranking Member Raskin.
Ranking Member Raskin (03:42:02): Thank you to the distinguished gentle lady from Massachusetts, and thank you for those trenchant insights. I wanted to make the point that you are making and several of other members were making to bring it into sharp relief here. The very same day that Donald Trump narrowly escaped an assassination attempt, but an honored firefighter was gunned down and killed and other people were injured. There was another mass shooting that day, just several hours later in Birmingham, Alabama. Four people killed and 10 wounded in a nightclub shooting. And you might think, oh, that's some kind of freakish coincidence. Not at all. We have more than one mass shooting a day in America. They're so commonplace now that they are barely reported in the national news. It's of course local news in Birmingham, Alabama that four people were killed and 10 other people were shot and seriously wounded, being treated at the hospital. (03:43:08) These things are a nightmare for the families of the victims who've been killed. For the families who have to take care of people who've been seriously injured and wounded. They are a major financial drain publicly and privately. And yet we allow AR-15s to be purchased with [inaudible 03:43:31] promiscuously all over the country. People can just go out and get an assault weapon and the distinguished gentle lady from Michigan was right. We have a hearing when it affects the President of the United States, but on all the other days of the year, we don't have a hearing about it. And I think it is because of an honest disagreement we have about the Second Amendment. There are some people who think the Second Amendment means you've got the right to arm yourself with whatever weaponry
Ranking Member Raskin (03:44:00): ... you need to overthrow the government of the United States, and we reject that as a false interpretation of the Second Amendment and a false interpretation of the Constitution. We can ban assault weapons. We did it back in 1994. It dramatically reduced these mass shootings, and when that ban was lifted, the mass shootings went up through the roof again, and we've shown it. (03:44:21) So just like we're demanding real answers and real action from the Secret Service, let us demand real action and real answers from ourselves about the nightmare of mass gun violence, which puts America into a category all its own when you compare us to the countries in the European Union or Canada or other similarly situated countries. There's nothing like what we're going through. (03:44:47) So we've got to act on the Secret Service to protect ourselves against political violence, and we've got to act as a Congress to protect ourselves against AR-15 violence in America.
Mr. Chairman (03:44:58): Chair recognizes Mrs. McClain from Michigan.
Mrs. McClain (03:45:02): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to thank the Secret Service agents, those who work tirelessly to protect our president and specifically those agents who did not hesitate to jump in front of President Trump. My heart goes out to Comperatore family and the people at the rally who are still recovering. (03:45:25) On the other hand, the Secret Service has a leadership problem, and it falls on you. Although I appreciate your hollow words that the buck stops here, I was actually hoping for some answers. Director Cheatle, you must answer to the American people if you want to stay in charge. It's really, really simple. You want to keep your job, right?
Director Cheatle (03:45:52): Absolutely.
Mrs. McClain (03:45:53): Okay. The best way to keep your job is to answer the questions, not play this shell game, not sing the Slim Shady song << Wasn't me >> (03:46:04) I mean come on. How long did you prepare for this hearing?
Director Cheatle (03:46:10): I've been preparing for this hearing over the weekend and into last week.
Mrs. McClain (03:46:14): Okay. Five days? Six days?
Director Cheatle (03:46:17): As soon as I was notified-
Mrs. McClain (03:46:18): And how long was that?
Director Cheatle (03:46:20): ... about this hearing-
Mrs. McClain (03:46:21): Okay. Four days?
Director Cheatle (03:46:22): ... I began preparing.
Mrs. McClain (03:46:23): Four days? Three days?
Director Cheatle (03:46:24): I'm not sure the date that I got the letter asking me to be here.
Mrs. McClain (03:46:28): What are you sure of? Are you sure of the color of your hair? Are you sure the color of your suit? Tell the American people. What are you sure of? You don't even know when you started preparing for the hearing? I mean the biggest hearing of your life and you have no clue. You can't remember when you started preparing for this hearing. (03:46:47) Can you understand why those words seem hollow to the American people who are supposed to entrust their faith in you?
Director Cheatle (03:46:54): I assure you, the moment I receive notification-
Mrs. McClain (03:46:57): But you can't remember you got a little Alzheimer's, dementia going? I mean you can't remember?
Director Cheatle (03:47:02): I have several active investigations going on and an operational agency to run.
Mrs. McClain (03:47:07): Okay. All right. But you want to take accountability, right? The buck stops with you, right?
Director Cheatle (03:47:12): I am taking accountability.
Mrs. McClain (03:47:13): Super. Then let's start with trying to answer some questions. You keep referring to the FBI. When asked how many shell casings were on the roof, you referred to the FBI. When asked if there were explosive in the car, you referred to the FBI. When asked if Crooks was acting alone, you referred to the FBI. See a common theme here? I can go on and on. (03:47:36) My question is who at the FBI should I speak with? Wait for it. Wait for it.
Director Cheatle (03:47:44): The FBI is responsible for the criminal investigation-
Mrs. McClain (03:47:46): Is there a name?
Director Cheatle (03:47:50): I'm not certain who at the FBI is running the investigation-
Mrs. McClain (03:47:52): I'm not certain. All right, here we go. "I'm not certain. I don't know." Let me ask a different question. Have you been in communication with the FBI?
Director Cheatle (03:48:00): Yes, I have.
Mrs. McClain (03:48:01): With whom?
Director Cheatle (03:48:02): I speak with the director and the deputy director.
Mrs. McClain (03:48:04): Okay. And what have they shared with you about this investigation? So I'll give you an opportunity to answer again. Did they share with you how many shell casings were on the roof?
Director Cheatle (03:48:19): They have shared with me the evidence they collected-
Mrs. McClain (03:48:20): Did they share with you how many shell casing were on the roof?
Director Cheatle (03:48:26): Yes.
Mrs. McClain (03:48:28): Okay. How many were there?
Director Cheatle (03:48:31): I would refer to the FBI for the investigation-
Mrs. McClain (03:48:33): How many were there?
Director Cheatle (03:48:34): ... and their information that they need to share in their investigation.
Mrs. McClain (03:48:38): So they've shared the information with you. You just don't want to share the information with us. Correct?
Director Cheatle (03:48:45): We have concurrent investigations that are going on.
Mrs. McClain (03:48:47): So they have shared this information with you. You know the answer to the question. You just refuse to answer the question from the member of Congress who has subpoenaed you to be here. Is there a different answer to that question?
Director Cheatle (03:49:04): I was always willing to come here and testify before this oversight hearing. That [inaudible 03:49:10] necessary-
Mrs. McClain (03:49:09): Beautiful. Then let's do that. Let's, for once, have your actions match your words. So you've been in communication with the FBI. You know the answers, and you refuse to tell us the answers. (03:49:23) So I will ask you again. You know how many shell casings were on that roof. What is the answer to that question?
Director Cheatle (03:49:30): I think it's pertinent to talk-
Mrs. McClain (03:49:31): What is the answer to that question?
Director Cheatle (03:49:36): I think it's pertinent to talk to you about the information that the Secret Service has and that the Secret Service knows related to the offense on that day-
Mrs. McClain (03:49:42): I'm asking you an answer to the question. If you're supposed to be in charge, if the buck stops with you, how come you can't share the answers?