FBI Director Christopher Wray Testifies on the 2025 Budget

President's fiscal year 2025 funding request for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our witness today is FBI Director Christopher Wray. Director Wray, welcome. It's nice to have you back before this committee. Attorney General Garland was before this subcommittee in April and we discussed the fundamentally different position we are in now compared to what we were in last year. (00:24) Our fiscal year 2023 bill made notable increases to the Justice Department's law enforcement components. But fiscal year 2024 was a very far different outcome for the subcommittee and for the department. The significant cuts in 2024 came as a result of the Fiscal Responsibility Act's discretionary spending limits. So our bill faced a 3% cut compared to FY '23. That's roughly $2.5 billion less than we had in the prior year. (00:57) In each of our hearings this year I've tried to raise concerns about the ongoing constraints of the Fiscal Responsibility Act and the continued cuts to discretionary spending. These cuts have real consequences and I'm hoping we will hear more from you this afternoon about what those consequences mean for the FBI and how they impact the safety and security of the American people. The Bureau has already provided a good example of some of these impacts, despite what appears to be a relatively modest cut of $32 million or 0.3% in FY '24 to the FBI salaries and expenses. The amount needed for the FBI to maintain just its current services is actually 484 million more than what we funded. (01:52) The FBI's fiscal year 25 budget request is $11.3 billion, 661 million above last year. It includes program enhancements for cyber investigative capabilities, mitigating threats from foreign intelligence services, and to address the increased volume of firearms background checks. The request would also allow the FBI to fund critical national security and law enforcement positions that were reduced as a result of the FY '24 appropriations. We also hope to hear from you about the FBI's ongoing work to address escalating threats that face our country, including how the FBI is working with its federal, state, and local law enforcement partners to fight illicit drugs coming into the country and how the FBI is working to protect children, particularly from online threats and exploitation. (02:45) Now, before I close my opening remarks, I would like to thank the employees of the FBI for their dedication and service to our country, especially when we are asking them to do more with less to keep us safe. Director Wray, I look forward to your testimony and our discussion today. And now I will recognize the subcommittee's ranking member, Senator Moran for his opening remarks.

Senator Shaheen, thank you for convening our hearing. Director Wray, welcome back to this Commerce, Justice, Science Subcommittee. I appreciated your time, as I indicated just a moment ago, in your remarks at the University of Kansas this past April at the annual FBI and KU Cybersecurity Conference. The quality of the speakers and the panel suggest to me that this will become a premier annual cyber event and I hope you will continue to join us. We'll try to do it during basketball season if you prefer. (03:36) The ability of our nation in both government and private sector to deter and neutralize cyber attacks from having their intended effect is essential to our national security and to our economy. These new challenges and dangers require a capable, qualified and well-trained workforce to combat the threats. In addition to that, I want to discuss national security crisis at the southern border. President Biden just signed an executive order to limit claims of asylum for those entering our country. While action by the president is needed, I'm doubtful that this executive order will make the necessary changes to ensure an operational control of our border and that we know who, why and where people are crossing into our country. (04:22) Last month it was reported that a suspected member of ISIS had been freely living in the United States after illegally crossing the southern border. Nonetheless, it would take more than two years before that person was arrested on April the 17th. In another case, an individual on the terrorist watch list was summarily released by the border patrol after crossing the southern border. I recognize that these cases most directly implicate failures at DHS, but the FBI also plays a major role in national security screening and facilitating the sharing of information across our government. (04:54) Our world and our country have become more dangerous. Our adversaries are coordinating with the intention of doing harm to the US, our allies and our partners. The conflicts overseas present clear threats here at home. As Russia wages its illegal and unjust invasion of Ukraine it's widely reported that Moscow is engaged in asymmetric activities such as sabotage in Western Europe. I would like you to address if we are seeing signs of that in our own country. The ongoing war in Gaza has the potential to inspire terrorists around the globe. We cannot be complacent about in believing in America will be immune and Jewish Americans should not have to live in fear. (05:32) And the Chinese regime continues its efforts to steal intellectual property, threaten critical infrastructure, and on this anniversary of Tiananmen Square has established police stations in the US to harass Chinese dissidents who find freedom in our country. You recently said director the PRC has made it clear that it considers every sector that makes our society run fair game. It's clear the conflicts abroad present real challenges at home, compounding those challenges, our distinct vulnerabilities on our borders, our means of communication and our technology systems. (06:07) Director, you have a wide array of challenges in front of you and the FBI. It seems almost insurmountable the things that we face today. I look forward to hearing from you how our budget can help better support the work the FBI does to mitigate these growing threats, address the crisis at our southern border and ultimately keep Americans safe. Thank you and the people who work at the FBI for your efforts in that regard, and I thank you also for being here today.

Thank you very much, Senator Moran. Vice Chair Collins, would you like to make an opening statement?

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. First, welcome Director Wray. Let me start by just saying that I appreciate very much your efforts to warn policymakers and the American public about the threat of a terrorist attack. We tend to be very focused on the great power competition with China and Russia and Iran, North Korea being major threats to us. But in fact, in my judgment, the most imminent threat that we face is that of a terrorist attack. And I share your assessment that everywhere we look the lights are blinking red, to quote you previously. The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, the rise of the Taliban once again, a reconstituted ISIS-K, Iran's deployment of proxy forces in the Middle East, the chaos at our southern borders and indeed our northern border as well has allowed terrorists into our country and surging anti-Americanism have all combined to dramatically increase the threat of terrorist attacks in our country and aimed at our allies abroad. That is an issue that I will want to address with you today. (08:18) The second issue, which we have talked about before, is the absolutely stunning increase, the shocking increase in illegal marijuana growing operations in rural homes in Maine that are often run by Chinese nationals. I brought this up to you at the Worldwide Threats Briefing a month ago, and I have raised the issue with the Attorney General. Just this past Thursday, the Somerset County Sheriff's Office shut down a growing operation in a house that contained 1500 recently harvested marijuana plants, more than 30 pounds of processed marijuana and illicit drug related materials, all of which were seized. This particular growing operation was located adjacent to a daycare center. (09:22) The Attorney General has committed to having the department justice more actively involved along with other federal agencies in helping state county and local law enforcement in Maine. I would note Maine is not alone in experiencing this enormous increase. The estimates are that they're between 150 and 200 of these sites yet to be dealt with in the state of Maine. But we're not alone, there are about 20 states. And I will be asking you this morning your assessment, what the FBI is doing specifically and whether you have information about the involvement of transnational Chinese criminal organizations. (10:16) So those are two of my greatest concerns and I look forward to our dialogue today. Thank you and the members of the FBI for all you do.

Thank you, Senator Collins. Director Wray, the floor is yours.

Thank you. Good afternoon, Chair Shaheen, Ranking Member Moran, members of the subcommittee-

I don't think his speaker's on. Your speaker's not on sir.

Pull it closer, Director.

Okay. Is that... Oh, there we go.

Oh, there we go.

Good afternoon, Chair Shaheen, Ranking Member Moran, members of the subcommittee. I am proud to be here today representing the 38,000 men and women who make up the FBI. Every day our people are working relentlessly to outpace our adversaries and stay ahead of complex and evolving threats. So I'd first like to thank you for your support over the years of our efforts to achieve our mission of protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution. (11:18) At the same time, I also realize the reality of the environment we're in today where so many agencies are dealing with tightening budgets. And this year the FBI has been one of those agencies with our fiscal year 2024 budget having now come in almost $500 million below what the FBI needs just to sustain our 2023 efforts. And while I very much appreciate this subcommittee's efforts to blunt any cuts, candidly this could not come at a worst time. When I sat here last year, I walked through how we were already in a heightened threat environment and since then we've seen the threat from foreign terrorists rise to a whole other level after October 7th, we continue to see the cartels push fentanyl and other dangerous drugs into every corner of the country claiming countless American lives. We've seen a spate of ransomware attacks and other cyber attacks impacting parts of our critical infrastructure and businesses, both large and small. Violent crime, which reached alarming levels coming out of the pandemic, remains far too high and is impacting far too many communities. China continues its relentless efforts to steal our intellectual property and most valuable information, and that's just scratching the surface. (12:48) When I look back over my career in law enforcement, I would be hard-pressed to think of a time when so many different threats to our public safety and national security were so elevated all at the same time. But that is the case as I sit here today. And while we have always found ways at the FBI to innovate and make the most with what we have, this is by no means a time to let up or dial back. This is a time when we need your support the most. I look forward to working with this subcommittee to get things back on track because right now we need investments in our people and the resources required to keep Americans safe. (13:33) Now, I will stack the FBI's workforce up against anyone, anywhere, anytime. They are innovative. They're efficient. They're relentless. They're patriots. And we have been fortunate at the FBI in recent years that our recruiting has gone through the roof. Americans are applying in droves to devote their lives to a career with us protecting others. But we need more positions to be able to bring all the good people we can to the fight, certainly not fewer. And as great as our people are, we also need to equip them with the necessary tools required to tackle today's threats. Now is not the time for less. To fulfill our mission, the men, women of the FBI need more. (14:19) Terrorism. Just in the time that I've been FBI director we've disrupted multiple terrorist attacks in cities and communities around the country. We need funding to continue protecting America from terrorism. I touched on this earlier, but there was already a heightened risk of violence in the United States before October 7th. And since then, we've seen a rogues' gallery of foreign terrorist organizations call for attacks against Americans and our allies. And given those calls for action, our most immediate concern has been that individuals or small groups will draw twisted inspiration from the events in the Middle East to carry out attacks here at home. But now, on top of that, increasingly concerning is the potential for a coordinated attack here in the homeland, not unlike the ISIS-K attack we saw at the Russia concert hall back in March. (15:15) China. We're up to something like 2000 active cases across all 56 FBI field offices focused on the PRC's efforts to try to steal our information and technology. And we need funding to continue countering the threat posed by the PRC. A government sparing no expense in its quest to hack, lie, cheat, and steal its way to the top as a global superpower and to undermine our democracy and our economic success. (15:47) Cyber. We're investigating more than a hundred different ransomware variants. Each of them impacting scores of victims, and that's just ransomware. We need funding to continue disrupting all kinds of cyber threats, certainly those from China, but also from a crowded field of sophisticated criminals and hostile nation-states like Russia, Iran and North Korea. (16:11) The fentanyl epidemic. We've got between 300 and 400 investigations just into cartel leadership. And time and time again, our folks are seizing enough fentanyl to wipe out entire states. We need funding to continue thwarting the range of threats emanating from the border. Fentanyl gangs like MS-13, human trafficking. (16:35) Violent crime. Last year our Safe Streets and Violent Crime Task Forces arrested like something like 50 bad guys per day every day, all year long. We need funding to continue fighting the violent crime that remains at levels in this country that are still too high. (16:53) Child exploitation. Our dedicated agents, analysts, and professional staff working violent crimes against children are arresting hundreds of predators and rescuing hundreds of victims each and every year. We need funding to continue protecting our most vulnerable victims from their tormentors. (17:13) Now, in all those areas that I just mentioned, we are working closely with our partners at all levels of government to achieve our shared goals of keeping our communities safe and protecting Americans from harm. Every day FBI agents, analysts and professional staff are working shoulder-to-shoulder with thousands of task force officers from hundreds of different police departments and sheriff's offices all over the country on our FBI-led task forces. On top of that, we provide technology and expertise, valuable investigative leads like DNA matches and cutting edge training to law enforcement nationwide to help them keep our communities safe. (17:56) So as I know this subcommittee recognizes, cuts to us are cuts to our partners, state and local law enforcement agencies and officers who are on the ground putting themselves in the line of fire often, quite literally. That's just one way that cuts to us are going to have real impacts on the American people. So yes, despite best efforts, we took a hit in the 2024 budget, but 2025 is a chance to get back on track and provide the FBI's men and women the tools and resources the American people need us to have to keep them safe. So thank you again for having me here today and I look forward for to our discussion.

Thank you very much, Director Wray. Senator Manchin, I understand you have to leave to chair another hearing. So would you like to begin the questioning?

First of all, thank you Madam Chairman, I appreciate that very much and to Director Wray, to you, and to all of the 35,000 plus members who protect us every day and put their lives in harm's way for us I want to thank each and every one of them too. (19:03) Sir, real quickly, I want to thank you for coming in 2022 to our Clarksburg West Virginia FBI Center, which is your largest, I believe in the installation, does all the background checks. And my concern there is a bipartisan Safer Communities Act, making sure you have the necessary funds and budget to enact that properly. That we can continue to grow and protect the people of America from those who want weapons for the wrong reason and shouldn't have them, that we can do the background check properly. So if you feel that this has been done adequately there and if there's any help that you're needing, please let me know.

So I certainly appreciate your strong support for the men and women of CJIS. As we've discussed I think before in my view, the folks at CJIS are the folks that in some ways have the greatest impact on the American people, but that the American people know the least about. And one of those services, of course is NICS and the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act provided an important Boost to our authorities in that space and additional funding. (20:09) Now, on the funding part though, here's the key-

I heard-

Here's the key. So we need to get those... that in the '25. It's not a huge enhancement, but it is an enhancement with more positions because right now what's happening is the sheer volume of the new checks that we have to do is...

... Go ahead and brag on the people in Clarksburg West Virginia all the good work they do, I that very much. And I'm very proud of them too. The southern border, I think you've touched on that and how absolutely horrendous that is and what we've got to do... And all the threats of working today's announcement by the president will give us some light of hope no matter how much, but... It all is going to be much appreciated. So I know you're watching that very... Is bothering me more than anything else is basically the attack on the judiciary... (21:45) But explain to people, my state is an R40 state, if that gives you an idea of how strongly that the former President Trump has been supported, and I want to make sure I'm accurate when I tell them. They come to me and they say, well, it was a kangaroo court, this and that happened and it wasn't fair and everything. And I said, well, I understand that... There was a jury of peers, 12, it went through the process, but in no means does, it means it's over. The rule of law, the way I understand it in America, no matter what state you're in, I have a right to... I think I've had a misjudgment or basically someone who ruled and maybe took liberties they shouldn't have taken, that judge can be reprimanded. It can go through another [inaudible 00:22:25] court. I think people have to... Understand the checks and balances we have in the rule of law, there's no other country like us. A lot of countries' one and done. They see it, you're guilty, you're gone. Not in America. So for people, I've... The President, whether the D's or the R's or who's playing... Someone has the ability to... If they think they've been misjudged.

So of course I'm not going to...

Yes.

And I do think that it's one of the things that distinguishes the United States and our allies from authoritarian countries like China, whether it's redress, whether it's appeals.

Sure.

For example, when we've charged folks acting on behalf of the Chinese government, that's us saying we're so confident in the facts that we're willing to prove them beyond a... Talked about and... The prosecutors don't like me... We lose cases in this country. The Chinese don't lose many cases and it's not because they're better. I can assure you.

I got you.

So, just in general, I'm not speaking by any specific case or any specific criticism, but respect for our institutions, respect for our processes is something that I think is something we need to try to hold dear. Just again, I'm speaking in general not about any...

We have in a... Judicial system. The more you can do to educate the process and all the curing elements I have, if I think I've been treated wrong, I've got other ways to handle it in America. Nowhere else does that happen. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Moran.

Chairman, thank you very much. I'll give my time in this round to the Senator from Maine.

Thank you very much. It's very kind of you. Director Wray. I want to follow up... Marijuana operations in the state of Maine in rural houses... And one of these growing operations. And by the way, the houses are full of black mold... Again. So that is also of great concern. (26:01) What is the FBI's theory about why Chinese nationals or Chinese transnational criminal organizations are setting up these illegal marijuana growing operations in states like Maine?

So it's something we have a number of investigations into, as you might imagine. I guess speaking in my sort of intelligence agency leadership role, we don't yet see, but we're obviously investigating, any direct ties between these grows and say the Chinese government itself. But we are starting to see as we unpack this more ties between a lot of these growing operations and Chinese organized crime. And as to why they might be viewing the United States rural communities, et cetera, as an attractive market for this kind of activity, at the moment our assessment is that it's a combination of the fact that it is activity that can be done relatively cheaply and by comparison to say other drugs in the United States, the consequences that they face from a legal perspective are not as severe or that they might be in other countries where they might also want to operate. So it makes for an attractive business proposition, if I can speak that blandly about it. (27:37) So we think that's what's going on. We're continuing to investigate this. I'm very sympathetic to our state and local partners. You're right that we're seeing it in rural communities. We're even starting to see some of this creeping into say, tribal lands, for example, around the country. So it's an emerging concern for sure, but that's what I can say on it right now I guess.

Thank you. Just one theory that I've heard is that these Chinese transnational criminal organizations are using it as a money laundering operation to bring more fentanyl into the country, which is of course the last thing that we need. So I hope the FBI will continue its cooperation in the state of Maine with state, local county officials as well as with your other federal partners like DEA and DHS, IRS, et cetera. (28:40) I've mentioned my concern about a terrorist attack because I think the lights are blinking red. There's a related issue that I want to bring up in the time that I have left, and that is just this past Friday, the FBI issued a joint intelligence bulletin that noted that anti-Semitism will likely continue to drive calls for violence against Jewish individuals and institutions in the United States. Could you comment on the threat to the Jewish community, which may originate organically here in the United States or maybe driven by Hamas and other anti-Semitic groups?

So we see, and we have seen for quite some time, an elevated threat to the Jewish community in the United States. That was true even before October 7th. So we saw last year a significant increase in hate crimes overall. And then within that, a significant increase of hate crimes against threats and other types of violent activity directed at the Jewish community. And then since October 7th, the increase just went up dramatically. I think in the first four months after October 7th, we saw about a 60% increase in the number of hate crimes investigations we were opening. And while not all of those were targeting the Jewish community, some were targeting Muslim Americans, Arab Americans and others, the vast majority were targeting the Jewish community. (30:29) Put that in a little more context. The Jewish community represents about two and a half percent of the American population, and yet within religiously motivated hate crimes, about close to 60% of them are directed at the Jewish community. So you can see the reason why we think it is such a significant concern. They are targeted by foreign jihadist inspired terrorists, whether it's ISIS, Al-Qaeda, others. They're targeted by Shia terrorists, Iran and its proxies. They're targeted by domestic violent extremists, white supremacists and others, as well as anarchists and some of the folks who are pro-Palestinian and so forth. So they have the tragic distinction of really being targeted by almost every type of terrorist organization there is out there, foreign and domestic, across the spectrum. And so they desperately need our help and we're going to give it to them.

Thank you so much.

Senator Reed.

Well, thank you very much, Senator Moran. Director, thank you for your service and please convey my deepest thanks to the men and women who serve with you. (31:45) You indicated in your opening remarks that last year you took a hit in your budget. This year if you don't get what the president asked for, how many personnel do you estimate you'll have to lay off?

Well, we don't know yet how many, because of course we don't know what will happen. I think at the moment, the effect of the '24 budget is that that's about 1,000 positions that we can't fill. And we are kind of muddling our way through the impact of the '24 budget. But if Congress were to, in my view, make the mistake of doubling down on that, then the consequences would be very significant. I mentioned the work we're doing to protect people from terrorism. That's fewer tips and leads followed, fewer terrorist attacks detected. That's a significant concern in a heightened terrorist threat environment. I mentioned violent crime, arresting 50 bad guys per day every day. The kind of cuts that you're alluding to means more violent gangs terrorizing neighborhoods, more bad guys on the street to hurt people. I talked about the threat from China. The scale of the China threat is massive. Cyber alone, they outnumber the FBI 50 to 1.

So, scaling backwards means that many more cyber attacks at a time when they're trying to target our critical infrastructure among other things, so it makes the environment safer for hackers. I talked about the border. We've got between 300 and 400 investigations into the cartels. We're seizing enough fentanyl in FBI field offices in our task forces, single seizures, enough fentanyl to wipe out an entire state. So, cuts to our budget in '25 is going to mean more fentanyl on the street, more overdoses, more deaths, more violence. (33:34) So, when people ask me what is the effect of these cuts, the people it hurts are state and local law enforcement and the people work together working with them trying to protect the people. It helps are the terrorists, the cartels, the violent gangs, the Chinese government, the hackers, the child predators. I can go on and on. I would implore Congress, and again, this subcommittee, I think, has always been very responsive, but I would implore Congress, please don't make the mistake of thinking that you can make cuts like this and not have real consequences to public safety and to our state and local partners. I think that's the part that keeps getting lost. Our state and local partners, and I can say this with the perspective of having been in law enforcement since the mid-nineties, state and local law enforcement these days depends on the FBI more than ever. Not just for all the things I just listed off, but for training, technical assistance, fingerprints, DNA... I mean, you could go right on down the list. (34:36) NCIC. Senator Manchin, if you were here would I'm sure be glad that I was bringing up NCIC. When an officer does a traffic stop, they're running the person's identifiers through the FBI databases back in West Virginia. That information tells them whether the person they pulled over is dangerous. So this goes straight to officer safety. That's just another example. All this stuff is put at risk when we start talking about cuts of the sort that we had in '24, and we just cannot have happen in '25.

One of the ways we think around here, and I might be exaggerating the think part, is domestic defense, domestic side, defense side. You're actually a national security agency, but you're lumped in with the domestic side. And we can't, I think, continue to think that way. Your operation is valuable to our national defense as the Department of Defense. And I happen to chair the Armed Services Committee. So I think that point should be made. I don't have much time left, but could you quickly characterize the domestic terrorist threat, particularly in the context of the election.

The domestic terrorist threat?

Yeah.

So, we certainly... We view the domestic terrorist threat as being persistent, I should say, and significant. The biggest concern is lone actors or maybe small groups acting against soft targets with easily accessible weapons, often with very little notice, and it covers the waterfront. We've seen a lot of racially motivated violent extremism. We've seen anti-government, anti-authority, violent extremism that covers a variety of perspectives and it is a threat that year after year continues to be a real concern.

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Reed, I think our number in this CJS appropriation is $890 billion that's defense spending. So you can't make a clear distinction as sometimes people try to do.

Well, I'm all for that defense.

I'm just trying to point out that you're right.

Thank you.

I may not have made that clear because you seem to want to argue with me. Director, you're talking about salaries and reduced financial support for the FBI in our FY 24 budget. It was really effectively held flat, which is a challenge in inflationary times. You request $85.4 million for the restoration of 270 positions related to national security in law enforcement. (37:29) Is this your highest priority?

The restoration of positions is our highest priority, yes.

And if that was accomplished, if we were capable of doing that, the benefit of that is what you described to Senator Reed, correct?

Right. The goal would be to allow us to sustain the pace that was set with the '23 budget. Because what's happened is the net effect of the '24 budget is to set us back 500 million because of the factors that you listed. So the key is to restore our operations so that we can continue to hum against all the things that I was listing off to Senator Reed and not set us backwards. And if that doesn't happen, then we start falling even further behind is the problem.

Do you have a significant number of vacant positions already?

We have some positions that are vacant. Our fill rate is actually higher than historically it has been at the FBI, which is a good thing. It's good news for America. So we're trying to kind of manage our way through the '24 cuts through a combination of attrition and how fast we're filling the vacant positions we do have. But again, if it lasts, if what happened with '24 is replicated, then we're going to be in a real world of hurt.

Is the FBI workforce... What's the age category? Is it aging or it's a young... Are the people nearing retirement that work at the FBI or...

Well, we are coming off of the heels of a, you might call it a bit of a retirement bulge when you look actuarially. So in other words, if you went back 20 plus years, there was a big hiring spree, if you will, post 9/11 and 1811s, armed law enforcement agents, in particular. (39:32) In other words, the way the system works, if they have 20 years in service and they're 50 years or older, they're eligible to retire. So whenever you're looking at retirement age of the workforce, you got to go back 20 plus years and see what was happening then. And so we're coming off of a bit of a bookend of that group. So it's starting to level off the last time I looked at it. So we're not in a big retirement bulge right now anymore. So that's part of why it's an issue.

Director, I mentioned in my opening statement the southern border and the challenges that we've had at the border. I mentioned a member of ISIS. I mentioned a NBC news report about an individual that was on the terrorist watch list that was released. I recognize that the primary responsibility implicates the failures of the Department of Homeland security, but the FBI Terrorist Screening Center is the primary federal entity responsible for national security screening and for facilitating the sharing of information across government. (40:39) Do these cases reflect a breakdown in our efforts to ensure that all government partners have full actionable information they need to protect our citizens from terrorism?

So, I'm not sure I can discuss specific examples, but let me try to get at your question this way. Certainly, we have seen over the last five to six years an increase in the number of known or suspected terrorists. In other words, watch listed subjects attempting to cross the border. And that is of concern, and that's where there's a lash-up between the TSC and CBP at the border that, I think, in general works pretty well. (41:27) The bigger problem in my view is twofold. One, individuals who when they come in are either armed with fake documents or snuck in some way or, and this is very important, individuals for whom there's not enough derogatory information in the intelligence community to watch list them yet. Let me unpack that a little bit because this is an important point. Because it kind of goes to what Senator Collins was asking me about, and it may relate a little bit to your other hat on the Senate Intelligence Committee. So as we collect collectively across the intelligence committee and with our partners less information about foreign terrorists overseas, there's less information to be had about who the people coming into this country are, which then means-

Would you say that sentence again? I missed the first part of the sentence.

So, the way I look at it is as we have less collection overseas against foreign terrorism, there's less sources of information to inform people about people coming in. In other words, somebody could be coming in who should be watch listed but isn't, and it's not because of a breakdown between CBP and the TSC, it's because the information that should have told everybody that this person is a threat has not yet been unearthed by whatever intelligence agency it is out there because it's not just the FBI that puts people on the watch list. We're getting information from lots of other agencies. (43:03) So, as we pull out of Afghanistan for example, you get less and less information about whether somebody from Afghanistan is actually a threat. And so some of the cases that I have seen that concern me are situations where somebody comes into the United States. (43:17) It's not because there was a breakdown between CBP and the TSC, it's because they weren't watch listed at the time. But in hindsight, they should have been watch listed because information was later developed that says, "Uh-oh, this person is a problem." You see what I'm saying there? That's a much bigger concern in my view. (43:39) And so we really need to be focusing on how we can try to address that with the rest of the intelligence community, with our partners, and so forth. When that happens, when we find somebody who's here in the United States who we now then know this person needs to be put on the watch list, then we use our Joint Terrorism Task Forces to go out and try to find the person, work with our state and local partners. We have the backstop of 800,000 sworn law enforcement, et cetera. But that to me is a bigger concern than the number of KSTs [inaudible 00:44:09]-

Director, just a brief follow up, is there a delay in timing once it's known that they should be on the watch list? Is there a delay before it's known across government agencies?

I don't know about delay. I mean, there's an interagency process.

How long does it take?

I think it varies is the short answer. I mean, it is not just the FBI can snap its fingers and put somebody on the list. There's an interagency very rigorous process to protect civil liberties and other things to put somebody on the watch list. But once they're on the watch list, there's pretty much instantaneous notification to the relevant parties.

Thank you.

Yeah.

Thank you, Senator Moran. I would just point out to the members of the committee that the second vote has started. So, anybody who hasn't voted, you have your opportunity now. I know there are a number of other hearings going on, so I understand Senator Van Hollen, you are hoping to get back to another hearing.

Is that all right?

Senator Heinrich said it's fine with him as long as he's next, so we made a deal.

Okay, thank you both. Yeah, sorry, I have Secretary Yellen in front of my subcommittee. Director Wray, it is great to see you. And I do want to start by-

You're not suggesting that she has precedent over Director Wray?

No. No, of course not. But I'm sharing that one. I want to thank you for your efforts on combating domestic terrorism and commend the Bureau for its work on that front in Maryland. This time last year, as a result of an investigation led by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, two individuals affiliated with neo-Nazi groups were charged with conspiring to attack Baltimore's power grid facilities. Their motivation stemmed from violent extremist White supremacist beliefs. In recent developments, just last month, the FBI Field office and the U.S Attorney's Office announced that one of the individuals pled guilty to conspiring to damage or destroy electrical facilities and will be sentenced in the fall facing up to 20 years for that crime. (46:20) So again, thank you for your team in action. (46:25) Also, I'm sure you're aware of the fact that the Attorney General was testifying in the House today in front of the House Judiciary Committee. (46:33) As you know, these crazy conspiracy theories continue to fly. So I wanted to ask you to take this opportunity to once again put a nail in the coffin of this idea that somehow the FBI was complicit in organizing instigating the January 6th attacks. You said in July of last year, so a little under a year ago, "This notion that somehow the violence at the Capitol on January 6th was part of some operation orchestrated by FBI sources and agents is ludicrous and is a disservice to our brave, hardworking, dedicated men and women." (47:19) Director Wray, can you confirm just how outrageous and frankly dangerous these kinds of assertions are?

Well, first off, I stand by my prior testimony. I think the men and women of the FBI work their tails off every day to protect the American people from a whole range of threats. I think irresponsible, inaccurate allegations like that are a disservice to these people who are putting themselves on the line every day to protect others. I think it's unfortunate, would be the kindest word I can use.

That is kind. Diplomatic. But thank you for reaffirming your testimony from last year. Speaking of the men and women at FBI, we agree that they deserve our thanks and they also deserve a new headquarters worthy of their work. And as you know, last year the GSA selected Greenbelt, Maryland for a new suburban consolidated FBI headquarters. (48:25) Two months ago, the GSA submitted a report to Congress requesting approval for use of previously appropriated funds for site acquisition and design of this new facility. The GSA report notes that, "Final facility size will be driven by updated FBI requirements." (48:46) Director Wray, is the FBI developing the necessary updated requirements for the new facility?

So, we are working closely with GSA. I think the short version of the process is that the report that was submitted in March, I believe it was, was intended to get Congressional feedback on that because as I understand it, GSA needs that feedback in order to then do the much more detailed, more labor-intensive and even expensive work that's required to build out the rest of it. (49:22) So we're continuing to work with GSA, but I think we're waiting to hear back from Congress, or at least I know GSA feels like they need to hear back from Congress about the reactions to that, that higher level plan that you... I think it's the same one that you referred to in March.

Well, let me just ask you this. Are you, the FBI, fully cooperating with all the GSA requests in order to prepare for the building of the new FBI headquarters? Are you fully cooperating with all of GSA's requests?

I believe we are working closely with GSA in cooperation with them in full compliance with the law. The specifics of exactly what conversations, what meetings, that part, I couldn't tell you right here right now, but my understanding is that we continue to work closely with GSA on the project as contemplated by-

Well, I only ask Mr. Director because we've not heard from GSA about need for feedback from Congress before they move forward in cooperation with the FBI. So that would be news to me that I'll follow up with GSA about.

Again, I think the way it was described to me was that the report that we worked on with GSA that was submitted, again, I think it was in March, was intended to tell Congress the direction we or GSA are headed to get feedback, was the word that was given to me, from Congress. I think in effect to make sure that we're in the right direction because the next steps are significantly more labor-intensive and even expensive. (51:05) And so before we start doing too much of that, GSA felt like they needed in effect a steer, I suppose it is from Congress on that.

Okay, thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.

Well thank you, Senators Van Hollen and Heinrich. Now, Senator Heinrich, when I said you would be next, I did not anticipate that we would have Senator Kennedy coming in and he was here first. Okay, so in fairness, Senator Kennedy.

Sorry, Martin. Mr. Director, welcome. I bet you just love talking about where to put the FBI building, don't you? Probably one of your favorite topics. I've got two questions. (51:46) Number one, if you took the major Mexican drug cartels, which also traffic people into the United States and turned them upside down and shook them, President Lopez Obrador would fall out of their pockets, wouldn't he?

Well, I don't know that I can comment on a specific individual's corruption other than through cases that we bring, but I understand the point that you're making for sure.

We're not getting much cooperation out of Mexico, are we?

Let me put it this way. While we have had some successes here and there in terms of extraditions and so forth, and I appreciate those and I'm grateful to our Mexican partners for those, especially at the working level. We need a whole lot more from Mexico than we've gotten in terms of shutting down the cartels and stopping the flow, the precursors... I mean, I could go on and on. (52:54) So I'm grateful for the successes we have had, but we need a heck of a lot more is the way I would answer that.

Why don't we use leverage of what I call NAFTA II to try to encourage the President of Mexico to cooperate more.

I mean, NAFTA, of course, is a trade agreement and I'm not really an expert on trade relations. Certainly from an FBI perspective, we welcome every tool in the toolbox to try to improve the relationship and the cooperation, and I'm hopeful that the Mexican government will see the value of building on the successes we have had and take it to the level that it needs to be because it's not where it needs to be.

Okay. Here's my second question. We know that Jeffrey Epstein, who is now deceased and Ms. Maxwell, his associate who's in prison, were engaged in a conspiracy of sex trafficking with minors. So are others. It's been widely reported. (54:22) What's the FBI doing to investigate the other people that were involved in the sex trafficking ranks?

Well, I'm not sure that I can confirm any specific individual being investigated.

Well, let me put it this way. Let me give you some facts widely reported. Jeffrey Epstein had video surveillance in all of his homes and on his private island. And there have been articles after articles from witnesses who have said he videotaped sex acts with prominent people because he was trying to, with young girls that he had procured, to try to incur favor with those prominent people and potentially to be able to blackmail them. Now that's a fact. (55:20) And the FBI and other federal agencies have raided his houses. Do you have those tapes?

Again, I can't discuss the specifics of our law enforcement operations related to Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell, but obviously we had very active investigation related to both of them. But whether it extends to other people, I'm not sure that's something that I can comment on.

A suit was filed yesterday against one of those prominent people by one of the young women sex trafficked allegedly said he was part of the ring. It's on the front page. I don't know. Is this New York Times? Wall Street Journal? (55:58) And we keep seeing article after article after article and we keep hearing about prominent person after prominent person after prominent person. I just want to know if these prominent people are above the law and aren't being investigated or is the FBI investigating them?

Well, no one is above the law, number one. As to whether specific people are being investigated, that's not something that I, as I'm sure you can appreciate, can engage on here. We've devoted significant resources to the investigation.

Is it ongoing?

I'm not sure there's anything I can share with you on that, but let me see if we can get back to you and provide a little more information about that.

Well, for example, these allegations in this lawsuit, the civil action.

I haven't seen the article.

Your reading, it'll trigger your gag reflex. Is the FBI going to investigate that?

Well, again, I haven't seen the article, but I would be happy to take a look at it and take it back and see if it's part of something we're already working-

I'd just like to know-

I share your-

Yeah, is the FBI still investigating this? Or are these prominent people going to go Scot-free?

I'm not sure that I can tell you whether or not there is ongoing work being devoted to this. I would be happy to take a look at the specific article. I share your disgust at Mr. Epstein's conduct and Ms. Maxwell's conduct.

And others.

The whole operation.

Okay, thanks. Madam Chair. Sorry, Martin. You're fine a American anyway.

Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator Peters, Senator Heinrich has kindly consented to give you time to prepare for your round of questioning and he's going next because I made a deal with him.

Okay. We've done some musical chairs here. I apologize. Director, I wanted to ask you a little bit about the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act and specifically how the engaged in the business language may have broadened your ability to perform background checks and what impact that then has on other agencies' ability to successfully prosecute things like the straw purchasing and gun trafficking provisions in that law.

So certainly BSCA was an important piece of legislation that has added to our authorities at NICS in particular in a number of ways in terms of additional background checks for the so-called U-21 group in particular. And I think that's important because as I go around talking to state and local law enforcement and I've talked to law enforcement in all 50 states, I believe easily in this job. (58:57) One of the two recurring themes you'll hear on violent crime is the role of juveniles and the role of mental health. Almost every group, no matter what state I'm talking to. And so the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act does, I think, take an important step in the right direction in terms of addressing that specific part of the threat. (59:16) The part that you're asking about is more in ATF's lane, but we work very closely with ATF on our safe streets and violent crimes task forces, and we are always looking for the strongest violation to disrupt the threat. And so whether it's straw purchaser cases or things like that, I know when I was a line prosecutor, I prosecuted, tried a number of straw purchaser cases. Those are important tools, and so often that's one of the best violations to dismantle a violent crime threat.

One of the other things that we haven't, I don't think adequately, addressed in the law yet, but which is skyrocketing is these ghost guns or privately made firearms. Law enforcement has seen a thousand percent increase in recoveries between 2016 and 2021. (01:00:07) In 2022, a ghost gun was used to shoot and kill a 16-year-old at West Mesa High School in Albuquerque. I wish that were a completely isolated case. What does the FBI doing to recover and prevent assembly of ghost guns? And what tools, maybe even more importantly, do you need from the Congress to be able to get your hands around this challenge?

So I would say ghost guns, as you say, represent a real challenge for law enforcement because the kits are cheap and widely available and undercut the ability to trace the firearm and in effect end up undermining the background investigation process. (01:00:55) And unfortunately, we are seeing ghost guns more and more in violent crime and gang investigations. Now, as to authorities, you're really talking more ATF in terms of regulation or even legislation, but we do coordinate closely. Whenever we seize ghost guns as part of a take down, we're obviously working closely with ATF on that. As to other things that Congress can do to help, at the risk of answering every question with the same answer, we need Congress to restore the progress that was made in '23 so that we can sustain our efforts against violent crime and sustain our work in terms of denials of firearms to the people who are legally prohibited from having them.

Yeah, absolutely. On that note, and I suspect it will be a similar answer, we made some progress recently with the Fend Off Fentanyl Act that was really designed to prevent Fentanyl from getting inside the United States in the first place, but you have to deal with it once it's already here. You mentioned funding and the potential impact that the budget could have on your ability to disrupt that flow. (01:02:12) Feel free to reiterate the importance of that and then also touch on other tools that you may need to address the crisis that we are seeing in communities all across this country.

So we are finding most of the Fentanyl that we seize at the FBI is Fentanyl that's already here in the United States. And what we're finding is that something like 70% of is coming up in violent gang take-downs. So that shows you firsthand the nexus between the Fentanyl problem and the violent crime problem and some of the most dangerous offenders. (01:02:54) It is not unusual, not unusual for the FBI for any given field office to seize enough Fentanyl in one take-down to have wiped out an entire state. And so if you start thinking about the impact of the cuts that we've been talking about in this hearing, that's fewer seizures, that's more pills on the market, that's more people dying. I mean, just put it as bluntly as that. And that's just looking at it that way. (01:03:20) And of course, we also have all these investigations into cartel leadership. And again, the cuts impact that if we're going to be serious about going after the cartels. Among the other things that we are doing to try to tackle the Fentanyl problem, we have an initiative called JCODE that aggressively targets Darknet trafficking of Fentanyl. (01:03:42) We, just last year, had an operation called SpecTor that was the largest ever, I think, take-down of Darknet trafficking, marketplace of Fentanyl and other dangerous synthetic opioids. So that's an important part of our work. I know in your home state of Albuquerque, I just remembered it off the top of my head, there's a great take-down that they did where they were seizing enough Fentanyl to wipe out like an entire state along with, again, back to the nexus with violence, along with hand grenades, ballistic vests, the whole nine yards. (01:04:21) So, the Fentanyl problem and the violent crime problem are inextricably linked. And of course, the Fentanyl problem is directly tied to the problems from the other side of the border.

So not a great time to cut his budget.

Certainly is not. It's unfortunate we have another year of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. Senator Peters, thank you for your patience.

Well, thank you Madam Chair. Director Wray, good to see you again as always, and thank you for your service to our country. (01:04:53) Director Wray, last year as Chairman of the Homeland Security Government Affairs Committee, I released a report on the watch listing and screening processes at airports. The report raised concerns about the watch list, including who it is shared with, its implementation, its oversight, as well as the redress process. (01:05:16) In particular, the report found insufficient transparency, lack of a holistic approach to screening, and no meaningful options to resolve concerns for Americans who believe that they were misidentified or the subject to discrimination. Certain communities such as Muslim, Arab, and South Asian Americans report disparate screening during their travel and the breakdown in trust over the inability to redress the process. (01:05:44) Certainly, I think you agree the administration, including the FBI, must effectively target our resources to protect our country from terrorism first and foremost, but we also need to respect the rights of innocent Americans as well. (01:05:58) So my question for you, sir, is...

Because I believe you're familiar with this report. And what steps have you taken to ensure that there's more transparency, especially to Congress, about the watch list and other data sets maintained by the terrorist screening center as recommended in the report that my committee published?

So certainly I agree as you stated, that it's important that the database be used to protect our national security and at the same time, respect of civil liberties. And no one is placed on the watch list solely because of race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, or any first amendment protected activities. And there is a rigorous interagency process. There are continuous review and quality control measures. We're constantly taking advantage of new methods and technologies to strengthen those processes. And while the FBI and the TSC, as I know you know because of your other role, are not responsible for the actual travel screening. We do work diligently with the interagency to try to make sure we're maintaining a current and accurate watch list. (01:07:00) Recently the TSC put out a comprehensive document about the watch list process, which includes everything from the process for nominations, the use of the list, quality assurance measures, and to the heart of your question, the redress procedures. And so our hope is that that document strikes the balance of the two issues that you mentioned in terms of providing more transparency about all those processes so that people know how it works, know how they can challenge if they have something they want to challenge, while at the same time not compromising our national security. Ironically, some of the transparency around this process could itself infringe on people's privacy and civil liberty because of who it identifies in a way that maybe they wouldn't want being identified.

Right. It is always a careful balance, but we have to continue to work. We've been working with your team. We hope we can continue to do that, and it's been a particular issue in Detroit Airport, for example, for reasons you and I have discussed-

Right.

... many times. Director Wray, we have seen historic spikes in anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim and anti-Arab American hate incidents, certainly driven by the war between Israel and Hamas. We're also seeing rising anti-immigrant rhetoric, which has in the past has inspired domestic terror attacks in Pittsburgh and El Paso for example. DOJ has also announced its investigating dozens of violent threats against election workers and has already convicted 13 individuals. And as you said earlier, you're increasingly concerned about the potential for a coordinated foreign terrorist attack here in the homeland. So the threat of terrorist attack is high and we don't know what will inspire the next attack or where it will happen. But my question for you is, given all of these threats, how is the FBI now prioritizing resources to protect these communities from these varied threats?

Well, you covered a waterfront because there's a waterfront-

Right.

... of threats. So to start with on the terrorism side, terrorism which includes both foreign terrorism and domestic terrorism, remains our number one priority. That has not changed and that drives prioritization within all the field offices for one thing. Second, we, a couple years ago, elevated civil rights, specifically including hate crimes to what we call a national threat priority, and the effect of that is to drive prioritization in all the field offices. In addition, I created a few years ago something that we call the Domestic Terrorism Hate-Crimes Fusion Cell, because what I found was that sometimes the same act of violence could be considered either a hate crime or an act of domestic terrorism. In many ways, it's the same type of attack, it's just two different legal structures, and in the FBI, the criminal investigative division, we have people who focus on hate crimes and then of course we have people who focus on the national security side on terrorism. (01:10:20) And so this Diffusion Cell that I created brought the two groups together to ensure both that nothing slips through the cracks, but also maybe more importantly, to try to see if we can better anticipate and to be more proactive to prevent these attacks in the first place as they're solely responding after they tragically occur. And I'm proud of some of the work that was done, including I think for the first time ever a couple years ago now, a proactive hate crimes charge that disrupted an attack against a synagogue. I believe it was in Nevada, but it could have been in Colorado because there was one of each.

Great, well, thank you. Appreciate that and look forward to continuing to work with you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you Senator Peters. Senator Fisher.

Thank you Madam Chair and thank you for being here today, Director Wray. I continue to be concerned about the threat that the Chinese Communist government poses to critical infrastructure in the United States, especially when it comes to cybersecurity. In Nebraska, this presents distinct vulnerabilities for our agriculture industry and the nation's food supply. For instance, malicious code contained planting data and harm crop yields. It also can be used by foreign actors to steal our ag innovation. What internal mechanisms is the FBI relying on to counter cyber threats to the agriculture industry from China specifically?

So we are specifically concerned, not just as you are about the China threat more broadly, but about the China threat as it relates to agriculture in particular. I have visited our Omaha office a couple times. I met with our partners there and I know from firsthand experience and contact with them, that they are acutely focused on specifically the threats to agriculture, and in fact, they're holding, I think, a big summit soon that I was hearing about. It's bringing people from all over the state and the region, again, very much focused on this issue. We have seen in the past, the Chinese government or people from China acting on behalf of China attempting to steal cutting edge agricultural research. Even to the point of, I know in Senator Moran's home state of Kansas, we stopped a guy trying to fly out of the country with cutting edge agriculture research. (01:12:44) In Iowa, I can remember we had guys out in the fields digging up genetically modified corn seed and we worked with the DOJ to prosecute them. So there's the theft, the IP theft part, and we know that China has specifically identified agriculture as one of its areas that it wants to target. It's quite explicit about that, so that's a concern. You also brought up, I think, the critical infrastructure dimensions of this. And we have seen the Chinese government attempting to target multiple sectors, civilian sectors, to pre-position, to potentially cause havoc at a time and place of their choosing. And so that's something that we're really trying to focus on.

Can you tell us that in this setting specifically what sectors and where that's happened or should it be in a closed session?

There's some sectors I could share publicly, whether there's anything I could share about agriculture specifically on that, I'm not sure. I know what I can say publicly, but it gives you a flavor of what we're dealing with. We conducted with our partners a court authorized operation that took down and exposed a Chinese government effort to pre-position on civilian critical infrastructure that included water, telecommunications, and a variety of others. And again, there was no legitimate purpose to be on the parts of the networks they were on other than to be in a position to wreak havoc at a time and place of their choosing.

Right. In addition to the cybersecurity, we're also worried about communications network, that infrastructure there that the Chinese are looking at. And it's been a challenge to be able to fund the FCC, the Rip and Replace program that's out there. So we know that the Chinese have that telecom equipment there. We know the security risks that are involved. Are you able to share any updates today from the FBI's work to evaluate the Chinese network gear that's located, especially next to US military installations? Again, if you could do it here or if it would need to be in a closed setting.

So on the-

Western Nebraska has assets that we're worried about.

Yeah. On the communication side and the whole Rip and Replace issue, that's probably something better reserved for another setting. What I can tell you is that we have a number of investigations underway that relate to allegations concerning buying up of land near installations that would be of concern. And it's not that there's anything inherently unlawful about foreign purchase of land, but we get concerned when the purchaser may have ties back to a government that doesn't share our values and it's positioned near some critical site.

Right. And that's what we follow as well. Do you have enough availability? Is there enough transparency in these transactions to easily discover if there's a connection to the Chinese there? As I said earlier, we have concerns in Western Nebraska about some of this.

So it is a challenge. On farmland in particular, we are working with USDA to try to look to some kind of mandatory reporting regime that might be helpful there. So that's a relationship that continues to grow between the agencies. I would say that the Chinese government, now that more and more businesses, states, countries, are wise to what they're up to, are making it harder to trace transactions. And they're not just sort of looking at the combined efforts of us and our partners and just saying, nevermind. They're doubling down and trying to figure out how to be more creative to try to hide the hand of the Chinese government in some transaction. So we are having to work that much harder with partners to try to sleuth out the involvement of some state nexus.

Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you Senator Fisher. Senator Merkley.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair and good to see you, Director. Director, I wanted to explore a little bit the challenge of the plot to murder a seek activist here in the United States. The Department of Justice unsealed and indictment, and the individual I gather is in the Czech Republic, and that we've established there are extradition possibilities. Is that progressing?

I can say that I'm very aware of the case you're talking about, and I do feel the case is progressing. There's probably not a whole lot I can say about it for that reason, but yes, the case is progressing.

But we're actively pursuing extradition?

I believe I can confirm that much. Yeah.

Thank you. The Washington Post reported that US officials have identified the individual in the Indian Intelligence Agency who was the crafter of the plot, and that the plot was approved by the chief of research and analysis swing, which is the Indian Spy Agency. I have not seen that we are pursuing indictments, but are we pursuing indictments against individuals who not just the hired assassin, if you will, but those who planned and plotted the assassination?

So that's a question that I can't answer here. What I can tell you just because it's a very ongoing investigation, and what I will tell you is that we feel quite strongly as I think you do, that individuals cannot attempt to conduct lethal plotting in the United States, even if they feel strongly that somebody is somebody they view as a bad actor. That's not a recourse that they have available to them to engage in lethal plotting.

I raised this particular case because I've previously raised and really tried to put a spotlight on the growing problem of transnational repression. And as the chair, on the Senate side chair of the Congressional Executive Commission on China, we hold a lot of hearings in which people are testifying. Many of those folks have been subject to transnational repression by the Chinese government. This morning we had the anniversary, the hearing on the anniversary of Tiananmen Square, and the individuals again spoke about the challenges they have faced. In fact, one individual testified with an assumed name and a mask in order to protect herself from repression. (01:20:09) Previously, I've raised the issue of having a better gateway for people to talk to the FBI about transnational repression because in the past, the FBI had said, "Well, just tell people to call the general tip line." That is not something hardly anyone does, of those that I'm aware of who have been subject to this. They're not sure it's a crime. They're not sure it will be confidential. They're not sure there will be a Chinese speaker. So in our FY24 bill, we had report language that directed the FBI to ensure that its tip line is staffed by people with and linguistic ability to communicate with the diaspora and knowledge of the tactics of transnational repression. Has the FBI accomplished that assignment?

Well, what I can tell you is that we have a transnational repression cell that is focused specifically not just on how we analyze the intelligence related to transnational repression, but how we feed that into outreach and engagement with the targeted communities, and that includes everything from translations into the relevant languages to supplying it to field offices for community engagements with dissonant and diaspora communities sprinkled around the country, with the whole goal of being trying to address the very concern that you're alluding to, which is to recognize that these are folks who, in many case, the transnational repression is at the hands of law enforcement from these other countries. So they're understandably a little bit reluctant to turn to law enforcement here. So it's an effort to educate them on what transnational repression is, how they can reach out to us to show them that we're there to help.

And that is valuable, and thank you for having your outreach teams engaged in that manner. I'm still not hearing that they're presenting an opportunity to those communities in which those communities feel comfortable sharing their experiences. So I want to continue to raise this. I think from your response, the specific assignment of having the tip line staffed with people with the linguistic ability specific to the population most affected may not have happened yet, but I'll follow up with you in that regard. (01:22:42) And how quickly five minutes pass, so I'm out of time, but I'll just close with noting that this challenge is growing. Some of folks that we work closely with, India included and Turkey, are now engaging in transnational repression. It's particularly important that nobody gets a pass on this. Here in the United States, people should not be possible for foreign governments to threaten them or threaten their families back home. It's such a direct attack on freedom of speech and freedom of association. Thank you.

Thank you Senator Merkley. Senator Hagerty.

Thank you Madam Chairman. Welcome, Director Wray. Director Wray, we're in the midst of a critical election year and the American people need to be able to count on a fair process. Are you concerned about election interference this year? A yes or no answer will suffice.

Am I concerned about election interference? Yes.

I'd like to talk about one specific threat. One specific concern that I have. Several federal laws prohibit using governmental authority to interfere in federal elections, and the FBI would be in charge of investigating such a violation of federal law work to occur. Is that correct?

I'd have to think about the specific examples, but certainly there's a range of types of interference in elections that we have authorities to pursue. So I guess depends on the facts, the specific factual scenario.

Certainly happened. I know the FBI has investigated extensively in the past in this arena. Here we have a situation that's unprecedented. No former president, no major candidate for president has ever been prosecuted criminally in American history, yet now we have a situation where the incumbent president's major candidate, major opponent is being prosecuted in five separate jurisdictions all by Democrat partisan prosecutors, and all of this culminating right in the middle of an election season. Does that sound to you like coordinated election interference or is that just a coincidence?

Well, I'm not going to discuss pending state criminal prosecutions. That's not something I would ever do.

Well, I'm talking about utilizing governmental authority to interfere in election. Let me get more specific. What we saw happen last week was Alvin Bragg who ran on a platform of getting Trump do just that, with a flimsy made up theory and a criminal conviction. Just this weekend, the leader of the Soros organization came out and advised Democrats to repeat the slogan, "Convicted felon," so it could be imprinted on voters minds. Alvin Bragg facilitated that imprint and did just that. Is that coordinated election interference or is that just a coincidence that that would happen?

Again, with all due respect, I'm not going to talk about... you're talking about a state criminal case.

I'll go to a federal level then. If you look back to April of 2022, the New York Times reported that President Biden had told his advisors that he wanted Donald Trump prosecuted. That was printed in the New York Times, just days after President Trump announces that he's going to enter the election process. Merrick Garland appoints Jack Smith to prosecute Trump, President Biden's opponent. Is this coordinated election interference to go after your opponent in a federal election using the Justice Department to do it?

You're asking about a special counsel appointed by the Attorney General and a pending federal case that is in front of a federal judge, and it's not something that I can appropriately discuss here.

Well, here's another situation. When Letitia James was running for New York Attorney General, she campaigned to get Trump. In fact, representative Dan Goldman called it an individualized political vendetta. Does it seem that using the criminal justice system for a political vendetta is election interference or is that just a coincidence too?

Again, I'm just not going to weigh in on pending state criminal cases. It's not an appropriate role for the FBI to do.

But the FBI has the duty to investigate violations of federal law and federal law prohibits the use of governmental authority to interfere in elections, particularly a presidential election of this consequence. The FBI is not investigating, and I presume, who's going to investigate it? Who's going to look into this?

Well, again, I'm not going to talk about who we are or are not investigating because that's not something that's appropriate for me under DOJ rules. I can tell you that we are going to do our part, and we have up one part, in protecting our elections from the threats that we have jurisdiction to investigate.

Well, the way the legal stars have aligned in this circumstance is deeply concerning, not only to me but to the American people. And I just stepped through a number of situations where it certainly appears that there is a coordinated effort to go after the President's main political rival and it's happening. All of these are convening right at the same time, right in the middle of an election year. They're using facts or theories from years past, but all of it is coming together right at this point in time. It certainly looks like a coordinated effort to me, and it certainly looks like the type of thing that the FBI should be investigating. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Senator Hagerty. I would just point out that I think there are a number of people who do not support that conspiracy theory, so I appreciate that you have that view. I think it's appropriate that-

If it's a conspiracy, the way this aligns is the most incredible-

... others don't have that view.

... thing I've ever seen Madam Chairman.

I share the Director's view that that's not appropriate for the director of the FBI to comment on. Senator Coons.

Thank you, Madam Chair and thank you Director Wray. Director, I've had the chance to work with you in an oversight role both during the Trump administration and the Biden administration, and I admire the ways in which you have worked. Do you think it's important that the FBI maintain its independence from any efforts to politicize the federal law enforcement system?

Very much so. I think the FBI has a unique role to play in American society and in our legal system. We need to be able to call balls and strikes no matter who likes it. And unfortunately in today's world, it is a reality that with everything we do, there's going to be somebody who doesn't like it, but we can't get hung up on that. To me, that's what independence means. We're going to call it without fear about who's going to be angry or upset, or alternatively joyous or happy about something we do. We just can't go down that road. So my commitment, my focus as was stated I think very clearly to you and the rest of the Judiciary committee when President Trump nominated me, was that we're going to focus on doing the work in the right way. We may not get the results that people want in this case or that case, but I will do my best, and I have continued to do my various to make sure we do our work in the right way.

I appreciate that. We've known each other a long time and I respect the way you conduct yourself as Director. We've recently gone through an important process around FISA reauthorization. In your both written and spoken testimony, you said that the FBI is principally focused on the protection of the American people from terrorism, both domestic and international. This is a top priority and there are significant threats. And I think that there were some significant reforms codified in the reauthorization of Section 702 and the surveillance authorities. I'd be interested in hearing what you are doing to implement them to ensure that the civil liberties of the American people are protected under your directorship and any potential successor, and how you strike that balance appropriately given the urgency of also protecting the American people from terrorism.

So as you know, the law that was passed recently as the most significant rewrite of FISA, I think since its passage, and there was no kind of on-ramp period. So we implemented it sort of day one, even though there weren't resources that were provided to do it. And even though it came in an environment, as I've already testified, where we're dealing with effectively a $500 million cut, but we're going to comply with all the requirements. They are resource intensive in their own way because you're talking about pre-approval requirements for one thing, prohibition on certain queries, again, that have to be detected and audited. One of the things that I did, even before the law passed, is I created an office of internal audit at the FBA, which did not previously exist, who's sole focus was on FISA compliance. And we achieved great strides in FISA compliance as is confirmed independently by the court. But it is a significant change in how we operate. And my message to the troops is twofold. (01:32:14) One, got to make sure you're doing it in the right way. And number two, given how critical this tool is to protecting the American people from foreign threats, terrorists, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, especially foreign cyber, we need to make sure that we're using it in the way that Congress and I think the American people expect us to do to protect them because it is an indispensable tool. I don't use words like indispensable. It is indispensable.

Well, thank you. And it's a two-year reauthorization. I intend to follow it closely as we reconsider it two years from now. As you know, I've long been concerned about intellectual property theft. Senator Hatch and I passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act, I think back in 2016. And one of the areas that I think is an important priority for us nationally is to protect American invention and innovation, particularly from the CCP, because they intend to be a pure competitor or to exceed our capabilities largely by stealing our innovations in areas like artificial intelligence and precision biology and other areas. What are you doing to address threats to American innovation and how would the additional resources you're seeking for FY25 bolster those efforts?

So first off, we are laser focused on our adversaries efforts to steal American intellectual property. And there is no country, I've been consistent on this for I think since early in my tenure and maybe even in 2017 itself, there is no country that presents a broader, more severe, more comprehensive threat to our economic security, our ideas, our innovation, ultimately our freedom, than the Chinese government. I want to be clear, I'm talking about the Chinese government, not the Chinese people, and certainly not Chinese Americans. And what makes the threat from the PRC so pernicious is that they combined multiple tools, so everything from human efforts, whether it's traditional intelligence officers, co-opts, corrupted insiders, et cetera, with a cyber program that dwarfs, that dwarfs anybody else's, combined with what would otherwise be legitimate business activity, joint ventures, different kinds of mergers and acquisitions, partnerships that are in effect just a vehicle to enable the other stuff. And so you put all those avenues together, it becomes particularly challenging. (01:34:45) We have north of or around 2000 active investigations that are just into the PRCS efforts to steal our information and technology. It's up like 1300% from where it was not that long ago. All 56 field offices. And from an investigation perspective, we're incredibly active and the resources are indispensable to do that. But investigations alone aren't enough. We're much more engaged over the last several years with the business community, trying to work with them so that they can figure out how better to harden their... Because they are the attack surface. So there's a lot of outreach. (01:35:25) Cyber, the Chinese cyber effort is gigantic. If you took all of the FBI's cyber resources and said, forget Russia, forget Iran, forget ransomware, just do nothing but China, the Chinese government's hacking program would dwarf ours 50 to one. So the idea that Congress would set us back instead of launching forward on that boggles my mind. And so I would implore, and I know this subcommittee has been a great ally on this stuff, but I would implore Congress more broadly to make sure that we don't do that because I can guarantee you the Chinese government ain't cutting its budget.

Nope. Well, thank you Director Wray. I'm the chair of the Intellectual Property Subcommittee, Senator Tillis and I have a number of pieces of legislation we're trying to advance to strengthen the tools to protect our IP, but you also need the resources. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you Senator Coons. Senator Murkowski.

Thank you, Madam Chairman. Director, welcome to the committee. Thank you for your leadership. Talk about fentanyl just for a moment. Alaska continues to outpace the other states. Unfortunately, this is a position and place that we would never ever want to be. Between 2022 and '23, we saw the largest percent increase in drug overdose of any state by far. We're referred to as, quote, "One of fentanyl's deadliest frontiers." Just from last year, the drug overdoses increased by 40% from '22 to '23, FY22 to 23. And then of these overdoses, three quarters were from fentanyl. And so we're seeing our cities under attack. But even more troubling is the very, very remote, small, oftentimes Alaska native villages, villages of 800 people, where the cartels, those who are moving these drugs, know that they can get 10 times more for this poison than anywhere else. And so they're targeting our smallest of small communities. So we're seeing this awful increase. And yet, if we look at what is happening in other areas, many states have seen reductions in overdose death rates during this same period. (01:38:06) What are you doing there that is allowing for greater levels of success? What are the obstacles to doing the same in places like Alaska? It was somewhat gratifying to see a recent announcement that the US attorney's office there in Alaska had had announced new charges against this ring where there had been 53 defendants named. Now there are additional charges. This is good, this is positive, but we're looking at what we're up against. And we're a state where the stuff is coming in by air, it's coming in a little bit by vessel, that and the mails. So we know where the points of entry are, and we're still not

... not able to do the interdiction that is making a difference to turn this around. You got any words that you can share with people who are really very, very anxious about what we're seeing with fentanyl?

Well, certainly I'm acutely aware of what a big problem is up there and as some of the challenges that law enforcement in your home state have to contend with. I've been up to visit, as you know a couple times.

Appreciate.

And on one of them in particular, the Alaska State Troopers with whom we have a great relationship, took me up in a helicopter to be able to kind of get a better sense of just the sheer sprawl and remoteness of some of the communities that you're talking about. (01:39:41) We are working through the Alaska High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area initiative, and that's a big part of it, not just on the investigations enhancing those, but promoting interagency partnerships, increasing awareness. Part of that effort in addition to big cases like the 53 person one you mentioned and the seizures that came with that is to try to make sure that people, including in some of these more remote communities, kind of know what behaviors to be on the lookout for, how to report, who to report it to, that kind of thing. (01:40:16) You mentioned some of the reduction in overdose deaths that you're seeing in some other states. The one thing I would say about that is that overdose deaths as a metric for progress I think is in some ways frustratingly misleading because first response is getting so much better in some states so that what you're having is you might have the same or maybe even more overdoses, but because there's wider availability, faster availability of Narcan, the people who were overdosing who before would've died aren't dying. And so it has the pernicious effect of making people feel like they're making more of a dent in the problem than they are. (01:41:04) Don't get me wrong. It's great that the people aren't dying and it's great that there's emergency care to keep them alive, but overdose deaths in some other state may not be as successful as it might appear to you by comparison.

And I absolutely get your point. And what we need to be doing is basically choking the poison off in the first place so it doesn't get to my state or any others. I'm out of time here, but I want to ask one final question here, and this relates to the not Invisible Commission. This is related to murdered missing indigenous peoples. They got their report to Congress and the federal agencies back November of last year. It recommends that law enforcement, including FBI, are trained in MMIP violence, crime and human trafficking, coordination with BIE and all of that. And I'm hoping that we've got some good progress that is being made by the FBI in implementing the provisions of this report. (01:42:08) The concern that I have here is I just mentioned the fentanyl crisis in this state. We've got a stepped up initiative that we must do when it comes to those vulnerable people, murdered, missing, and particularly our indigenous women, but we've got one field office in Alaska for the FBI. We have two satellite offices, one in Fairbanks and one in Juneau. Do you think that that is sufficient resourcing to cover a state that you have acknowledged it's huge? It's one fifth the size of the rest of the country. But to be dealing with these issues that are impacting us in disproportionate ways, do we need more resources up north?

We clearly need more resources, although I will tell you we need more resources just across the board and that the, I say sometimes, but it applies very much to this context. Everywhere I go, somebody has a really good, and I don't mean that sarcastically a really good idea of some place the FBI needs to be devoting more resources. (01:43:16) I have not yet found anybody who can tell me in any responsible way where the FBI can be devoting less resources. And so this is a time for Congress to lean forward in this next appropriation. I'm very aware of both how small our field office, our Anchorage division, which as you say includes not just the headquarters city in Anchorage, but the other two RAs as well by comparison to just the sheer immense area that they have to cover. And it always strikes me every time I'm talking with them about the challenges that presents, not just the sprawl, but how few roads there are and how that people have to get around and all the things that does to complicate law enforcement work in that area. So Anchorage needs more resources, but the FBI needs more resources.

The FBI needs more resources. The question that I didn't ask you was about the northern border and what we're seeing with those on the terrorist watch list coming through because we're anxious about that. So we got all kinds of issues and again, how we're resourcing regardless of where it is is a challenge. So thank you Madam Chair.

Thank you.

Thank you. Senator Murkowski. Senator Capito.

Thank you Madam Chair and ranking member and thank you Director Wray for being here with us. It looks like I might be your cleanup batter here, so that might be good. I want to go to something that Senator Murkowski was talking about. She talked about her state. You're well aware of West Virginia unfortunately leading the way and our numbers went up a little bit over the last year, which was very discouraging because we have a lot of communities and community involvement and the FBI has been involved with this on the law enforcement side, but all kinds of issues to try to lower those numbers. So it was a bit disappointing to us. (01:45:01) But I wanted to ask of what the FBI, the drug cartels, the transnational criminal organizations that we see along our southern border mostly, I would imagine, what kind of additional resources or different strategies can the FBI employ? Because obviously fentanyl is still coming streaming across the southern border. They're obviously pressing a lot of the pills before they come over, the whole thing with the chemicals coming from China. What are you seeing in this in terms of targeting the transcontinental criminal organizations?

So certainly the vast majority of the fentanyl in this country comes from the cartels in Mexico, sourced from precursor chemicals from China. And then is trafficked here or distributed here primarily by violent gangs. And so I think to be effective against the threat, which is really an epidemic, we need to be trying to hit all of those different choke points. (01:46:10) The FBI plays a role, some role in almost all of them, but not uniquely. This is way bigger than any one government agency. Frankly it's bigger than government itself. So we are through our Safe Streets task force is going after the gangs that are distributing this stuff on the streets. We are through our Transnational Organized Crime task forces and working on OCDEF Strike Forces going after the cartels and the cartel leadership, which are the source of supply. (01:46:38) We are trying to push in our own way the Mexicans, and we do have good relationships with our Mexican law enforcement counterparts, but this sort of onesie-twosie effect of a great extradition here, a takedown there, those are things to be celebrated, but they really aren't enough to affect the problem at scale. (01:46:57) And then the China piece, the precursor chemicals is a huge part as well. One of the things we're trying to do now, and I'm very pleased about this, the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines has convened and we've been doing an intelligence community sprint on the fentanyl problem to try to figure out how we can better ensure sharing of information between the different intelligence agencies who are not law enforcement and law enforcement to have the information flowing. We clearly have to go after the money after all this whole thing is profit-based, right?

Right.

So we need to figure out better ways to go after the money. So some of those are some of the things that need to be done, but it is incredibly frustrating. I know that our office in West Virginia who are dealing with, as you say on the receiving end of so much of this problem, I continue to be blown away frankly by how high-performing those office, some of the takedowns they've had in West Virginia for a comparatively small footprint is really something that's inspiring.

I guess that's a plus and a minus, the minus being they're there, the plus being, they're being disrupted and caught. So that's congratulations to them. I know there's been some big busts. (01:48:15) I want to ask you about the NICS system because the question I have is, and thank you for the visit and I thought it was a really good visit. I'm trying to understand your budget where you have a technical adjustment of 43 million proposed in your budget regarding implementation of the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act. We're being told that this could impact the 170 people that are at the NICS facility that are working in that. How is that going and can you explain a little bit the anomaly that you have here as one of the program changes for 2025?

So I can see why it's confusing a little bit. There's two things going on. One is the 170 positions that Congress gave us with BISCA was one-time funding. And so one of our requests, which I think is 43 million tied to the 170 positions, is designed to make sure that one-time funding, because we've largely filled almost all of those 170 positions. If we don't get that reappropriated, that's gone. So that's incredibly important that we get those 170 positions and that 43 million reauthorized. So that's part of it. (01:49:25) Then on top of that though, because of the pace and the volume, we have asked for a smaller, but nonetheless an enhancement. So bottom line, it's restore the, not restore, but maintain-

The 170-

... the 170, which is one-time only.

And then add ...

And then add a little bit with the enhancement that we've asked for.

Some of the, and I'll stop here, but the statistics that we, this was early on when the bipartisan bill was being discussed at NICS, there had been some disruptions where the information showed that if you knew what had happened pre 18 years old, you would've fallen into that category and there were disruptions where people were unable to secure a weapon and because of mental health or whatever. Is that continuing? I mean, is that trend continuing that it's disrupting or ... ?

We're definitely seeing that. I'm struck by the number of times when we have that, of course, there's mental health piece, there's the juvenile piece and then there's the contact with law enforcement about the individual piece and that the number of times when the conversation, the exchange with law enforcement in whatever state it is is saying, "Whoa. We know who that is, and that would not be a good thing." (01:50:44) We have significantly improved the timeliness of those. I remember when you and I were there, it was still kind of a work in progress, but I think it's up like 10-fold how much faster it's happening, which is great. But part of the reason we asked for the enhancement on top of the original part is that because of course we're going to conduct the congressionally mandated checks, but the ...

Need more resource.

We're very proud as you know and as I know you are, of how quickly NICS can turn things around so that the giant majority of people who are law-abiding citizens who have a Second Amendment right to buy their weapon can get it timely and not have it be held up. But the problem if we don't get the funds appropriated is it's going to have an impact on how much we can cover and how fast we can cover it.

Yeah, I mean, just for context, I saw the statistics that came that I have just last data point is in 2023, there were 29 million NICS firearm background checks in the country that go through the office in West Virginia. So thank you very much.

Thank you, Senator Capito. I have not yet asked questions, so I will.

I guess I wasn't [inaudible 01:52:05].

Do that. And then I know Senator Moran has one more question. But I wanted to go back to the issue of disinformation and election security. You talked about China having a 50-to-1 cyber advantage in terms of their cyber operations. We saw before the New Hampshire primary earlier this year, a domestic actor who used artificial intelligence to voice clone President Biden and target voters in New Hampshire as part of a robocall scam. How are we responding? (01:52:38) I mean, this was a domestic issue, but it points to the potential challenges from AI and the threat that that can present to our elections. So how are we responding to what we're already seeing from Russia and China in terms of the disinformation and how are we sharing, how is the FBI sharing what you know with local law enforcement and election officials so that everybody's aware of what the threat is?

So we are of course, seeing, and I've been warning about this for some time, the role of AI to enhance efforts that our foreign adversaries have already been engaged in. And one way to think of that is just like social media when it first really came of age was this gigantic bullhorn that took something that has been happening for decades, namely foreign disinformation warfare, and just scaled it in a way that was particularly challenging. (01:53:43) I think that's the right way to think about AI. It's not that it changes fundamentally what it is our adversaries want to do or why we need to be worried about it or what authorities the FBI has in our role in combating it. It allows them to amplify, to do it, to make it more sophisticated, more deceptive, cheaper, faster, all the reasons people love AI for good things they can use for bad things. (01:54:10) And so our approach is in many ways much the same, which is to make sure that we're engaging with our partners, sharing what we're seeing and hearing where we have authorities that apply to us taking action. But information sharing is the key. (01:54:28) I will say that when it comes to AI specifically, there's an increasingly important role for the private sector because if you're going to detect AI at scale certainly, it's going to be the American private sector that's going to be the key to doing that. So we are trying to partner up with the business community to make sure that they're doing their part on that, because AI is actually pretty good at detecting AI, and there is a role. America leads the world in AI innovation, which is why the Chinese are trying to steal it, by the way. And that's why we need to make sure that American companies are using their innovation to help protect our democracy.

So is there more that we should be doing in Congress to make it in the interest of some of those companies that they do a better job of policing what is on their sites?

Well, that's probably a longer discussion for another day. I will just say for right now, because this is important, and I know it's something you both care about, when it comes to these companies, there is this broader phenomenon to how important it is for them to take some kind of ownership for the way in which their products and services are used. (01:55:41) And that applies not just in this context, but in a subject that you will hear about from law enforcement, not just all over this country, but all over the world is the way in which these companies are implementing warrant-proof encryption, which basically means that child predators, terrorists, fentanyl traffickers, et cetera, can find a space where they can go and communicate and act. And law enforcement, no matter how rock solid your legal process is and how independent the judicial approval is, won't be able to have access to this information. (01:56:17) The threats won't be gone, the kids will still be victimized, the predators will still be out there, but now the companies knowing that this is happening are moving in this direction. It's a business decision that these companies are making. And so I don't think it's unreasonable for us to expect these companies to take some ownership of this process, and if we don't do something collectively as a country, we're going to wake up and find that we are blind in a way that's really going to put people's lives at risk.

Well, that's an excellent segue into my next question which is we are hearing about a new and growing threat where individuals have been using content manipulation, so AI to create sexually explicit photos and videos that appear to be real. It complicates investigations because it's difficult to tell what's real and what's not. So I know that the FBI has released a public service announcement earlier this year warning about this, but can you talk about how we're also asking private companies to look at that issue and do a better job of policing what's on their sites?

Certainly we share your concern about online targeting of kids. It's not just magnified the problem, but it's created a whole new set of actors and globalized the problem. So you have financially motivated extortion, for example, which has started to get more notoriety, and AI is just one more tool, a weapon in that context to enhance those efforts. (01:57:54) But while the technology may change, whether it's AI generated or not, child sexual abuse material is illegal and we're going to aggressively go after it. I would like to continue to work more and more closely with companies to try to see how they can be part of the solution. I think there's a lot of opportunity for that. Our folks in that program, the Violent Crimes Against Children program are some of the hardest working people in the entire FBI dealing with some of the worst that humanity has to offer. And I think we last year had something like 3000 arrests and rescued for all intents and purposes, something like 700 kids. (01:58:38) So again, I come back to the budget discussion. What's going to happen to those kids if Congress makes the mistake of going backwards like they did in '24 or with the budget?

Well, I think you won't get any argument from Senator Moran or me about that. I just want to close with one final question, and that has to do with anomalous health incidents, also known as Havana Syndrome because the FBI has been one of those agencies that's been working to establish policies and procedures to provide help for people who are affected. Can you give us any kind of an update on where you are in that process and whether people are beginning to see support that they had hoped for for treatment?

As you know, there's nothing more important to me than the health and safety of my workforce and their families, and the benefits provided for require DOJ to issue regulations to allow us to start to make the payments. (01:59:49) I'm pleased that those regulations finally went into effect last month, May 20th. We didn't sit around just waiting for that though. We put in place all kinds of procedures and mechanisms so that the minute the regulations went into effect, we could kick into high gear and start the payment process. I know that we have, I can't give you the exact number, but I know we have people already because we've been trying to improve our communication with the workforce too about this. So I know that we already have some people whose payment applications and so forth are now already under the rules now in process. And so I'm hopeful that it'll now flow quickly because we didn't have to then build on additional delay after the time the rules went into effect.

Great. Thank you. I'm pleased to hear that. Senator Moran.

Senator Shaheen, thank you. Director, just almost every day, certainly every week I have a conversation with someone in Kansas or I read something in the newspaper or hear on television or radio news about a ransomware, a cyber attack. I mean, it's prevalent. It's more than prevalent, it's dominant. And it's a small business. It can be the courthouse, our state's court system, the county treasurer's office. (02:01:12) What is it that we could be doing perhaps just as public servants to try to minimize the chances that somebody is attacked or that they take the necessary steps to prevent it? You talked about the private sector in the conversation with Senator Shaheen. Is there a chamber of commerce, a business organization? Are there steps that a business can take, a county commission, a city office that can take to prevent this from happening? And are there tools that need to be provided to local law enforcement to assist in this? (02:01:51) I think this is so common that I don't know how the solution can rest with law enforcement to the FBI in particular. And my guess is that any kind of effort to prosecute or to shut down those who are committing the cyber attacks ends in not a significant amount of results.

So for all the reasons you said, ransomware is certainly one of our top cyber priorities. I think there are a few things I would say with a glimmer of some good news buried in there. So the first is that we are very heavily engaged in private sector outreach, specifically to try to build resilience and harden the private sector's infrastructure from ransomware attacks. There are basic things that can be done, for example, in terms of having appropriate backups and things like that. I think you would be surprised to learn how often ransomware attacks are enabled, not by some really sophisticated black belt level intrusion, but by somebody somewhere at a business who didn't engage in proper cyber hygiene. They clicked on the link that they shouldn't have clicked on. It happens way more often than you would expect, including in very sophisticated places. Or the company or the business didn't upload the appropriate, those patches and updates that we all get. And those things matter. So things like that. (02:03:32) If every victim or victim to be took some of these basic cyber hygiene steps, we wouldn't stop ransomware, I want to be clear, but we would significantly make it harder for ransomware actors to be successful. So that's one. And so the more everybody can help us spread that message, we will build some greater level of resilience that way. (02:03:54) The second thing that is just incredibly important is we need the victims to reach out to us as quickly as possible when they're hit. I think sometimes people are worried because we discourage paying the ransom that if they tell, our position is, we don't think you should pay the ransom, and we're happy to explain why, but whatever you decide to do, make sure you contact us. Because there have been times when businesses have contacted us quickly where we're able to help them figure out. There've had cases where we've been able to obtain decryption keys so they can get their systems unlocked, protect their information and not pay the ransom. But that can't happen if they don't contact us. (02:04:37) There are times when we can chase the money working with the victim and basically claw back the ransom before it gets to the bad guys. So things like that that we can do, but none of it we can do if the company doesn't contact us right away. That's what's so important. There's lots of things that can happen. (02:04:54) The last part that I would say is we are starting to figure out not just the FBI, but collectively with our partners, what success against ransomware could look like. And that is joint sequenced operations campaign, sustained campaigns against particular ransomware actors where we go after not just the administrators of the ransomware group and their affiliates, but their whole ecosystem, their money launderers, their service providers, their bulletproof posters, all that stuff. So we're going after all the people that are related to the ransomware group. (02:05:32) We're going after their infrastructure. So we're seizing their servers, shutting down their domains, things like that. So we're going after the people, we're going after the infrastructure. And then of course, ransomware is a for-profit crime. We're going after their money. We're chasing their cryptocurrency, which is invariably the way the ransoms are paid, and we're getting better at disrupting the flow of the ransom back to the ransomware actors. (02:05:59) We're not where we need to be, but we are starting to see signs. We've had situations where we'll knock down a particular ransomware group and they're flailing around and out of business for months and months at a time. So we started to get a taste of what success could look like. And again, it's a joint, it's a team effort. FBI, some of the other intelligence agencies, foreign law enforcement, the private sector itself, all kind of working together. And so we have had some successes. (02:06:30) I think about the Hive ransomware group where we had basically hacked the hackers and gotten into that and they didn't know we were in. And so they kept trying to conduct ransomware attacks and we kept getting the decryption keys and providing them to the victims, and then it wasn't working. Eventually we dismantled the whole thing, but we're getting more innovative and creative and using court authorized operations, not just to try to arrest people, although we definitely want to do that, but to essentially shut down the operation itself.

That is more encouraging than I expected. If someone is subject to ransomware and a cyber attack, they'd call their local police department, their county sheriff, and those local law enforcement officials would know what to do. Is that a true statement?

Would not know what to do?

Would know what to do. Local law enforcement knows what the next step is.

Well, I think we try to engage with local law enforcement as you know, because seen it firsthand in Kansas every day. My hope would be that the local law enforcement would tell them, contact the local FBI field office, but really they should be contacting us because there are things that we can do that probably the local police chief or sheriff can't. (02:07:49) But of course, again, I'm going to sound repetitive here, all these things take resources, and in particular in the cyber unit, we need to be able to make sure we can pay and train the most sophisticated cyber talent. And that is an issue within the federal government to make sure that pay authorities, and of course, the funds that are appropriated behind it are even across the federal government so we don't have a situation which I am concerned about, where other federal agencies start cannibalizing each other for the cyber talent that we all need. So we do need to make sure that there's pay authorities and pay funding to ensure that real black belt talent who makes all the difference in some of these cases is kept.

The FBI, you have those pay authorities? Do you have those pay authorities?

Our authorities are not where they need to be. So it's a combination of both the funding and the authorities. It's a mix.

And I wonder if insurance, private insurance is a component of addressing this problem. More businesses or entities that get insured against a ransomware attack. I assume the insurance companies then are going to insist on different behavior by their insured.

I do think insurance, cyber insurance is an important part of all this. Now, I will say we see ransomware actors researching victims and researching insurance to try to figure out, it's kind of like, well, I want to figure out how much they have in their wallet before I rob them kind of thing. So there's a little bit of that going on, but I would not discourage people from getting the insurance. And we do have our own engagements with the cyber insurers as well to try to make sure we're working with them. So that's another important piece to all of this.

I would compliment you on your capability of being repetitive today. Thank you, Director.

You think we got the message?

What was he saying?

Thank you, Director Wray. If there are no further questions, senators may submit any additional questions for the subcommittee's official hearing record until June the 11th. We would ask that the FBI respond within 30 days to any of those future questions. And now the subcommittee stands in recess subject to the call of the chair. Thank you.

Thanks.

Thank you.