Mr. Cotton (00:01):
I want to welcome everyone to this hearing on President Trump's nomination of Mr. Ratcliffe to be our next director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Ratcliffe, welcome back to the Intelligence Committee. I also want to welcome your wife, Michelle, and thank her and your daughters for the sacrifices they've made across a lifetime of public service. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft is also back before the Senate. Mr. Attorney General, I'm sure being here makes you nostalgic for your own confirmation process a few years back. John, welcome. We look forward to your remarks. I want to acknowledge also my predecessor, Vice Chairman Warner. Senator Warner and I have worked together collegially over the years, even when we've disagreed strongly. I expect this spirit of comity to continue not just between the Vice Chairman and me, but across our committee. I also want to thank Senator Rubio for a service on the committee.
(00:58)
He remains a member of the committee, but he is otherwise detained this morning at his own confirmation hearing. He's been a trusted colleague and respected leader on the committee for years. We will miss him, but we also look forward to his distinguished service as our next Secretary of State. I want to extend my special thanks to our committee's senior staff on both sides as well. They put in yeoman's work over the holidays to be sure we could promptly move forward Mr. Ratcliffe's nomination. I want to begin with a few observations from my decade of service on the Intelligence Committee. The men and women of the Intelligence Committee community perform vital work to protect our nation. They often serve in dangerous and squalid conditions. Their successes are seldom celebrated and even known. Unlike our troops, no one buys them beers in the airport. Sometimes their families don't even know what they do, so let me say to them today, on behalf of this committee and a grateful nation, we respect you, we appreciate you, and we thank you, but we also need more from you.
(02:09)
In these dangerous times, our intelligence agencies haven't anticipated major events or detected impending attacks. In just the last few weeks, the members of this committee, and I presume the president had no forewarning of the New Orleans' terrorist attack or the collapse of the Assad tyranny in Syria. The same goes for Hamas's October 7th atrocity against Israel in 2023. I could give other examples, but suffice it to say we're too often in the dark. While this goes for the entire intelligence community, the problem is especially acute at the CIA, which remains after all the central intelligence agency. The CIA needs to get back to its roots but must overcome several challenges to do so. First, the CIA has neglected its core mission, collecting clandestine foreign intelligence. Put more simply, stealing secrets. Intelligence collection is the main effort.
(03:14)
Every other job is a supporting effort. If you don't collect intelligence by, say, handling spies or hacking computers, you should ask yourself how you support those who do or how you harness and use what they produce. I've seen way too many reports over the years with phrases like "according to," "based on," "judging by" followed only by "diplomatic accounts and press reports." In other words, not intelligence, and it's gotten worse over the last four years. Those sources are not unimportant, but without clandestine intelligence, we might as well get briefed by the State Department or a think tank or just read the newspaper. Second, the CIA has become too bureaucratic. Now I realize that Alan Dulles probably had the same complaint just five years after the CIA was created, but this has also gotten worse in recent years in no small part thanks to former director Brennan's so-called modernization. Lines of authority have grown blurry, talkers have replaced doers.
(04:18)
Managers with no field experience have taken over operational roles and more. Much like our military, the tooth-to-tail ratio at the CIA is badly out of balance. Third, the CIA's analysis and priorities have been politicized. Intelligence analysis all too often has aligned curiously with the Biden administration's policy preferences. "The Afghan army is strong and cohesive." "Ukraine's army will collapse within days of Russia's invasion." "Israel can't possibly destroy Hamas or Hezbollah." "Iran's air defenses are mighty and fearsome." Time and again, the CIA has produced inaccurate analysis that conveniently justifies President Biden's actions or as often, his inaction. Likewise, the CIA's misplaced priorities have yielded too many reports on matters like the prospects for gay rights legislation in Africa or climate change. These topics may have their place in government, but it's not at the CIA and I certainly hope to never again see another video, statement, or social media post from the CIA about diversity or equity or inclusion.
(05:29)
If you wonder why our intelligence agencies struggle to collect intelligence, consider this fact. The CIA offered to pay diversity consultants three times as much as a new case officer. I'm sorry, but if you feel like you need a diversity consultant or an affinity group or your pronouns in an email, maybe the CIA isn't for you. This job isn't about your identity or your feelings, it's about our nation's security. Fourth, the CIA dabbles too much in questions of political judgment even as it neglects its core mission of intelligence collection. Some of the blame, to be fair, lies with us. I hear questions from this committee about, say, some nations willed the fight or, "If we do this, that, or the other thing, what will Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping do in response?" These aren't really intelligence questions but rather matters of statesmanship and political judgment or prudence, the statesman's supreme virtue. I would observe that Lincoln and Churchill didn't have our vast modern intelligence apparatus, but they were pretty good wartime leaders because they were great statesmen. It's the CIA's responsibility to provide us and the president with timely relevant secrets. For example, that Russia has mobilized multiple divisions on Ukraine's border at Christmas Time and sent perishable fresh blood supplies to the front. It's our job to use that information to discern the inherent logic of events, not to defer passively to the intelligence community's judgment. That is a convenient conclusion that Putin hadn't yet decided to invade just days before the obviously impending invasion. Fifth, the CIA needs to become bolder and more innovative in covert action. I've seen successful covert action programs, I've seen debacles. The latter are usually caused by ill-advised constraints by political leaders or when a president uses covert action as a substitute for policy and not a supplement for policy.
(07:38)
I'll have to save more for our closed session of course, but for now I'll just say that the timid indecision that has characterized the Biden administration's overt actions extends to its covert actions. Mr. Ratcliffe, you have a big job ahead of you. The nation needs a strong, capable, and aggressive CIA. I believe the men and women you will lead want to serve in just that kind of agency. They join the CIA after all, not a church choir or a therapy session on a college campus. They and the nation are counting on you to deliver badly needed reforms and on this committee, to ensure you do. I'll now recognize the Vice Chairman for his opening remarks.
Mr. Warner (08:22):
Mr. Chairman, and first of all, congratulations on becoming chair of what I think is the most important committee in the Senate and I look forward to working with you in the kind of traditions that we have maintained in the now close to 15 years that I've been on this committee. So congratulations, Tom. Mr, Ratcliffe, it is good to see you again. Congratulations on being named director of the CIA. It was a pleasure to meet your wife and we will… I think you've brought a great introducer in former attorney General Ashcroft. Pleasure to see you, sir. Mr. Ratcliffe, I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you last month and hear your views. You previously served on the House Intel Committee and obviously as DNI, so you obviously have an appreciation for the work done by our internal intelligence community generally and more specifically the CIA. If confirmed, I believe you'll be the first person to actually have served as both ODNI and head of the CIA.
(09:28)
Echoing a little bit of what Senator Cotton said, the agency you are nominated to is facing unprecedented number of challenges, which I believe as well requires a great deal of leadership. These challenges, ranging from the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, competition with China, especially with respect to AI and other advanced technologies, the persistent threat of international terrorist organizations, and a constant theme of cyber threats from nation-states and their actors attacking our critical infrastructure to candidly just kind of run-of-the-mill criminal ransomware actors. Adding to all this has been a focus of mine and I know so many of us on the committee that the revolutions in technology from AI to synthetic bio to advances in energy require I believe fundamental changes in how we operate. In effect the very fabric of warfare in many ways is changing.
(10:34)
I believe very strongly that national security is no longer determined by simply who has the most powerful ships and tanks, but who also will lead in this technology competition, from semiconductors to drones to synthetic bio. I believe, and we've made some progress on this, but I think we've still got a long way to go that the IC must continue to adapt to these challenges. In particular, it must be better organized to collect on the development and use of advanced technology by our adversaries because they pose a dramatic threat to the United States leadership. The truth is, if we are not staying ahead of that, the ability for these foreign nation-states to use technology to get us in a stranglehold could be a huge, huge challenge.
(11:26)
During such times, it's also vital that we're able to recruit and retain the best possible talent for the IC. That starts with ensuring that the workforce feels respected and valued. I'm very concerned that the president-elect has continued to engage in undeserved attacks on the professional women and men of our intelligence agencies. These comments I do think affect morale of these men and women who… Senator Cotton said they don't get the recognition of getting beer bought for them.
(12:01)
They have to toil in anonymity, but they have, I believe, consistently regardless of which party is in power been willing to defend our nation. Unsurprisingly, particularly public comments from our leaders have a negative effect on the recruitment and retention of the talent of these critical men and women of the IC. Mr. Ratcliffe, today is your opportunity to reassure the men and women of the CIA that they not fear reprisal for being willing to speak truth to power. The most critical role of the IC is speaking truth to power. I need your commitment that you will not fire or force out CIA employees because of their perceived political views and that you'll not ask these employees to place loyalty to a political figure above loyalty to country, and I need to hear your plan on how you will reassure the CIA workforce on these issues.
(13:04)
Also, on the personnel front, I'm concerned that we continue to hear from CIA officers who have been victims of sexual assault at work as well as those suffering from the lasting effects of AHAI. I would like to hear your plan for ensuring that those who come forward about being hurt in the line of duty are taken seriously and provided the care and the attention they deserve. Mr. Ratcliffe, if confirmed, you'll be sitting at a critical intersection between intelligence and policymaking. Your job will be to give the president the best professional judgment of America's intelligence experts at the CIA, even when that judgment might be inconvenient or uncomfortable.
(13:53)
I'll need your public assurance that you always seek to provide unbiased, unvarnished, and timely intelligence assessments to the president, to the cabinet, to his advisors, and to those of us in Congress. I need your assurance that this intelligence will represent the best judgment of the CIA, again, regardless of political implications or views. And though we should not need to say it out loud, I will also need your assurance that you will work to appropriately protect our intelligence communities' sources and methods. Thank you again for your service so far. Thank you for what I know is going to be a good testimony today and I look forward to working with you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cotton (14:41):
Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft kindly offered to introduce his former colleague when Congressman Ratcliffe was nominated to be the Director of National Intelligence in 2020, but Covid forced him to do so only by letter. Fortunately, we have another chance to hear from him today, so I'm pleased to recognize Attorney General Ashcroft for his introduction.
Attorney General John Ashcroft (15:03):
Well, good morning, Chairman Cotton and Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, members of the committee. I want to thank you for your serious consideration and attention to the constitutional responsibility of confirming high ranking executive branch officials and it's an honor for me to participate with you by my appearance here today. Testifying and sharing my profound support for the nomination of the Honorable John Ratcliffe as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency is something for which I'm deeply grateful. Good national security decisions proceed from the combination of valid intelligence, information, and considered judgment and integrity is an indispensable imperative for intelligence, the best friend of national security. And national security, unfortunately, is the singular portfolio most allergic to the infection and devaluation that results from inaccuracy and distortion.
(16:06)
For high quality decision-making, sound intelligence must never be diluted or contaminated by personal bias or political predisposition. John Ratcliffe's record of upholding the Constitution and enforcing the law, including his far-sighted work in the intelligence field recommends him supremely to serve America as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I've known and worked with John for almost decades. I know of no person, no person of a higher commitment to integrity. I've seen him speak the unvarnished truth to those he works with and those he works for, whether senior governmental officials or corporate CEOs. As a member of the Congress, Ratcliffe's career stands as an outstanding record of public service. He was consistently well-prepared, tough, but he's a tough and fair interrogator, fundamentally focused on the Constitution, never involving himself in personal attacks.
(17:08)
John has served on the House Intelligence, Judiciary, Ethics, Homeland Security Committees, and as Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committees, Cyber Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee. In the Department of Justice, John served as a federal prosecutor, first as an assistant US attorney and chief of anti-terrorism and national security for the Eastern District of Texas, then as US attorney for the Eastern District of Texas where he pursued more than 30 national security and terrorism related matters. After his service as a US attorney, I had the privilege of working with John in the Ashcroft Sutton & Ratcliffe law firm where he focused on government and internal investigations, homeland security, on foreign corrupt practices law.
(17:57)
In professional moments, both public and private, I have seen John's thoughtful, decisive, yet humble leadership. He's a careful and willing listener, skilled at proceeding and processing with different voices in complex situations. He is comfortable in being held to account and he will require those in the agency to be similarly accountable. Over the past 15 years, he's served in crucial roles as both a developer and consumer of intelligence, and John therefore brings to the office of the director of the Central Intelligence Agency a relevant reservoir of experience as well as sound judgment on an array of issues related to national security.
(18:43)
He understands that the intelligence community exists to secure the liberties and freedoms of Americans, liberties and freedoms that he holds in highest regard. As a prosecutor, John dealt with national security and terrorism-related matters. This ranged from domestic and international terrorism to drug trafficking, human trafficking, and the transnational criminal organizations that threaten us in ways that we have previously not been accustomed to. During recent decades of our nation's most elevated concern regarding terrorism, John developed excellent relationships with the international intelligence sources in order to aid America. That experience will serve him well in fostering appropriate cooperation with the intelligence agencies of our allies.
(19:33)
Under John's leadership as Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, he forged policies and statutes which will strengthen and do strengthen our nation's intelligence gathering capacity. He is thoroughly conversant with the wide variety of national security topics with a focus on emerging and expanding cybersecurity threats. This includes investigating foreign cybersecurity interference, reviewing the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to secure government networks, evaluating the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, the Wassenaar agreement, and the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program, together with the interagency coordination on cybersecurity.
(20:21)
John enlisted bipartisan support to build a national cyber intelligence infrastructure to protect our country. President Obama signed the significant cybersecurity bill that John co-authored, the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act, which passed the House of Representatives with an overwhelming bipartisan vote. His record reflects a commitment to continue building a forward-looking intelligence community that is integrated and coordinated. His experience signals his possession of the skills necessary to lead the intelligence community in effectively addressing proliferating national security threats. John Ratcliffe is capable of and committed to delivering the most insightful accurate intelligence and counterintelligence possible. He will supply decision makers with excellent information upon which they can base sound judgments, safeguarding our national security. Mr. Chairman and committee members, thank you for what I consider be the privilege of communicating to you my unreserved endorsement of John L. Ratcliffe for the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Thank you.
Mr. Cotton (21:42):
Thank you, Mr. Attorney General. I understand that Mr. Ashcroft will now step away or…
Attorney General John Ashcroft (21:52):
I'll join the citizens.
Mr. Cotton (21:54):
You're more than welcome to do so.
Attorney General John Ashcroft (21:56):
And observe from the high perch of citizenship the rest of the proceedings.
Mr. Cotton (22:02):
Thank you again.
Attorney General John Ashcroft (22:03):
I pray God's blessing on this committee and I am very, very pleased that the committee seriously considers the statement of both of the Vice Chairman… We used to call that person the Ranking Member, but I think he's Vice Chairman now. And the Chairman, I'm grateful to you. Thank you for allowing me to be here.
Mr. Cotton (22:27):
Thank you, Mr. Attorney General. Mr. Ratcliffe, before we move to your opening statement, it is the custom of the committee to ask a series of questions of all nominees, nothing personal about you. So first off, do you solemnly swear that you'll give this committee your full and truthful testimony today and in the future?
John L. Ratcliffe (22:48):
I do.
Mr. Cotton (22:48):
Okay. Again, we have five standard questions. A simple yes will do, a no will require further explanation if you needed help with the test. First, do you agree to appear before the committee here and in other venues when invited?
John L. Ratcliffe (23:04):
Yes.
Mr. Cotton (23:05):
If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your agency to appear before the committee and designated staff when invited?
John L. Ratcliffe (23:12):
Yes.
Mr. Cotton (23:13):
Third, do you agree to provide documents and any other materials requested by the committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
John L. Ratcliffe (23:22):
Yes.
Mr. Cotton (23:24):
Fourth, will you ensure that your office and your staff provide such material to the committee when requested?
John L. Ratcliffe (23:31):
Yes.
Mr. Cotton (23:32):
Finally, do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all members of this committee of intelligence activities and covert actions rather than only the Chairman and the Vice Chairman?
John L. Ratcliffe (23:44):
Yes.
Mr. Cotton (23:45):
All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Ratcliffe. The floor is yours for your opening statement.
John L. Ratcliffe (23:52):
Thank you very much, Chairman Cotton, Vice Chairman Warner, and distinguished members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you as the President's nominee for the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I've enjoyed meeting with each of you individually and I look forward to answering your questions today. Thank you to my friend and mentor, former Attorney General John Ashcroft, for being here today and for his gracious and humbling remarks. Sir, I am forever grateful for your faith in me. Thank you to Director Burns and your excellent team at the CIA for your commitment to a smooth and professional transition. I'd like to recognize my amazing family, my wonderful wife, Michelle, our two daughters, Riley and Darby, my five brothers and sisters, and watching from above my parents, Bob and Kathy Ratcliffe. I simply have no words to adequately express my gratitude to all of you.
(24:49)
And finally, thank you President Trump for the great honor of nominating me to lead the world's premier intelligence agency. I am grateful for the opportunity to serve under you once again and if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to help you protect the American people and advance America's interests. Today we face what may be the most challenging national security environment in our nation's history. The Chinese Communist Party remains committed to dominating the world economically, militarily, and technologically. Transnational criminal organizations are flooding American communities with violence and deadly narcotics. The Russia-Ukraine war wages on, spreading devastation and increasing the risk of the United States being pulled into a conflict with a nuclear power. The Iranian regime and its terrorist proxies continue to export mayhem across the Middle East and Iran is closer to nuclear breakout than ever before. North Korea remains a destabilizing force. And increasing coordination among America's rivals and adversaries threatens to compound the threats that they each pose to us individually and numerous terrorist groups and other non-state actors, some of which have even crossed our southern border, still pose a persistent threat to our people and our homeland.
(26:13)
These threats converge at a time of rapid technological change. Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing will define the future of national security, geopolitical power, and human civilization. Ubiquitous technical surveillance is presenting unprecedented challenges to one of the CIA's core missions, collecting human intelligence. In short, the challenges are great and increase the necessity of confirming a CIA director who is prepared on day one to take them head on. For roughly a quarter of a century, I have devoted my professional life to US national security. I served as the chief of Anti-terrorism and National Security and then US attorney for the Eastern District of Texas. As a congressman, I was a member of the House Intelligence, Homeland Security, and Judiciary Committees. As Director of National Intelligence, I had the privilege of working closely with President Trump and oversaw the 18 agencies of the US intelligence community, including the agency I now have the honor of being nominated to lead.
(27:21)
In each of these roles, I served with fidelity to the Constitution and a strict adherence to the rule of law, and I have always prioritized American civil liberties, something I will continue to do if confirmed to serve. Again. Each of these experiences has shaped me as a leader and national security professional. Together, they have prepared me to steer the CIA through a tumultuous time in the world and toward a future in which the CIA's mission will be both more difficult and more indispensable than ever before. If confirmed, my leadership at CIA will focus on setting and communicating priorities and demanding relentless execution. Above all will be a strict adherence to the CIA's mission. We will collect intelligence, especially human intelligence in every corner of the globe, no matter how dark or difficult. We will produce insightful, objective all-source analysis, never allowing political or personal biases to cloud our judgment or infect our products.
(28:29)
We will conduct covert action at the direction of the President, going places no one else can go and doing things no one else can do. To the brave CIA officers listening around the world, if all of this sounds like what you signed up for, then buckle up and get ready to make a difference. If it doesn't, then it's time to find a new line of work. We must be the ultimate meritocracy. I will unapologetically empower the most talented, hardest working, and most courageous risk-takers and innovators to protect the American people and advance America's interests, and I will not tolerate anything or anyone that distracts from our mission. It would be inappropriate in an unclassified setting for me to discuss in detail some of my views on intelligence collection priorities, but I'm happy to do so in the classified hearing that will follow this one. However, if confirmed, there are several organizational priorities that I plan to focus on that I'd like to discuss here.
(29:36)
The first is talent. As you are all no doubt aware, the CIA has remarkably low turnover rate among its workforce. This shows the CIA's success in attracting mission-focused public servants who find deep meaning and value in the unique work they're privileged to do every day. But in some cases it also suggests that complacency is tolerated. High performers hate nothing more than mediocrity and nothing poisons a high-performance workplace culture more than leaders who don't hold team members accountable when they don't meet expectations. The CIA must be a place that incentivizes and rewards meaningful contributions to our nation's security and holds accountable low performers and bad actors who are not focused on our mission. It has been said that the CIA's World War II predecessor, the OSS, described its ideal recruit as "a PhD who could win a bar fight." This sentiment is the essence of what today's CIA must recapture, but we must find that fighting spirit in recruits whose talents, skill sets, and backgrounds are more varied than ever.
(30:49)
I will also work to develop pathways for mid-career professionals with highly sought-after skills to fill gaps in the agency's workforce and for CIA officers to do rotations in the private sector that broaden their perspectives. I am committed to protecting and supporting CIA's workforce. We will fully investigate workforce health and wellness issues, including anomalous health incidents. Our officers must embrace a culture of toughness and resilience, but we must also be clear that when they put themselves in harm's way, we will make sure they are taken care of when they return home. We owe that to America's men and women in uniform and we owe it to the silent warriors who risk their lives in the shadows as well. Altogether, these talent strategies will be particularly important in addressing another organizational priority that I will focus on, technology. At the CIA, technology is both a tool and a target.
(31:54)
As a tool, technology is baked into nearly every facet of the agency, from the spy gadgets imagined and created by the Directorate of Science and Technology, and used by the Directorate of Operations and the cyber capabilities deployed by the Directorate of Digital Innovation to the Directorate of Support, using new technology tools to support our workforce and the AI-powered large language models used by the Directorate of Analysis. But over the decades, as technological innovation has shifted more and more from the public sector to the private sector, the CIA has struggled to keep pace. As a target, technology is more important than ever, whether it's understanding our adversary's capability in AI and quantum computing, or their developments in hypersonics and emerging space technologies or their innovations in counterintelligence and surveillance.
(32:50)
The recent creation of the agency's Transnational and Technology Mission Center was an acknowledgement of that fact, but much more has to be done because our adversaries,
John L. Ratcliffe (33:00):
And one in particular that I will discuss now, understand that the nation who wins the race of emerging technologies of today will dominate the world of tomorrow. Which brings me to the need for the CIA to continue and increase in intensity the focus on the threats posed by China and its ruling Chinese Communist Party.
(33:22)
As DNI, I dramatically increased the intelligence community's resources devoted to China. I openly warned the American people that from my unique vantage point as an official who saw more intelligence than anyone else, I assessed that China was far and away our top national security threat. President Trump has been an incredible leader on this issue, and it is encouraging that a bipartisan consensus has emerged in recent years.
(33:48)
The recent creation of the CIA's China Mission Center is an example of the good work that must continue. In closing, the agency must provide the president and US policymakers with the best possible intelligence to inform their decision-making in hopes of preserving peace and spreading prosperity. This is our once in a generation challenge. The intelligence is clear, our response must be clear as well.
(34:21)
I'm honored for the opportunity to appear before you today and I thank you for your consideration of my nomination to be the director of the CIA, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Cotton (34:31):
Thank you. Mr. Ratcliffe. Colleagues, I'll remind you that we'll move on to questions now for five minutes each in order of seniority at the gavel. When we conclude this open session, we'll have a 30-minute break and move directly into a closed session.
(34:47)
Mr. Ratcliffe, the director of the CIA has four responsibilities under the law. One, collecting foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Two, correlating evaluating, disseminating that intelligence. Three, directing and coordinating all human intelligence collection outside the US. And four, performing other intelligence functions as directed by the president.
(35:09)
The way I count those four responsibilities, at least three of them are about collecting foreign intelligence, and I said in my opening statement that collecting foreign intelligence is the core mission of the CIA. Do you agree that it's the core mission of the CIA to aggressively and unapologetically collect foreign intelligence, which is to say, steal the secrets of our adversaries to protect this nation?
John L. Ratcliffe (35:33):
I do, Senator. It's why in my opening I said we would go to every corner of the globe, no matter how dark or difficult, to do that. Look, I know this committee knows well that on this issue with regard to the collection of human intelligence, we're not where we're supposed to be. And other agencies collect human, but CIA is the world's premier, and must be the world's premier clandestine collector of human intelligence.
(36:03)
And yes, there are challenges. We've talked about some of those, ubiquitous technical surveillance. But some of it, Senator, I believe is an issue of making it a priority and focus and execution. You mentioned in your opening, a former director once recently said that the CIA does not steal secrets, and I think that was demoralizing to the directorate of operations, so I'm here to publicly say that if confirmed, that's exactly what the CIA is going to do. Good decisions are hostage to good information and good intelligence, and the better we do at collecting human intelligence, the better decisions you all can make, the better analytic judgments analysts can make, and the fewer intelligence lapses or failures that you highlighted, Mr. Chairman, will occur, if we embrace that as a priority.
Mr. Cotton (37:00):
Thank you. With intelligence collection as the core mission of the CIA, then I presume you agree in my opening statement that the people who collect the intelligence are the main effort in the agency. Everyone else is a supporting effort. Important jobs to be sure, but a supporting effort. Is that right?
John L. Ratcliffe (37:20):
Yes.
Mr. Cotton (37:21):
Do we need to increase the ratio of people in that main effort who are collecting intelligence to the people who are supporting it, or using and harnessing what they produce?
John L. Ratcliffe (37:29):
Well, to the point of what the core mission is and increasing human intelligence, one of the things that if confirmed, I'll spend some time. As you know, I've had the opportunity to go out to the agency a few times as a nominee, but if confirmed, I do want to spend time looking at that, Senator, in terms of the ratios and how resources are being deployed, the structure in which those resources exist currently, and whether or not that needs to change to improve our performance.
Mr. Cotton (38:00):
Thank you. Let's talk a little bit about analytic objectivity at the CIA. That starts with you. You have a partisan background. We all on this dais have partisan backgrounds. We've thrown partisan punches as much as the next guy has. It also is not without precedent. Republican politicians have taken over this job before, George H.W Bush or Mike Pompeo, Democratic politicians like Leon Panetta have taken it over. I think for the record, all three of them were pretty good at the job.
(38:35)
Can you assure the committee, your workforce at the agency, the American people, that despite your partisan background in politics, you'll set aside those partisan views and that you will be someone who can effectively lead the agency in delivering the intelligence and analysis that the president and the Congress depends on?
John L. Ratcliffe (38:54):
I can Mr. Chairman. While I enjoyed my time in Congress, I enjoyed more my time as DNI, an opportunity to be apolitical, and look forward if confirmed as CIA director to continuing to do that. It's absolutely essential that the CIA's leader be apolitical. As you know that when you walk in the building at the CIA, inscribed on the wall is the quote, "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." That's a reminder to CIA officers when they walk in about the truth, collecting the truth, intelligence, critical information, so that American people can be free. Their freedom and liberty are dependent on the CIA doing that job and doing it in an apolitical way. And so, I am very much committed to that, and look forward to that if confirmed.
Mr. Cotton (39:56):
Thank you. Congress mandated by law of the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman for Objectivity at the CIA, it requires the office to quote, "Conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of the agency." In your preparation for this hearing, have you had an opportunity to review the results of the most recent survey of that office?
John L. Ratcliffe (40:24):
I have had a chance to see a summary, I haven't seen in detail the results of the congressionally mandated survey. I do know though that looking at it, what I can tell you at the top line, that participation in the survey was not what it should be, and it reflects that a significant percentage of the current CIA workforce does have concerns about the objectivity of the products that they're producing, and even cited that in specific instances to include the PDB, the president's Daily Brief, included some of those products that the workforce felt were not being objectively produced.
Mr. Cotton (41:06):
Thank you. I'm glad you saw and reached those conclusions. The office in that survey is a good way for the workforce to communicate to the leadership and to the Congress what is happening sometimes out of our sight, and I'm hopeful that you'll address that if confirmed. Vice Chairman.
Mr. Warner (41:24):
Thank you Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Ratcliffe, thank you for your opening comments. I appreciate your comments about technology. I appreciate your comments about independence of the workforce. I appreciate actually the chairman asking this as well.
(41:34)
I want to come back to a couple of these topics, because there is concern in the community. I hear it, you may have heard it, when we hear statements by incoming administration officials, and occasionally even from the president-elect himself, attacking the intelligence community and threatening to replace long-term career civil servants if they're somehow deemed as not sufficiently loyal.
(42:02)
You've addressed this, but I want to address it again right now. What assurances can you provide to this committee and to the CIA workforce that you'll resist efforts to fire or force out career CIA employees, because of their perceived political views, or somehow their views of loyalty to the president?
John L. Ratcliffe (42:24):
Well, I think the best example of that, Mr. Vice Chairman, is if you look at my record and my record as DNI, that never took place. That is never something anyone has alleged and it's something that I would never do. So, I would approach this position very much the same way, and provide the same assurance.
Mr. Warner (42:45):
Again, I think there has been a lot has happened in the last four years since your prior service, there have been these comments. I would, again, if you are asked to remove personnel, to get rid of individuals based upon this kind of political litmus test, I'd ask that you keep the committee informed of those requests.
John L. Ratcliffe (43:08):
I certainly will.
Mr. Warner (43:10):
Same thing, and again, I appreciate the chairman raising this as well. Most important job for you, for the folks at the CIA, speaking truth to power. And I want to again reiterate again the question Senator Cotton raised, we've got to make sure that your analysis is objective, it's not politically influenced. We've got to make sure it's timely, this willingness to speak truth to power even if it's uncomfortable. I would like you to speak to that again.
John L. Ratcliffe (43:45):
Well, Vice Chairman Warner, I appreciated the opportunity for you and I to visit, and as you recall, this issue came up and I was grateful then, and we'll take this opportunity to talk about what my record is in terms of speaking truth to power.
(44:01)
If you recall, we talked about the fact that as a member of Congress, I was the individual who was outside the Judiciary Committee in 2019 listening to the former FBI director Jim Comey say that my line of questioning was political, that the idea that intelligence authorities at the FISA Court being abused couldn't possibly happen, was a bunch of nonsense. But I had reviewed those applications and I knew that I was speaking truth to power, and the Inspector General and the subsequent FBI director later confirmed that under oath.
(44:43)
To that point, Director Ray this week in his exit interview said that China was the defining threat of our generation. I wrote that and said that four years ago as DNI, and when I did I was accused of being political, but I wasn't. I was speaking truth to power. I wasn't outsizing the threat from China.
(45:04)
In 2020, when a chairman of an intelligence committee misrepresented that a laptop owned by then candidate Biden's son was somehow a Russian intelligence operation, and 51 former intelligence officials used the imprimatur of IC authority to go along with that, I stood in the breach. I stood alone and told the American people the truth about that. So, I think my record in terms of speaking truth to power and defending the intelligence community and its good work is very clear. And what I can assure you is those types of instances, if I'm in that position as CIA director and have to do that again, as uncomfortable as that can be to be accused, the truth will ultimately defend itself and I think that intelligence will as well.
Mr. Warner (46:05):
And the truth will defend itself, even if that truth is counter to the views of a current administration. Well, at the end of the day it has to be back to the truth. I've got time for one last question.
(46:17)
As you well know, our intelligence community is the best in the world, but we also receive enormous amounts of benefit from our partners around the world. We've got to make sure, and obviously the president has the right to declassify information, but we've seen that willingness to declassify in advance of the Putin's brutal attack on Ukraine used effectively. But as we think about that declassification, particularly if it's done below the presidential level, making sure we consider the sources and methods of our allies, there's no requirement that intelligence is shared, it is based on a trust relationship. I'd like you to briefly speak to making sure that we maintain that trust relationship with the very valuable information we see from our allies and partners around the world.
John L. Ratcliffe (47:02):
Well, I agree completely. As DNI, I was able to experience what you just said. We do have the best intelligence enterprise in the world, but we have great partners around the world that we work with to do great things, to improve not just our national security posture but theirs, and that is reliant upon mutual trust and respect for intelligence sharing between intelligence agencies. And as CIA director if confirmed, I'll understand that improving our national security posture and protecting the American people will be absolutely dependent upon maintaining those relationships and maintaining that trust.
Mr. Cotton (47:47):
[inaudible 00:47:48] Senator Collins.
Senator Collins (47:49):
Thank you Mr. Chairman, welcome. For the past nine years at least, anomalous health incidents, also known as the Havana syndrome, have been a serious and persistent problem within the intelligence community. At first, there was a robust effort to investigate the cause of these incidences and to support the possible victims. Along with the other senators on this committee, I was one of the authors of the Havana Act to ensure that there was funding available for those who had been afflicted.
(48:36)
However, more recently, support for both investigative analysis and for victims within the CIA have decreased. Then we've had some interesting developments. On December 5th, the House Committee on Intelligence released an unclassified report, finding that there was an increasing likelihood that a foreign adversary was responsible for at least some of the reported AHI cases. Then on the 10th of January, the ODNI released an updated intelligence assessment of AHIs that revealed that two intelligence agencies reported that they believed a foreign actor may have used some sort of novel weapon or prototype device to inflict AHIs on our personnel.
(49:47)
This is very disturbing to me. It raises questions of whether dissenting voices were suppressed in earlier analyses. And my basic question to you is this, what actions if confirmed will you take to ensure that the CIA aggressively and objectively investigates the causes of AHIs, including examining whether or not a foreign adversary is responsible for harming the men and women who are serving our country?
John L. Ratcliffe (50:34):
Senator Collins, thank you for the question and I want to start by saying I enjoyed the chance to visit with you, and as you recall, we talked about this issue from my perspective four years ago, when I was the Director of National Intelligence, and you were as concerned then as you are now about this issue along with Senator Rubio. And I asked then CIA Director Haspel to look into the issue four years ago. Having stepped away, I share your frustration that four years later we're very much in the same place in terms of trying to make an assessment and determination on the cause of this, and I share your frustration in not being able to understand why. But if confirmed, and have the opportunity to be briefed on all of the assessments and intelligence, my pledge to you is that I will drill down and look carefully at that issue and work with you to see… I read the unclass report, the house report, and the unclassified version of the Intelligence Community Assessment.
(51:45)
I have not had access to, my understanding, a very lengthy classified report, but I look forward to drilling down on that. Because as I talked about in my opening, the workforce has been affected by this, and it has affected their morale because of this, and it's why I highlighted that. And so, the cause of it is one point, but the care of the CIA workforce had been affected is another, but they're equally important to me. So, my pledge is to look into it, but to work with you to try and… Obviously we need to know if we have an adversary that is using a weapon against our people, and I look forward to my ability to look at that intelligence for myself.
Senator Collins (52:37):
Thank you, and I look forward to working with you. I have very little time left. The chairman mentioned that the intelligence community, for which I have the greatest respect, has had some significant misjudgments lately.
(52:56)
For example, there was a misjudgment of how long the Afghan government would stand after the United States' hasty and ill-advised withdrawal. The IC missed early assessments on Ukraine's willingness to fight, projecting incorrectly how quickly the Russians would be able to take Kyiv. They did not warn or predict of the Hamas mass attack against Israel. The IC was surprised at South Korea's martial law declaration, nor did they predict the rapid collapse of the Syrian regime.
(53:40)
My question to you, and I know the IC is not going to get it right every time, but when there is a pattern, or even when there's a miss, what should the IC do to review why these major intelligence changes were not identified or predicted?
John L. Ratcliffe (54:08):
Thank you, Senator. It's what I talked about, I think in response to Chairman Cotton's question about this, is that, yeah, the intelligence community isn't always going to get it right, hasn't always gotten it right, but we've had too many instances where you all as policymakers are finding out by watching news reports about some of these things that I think can be, in some cases at least, fairly characterized as intelligence failures or lapses.
(54:39)
We talk about what can we do, what do we need to do? Part of it is a technical thing, in terms of improving our collection, addressing ubiquitous technical surveillance. And I know I haven't been fully briefed on this, but I am impressed by some of the things that, for instance, the Directorate of Science and Technology is doing to help us solve for X with regard to operating as human sources in an environment of UTS. But I also think a bigger part of this that I'm going to focus on, Senator, is to look at what's happening in terms of the focus and execution on core mission.
(55:22)
As I said, good decisions are hostage to good information, and we all know that the human intelligence collection isn't where it needs to be. And so, looking at the reasons why we've lost our focus there, and some of those things are if you have a politically motivated, bureaucratically imposed social justice agenda that takes up part of your attention, that can distract from the core mission of collecting human intelligence that matters, and providing it to you in a timely way. So, my pledge to you is that I'm as every bit as concerned and I don't want those intelligence failures or lapses to happen on my watch, and we'll do everything that I can to make sure that it doesn't.
Mr. Cotton (56:05):
Thank you Mr. Ratcliffe for the thorough answer. I know that you would be thrilled to stay here all day long to answer our questions, but the colleagues, let's try to move it along. I know there's at least four or five other hearings going, many of you have to get to those hearings. Let's try to move quickly and stick to the five-minute limit. We'll have a chance to question Mr. Ratcliffe in closed hearing, and I'm sure he'll be happy to answer your questions for the record as well. Senator King.
Senator King (56:25):
I'm hoping that quantum computing might solve the problem of having to be three places at once here at these hearings. I first want to acknowledge a new senator at the end of the dais, Senator Young, welcome him to the committee. I'm very pleased that he's joining us and I know he'll make a great contribution.
(56:44)
Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations.
John L. Ratcliffe (56:46):
Thank you.
Senator King (56:46):
Welcome. And it seems to me that you have an initial task that's a little unusual, but also very important, and that is to restore the confidence of the President-Elect in the intelligence community. Before you can deliver the information that he needs to know, you need to get him to a place where he does have confidence in the judgments that are coming to him, and he's notoriously skeptical of the intelligence community, and being skeptical is not necessarily a bad thing, but I hope that's one of the first things that you can work with him on is to make him receptive to the information and the truth that you will be providing as a result of your position.
John L. Ratcliffe (57:29):
Well, thank you, Senator. I think one of the reasons that I have this opportunity for you all to consider me for confirmation is because President Trump knows and wants me to lead with integrity, wants me to carry out the duties of the CIA as a director to follow the law and authorities as far as it will go, and no further, to protect America's national security interests.
Senator King (57:59):
I think that confidence that he has in you is an important asset, I just suggest rebuilding his confidence in the community is an important task. Let me move forward. Everybody's talked about telling the truth to power. Dan Coats, one of your predecessors at DNI, put it I think most succinctly and persuasively. He said, "The mission of the intelligence community is to find the truth and tell the truth." I think that's a very good way to look at it.
(58:25)
And we haven't talked much here today about why that's so important. I recently reread David Halberstam's book, The Best and the Brightest, comprehensive history of Vietnam. It's heartbreaking about the intelligence failures and frankly intelligence manipulation that led to a great deal of that tragedy. So, that's why it's so important, because skewed intelligence can equal lives lost, and you've already committed, I won't make you say so again, but I think you understand how important this is.
John L. Ratcliffe (59:02):
I do.
Senator King (59:03):
Four years ago I asked you a series of yes and no questions. You answered them all correctly. I'd like to run through them once more very briefly. Would you ever ask, encourage, or support an intelligence professional adjusting his or her assessment to avoid criticism from the White House or political appointees?
John L. Ratcliffe (59:20):
No.
Senator King (59:21):
Would you ever change or remove content in an intelligence assessment for political reasons or at the behest of political leadership?
John L. Ratcliffe (59:29):
No.
Senator King (59:30):
Would you consider an individual's personal political preferences to include loyalty to the president in making a decision to hire, fire, or promote an individual?
John L. Ratcliffe (59:39):
No.
Senator King (59:41):
And do you commit exclusively consider professional qualifications in IC personnel decisions without consideration of partisan or political factors?
John L. Ratcliffe (59:51):
Yes.
Senator King (59:53):
If you were to receive credible evidence as the director of the CIA that an individual was undermining objectivity and furthering a political agenda in the intelligence community, would you remove or discipline that person?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:00:07):
Yes.
Senator King (01:00:09):
Will you, or any of your staff, impose a political litmus test for CIA employees?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:00:15):
No.
Senator King (01:00:18):
Finally, if confirmed, will you reassure your workforce that loyalty tests are not allowed and not encouraged in the CIA?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:00:26):
I will.
Senator King (01:00:27):
Those were exactly the answers that you gave before. Thank you. One other brief question. I believe that you are the author of an important statute on cyber security, and I've done extensive work in that area myself. I believe that one of the great failings in national policy is the lack of a cyber deterrent strategy, that our adversaries, particularly China, feel that they can attack our telecommunication system, our electrical system, or whatever, with impunity. Do you believe that it would serve the national interest to develop a declaratory cyber deterrent strategy, similar to the strategy that underlies the rest of our national defense posture?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:01:13):
I do, Senator, and I know we share a similar view on the threat from cyber. There's so much focus on the sovereignty and integrity of our territorial borders, but as you well know, it's invasion through our digital borders from half a world away in a few seconds, in a few keystrokes that can cause-
Senator King (01:01:33):
It's happening every day.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:01:35):
… so much damage. And the deterrent effect has to be that there are consequences to our adversaries when they do that. One of the things that I hope to do, if confirmed as CIA director, is to work on the development of the types of tools that will be effective in allowing us to do those things. The deployment of those capabilities, of course, would be a policy decision for others to make, but I would like to make sure that we have all of the tools necessary to go on offense against our adversaries in a cyber means.
Senator King (01:02:11):
Thank you very much. I hope you will advocate that in the councils of the national security apparatus of the Administration. Thank you, Mr. Radcliffe. I appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Cotton (01:02:18):
Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford (01:02:20):
John, Michelle, thank you for being here. Thanks for your leadership. Thanks for your sacrifice and what you have already done to be able to serve the nation. We really appreciate that. That is a tremendous sacrifice to serve in the intelligence community. As my wife has said to me a couple of times, we share everything about everything and talk about life together, but there's now a portion of my life I can't talk about with her serving the intelligence committee. You've had even more of that serving as ODNI, and so thanks for y'all's sacrifice to be able to serve.
(01:02:50)
I've got several questions I want to be able to run through quickly on this. There are a group of folks in Oklahoma City, I can't name who they are because they're alive, but their lives were threatened on election day by an ISIS terrorist in Oklahoma City that was discovered initially by a 702. That 702 authority is important. There are people in my neighborhood that are alive today because of that 702 authority. Now, you've been outspoken on this. It has been much maligned in many ways on it, but it has been vital for intelligence collection around the world. What is your position on 702 authority?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:03:25):
Thank you, Senator Lankford, for the sentiment and for the question. FISA and particularly Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, is an indispensable national security tool. There's no other way to get around that. I say that not as a matter of opinion, but as an informed judgment as in my role as the Director of National Intelligence, being the president's principal intelligence advisor, advising the president in the Oval Office and understanding that a significant percentage, sometimes more than half of the actionable foreign intelligence that we provide to the president as the policymaker to act as commander in chief, comes from FISA derived, or 702 derived, action.
(01:04:16)
I will say I have supported FISA in that regard, but I've also, as I outlined earlier, understand that it is an important, indispensable tool, but one that can be abused and that we must do everything that we can to make sure that it has the appropriate safeguards, because it can't come at the sacrifice of American's civil liberties. So, I have supported those reforms and called out those abuses when they have taken place.
Senator Lankford (01:04:41):
I think the best way to be able to do that is by actually enforcing those that have abused it, that they're actually called out and accountability is held for those individuals, so everyone knows this is an indispensable tool, don't abuse it. And I think that becomes very clear.
(01:04:55)
You have mentioned in your testimony, "We cannot ignore CIA's critical counter narcotics and counter terrorism missions in support of border security efforts." I think few Americans understand just south of our border is one of the most violent areas of the world. Today, there are murders, beheadings, there's aerial bombardments with one cartel fighting within itself for leadership happening right now. It is an incredibly violent area just south of our border, not to mention the thousands of Americans that die with the narcotics that they pump into the United States and that destabilize our economy and our families. That's a critical role for us in our national security. How do you perceive that?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:05:37):
Well, and it also ties in, Senator, to your question about the importance of FISA. So, much of what the CIA has done and can do to support the US government efforts to interrupt the drug trafficking rings and the
John L. Ratcliffe (01:06:00):
… and the places from which the precursor chemicals for those drugs come from. Our disruptions are often as a result of FISA-derived information. But you highlight an important point. We talk about the threats from China and Russia and other adversaries overseas, but we, I think all know and understand and acknowledge that the failures in the integrity of our border has turned my home state of Texas as not only a border state, but every state into a border state. And that we have to make sure, and one of the things that if confirmed I want to talk about and pledge is the understanding that in addition to drug trafficking, I made a point about terrorists coming across our border, that we not lose sight of counterterrorism as something that the CIA needs to be focused on as we talk so much about the threat from China and Russia and the great power competition.
Senator Lankford (01:07:08):
Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back 12 seconds. How about that for a gift?
Speaker 1 (01:07:11):
Thank you. Senator Bennett. Please follow Senator Lankford's example everyone.
Senator Bennet (01:07:14):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll take Senator Lankford's 12 seconds. I'm just kidding. I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on taking this role. Thank you for that. And I want to thank the Vice Chairman for your leadership as chairman of this committee. I hope that we'll continue with the standard that you set for all of us in terms of politics.
(01:07:34)
Congressman Ratcliffe, it's good to see you again. Thank you for your visit to the office.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:07:39):
You as well.
Senator Bennet (01:07:39):
I know you're a student of our history and a student of this committee. You know that this committee came out of a series of reforms that Congress put together to deal with a really dark chapter in American history, there was [inaudible 01:08:00]. Senator Kaine from Maine talked about bad intelligence during Vietnam. There were instances of the CIA engaging in assassination plots abroad. It's hard to imagine today that that's even true, that provoked bipartisan outrage and the reason this committee exists in part is not just to make the policy that you've been talking about and others this morning, but also to provide oversight on behalf of the American people and our colleagues who, as Senator Lankford was just saying, don't have access to the intelligence that the people on this committee have. I would just ask you to talk a little bit about your views on what the purpose of that Congressional oversight is and if you are confirmed to this position, what your responsibility to this committee will be.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:08:55):
Thank you, Senator Bennet. I enjoyed the chance to visit with you and talk about a number of issues. As you know from my background, I came from Congress. I was on an oversight committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. And so I think it gives me a unique perspective. I brought that over as DNI and if confirmed as CIA director, I have the perspective of both the executive branch and the legislative branch. And I will confess that one of the things I was disappointed in was the fact that despite being on a congressional oversight committee over the intelligence communities, there was so much intelligence that I learned for the first time as DNI that I knew that known member of Congress was aware of. And I think that that sort of speaks to my approach and understanding that I take seriously the obligation that I will have if confirmed as CIA director to keep this committee fully and currently informed on intelligence issues. It's not that this committee or any intelligence committee or any oversight committee and Congress needs to know everything, but you should at least know the topics exist.
Senator Bennet (01:10:17):
So let's talk about that a little bit. Congressman, I mean the president gets his presidential daily brief every day. There's a very high standard for veracity for what's in that because he has to obviously make the most significant decisions that any human has to make about deploying our defense assets or the other things that a president does. We don't have anything like that in Congress. And a lot of the time it seems like we're often, as you said, finding ourselves fishing around in headlines and in the sort of less well-organized intelligence materials that we're provided with no assurance that it's a complete picture of anything. So I wonder what your conclusion about that is and what the obligation of CIA or any intelligence agency is with your leadership to be able to provide a fuller picture, the picture that you're talking about, that a member of Congress who's on these committees should actually know rather than be guessing about.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:11:26):
Well, my perspective is that you've highlighted all of the things that sort of reveal that our national security posture is impacted in a negative way when we're not communicating well between the branches of government and particularly on sensitive national security matters. So I think a better informed Congress will allow for better national security decisions and keep the American people safe. So I'm open to a continuing dialogue about how I won't stand on traditions. This is traditionally what the CIA does or shares I'm open to. At the end of the day, we talk about the core mission of the CIA, it's to provide a decisive strategic advantage to you and to the president as policymakers. And so I don't view it as just informing the president, I view it as integral that I be informing you to provide that same strategic decisive advantage.
Senator Bennet (01:12:32):
I'm out of time. I appreciate the very much the fulsomeness of your answer. I just want to observe that it's really easy for politicians to accuse the intelligence agencies of politicization. And actually it's important that we do that when it's an appropriate thing to do. But this is the place where that oversight is supposed to be provided. These are the people that are supposed to fix that problem. And it can only be done if we have people with integrity that are working at the heads of these agencies that can help us fix the problems, not just complain about it. And I hope we'll be able to work together to do that. Thank you Mr. Ratcliffe for your [inaudible 01:13:13]-
John L. Ratcliffe (01:13:13):
I look forward to it.
Speaker 1 (01:13:13):
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds (01:13:15):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ratcliffe, first of all, thank you for your service to our country already. And to Michelle, thank you for the sacrifice which you also offer and allowing him to do this particular job in the future.
(01:13:28)
I want to go back to the FISA Section 702 just a little bit. We're in an open session and I think one of the opportunities that we have is to perhaps share with the American people with a little bit more clarity what 702 is really all about and what actually happens. Could you kind of describe in an approach that, look, it's coming up for renewal again in April of next year, and between now and then we're going to have to convince the American people and other members of Congress that we've made significant improvements in the protections, but also we've done our best to try to explain why this is such an important part of, as a tool, in our collection approach. Can you talk a little bit about the mechanics so that as those listen to you today, they understand what FISA 702 actually is and how it fits into the collection process?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:14:26):
Sure. Senator, thank you. I enjoyed the chance to visit with you and I know we are like-minded in terms of the importance of 702 as I talked with Senator Lankford and how I view it as an indispensable tool. It's one that I used as a prosecutor, as General Ashcroft talked about, national security and terrorism related investigations. So I've used it as a practical matter there, like you as a legislator have seen it, but then in the unique perspective of as DNI and if confirmed here, the importance of it in fulfilling the core mission-
Senator Rounds (01:15:07):
Well, let me- [inaudible 01:15:08]
John L. Ratcliffe (01:15:08):
702 allows for foreign collecting foreign intelligence on foreign persons, not on US persons. The controversy why some people think that FISA is, no pun intended, a four-letter word, is that in the course of doing technical collection on foreign persons for foreign intelligence to make good decisions to keep our country safe, that sometimes US persons are incidentally collected. In other words, they're having a conversation with a foreign person.
Senator Rounds (01:15:39):
Yeah, look, we eavesdrop, don't we? And we're not eavesdropping on Americans, we're eavesdropping on people that are not American citizens and we're doing it outside of our country.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:15:51):
That's right.
Senator Rounds (01:15:53):
And in the middle of it, we have Americans that are sometimes caught up and maybe perhaps having a conversation with somebody outside the country.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:16:00):
That's right.
Senator Rounds (01:16:00):
And at that point there might've been something collected inadvertently, can we use that?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:16:06):
So there is, when for instance, the CIA collects intelligence, it is allowable to do a US person query where you're looking for someone that might be communicating with some foreign person to do something bad to the United States. What you can't have is accessing that or making a query for political reasons or for some reason other than protecting our national security and so we have to have the safeguards to make sure that those kinds of abuses can't take place and be misused. And my pledge to you is, if confirmed as CIA director, that won't happen. I will point out that, I haven't been briefed on everything, but I am impressed with the CIA's compliance rate with regard to us person queries is 99.6%, meaning they do a really good job of making sure that Americans who are swept up incidentally aren't having their civil liberties violated. Is it perfect? No, but we need to try and-
Senator Rounds (01:17:10):
But there were reforms made based upon practices that were not appropriate several years ago, is that a fair way of putting it?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:17:16):
That's correct.
Senator Rounds (01:17:16):
But they've already been addressed now?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:17:18):
That's correct.
Senator Rounds (01:17:19):
And so you would be supportive of the renewal of 702, and perhaps there are some additional considerations, but at this point it is critical that we get it renewed?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:17:28):
It critical, it's indispensable. And for critics of it, no one has offered a replacement. If for instance, half of the actionable foreign intelligence comes from FISA 702, what are we going to replace that with? And the critics haven't provided any alternative to that, and so.
Senator Rounds (01:17:50):
And look, I agree. I just thought it was be important in this open setting that there'd be a better understanding or at least a better clarification to just how critical it is and what it really is. It's basically looking at things overseas, not in the United States.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:18:04):
And I think it's going to be an iterative, ongoing discussion and needs to be as it comes up for reauthorization again, and it'll be incumbent on me if confirmed to both within the administration and outside stress the things that you and I are talking about and make sure that people understand and to dispel false narratives about how FISA is being misused or can be misused.
Senator Rounds (01:18:28):
Correct. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Chairman.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:18:30):
Thank you.
Speaker 1 (01:18:31):
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand (01:18:33):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Mr. Ratcliffe for your service. Thank you for meeting with me. We had an excellent conversation about a number of our priorities on the committee, but mine specifically, pandemic preparedness was one issue, AHIs, which Senator Collins covered very effectively and sexual assault and harassment in the military. So I just want to address those so you can talk about them publicly.
(01:18:58)
As we discussed, we need to do a much better job in detecting and preventing and knowing the intelligence to prepare for the next pandemic. We didn't have the type of collaboration we needed to prepare for COVID. We had disagreements about how COVID began and we never really got resolution on that, which is a concern for me. But this idea of A one health proposal is creating essentially a fusion center for the CIA, the NSA, the DOD, the Department of Agriculture and HHS so that you are in real time working collaboratively to detect this information. Because Agriculture and science, they often share data and information and we know with regard to the Wuhan lab that they were publishing data and information about the tests they were doing, the scientific community had access to that.
(01:19:56)
If the CIA on the other hand was looking into other intelligence they might have been able to get the details about illnesses quicker than anyone else, but none of these groups were talking so the data wasn't shared in a timely basis and so we didn't really have the information we could have had if the CIA was talking to the medical community, the scientific community and the agriculture community in terms of research. So I just want your commitment that you will work with me on this very important issue because the CIA can play such a meaningful role in protecting our nation from such other threats such as a pandemic or any use of a biological weapon or any use of that kind of harm to the United States.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:20:40):
Senator Gillibrand, I really did enjoy the chance to visit and talk about these issues. I agree completely. I do pledge to work with you on that. We go back to one of the worst incidents in our nation's history, 9/11. It was a failure of communication-
Senator Gillibrand (01:21:00):
Correct.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:21:00):
We had the intelligence, we just weren't sharing it with each other in a way that would prevent that. And you brought up COVID, is the more recent example where maybe as many as 25 million people die worldwide and at least a million Americans as a result of that. And one of the things when I came in as DNI, to your point, was I was surprised at the lack of coordination between, for instance, the intelligence community and health agencies like the CDC and the NIH and the ability to… The channels were not open to share information like you're talking about. So many of these things can be, if not prevented, mitigated quickly if we're communicating and sharing intelligence better. So I completely agree with the sentiment that you've expressed and look forward to working with you to make sure that we're doing those things if I'm confirmed as CIA director.
Senator Gillibrand (01:21:56):
Thank you. And I just want to associate myself with the comments of Senator Collins with regard to AHIs. I think it is essential, as I mentioned in our hearing, that you collaborate with the Department of Defense, with their intelligence agencies to understand what the nature of these effects are, what causes them and what type of adversaries could be using technology in a way to actually harm our service members. So I just really appreciate that you will commit to delving deep into this issue and really try to limit the siloing of information between CIA and DOD on this very topic.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:22:39):
I will. I look forward to it. The CIA is the premier intelligence agency in the world, and I am not saying that it should always be able to make an assessment about cause, but over time that's typically something that we should expect and in some cases, demand. And for instance, COVID, you brought up that, that's one issue, but AHI is another one. I'm curious and look forward to reading the classified version of the AHI in terms of the assessments that were made or the inability to make an assessment on causation. And if I'm not satisfied, we'll continue to look at that.
Senator Gillibrand (01:23:22):
Thank you. And my last question, obviously the scourge of sexual assault is problematic in every area of society. We want to make sure that the CIA is a safe place to work and that people who are being harassed or assaulted can come forward and demand justice. I just ask your commitment that you'll work with this committee to make sure all of our members of this community can work in a safe environment.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:23:49):
I will, Senator. I appreciate your leadership on this issue. I know it's been something you've highlighted and as we talked about in our meeting, over the course of my career, I'm grateful for what my record reflects in leadership positions I've had and organizations I've had in terms of not tolerating sexual assault and sexual abuse when I was US attorney, when I was DNI, when I was in Congress, all of those and so I make that pledge to you gratefully.
Speaker 1 (01:24:19):
Senator Young.
Senator Young (01:24:21):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's great to serve with you and other members of this committee. Mr. Ratcliffe, I had a nice visit with you in the office. You answered many of my questions. What I'll ask you here today will be familiar to you and build on that meeting. Thank you again for your willingness to serve your country. You are prepared, I think for this step, this position, you're qualified. I anticipate supporting your nomination, so we'll begin with that. You spoke in your testimony to the growing role of emerging technology and to advances being made by our adversaries, if confirmed, how will you direct the agency to analyze and respond to foreign threats that undermine often overlooked but critical areas of our security and economic well-being, such as the food and ag sectors?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:25:19):
So thank you for the question. I did enjoy our visit, Senator Young, and enjoyed serving with you in the House of Representatives, and if confirmed, look forward to working with you from this perspective. I was talking with Senator Gillibrand about COVID-19 origins of that and the things that the intelligence community needs to do to be better. Part of that is, to your point, embracing emerging technologies and making sure that one of the things that the CIA does is adapt to the technology curve. So for instance, when we talk about utilizing artificial intelligence and machine learning, there's so much data that's out there in this great technological age that we live in, that sometimes the intelligence community spends so much time sifting through the data that they can't find the signal for the noise. And one of the things that technology allows us to do is to find the signal in all of that noise, in other words, so that we can find the intelligence, spend more time using the intelligence and less time looking for it. And so you brought up different issues where that can be valuable and where that can be helpful. One of the things that I know you're interested in and we've talked about was the biosecurity and the biointelligence issues and how the CIA needs to expand its authorities in that regard and its relationships with scientists and researchers to be on the leading edge of information as it's coming out and to develop early warnings to some of the problems that we're talking about in that space.
Senator Young (01:27:22):
Well, I'm encouraged that you are thinking critically about this topic, and it's clear to me you should know as you're likely aware, but all others who are watching this should know that there has been commissioned by Congress, a National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology. And that commission is charged with looking at the national security implications of our current biotech leadership, but also making recommendations to make sure that the United States can stay ahead of our adversaries, in particular China. And so we'll produce those recommendations in the spring timeframe. I'm chairman of that commission currently, and some of those will implicate very directly our intelligence community. And so I would just ask that you and your staff review that report when it's published and work with this committee and others on some of its recommendations. Do you commit yourself without having seen the report, but to be attentive to its recommendations and findings?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:28:41):
I absolutely do, and I appreciate your leadership on that issue and as we talked about and we'll talk about more, I look forward to supporting and collaborating your efforts in that regard.
Senator Young (01:28:53):
Thank you. Time is winding down and I'm the new guy, but one other quick question here. Would you like to volunteer any particular approaches that you might want to lead the agency into delay or degrade the threats posed by foreign nations using emerging technologies like AI or biotech?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:29:19):
I think we can talk about some of those things in the classified session, Senator. I think that what I would say in this setting is that when it comes to technology, we have so much concern about China and Russia and our adversaries and what they're doing and how we need to counter them, I have absolute confidence that we can and will. There's only one country in the world that can parallel park a 200-foot rocket booster, the Chinese can't do it, the Russians can't do it. We do it and we do it in part because of the great collaboration we have and can have a need to deepen between the private sector where there's so much innovation and ingenuity in the space of emerging technologies. And I'm committed as CIA director, if allowed to, expanding upon that.
Senator Young (01:30:21):
Thank you. Chairman.
Speaker 1 (01:30:22):
Senator Ossoff.
Senator Ossoff (01:30:25):
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations on your nomination. Thank you for your service to the country. Congratulations also to your family. I enjoyed our engagement a few weeks ago. It was a useful opportunity for me to learn more about your views and your plans for CIA. I want to begin with a matter that impacts Georgia. On election day 2024, there were a series of bomb threats issued against polling places in DeKalb County, Georgia, principally, predominantly Black, predominantly democratic leaning precincts that disrupted election operations and the ability of folks to vote in the afternoon on election day. Our state election officials attributed those threats to Russian actors. What assurance can you give my constituents in Georgia that CIA will sustain collection to identify threats to voting rights and election administration in the United States?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:31:26):
So thank you Senator for the question. I enjoyed our visit as well. I can give every assurance. As you know, the CIA doesn't have domestic authorities, when we talk about election security issues, the FBI and DHS are the agencies that provide that protection. Where the CIA plays a role is if we have bad actors who want to influence or impact our elections, as you've related, in this case, I haven't seen that specific intelligence, but that for instance, Russia, Russian actors were behind those threats. Those are the kinds of things that the CIA not only should do, but must do and frankly do better in terms of collecting intelligence on how our adversaries intend, whether it's through physical means or through a cyber means of disrupting or influencing elections and the CIA's role should be to identify those threats over there before they come over here.
Senator Ossoff (01:32:37):
Thank you for that commitment to sustain that collection. I appreciate it. I want to give you the opportunity to provide some clarifying information about events that have attracted some scrutiny in September of 2020 when you sent a letter to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which declassified certain intelligence about Russian analytic products that had been collected by the intelligence community and which pertain to events four years past during the 2016 election and the controversy over alleged links between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. My purpose is not to interrogate, to relitigate that ancient history from 2016, but to understand why you chose to send that letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee declassifying intelligence on that day, September 29th. You will no doubt recall that that was the same day as the presidential debate, yes?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:33:32):
I don't recall that it was that day, but it may be.
Senator Ossoff (01:33:36):
You don't recall? Your testimony is that… You're not aware that that letter was sent to the Judiciary Committee by you on the same day as the presidential debate?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:33:44):
I didn't recall that it was on that date. But I mean, I'll take you at your word. The dates will reflect what they are. But to your question-
Senator Ossoff (01:33:53):
Well, let me just… I want to drill down on that front, because my purpose here is not to suggest some kind of political intent, but you've made it very clear that avoiding the politicization of the intelligence community's activities is a high priority for you. Is that correct?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:34:08):
Correct.
Senator Ossoff (01:34:10):
It strikes me that releasing politically sensitive intelligence, that you'd think carefully about the timing of that, that you might consider that doing so on the day of a presidential debate, when this was intelligence collected four years in the past, might reasonably draw the question of whether or not there was some political impetus. Was that reasonable?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:34:33):
It's reasonable for you to ask that. And if I can, you asked me to clarify, if I can do that?
Senator Ossoff (01:34:39):
Please.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:34:40):
So you're correct, it was my decision, but it wasn't my process. So to your point, that effort was actually the request of this committee during my confirmation hearing as DNI was to go back and look at the intelligence from 2016 and the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment. I also received separately a request from the Attorney General and from then Special Counsel to declassify certain intelligence relating to that in support of what would be a public report from the Special Counsel. I, in addition to that, received what I would call requests or even demands from other Senate committees to include the Judiciary Committee and the Senate Homeland Security and Government Accountability, whatever the title of that committee is for information related to that. That took place over a course of several months. And the process, just so you're clear, was an iterative collaborative process that included the Attorney General, the CIA director, the director of the NSA, myself as DNI. And again, an iterative process that resulted in a highly redacted product to protect sources and methods, but yet to respond to these requests or demands to put that information out. So I take-
Senator Ossoff (01:36:21):
That's useful information and my time is running short, but we can discuss further in the close section if we need to. I appreciate you answering the question.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:36:28):
I very much look forward to that.
Senator Ossoff (01:36:29):
And again, enjoyed our recent meeting.
Senator Cornyn (01:36:34):
I think I have the [inaudible 01:36:37] anybody else on this [inaudible 01:36:40] when you were [inaudible 01:36:44] mayor of Heath [inaudible 01:36:48]. How many people live in Heath, Texas?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:36:50):
Around 7,000.
Senator Cornyn (01:36:52):
Okay. Do you still live there with your wife and family?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:36:54):
I do. It's a great community.
Senator Cornyn (01:36:56):
It is.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:36:57):
I say hi to all the Heathens out there.
Senator Cornyn (01:36:59):
Absolutely. So I have every confidence that you will do a outstanding job as the next director of the CIA. And I say that advisedly because as I said, I've known you for a long time and watched your career from the private sector to acting US Attorney for a while to member of Congress. And I had the privilege of introducing you to the committee at your previous confirmation hearing as Director of National Intelligence. So I don't really have any doubt about your qualifications.
(01:37:39)
I do want to talk about a couple of subjects, and one is I know people have heard the discussion of FISA and Section 702, and I appreciate the clarity that with which you have explained how essential this tool is. Part of the problem [inaudible 01:38:01] people don't trust actually implementing that tool because they've seen the abuses by members of the IC, including the FBI, particularly dating back during President Trump's administration. So they figure, "Well, everybody must misuse these tools." But I thought you had a great analogy when we discussed this on the phone. You said, "Well, you probably have a bunch of steak knives in your kitchen and they can be used for a useful and beneficial purpose, but they could [inaudible 01:38:35]." And I think that was a pretty good analogy.
(01:38:36)
But I want to ask you about one of "fixes" that some people have suggested to the current state of the law, and that is to require a warrant to query lawfully collected FISA information. You've properly identified the fact that this is directed at people overseas,
Senator John Cornyn (01:39:00):
… Overseas foreigners, overseas, not Americans, but you're a former US attorney and a pretty good lawyer, and you understand what probable cause requires to be able to establish probable cause. In front of a judge you need to have evidence. And if all you have is a FISA, a query of a foreign target that happens to mention an American citizen or a US person, is there any way for you to go to court and establish the requirements of a warrant or probable cause in order to query that data?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:39:44):
Well, Senator, you know the answer to that better than I do because you're a better lawyer and were an attorney general. But the answer is no, because the danger there is that you really don't have the information to obtain the warrant. And the process of obtaining the warrant, we're talking about national security issues where sometimes minutes matter in the ability to disrupt or interdict the bad actors, or to act upon the intelligence that you can gain from that. And so the process of even getting a warrant, the time that it takes, much less the fact that as you say, you won't have a probable cause basis to get there.
Senator John Cornyn (01:40:29):
Well, I think there's a lot of misunderstanding and misinformation about how FISA works. And admittedly, I have to go back periodically and refresh my own memory, because it does get to be fairly convoluted sometimes. But the fact of the matter is it's illegal to use this tool to spy on American citizens, and there are protocols in place to lessen the likelihood that that could ever possibly occur. But again, I think basically what's happened is there's been a lack of trust in the people who had access to those tools in the recent past, and I hope you will help restore that trust.
(01:41:11)
I also think you're going to need to share your experience and your wisdom with the nominees for FBI and Director of National Security, because we've had these conversations as well and I think there's some confusion about whether a warrant should be required or not. I think you're absolutely right and that is, I think, is not the answer. Thank you.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:41:40):
Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Cotton (01:41:40):
Senator Kelly.
Senator Mark Kelly (01:41:42):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations on your new job. Look forward to working with you on this committee. And Mr. Ratcliffe, congratulations to your nomination for this position, and congratulations to your family as well.
(01:41:57)
I want to follow up on what Senator Ossoff was referring to, the intelligence that was released prior to the 2020 election. That intelligence was rejected. First of all, it was before I was on the committee, but my understanding is it was rejected by Democrats and Republicans on this committee as having no factual basis, and it put Russian disinformation into the public sphere. I just want to understand, so just in hindsight, knowing what you know now, and this is four years removed from that and we've had another election, and obviously we've got challenges we face with Russian and Chinese, Iranian disinformation in our politics. So in hindsight, are there any changes that you would make to the way you handled that information?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:43:00):
Well, Senator, I appreciate the question. I certainly, looking back, having an opportunity to change certain things, might do that. I don't know in this case, for instance, Senator Ossoff raised the point that the declassification occurred on the day of a presidential election. I don't recall that, obviously that's when it did, but-
Senator Mark Kelly (01:43:29):
I think he said debate.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:43:31):
I had debate, I'm sorry, yeah, debate. I wasn't aware of that. I certainly don't think I did everything perfectly in terms of making decisions about every issue that relates to, I'm talking generally, but I talked about my record in terms of how I approach these things and how in terms of speaking truth to power, which sometimes includes declassifying information. Most of the things that I've done, Senator, aged very well, and I think others will continue to. For instance, on COVID origins, I think that ultimately I believe that there will be an assessment that is consistent with the position that I've taken, so-
Senator Mark Kelly (01:44:25):
Well, it's hard to get this stuff exactly right, I get that. This is complicated. In this case, it did become rather political, and I appreciate your willingness to look back.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:44:37):
So, the other thing that I want to say, is because I want to. Part of my answer to your question is classified, and I look forward in the classified session to talking about one of the things this committee asked me to do that did influence my decision, was to look at the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment. And in not only looking at that, what I did, so to be clear, was I requested a briefing from the CIA, from some members of the team that were involved in that. And I'm not sure that that information or that intelligence has been shared with this committee. So I look forward to-
Senator Mark Kelly (01:45:17):
Yeah, let's follow up on that. I've got a few more things I want to cover here and I've got about 90 seconds left here. In your written response to the committee, you indicated… This is a different topic. You agreed with the Trump Administration's 2018 assessment that the Assad regime used chemical weapons, including in Douma, killing hundreds, injuring hundreds more. The US intelligence community had a similar assessment that these weapons were used. If you're serving or when you're serving as the Director and the DNI ask you to explore evidence that the Douma or other attacks were staged, or that analysis indicating the use of chemical weapons is incorrect, or there's some kind of similar situation, what would you do?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:46:08):
Well, look at the intelligence. So you're right, I did include that. That was based upon the intelligence that I was able to review during my time as DNI. And I think the intelligence was clear. I think the assessments were, I forget if they were with high confidence, but I believe that they were. What I haven't seen is any intelligence in the last four years that I wouldn't have had access to. So I would look at that, but I'd be surprised if there is intelligence that would change my initial assessment, but I'd certainly go back and look at that.
Senator Mark Kelly (01:46:47):
And can I just very briefly have just a few more seconds here? I just want to get your commitment to work with me, focusing on transnational criminal organizations on the other side of the border. It's a big problem. It affects my state in a big way, [inaudible 01:47:03]-
John L. Ratcliffe (01:47:03):
And my state, and I absolutely make that pledge and look forward to working with you to address that threat.
Senator Mark Kelly (01:47:09):
All right, thank you.
Mr. Cotton (01:47:09):
Senator Moran.
Senator Jerry Moran (01:47:10):
Chairman, thank you. Mr. Ratcliffe, I enjoyed and appreciated our conversation in the office. I particularly appreciated the indication of your transparency with this committee, your forthrightness, telling us the truth. It's been difficult from time to time to know what the true story is, and certainly there are opinions about truth, but we ought to be trying to find the truth.
(01:47:34)
I want to ask you about statements that you've made. I agree with you that China is the greatest threat facing our country. Irate Russia as our second greatest threat, and believe it's the most acute threat today. Will you describe the scope of the threat as you see it, and the importance of countering the Kremlin?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:48:00):
The question, the threat from Russia?
Senator Jerry Moran (01:48:03):
Threat from Russia. So you indicate China's the first greatest threat.
John L. Ratcliffe (01:48:06):
Absolutely. So, Russia is very clearly an adversary of the United States. The threat, of course, is a country with a very large nuclear stockpile. The thing that separates the threat from Russia from China in my mind and why I put them, even though we include them in the great power competition, is that United States is the largest economy in the world. China's the second largest. Russia has an economy that's roughly the same size as my home state of Texas.
(01:48:44)
So what that means is that the Russians have to decide where they're going to compete with the United States. And so they've chosen areas like hypersonics and other areas, but that comes at a cost. And I think we saw some of the cost, in terms of their troop readiness as they engaged in their aggression against Ukraine. So, a dangerous, lethal adversary who in many respects is because of the limitations that I've talked about, has focused on areas where there are great equalizers, and one of those is cybersecurity. So countries that can't compete with the United States, in terms of kinetic firepower across the board, which can do so through cyber means, in other words. And we see that with Iran and North Korea and other countries who can't compete with us kinetically, focus on cyber means to cause us harm. Russia certainly falls into that category as well, in terms of where a lot of their focus is and my assessment of them, in terms of the malign activities that they take across against the US.
Senator Jerry Moran (01:50:03):
Certainly, invasion of another country has significantly complicated the security of our allies and perhaps the United States. Let me point out that you're the first Texan I have ever met that belittled the state of Texas.
(01:50:18)
In your answers to the committee's questionnaire, you state regarding Russia that you believe, I'm quoting you, "Believe that we cannot let our adversarial relationship boil over into unintended wars." And you go on to say, "I will advise the President when there are opportunities to work toward mutually beneficial outcomes with Russia." You did not make a similar commitment for China, Iran, or North Korea. What's the difference?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:50:44):
I don't recall the context of the question, why there would be a difference. For instance, I think what I was referring there, Senator, was for all of the things that I talk about in terms of Russia as a threat and the things where they challenge us with malign activity, there are areas where we, for instance, countering terrorism. Some of the same threats that we faced from terrorist groups are threats that they face. And so there are occasions where information or intelligence can be shared, or things can be done in our mutual, to the mutual benefit of our countries in those types of things. That would be true with China as well.
(01:51:33)
I think President Trump's approach from a policy standpoint is to not look for conflict with anyone, including our adversaries, but to provide a strong deterrent effect to their malign activities through America's strength, through peace through strength. So I think Iran may be different in the sense of it is a terrorist state, a terrorist regime, or it had been designated by the Trump Administration. And so I would put that in a different category.
Senator Jerry Moran (01:52:06):
In addressing the importance of analytical objectivity and speaking truth to power, you state that as the DNI, you represented the IC's analysis to policymakers faithfully, including dissenting views, even when the full analytical picture was unpopular. Could you give me an example?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:52:25):
Sure. In connection with the 2020 presidential election, assessment was made as to whether China was trying to undermine President Trump's reelection efforts, and there was a split between the community. A majority opinion was that China was not doing that, wouldn't do that, for a number of reasons. The minority opinion was that they were. I agreed with the minority opinion, but what I did was not try to substitute my judgment for the community. I wrote a dissent that would be public and people could see the reasons for that. And in the process, supported a whistleblower, one of our leading cyber officers in support of that position.
(01:53:20)
I will say that 15 months later, FBI Director Wray held a press conference talking about the exact things that I was saying China had engaged in, that they were doing. And so the opinion that China would never engage in those kinds of activities proved to be false and I think that my dissent aged well.
Senator Jerry Moran (01:53:43):
Not only did you speak out against the majority, but you turned out to be right. Thank you.
Mr. Cotton (01:53:49):
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Martin Heinrich (01:53:50):
Thank you, Chairman. On July 21st of 2020, you sent a letter to this committee stating that while you agreed to appear at the committee's open worldwide threat hearing as DNI's Director of National Intelligence, that you would not take any questions in open session. And you wrote that letter despite committing twice in your confirmation hearing that you would appear and answer questions. So, obviously this position is one that requires congressional oversight, and I don't think any of us up here would ever ask you to answer questions in a way that revealed anything that was classified or was more appropriate for closed session.
(01:54:38)
So I want to ask you why you thought that was appropriate. And then today, can you commit that if confirmed, you will appear at this committee's annual open hearing on worldwide threats and take questions from the committee itself?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:54:55):
Senator, thanks for the question. I think that was a slight mischaracterization that I didn't make… I didn't refuse, I made a proposal about how to handle the worldwide threats hearing. I did that for a number of reasons. First of all, I did it at that time as DNI, which as you know, the DNI speaks for the entire intelligence community. My proposal was actually a reflection of multiple leaders across the intelligence community who shared my opinion that other countries don't hold public hearings like that where we discuss sensitive national security information. And the problem isn't in terms of you asking questions about classified material. The issue comes up in terms of being put on the spot to provide an answer where sometimes you might inadvertently provide information that is classified because you don't recall whether it's at what level or if it's classified at all. So that's the danger and that has happened. So, that explains how I approach that issue.
(01:56:09)
What I would say is this, is I'm being considered for the CIA director, which is not the head of the intelligence community. And I understand notwithstanding my opinion about how the worldwide threat assessment hearing should take place, that the committee, and I learned from that, disagrees, didn't want that proposal. So that would not be an issue if I'm confirmed as CIA director.
Senator Martin Heinrich (01:56:38):
So, you will come and take appropriate questions?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:56:41):
Yes, yes.
Senator Martin Heinrich (01:56:43):
Let me ask you, and you answered Mr. Ratcliffe, this question in writing but I think it's important for the American people and frankly, for the world to hear your answer in an open hearing as well. Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016 prohibited the use of any interrogation technique that was not authorized in the Army Field Manual. Will you abide by this law?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:57:11):
Yes.
Senator Martin Heinrich (01:57:13):
In your answers to the committee questions, you wrote that the CIA must, and this is a quote from you, "The CIA must help rebuild public confidence in the intelligence community, in the wake of prior abuses." And you reference that on a number of different occasions in your answers. So, I've frankly never been one to shy away from criticizing either the IC or the CIA when I felt it was appropriate. But I think most of us up here can agree that on the whole, the CIA's men and women produce the finest intelligence in the world, with a great deal of objectivity and integrity. And if there is a lack of public confidence, it's because it's become too easy for some elected officials to throw around terms like, the deep state. So if you're confirmed, what precisely would you do to help rebuild public confidence in the agency and where do you see that necessary and appropriate?
John L. Ratcliffe (01:58:20):
Well, thank you, Senator, for the question. I think it's the things that we've talked about already, and some of it you may not have been present for. But in terms of leading by example, if confirmed as the CIA director, I went through a series of examples where I talked about speaking truth to power and the importance of that and setting the right example in connection with that. So, I think that's essentially how I would go about it, is to lead by example.
Senator Martin Heinrich (01:58:59):
Thanks, Chairman.
Mr. Cotton (01:59:00):
I believe the Vice Chairman has a follow-up question.
Mr. Warner (01:59:04):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also, one quick thing I wanted to mention was, I appreciate your answer to Senator Heinrich's question about appearance here. I think we do have a unique situation in America where we have public congressional oversight. I think it's critically important to help restore that trust and I appreciate your commitment to appear and testify.
(01:59:25)
And this topic, I'm going to raise in closed, but I wanted to also at least get you on the open and I think you will concur. Senator Cotton, the Chairman pointed out a number of times when the IC didn't get it right over recent times. And I think, I'm not sure we'll ever get an all-seeing IC, but one area that I've been particularly concerned about is the ability for the IC to monitor technology advancement. I think historically that has not been the case. We've told our spies to go spy on the military or foreign governments, but we see repeatedly, as we think about this technology competition particularly with China, and I can cite chapter and verse from CIA getting it wrong, about how SMIC was going to be able to move to lower level semiconductors or smaller semiconductors. Area after area.
(02:00:15)
I think under Dr. Burns' current administration, we've moved the enterprise some. I think we've still got a lot more to do, but I did want you in this public setting to weigh in on your thoughts on how it is absolutely critical that the CIA is able to not only look at our adversaries in terms of government and military presence, but clearly in this technology competition, and how we have to up our game, in terms of collection.
John L. Ratcliffe (02:00:43):
Yeah, I agree 100% completely. You talked about it, Senator, earlier, in terms of military threats are one thing. But as you know, I believe for instance, the NSA, we have the best code makers and code breakers in the world, but if China gets to quantum computing before we do that, that causes a real problem. We've got to win the war, the race on technology, stay ahead of the technology curve. And part of that is, when we talk about technology as a tool and a target, is we've got to disrupt, we've got to… CIA has to play a really important role in disrupting our adversaries' technologies, in terms of trying to get ahead of us.
(02:01:34)
So, you mentioned semiconductors. Well, we all know that the issue that relates to Taiwan and that 95% of advanced semiconductors are there and we're trying to address those supply chain issues, but we can do things and the CIA must do things to disrupt how our adversaries are dealing with their supply chain issues, in regard to that. That's just one example.
Mr. Warner (02:02:02):
Well, thank you Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cotton (02:02:04):
Thank you. For the information of Senators, we intend to hold a committee vote on Mr. Ratcliffe's nomination as soon as possible, most likely on Monday afternoon. Therefore, any member who wishes to submit questions for the record after today's hearing, please do so by close of business tomorrow. Mr. Ratcliffe, I presume we can expect you to provide your replies even more promptly. Thank you, all. The open session of this hearing is adjourned. We will reconvene in close session in 30 minutes, that will be at 12:37 PM. Thank you.
John L. Ratcliffe (02:02:36):
Thank you.