Mr. Pfluger (00:00):
… Threat of unmanned aerial systems, more commonly known as UASs or drones. We will hear from two panels today and our first panel consists of three witnesses from the federal government. Good afternoon. I'd like to welcome you all to today's important hearing on the threats posed by unmanned aircraft or aerial systems, UASs or drones and the threat to US national security and the policy solutions that could mitigate these risks. Before we begin, I'd like to personally recognize two individuals, Congressman Dan Bishop and Congressman Anthony De Espozito for their service to the subcommittee and to our nation, and I wish them well in their future endeavors.
(00:47)
As we sit here today, we are at a critical juncture in the evolution of military technology, commercial innovation and cybersecurity. UASs have become a transformative force. They've been used in countless positive ways that include revolutionizing many industries like agriculture, logistics, film production, and others, while also improving capabilities for humanitarian relief and law enforcement. However, as with any powerful technology, UASs have also introduced significant security challenges.
(01:15)
In recent years, the proliferation of UASs, both domestically and abroad, has raised serious concerns regarding the potential misuse and criminal activities, espionage and more alarmingly, in threats to US national security. From foreign adversaries seeking to exploit UAS for surveillance and intelligence gathering, to the growing risk of UASs being weaponized to attack critical infrastructure, sports stadiums, our vulnerabilities are clear. The risk posed by commercial and military-grade UAS in the hands of rogue states, non-state actors, terrorist organizations, and even individuals, cannot be overstated. There have already been several troubling incidents where UASs have been used to penetrate airspace, compromising not only our national security, but public safety. Threats to our homeland can also derive from the manufacturing of products that Americans frequently use.
(02:09)
A glaring example is the widespread use of drones manufactured by Da Jiang Innovations, DJI, a Chinese company whose products are deeply embedded in US industries and critical sectors. These systems raise national security concerns, including risk of unauthorized data access and systemic vulnerabilities. Multiple US departments and agencies have already admonished against or banned the procurement of certain UASs originating in the People's Republic of China in recognition of the threats that they pose. Just this past October, reports indicated that CBP is blocking the importation of some UAS produced by DJI due to potential violations of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which is a law that prohibits the importation of goods into the US produced in whole or in part with forced labor out of the PRC. We must work to protect US communications equipment while strengthening US supply chains by ensuring foreign manufactured technologies that pose security threats cannot operate in US networks. The threats posed by UAS continues to present challenges.
(03:14)
The US border is one of the most significant vulnerabilities when it comes to this type of threat. UASs have already been used to circumvent traditional border security measures such as fences, walls, and surveillance towers. UASs have been used to smuggle drugs and weapons across the border and surveil CBP locations for human smugglers to then evade detection. CBP officials have consistently raised concerns that Mexican narco-terrorist gangs are using weaponized UAS only a short distance from the US border and in many cases, operating inside the United States. UASs also poses significant threat to critical infrastructure including power grids, oil refineries, airports, water treatment plants, and transportation systems. A single UAS carrying explosives could potentially cause widespread damage, interrupt services and result in significant economic loss to our homeland. Additionally, recent events illustrate the diverse roles UASs have played in both state-on-state conflict and asymmetric engagements such as those in Ukraine and Israel, as well as their use in potential intelligence gathering operations, near sensitive military installations at home and abroad.
(04:24)
We must learn from these conflicts to help protect our homeland security. DHS and DOJ were given counter-UHS authorities as part of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, which became law as part of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The current authorities provided under the Act are set to expire on December 20th, 2024, just one week from now. Over the past years, DHS and DOJ have used these authorities to engage in activities to protect covered facilities and assets against credible threats posed by UAS, not withstanding laws such as the Wiretap Act or the Aircraft Sabotage Act that could otherwise limit such activities. It's imperative that we not only make sure that the current authorities are extended to protect our national security, but also work together to responsibly reform the current legal authorities that provide federal agencies with critical tools to mitigate credible threats posed by UAS.
(05:22)
I'd like to applaud Chairman Greene as well as Ranking Member Thompson for their bipartisan work alongside members on TNI Judiciary for introducing H.R.8610, the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety and Reauthorization Act of 2024. This legislation will renew and reform current counter-UAS legal authorities. The legislation will also modify and improve counter-UAS authorities of the Federal Aviation Administration enhance important protections for the civil liberties of Americans using UAS in a legal and responsible manner and strengthen public safety in communities throughout this nation. For instance, the legislation requires DHS to establish a counter-UAS mitigation pilot program under which selected state and covered law enforcement agencies may operate approved counter-UAS mitigation systems and mitigate unauthorized UAS operations on behalf of covered entities at a number of sites each. Today we're going to hear from experts in the fields of national security, law enforcement, defense, and technology who will provide insights into the threats posed by the UAS and family of systems to our homeland and efforts to address these challenges.
(06:35)
I just want to say, if you're watching the news today, we've had several incidents that have occurred and are occurring right now in places like New Jersey. Recently, we had an incident at Langley Air Force Base. The threat is real. This hearing, I think, will address many topics. Maybe we don't have all the answers that come out of this hearing, but my hope is, that by having this hearing, by asking both the government and non-governmental panel that we can get to the right questions and if we don't have the right policies in place, then let's get those policies in place. If we do and the authorities are there, then let's figure out what we can continue to do to keep our homeland safe. There's many aspects of this, but the most important aspect is the safety and the security of every American citizen and the life that we live here.
(07:22)
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panels today and working in a bipartisan manner. I now recognize the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism Law Enforcement and Intelligence, the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner for his opening statement.
Mr. Magaziner (07:34):
Well, I thank Chairman Pfluger for calling this important hearing and all of my colleagues for participating. The proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems has created a technological arms race between criminals who use UAS technology to plot acts of terror, traffic fentanyl and other illegal substances, and invade the privacy of ordinary Americans, and law enforcement agencies tasked with keeping our homeland safe. Both the criminals and law enforcement agencies are innovating at a rapid rate and it is important that the federal government keep up. The time has come for Congress to expand the authority of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to better utilize monitoring, tracking, and signal-jamming technologies to protect critical areas, including our borders, large public events, prisons and sensitive government facilities, while also ensuring the civil liberties of drone operators. This is the goal of H.R.8610, the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety and Reauthorization Act, authored by Chairman Greene and Ranking Member Thompson, which I'm proud to have co-sponsored.
(08:43)
For years, DHS, DOJ and other agencies have briefed this committee on the threats posed by malicious and authorized UAS. We have seen drones shot down at airports in this country and around the world, major sporting events have been interrupted with players rushed from the field when unauthorized drones with unknown motives entered restricted airspace, and just a few weeks ago, the FBI arrested a white supremacist in Tennessee who planned to use a drone with an explosive payload to attack a power grid. However, it must also be said that drones are useful tools for many occupations and hobbyists. They can be useful for search and rescue, navigation, agriculture and more, and these positive aspects remind us that we must take a measured approach to the issue. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses about how best to balance the benefits and risks of UAS. Moreover, I hope that this hearing will help lay additional groundwork for getting H.R.8610 over the finish line. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger (09:48):
Thank you, gentleman. The chair now recognizes the chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez for his opening statement.
Mr. Gimenez (09:57):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today we're examining the growing threats posed by unmanned aerial systems, UASs or drones, and exploring solutions to better protect our homeland from this evolving technology. The popularity and accessibility of drones have skyrocketed in recent years. Today, there are more than 880,000 registered drone operators in the United States with countless other operating drones without proper registration or training. While many of these operators use drones for legitimate purposes, recreational, commercial, or otherwise, there is an undeniable threat from those who misuse this technology either through ignorance, other rules and regulations or with malicious intent. Uninformed operators can inadvertently disrupt air traffic or encroach on sensitive areas, creating safety risks that strain our law enforcement and the aviation systems. While uninformed operators present a risk, their potential impact is negligible compared to the dangers posed by nefarious actors with malicious intent.
(10:56)
Nefarious actors including transnational criminal organizations, terrorists and foreign adversaries, can exploit drones to evade traditional security measures, gather intelligence, smuggle contraband, disrupt transportation systems, or even launch attacks on our homeland. The threat from nefarious actors is both real and escalating. Along our borders, drones are increasingly employed by cartels to smuggle drugs and surveil law enforcement operations. We must consider all appropriate actions to ensure that foreign adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party are not using drones under the guise of legitimate activities to relay sensitive information back to China or other entities that seek to harm the United States. Critical infrastructures such as airports, power plants and ports face growing risks from rogue drones capable of conducting surveillance, causing disruptions or carrying out acts of sabotage.
(11:50)
These risks are not hypothetical. Since 2021, the Transportation Security Administration has documented nearly 2000 drone sightings near US airports with major airports experiencing drone incursions almost daily. Furthermore, between 2021 and 2022, the FBI reported 235 incidents of suspicious drone flights at or near chemical plants in Louisiana. Similar UAS activity was also observed that oil storage facilities in Oklahoma and natural gas facilities in Texas, highlighting the growing threat to critical energy infrastructure. Beyond our borders, the conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the weaponization of drones in modern warfare. Both sides have employed drones for reconnaissance, targeting and direct attacks, underscoring the ability to use drones to transform the dynamics of conflict. These lessons, both from domestic incidents and international conflicts, should serve as a wake-up call for us to bolster our defenses against the misuse of drones within the United States.
(12:50)
Looking ahead, the stakes will only continue to rise with major global events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, of which many games will be played in my hometown of Miami, and the 2028 Summer Olympics coming to the United States, we must be ready to confront these threats to safeguard critical infrastructure and ensure the safety of travelers, participants and spectators. We have a responsibility to defend against drone threats and the need for action is clear. We must act swiftly. Today's hearing is an opportunity to better understand the full scope of the challenges posed by drones and to explore innovative solutions to mitigate these risks.
(13:26)
I want to thank my colleague from Texas, Representative Pfluger, as well as my colleagues from the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement and Intelligence for partnering with us to host this important hearing. Thank you to our witnesses, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner Jones, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Wiegmann and Assistant Director Wheeler for appearing before the subcommittees. I look forward to hearing about how we can better counter rogue drones, safeguard critical infrastructure and ensure our policies keep pace with this evolving technology and I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger (13:55):
The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar for his opening statement.
Mr. Thanedar (14:03):
Good afternoon and thank you to both Chairman and Ranking Member Magaziner for holding today's hearing as well as to our witnesses for joining us. Over the past few years, the use of unmanned aerial systems, also known as drones has become common across a wide range of applications. Drones have become increasingly affordable and useful within agriculture, law enforcement, search and rescue, photography and other industries. However, as the airspace becomes more and more crowded with unmanned aircraft, we must ensure the government is prepared and empowered to protect the safety and security of US critical infrastructure and the American public. In 2018, Congress enacted initial authorities for the Executive Branch to begin testing and operating counter drone technologies, also known as CUAS technologies. Those authorities have kick started the inter-agency coordination and technology development needed to carry out such a complex effort, but the authorities remain limited and have relied on one short-term extension after another.
(15:31)
I hope Congress will act early next year to advance legislation to extend and expand these authorities. As we do so, we must ensure the government's counter drone activities appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties and do not have unintended impacts on the safety of the national airspace. As ranking member of the Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittee, I am especially interested in making sure airports are protected from threats posed by drones. Already, we have seen major airports shut down due to drones causing significant delays. Introducing new technologies that affect radio signals is especially sensitive within the airport environment and other urban environment, so we must ensure such technologies are carefully tested.
(16:34)
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how Congress can push our counter drone efforts into a new phase in a measured yet meaningful manner. Again, I thank our witnesses and my colleagues and I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger (16:54):
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. I'm pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this very important topic and I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you'll give before the Committee on Homeland Security in the United States of House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Thank you. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative.
(17:24)
I'll now introduce the witnesses. Mr. Keith Jones is the Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner for Air and Marine Operations. He has over 32 years of law enforcement experience. Notably, he has helped found the San Diego Sector's border Patrol search, trauma and Rescue team and was the principal primary driver of its national expansion. Mr. Robert Wheeler Jr. serves as the assistant director of the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group. His responsibilities include providing expertise in crisis management negotiations, hazardous devices and tactical operations, behavioral assessment, surveillance and aviation. He joined the division in July of this year. And Mr. Brad Wiegmann serves as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the US Department of Justice. He has spent his career as a government attorney with legal experience at the Department of Defense, Department of State, and at the National Security Council.
(18:16)
We thank all of you for being here today. We'll now begin with opening statements. I know that you have submitted written statements as well, and thank you for that and if you'll please adhere to the five-minute summary of your statements. We'll start with Mr. Jones. You're now recognized.
Mr. Jones (18:33):
Thank you, Chairman. Good afternoon, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member Thanedar and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. It's an honor to be here today on behalf of US Customs and Border Protection to discuss the CBP authorities and capabilities dedicated to countering threats posed by the malicious use of unmanned aircraft systems, commonly called UAS or drones. Throughout my 33-year career in border security, first with the US Border Patrol and now Air and Marine operations, I've witnessed transnational criminal organizations or TCOs and other malicious actors leveraging technology to circumvent US law enforcement. In recent years, I've devoted significant time to understanding the increasing UAS threat to border security and coordinating CBP's strategic response. Air Marine Operations is CBP's executive agent for counter-UAS operations. We work alongside our US Border Patrol and Office of Field Operation counterparts to detect, track and mitigate the threat of these aircraft along our borders.
(19:33)
We also collaborate with our DOJ and FBI partners on investigations, as well as CBP innovation, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Defense, private industry to identify technologies that can improve our mitigation and domain awareness capabilities. I'd like to emphasize three important aspects of this subject today. First, the current state of UAS threats to border security. Second, how our critical authorities enable us to respond, and finally, the importance of improving CBP's domain awareness capabilities and technology to detect and mitigate UAS threats.
(20:09)
First, UAS activity on the border is increasing rapidly. During a recent six-week period, CBP sensors recorded more than 6,900 drone flights within close proximity of our borders. It is these flights, particularly those in areas of high illicit activity, that present the greatest threat to the safety of CBP's frontline personnel, pose a serious collision risk to our crewed aircraft and diminish the effectiveness of our border security operations.
(20:36)
Although intent cannot be derived from border proximity alone, through our intelligence processes, CBP has associated a large percent percent of these drone flights with nefarious activities on the ground. TCOs have fully integrated UAS technology into their operations. Of most concern to CBP is the wide use of drones to conduct reconnaissance of CBP law enforcement personnel, their locations, and their activities. This technology enables smugglers to guide non-citizens or transport contraband across the border without encountering any law enforcement. Additionally, to a lesser extent, TCOs have used drones to fly contraband over the border and most drones have limited payload capacity. An average recreational drone can carry only a few pounds, but the potential risk is still significant. A few pounds of narcotics, specifically fentanyl, or a few pounds of explosives could cause serious harm.
(21:29)
The increasing use of UAS brings me to my second point, the authorities provided by Congress through the Preventing Emerging Threats Act are essential for CBP to detect and counter this serious threat. In accordance with the Act, DHS policy guidance and internal policy, CBP conducts counter-UAS operations in 10 high-risk sectors along the southwest and northern border as authorized by the DHS secretary. Our operations target specific threats to covered facilities or assets while safeguarding privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. Attaining authorization to implement counter-UAS operations is a rigorous and precise process, requires a credible threat based on extensive analysis and evidence, as well as correlation with actionable law enforcement information. Using our authorities and targeted approach, CBP mitigated 86 UAS threats at the border in fiscal year 2023 and 60 in FY24. CBP also mitigated 16 UAS at special event assessment rating or SEER events in FY2023 and 49 in FY24. CBP has mitigated three unmanned aircraft systems so far in FY25.
(22:38)
Finally, TCOs are rapidly obtaining larger, more maneuverable drones with a higher capacity for payloads and the ability to fly longer, higher, and farther. We're also tracking the threat of drones used for kinetic attacks with payloads of explosives, firearms or weapons of mass destruction. We're already seeing drug cartels in Mexico use drones to attack the military, police and their rivals. It means CBP needs these critical authorities, advanced technology to maintain the strategic advantage and continued commitment to achieving persistent domain awareness. CBP is dedicated to our security mission and with your support, we'll continue to counter this rapidly evolving threat and expand our risk-based implementation of Counter-UAS operations along the border. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Pfluger (23:23):
Thank you, Mr. Jones. The chair now recognizes Mr. Wheeler for his opening statement of five minutes.
Mr. Wheeler (23:28):
Thank you and good afternoon, Chairman Pfluger, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Magaziner, and Ranking Member Thanedar. Other distinguished members of the committee, appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf of the FBI. I currently serve as the assistant director of our Critical Incident Response Group in Quantico, Virginia. I've done that since July, as you've mentioned. In that capacity, I lead the FBI's efforts regarding both our pre-crisis planning and response to critical incidents and major investigations, which includes responsibility for our counter unmanned aircraft program. As UAS use continues to rapidly grow among the public, commercial, and military and law enforcement sectors, this technology also lends itself to increased malicious use by state, non-state and lone actors, as you know. This technology poses some unique security challenges for us. Just this year alone, we've seen concerning increase in the use of UAS in the commission of crimes with the intent to cause injury to US persons on US soil. A Chinese national recently pled guilty to two misdemeanor counts for using a UAS to conduct espionage at a US naval facility in January. We believe UAS are being flown for similar purposes over sensitive facilities across the United States. Just last month, a subject was arrested and charged in Tennessee for attempting to use a UAS with an explosive device to destroy an energy facility. That is the same case mentioned by the ranking member. That subject was driven by an ideology to disrupt society through the collapse of the national power grid. Those are two examples of the evolving ways that UAS are being used to harm us and our interests.
(25:09)
With the enactment of the 2018 Preventing Emergency Threats Act, the FBI was granted the authority necessary to mitigate a range of UAS threats in the protection of special events, emergency response, federal investigations, personnel and facilities. Specifically, the legislation authorizes DOJ and our partners at DHS to conduct counter-UAS operations in limited circumstances to identify, track and mitigate credible threats. I'd stress the importance for reauthorization of the counter-UAS authorities, as you know, expire December 20th. Failure to extend the authorities beyond then would cause significant impacts on our ability to protect the public. A durable extension is also extremely important. Our experience has taught us that short-term extensions to counter-UAS authority effectively prevent the Bureau and our partners from budgeting and staffing in ways which would allow us to execute a long-term strategy.
(26:08)
We know that Congress is considering extensions of five years and more, and we thank you for that consideration. The FBI strongly supports pursuing expanded counter-UAS authorities for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners as robustly and swiftly as prudently possible. SLTT partners have repeatedly informed us that existing counter-UAS authorities are inadequate. Since our counter-UAS authority was granted in 2019, the FBI has adopted 69 operational missions using this authority and provided limited support to 121 other events. We've detected over 1000 UAS in violation of federal law during these missions. One example at the Boston Marathon, this past April, our team mitigated a UAS threat which resulted in the capture and prosecution of a subject.
(26:57)
The FBI cannot alone protect the over 40,000 special event assessment rating or SEER events annually held in the US, along with the countless other requests for counter-UAS support at mass gatherings. The use of counter-UAS to protect against these situations is crucial and can only be fully addressed by expanding the capability to include our state and local partners.
(27:22)
In closing, we remain committed to protect Americans by countering the malicious use of this technology. The reauthorization or long-term extension of this legislation is essential to continue our mission in combating the evolving threat, and we look forward to working with you in establishing sustainable strategies to mitigate the threat going forward. Thank you.
Mr. Pfluger (27:43):
Thank you, Mr. Wheeler. The chair now recognizes Mr. Wiegmann for his opening statement of five minutes.
Mr. Wiegmann (27:49):
Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Pfluger, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Magaziner, Ranking member Thanedar and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of Justice. As my colleagues have just said, we are committed to continuing to work hard to protect the American people from the threat of illicit drone use. But to do so most effectively, we need additional legal authority. As drones become more and more prevalent in our airspace, merely continuing with our current authorities is insufficient to address the current scale of the threat. More than two years ago, I and others from DHS and the FAA testified before a Senate committee about this growing threat and the need for a more durable and significantly expanded legal framework. Since that time, the Congress has provided extensions of existing counter drone authority while considering how best to expand it.
(28:40)
We are very grateful that both the House and the Senate continue to agree that this authority must not lapse. The department is eager to share with you the lessons gained from our experience to help reach consensus about how much and in what way to expand the existing law. Now, the reason we need legal authority is that without it, use of the most effective types of drone detection and counter drone technologies could violate criminal laws, including those that prohibit destroying or disabling aircraft in flight and intercepting signals and communications. As has just been said, our current authorities will lapse within the next 10 days unless reauthorized, so our first priority is for Congress to reauthorize the existing law. But I know that this committee and others have also been working on legislation to go well beyond that, and we are eager to work with Congress on a bill that will help keep the American people safe. Now, as described in our written testimony, the two most important issues for us are, number one, broadening the types of sites that law enforcement can protect from nefarious and suspicious drone uses. So for example, to cover, as was mentioned in the opening statements, airports and critical infrastructure like power plants and chemical facilities. So we need to expand the types of sites that can be protected. And then number two, as my colleague from the FBI just mentioned, it's about empowering state and local law enforcement and operators of critical infrastructure to engage in counter drone efforts themselves nationwide.
(30:03)
This is not a job the federal government can do alone. The FBI can only cover a tiny fraction, less than half of 1% of the tens of thousands of events throughout the country each year that might need counter drone support to protect public safety. So the demand for protection across the country just vastly exceeds available federal resources.
(30:23)
To be clear, this activity can and must be done while safeguarding Americans' privacy and civil liberties. The technologies that we employ typically detect only communications being passed between the operator's controller and the drone to direct its activities. They do not extract text messages, email or internet search histories from phones or tablets used to control drones, nor do they allow law enforcement to listen to voice calls. We collect information such as the drone vendor and model, the drone and controlling device serial number, the geolocation of the drone, the location of the controller, and the most recent takeoff and home location.
(31:06)
This is very much like the information required to be broadcast by manned aircraft and which is now required under FAA's remote ID regulation to be broadcast by drones as well, and we use this information to further investigate when a crime involving a drone is suspected. As required in current law, DOJ would continue to have guidance that contains explicit protections for privacy and civil liberties and associated training. And state and local law enforcement, if empowered to engage in this activity would be required to adhere to the same rules. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and I'd be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Pfluger (31:41):
I thank the witnesses for their opening statements. Members will now be recognized by order of seniority for five minutes of questioning, and an additional round of questioning may be called after all members have been recognized and also knowing that we have a second panel. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning.
Mr. Pfluger (32:01):
Let's just start with current events and I'll ask an open-ended question. What is going on in New Jersey?
Mr. Wheeler (32:15):
Sir, the FBI and our Newark Field office, along with the state and local partners there, or the Bureau is actively investigating the situation you mentioned, just the unexplained sighting of drone activity over that part of New Jersey, including proximity to sensitive sites and areas of concern. So we do not attribute that to an individual or a group yet. We're investigating, but I don't have an answer of who's responsible for that of one or more people that are responsible for those drone flights, but we're actively investigating. What the Bureau has done to aid our state and local partners is what we generally do, enlist the help of the interagency, enlist the help of the public. There's a tip line there that 1-800-CALL-FBI, tips.fbi for information from the public that could help us resolve this. It is concerning-
Mr. Pfluger (33:35):
Is the public at risk? Is public safety at risk? Are we concerned that there are nefarious intentions that could cause either national security or a public safety incident that would put Americans at risk?
Mr. Wheeler (33:47):
There's nothing that is known that would lead me to say that, but we just don't know. And that's the concerning part.
Mr. Pfluger (33:57):
The fact that we have these unknown drones, UASs, that are flying over either critical or sensitive facilities is exactly why we're having this hearing.
(34:08)
Mr. Jones, actually, for anybody on the panel, let me just say we go back to last year there were incidents, including Langley Air Force Base, where for over a week, we had unknown drones flying over a very sensitive military installation with F-22s and other weapons systems on the ground, and I think that was caused for concern. So from a DHS standpoint, either on a border mission or from an FBI or DOJ, you mentioned, Mr. Wheeler, we don't necessarily have the authorities we need. Why can't we take action against these drones that are flying over sensitive sites? Why are we not taking action against drones that are flying over sensitive sites?
Mr. Wheeler (34:54):
Authority exists to mitigate a UAS in-flight when authorized, and that could certainly apply to a sensitive site. I would be a little measured in speaking for the Department of Defense for those sites that are in question here. But I will say that we're, for the FBI in a position, closely liaison relationship with the Department of Defense and those areas that you mentioned and will help in every way possible. But for securing those particular sites in this way, it is a DOD equity.
Mr. Pfluger (35:32):
Mr. Jones, for the border, I was down in the RGV last year and they told me that they had over 20,000 incidents just in a quarter of drones that were being operated by cartels. What's the danger along the southern border to our citizens, the safety of our citizens from drones?
Mr. Jones (35:51):
Thank you, Chairman. You touched on the volume. The volume of activity within the 500 yards of our contiguous border in the south and even on the north is staggering. We have deployed detection technology. You mentioned 20,000. The significant threat is counter surveillance. They're surveilling law enforcement activities. They're doing this 24 by 7, 365. And historically, they've had to have high ground or terrain. Now everywhere's the high ground. They have a factual advantage.
Mr. Pfluger (36:27):
[inaudible 00:36:27]. They can can see what's going on.
Mr. Jones (36:28):
Exactly.
Mr. Pfluger (36:28):
Do you have the authority to mitigate those physically or by other means?
Mr. Jones (36:33):
The secretary has designated certain areas along our border as covered facilities. So yes, the capability exists and the authority exists in those covered areas.
Mr. Pfluger (36:45):
Have those types of mitigations taken place? Are we actively mitigating?
Mr. Jones (36:49):
We are actively mitigating, yes, sir.
Mr. Pfluger (36:51):
My time is expired, but how many events are we experiencing per year along the southern border?
Mr. Jones (36:57):
For example, last year, if we look at 45, 000 detections on the southwest, of those, 2,500, plus or minus, actually made an incursion. So now we're talking about a very small subset. A lot of the surveillance is taking place outside of our jurisdiction in foreign airspace. That makes it particularly challenging for mitigation.
Mr. Pfluger (37:16):
I bet we'll get back to these. My time has expired. Now I recognize the ranking member for his five minutes of questioning.
Mr. Magaziner (37:22):
Thank you. I'll pick up on this same line of questioning. When number of us visited the southern border last year, we heard from your officers about the challenges that drones were posing and one question I have is I understand they're being used primarily by the cartels for surveillance to see where your officers are so that they can more effectively traffic people, narcotics, firearms, et cetera, across the border. Do you see any evidence of the cartels using drones to actually move some of that contraband? I'm thinking specifically of fentanyl. Are they using UASs to actually move fentanyl across the border?
Mr. Jones (38:02):
We have yet to see fentanyl being moved via UAS. We have seen other narcotics, albeit in small quantities. From a cost model, it's not as effective for cartels because the payload capacity is so small, they have to make multiple trips. We have seen cocaine. We have seen heroin. We have seen methamphetamine. We've seen weapons. So there is a threat of moving contraband across our borders.
Mr. Magaziner (38:27):
So the numbers of course are staggering. I think at one point in your written testimony, you alluded to periods of as many a thousand detections a week, but the number of mitigations at the southern border was 86 in fiscal year '23 and 60 in fiscal '24. So why so few as a percentage of the whole? What are the barriers that you're facing?
Mr. Jones (38:54):
Again, many of these detections occur in foreign airspace, thereby we cannot mitigate. Actually, a very small percentage actually incur into the United States. So for example, in the southwest border, only 5% of that large number actually affected in incursion. Of that, we have very strict criteria and they met the criteria, thus the 60 that we mitigated in FY '24 actually met the criteria for mitigation.
Mr. Magaziner (39:24):
So I'm going to ask about both the 5% and the 95% then. So when the 5% that do come into our airspace, is the criteria too narrow to bring them down? Why, again, so few?
Mr. Jones (39:35):
Well, again, one of the things that's notable here is that those are not 2,500 unique identifiers. You have repeat offenders. We take down or mitigate one drone. Of that large number, that could be responsible for hundreds of these detections.
Mr. Magaziner (39:54):
I see. These are events, not necessarily individual drones, these statistics?
Mr. Jones (39:59):
That's correct.
Mr. Magaziner (39:59):
Okay. So on the 95%, or really I guess 100%, even if you don't have the authority to bring them down, those that are over foreign airspace, do you still have the ability, the technological ability to track where the operators are and to alert Mexican or Canadian authorities as to where the operators are? And can you explain what that process is like?
Mr. Jones (40:23):
Absolutely, and we do communicate directly with our foreign partners and our communication is healthy. Our sharing information is healthy. And so what you just described is exactly what we do.
Mr. Magaziner (40:35):
And is it working? Does it happen? I mean, when you notify Mexican authorities, for example, that, "Hey, we've got a drone and we know where the operator is," I mean, are they pursuing the operators? Do you have success stories? Again, are there gaps that need to be filled in that process? Can you elaborate?
Mr. Jones (40:52):
Well, again, in the case of governor of Mexico, we have to rely on our Mexican partners to respond. A lot of times these are in areas that are not highly populated. They're very difficult to get to. They're also controlled by cartels. So by the time law enforcement responds, it's very challenging for them. It's not from lack of effort or lack of communication. It's just a very difficult environment.
Mr. Magaziner (41:13):
With the minute that I have left, I'll shift to Mr. Wiegmann. On the issue of special events of Seer events, can you just elaborate a little bit more about why it is so important that the state and locals have expanded authorities and what should the appropriate guardrails be for those expanded authorities?
Mr. Wiegmann (41:32):
Yes. Each year, the FBI can cover a number of special events and DHS covers some as well. So we're talking about big events like the Super Bowl, the World Series, the Indianapolis 500, that sort of thing. But obviously those are not the only events that could be subject to an attack or a drone threat. You have many other football games, baseball games, soccer games, the World Cup. If you add them all up, just focus on sporting events, even forgetting about New York Times, new Year's Celebration, there's all manner of events. So we can only cover a tiny fraction of those in any given year. And so if Congress gives the authority to state and locals who engage in the same activity, that vastly expands the scope of what counter drone protection.
Mr. Magaziner (42:12):
I'll just note for the record… Thank you. I understand the need to expand that authority for the state and locals for these special events. I will just highlight though, I think training is going to be very important in this because there are plenty of people who fly drones at high school football games and stuff for legitimate reasons. And we'll just need to make sure that the state and locals have the training to know how to go after the bad guys without overly penalizing the good guys. But I take your broader point.
Mr. Wiegmann (42:38):
Absolutely.
Mr. Magaziner (42:38):
I yield back.
Mr. Wiegmann (42:39):
That's a big part of it, the training.
Mr. Magaziner (42:40):
Thank you.
Mr. Pfluger (42:41):
Gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez for his-
Mr. Gimenez (42:46):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that we face significant threats now from the technology that we have right now, but right around the corner, if not already here, is AI. And so some of the techniques that we use to mitigate current drones won't work on AI because they won't be piloted. They'll be just given a mission. They'll be given parameters of what to hit and they'll hit it by themselves. They don't need to be piloted. Do we have any capabilities to actually go kinetic, actually knock these things down either through some kind of a projectile or with high energy that fries the systems? Do we have any of that available anywhere?
Mr. Jones (43:30):
Thank you for the question. Without tipping our hand to our adversaries, I think we would probably be best and we'd look forward to providing you a detailed briefing on our capabilities, kind of where our heads are at on and we share your concern.
Mr. Gimenez (43:42):
Yeah, because I think that that not only concerns me as far as customs and border protection and our personnel, but also airports, large events, etc cetera, where these drones can be used for really destructive purposes. And so I'm really, really worried about that. Mr. Jones, you said that you had legal authority to disable, to mitigate drones in certain areas. We have about a 2,000-mile-long border. So those areas, how many miles of the 2,000 do you actually have the authority to mitigate these drones?
Mr. Jones (44:18):
Chairman, again, we're starting to get into an area I'm not comfortable with in an open forum, but we'd love to dock those details with you behind closed doors.
Mr. Gimenez (44:29):
I take that to mean there's not too many miles. Okay. So that's fair enough. Have you seen any kind of… We know that the cartels, especially the Mexican cartels are working with the CCP, the Communist Chinese party. The CCP provides the chemicals to the cartels who then produce the fentanyl that's killing thousands of Americans every single year. Do you see any link between… We see that link. Do we see any links between the CCP, China, and the drones, the technology that's being used to surveil our border and it's being used to help the cartels in their quest to transport people, drugs, guns, everything into the United States?
Mr. Jones (45:20):
It's no secret that the preponderance of the UAS technology is manufactured in China and the cartels are using that very technology. We share your concerns. There's a reason why we don't use Chinese drones, and whether they knowingly or unknowingly are potentially collecting information for the government of China.
Mr. Gimenez (45:48):
That's it. That's all the questions I have. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Pfluger (45:51):
Gentlemen yields. The Chair recognizes Mr. Thanedar for his questioning.
Mr. Thanedar (45:55):
Thank you, Chair Plfuger.
(45:59)
The operation of CUAS technologies to intercept drones is sensitive as it generally requires seizure of property without a warrant. To do so, CUAS technology operators must hack into the signal used to control the drones, which often involves hacking into operators, cell phone or computer. As such, Congress has waived certain wiretapping and other privacy protections for agencies to carry out these activities. As DHS and DOJ have began to operate CUAS technologies, what have your agency's done to formally enshrine protections for privacy and civil liberties? Any one of you.
Mr. Wheeler (46:57):
Sir, I can speak for the way that the FBI conducts the mission. We're very sensitive to those concerns. The information that is captured electronically from our technology that we use is just the information that has to do with the control of the drone, the flight, the telemetry data if you will. Even if it is being operated by a personal device like a cell phone for example, the technology that we use does not capture any other information from there. And we're very sensitive to how that is collected. And whatever that information that we collect, we don't maintain it if it's not threat, if it is not part of a case. If it is part of something that we investigate, then our regular guidelines of legal process and how we would maintain evidence apply, but we're very sensitive to privacy concerns and making sure we get it right and do it correctly.
Mr. Thanedar (48:06):
All right, thank you so much. Congress is currently considering authorizing a pilot program for state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies to operate CUAS technologies. Expanding these authorities must be done carefully as doing so requires waiving wiretapping protections and other critical protections to protect privacy and civil liberties. How can we ensure the operation of such technologies potentially by a large number of law enforcement agencies will be closely coordinated with and overseen by federal authorities? Mr. Wiegmann, most critically, how can we protect privacy and civil liberties?
Mr. Wiegmann (49:00):
Thank you for the question. If the pilot program, the state local pilot program that you mentioned is adopted, there would have to be, the law would require training for all state and local officials. It would also require them to follow the same procedures that my FBI colleague just mentioned in terms of the type of technology they can use, the type of data that they can collect, the rules of engagement, what type of facilities they can correct so they do it safely. They'd have to work with the FAA. All of their activities would have to be approved by DHS and the Department of Justice working with FAA. So it's quite a labor-intensive process that we're envisioning under the state and local pilot program to basically get state and local authorities up and running so that they can mirror and do the same things that we do at the federal level. And that includes protecting privacy and civil liberties.
Mr. Thanedar (49:51):
Thank you. Thank you so much. And I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger (49:57):
Gentleman yields. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop (50:01):
Thank you Mr. Chairman. How do I pronounce your name? Is it Wiegmann or-
Mr. Wiegmann (50:06):
It's Wiegmann.
Mr. Bishop (50:07):
Wiegmann.
Mr. Wiegmann (50:07):
Yeah.
Mr. Bishop (50:08):
Mr. Wiegmann, I want to bore into this just a little bit more, and some of the questions have indicated and the answers indicate you got to be careful about revealing specific technological things. But I noted one thing when you were testifying, you said that the reason you need expanded authorities, I believe I got this right, is that the effective technologies to deal with this could violate laws on intercepting aircraft in flight and intercepting transmissions. Did I get that correct?
Mr. Wiegmann (50:32):
That's right.
Mr. Bishop (50:35):
Maybe you could just help me understand a little bit better. If you've got a mass spectator event, which is one thing that's been raised, it seems to me how do you have a… And you've also said, several of you have made the point that how you intercept data to prevent intruding on privacy and certainly certain types of data. And I must tell you that has a sophistication level I don't really understand. Why not just have a rule that anybody who flies a drone near a mass spectator event, the drone is going to be destroyed in the air. Is that something that it'd be hard to do? And then why do you need to intercept data in order to do that? If the object is there, destroy it.
Mr. Wiegmann (51:26):
It's a good question. I think the way it works, as I understand it, and my colleagues can talk about this operationally, if you had, let's say a football game and you would have a perimeter, it would be declared as a temporary flight restricted area. So around that, you're going to have a buffer zone. You have an area, it's a no-go, and then you have a larger area around that where you might want to detect what's flying. And then you have a larger area around that where you might be tracking, but regular commercial drone use is okay. And so as they're getting closer and closer to the facility, you're detecting originally the signals to see what is that drone. You're trying to identify a drone. Oh, is that a-
Mr. Bishop (51:59):
Like a long-distance radar or something like that?
Mr. Wiegmann (52:02):
Exactly.
Mr. Bishop (52:02):
Heads up radar system?
Mr. Wiegmann (52:02):
Is that a UPS drone that's just delivering a package somewhere? Let it go on its way. Is it's getting closer into the zone where you're just going to have to do something against it? So it's a calibrated thing. And as you get closer and closer, then that's where you take the opportunity to use the technology to jam it is most frequently, rather than destroy the drone. You're interfering with its navigation in a way that confuses it and requires it to land. And that's what they do in these scenarios to make it land somewhere rather than, it's not the same as shooting it out of the sky is my understanding of how it works. You're instead using electronic things to bring it down. So that's essentially how it works.
Mr. Bishop (52:39):
Is the technology… And I've always been curious about that. First time I asked it in a hearing a couple of years ago, there's a Twitter of laughter throughout the room about naivety of thinking you could destroy the thing in the air. And I guess maybe if it leaves debris to fall or something, I could understand that.
Mr. Wiegmann (52:56):
It could be dangerous also, I think. If you were just to kinetically destroy it, I imagine there'd be some hazards with that.
Mr. Bishop (53:01):
Should the average person looking at this or the average congressman trying to understand it, believe that these technologies where you can use electronics to force the device to land are successful or have a high degree of reliability? Maybe I'll direct that to Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones (53:23):
There's also non-destructive kinetic capabilities. So one thing from a law enforcement perspective we have to remember is that if we can capture a drone, there's a forensic capability that allows us to glean information. And so that's important to us, as well as avoiding or minimizing any collateral damage. We have to be very careful any application of force in public areas, responsible law enforcement versus do no harm.
Mr. Bishop (53:49):
Is any witness able to testify? Because what you've essentially laid out is we've had a series of short-term reauthorizations of ?the authorities that now exist and issues you want to expand the authorities. I have concerns, especially after a variety of ways in which I think government authority has misused power to intercept information or learn information about the American people and has gone too far. Can anybody describe what the hesitancy is and why they're not significant or why they should be overruled and proceed with this expanded authority Mr. Wiegmann?
Mr. Wiegmann (54:31):
Hesitancy in adopting the expanded authority?
Mr. Bishop (54:35):
Yeah. Yeah.
Mr. Wiegmann (54:35):
That's hard for us to answer because we support expanding the authority.
Mr. Bishop (54:38):
I understand.
Mr. Wiegmann (54:38):
I think that it's important to recognize when you talk about intercepting signals and so forth. As I mentioned in my opening statement as assistant director Wheeler just mentioned, the types of signals that we're getting are the same types of information that is actually required to be broadcast that anyone can pick up with a drone today as the FAs rule. So we're not talking… There is I guess a privacy interest, but it's the same type of information that we're now requiring. And it's a new regulation, but requiring drones to broadcast so that anyone can pick up because it's really just about the communications between the drone and the controller so that we can figure out where is that person? What's the registration? What's the model? How do we deal with it? So I think the privacy interest is limited.
Mr. Bishop (55:21):
My time has expired. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger (55:24):
The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa (55:29):
Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I want to thank the gentleman or witnesses for being here today.
(55:35)
Very timely issue for all of us, I think. Your testimony and the questions show that a little bit of a tension here between private property, private rights, but I think the bigger one here is protecting public safety. A couple of times back home, I had the chance to see some drones flying over my house looking in my backyard, frustrating, angry, didn't have any kinetic weapons with me, so they came and went. But on a serious note, I'm home to Disneyland. Worldwide is still viewed as an American private enterprise symbol. I've got the Anaheim Ducks Arena, OCVIBE that's being built right now, the Anaheim Ducks, SoFi Stadium nearby, World Soccer Cup coming to our area very soon, Olympics coming soon. So target-rich environment, so to speak.
(56:35)
And what you're saying, Mr. Wiegmann, specifically, you said that federal government does not have the bandwidth to really protect all of these sites, yet we're still not at a point where we can share the authority information with state, local, federal authorities. And I hope we don't have to wait for a federal law to be passed to get there. My local sheriff in Orange County has a fusion center. Fusion centers exist across the nation where federal, state, local, FBI, every agency collaborate, share information because when it comes to these drones, time is of the essence. Authority to neutralize these things is of the essence. I guess my question to each and every one of you, starting with Mr. Jones, do you know of any efforts right now to coordinate with our locals to begin sharing, creating the local authority to be more effective at protecting our citizens? Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones (57:50):
I can speak broadly, and just outside of just county of UAS, we are working with our federal, state, and local partners on a daily basis. Whether it's counter fentanyl, counter UAS, just general public safety, they're our partners. We're all on the same team.
Mr. Correa (58:08):
I'm glad to hear safe.
Mr. Jones (58:09):
We need the authority-
Mr. Correa (58:09):
Go ahead.
Mr. Jones (58:10):
We need the authority to designate select state and local law enforcement, and then with approved equipment, and just like my colleague state-
Mr. Correa (58:21):
You need a federal law.
Mr. Jones (58:23):
Yes, we do.
Mr. Correa (58:24):
Some of us here could probably do something like that, Mr. Chairman. Hope we can also… I didn't hear it. I know Mr. Gimenez question talked a little bit about Mexico cooperation. Any there? This is something that deals with those sides of the border.
Mr. Jones (58:50):
Like I stated earlier, our relationship and our information sharing with Mexico is healthy, both at the local level through the US border patrol, foreign operations branches, as well as our communications with Mexico City.
Mr. Correa (59:01):
Thank you very much. Mr. Wheeler, same question to you. Do you know of any efforts to coordinate past laws to help us work with the locals to protect our citizenry?
Mr. Wheeler (59:13):
Sure. I would illustrate as maybe a good example for the situation in New Jersey and our Newark division we talked about earlier the FBI Newark, JTTF, comprised of a lot of state and local officers that work on the JTTF are our people that are actively investigating this matter.
Mr. Correa (59:39):
Are there any efforts to pass legislation that you're aware of to give the locals the authority to neutralize monitor these aerial vehicles?
Mr. Wheeler (59:48):
Well, that's not my purview for the legislation, but I can-
Mr. Correa (59:52):
If you're aware of it.
Mr. Wheeler (59:54):
… [inaudible 00:59:54] support capacity building for [inaudible 00:59:57] state an local.
Mr. Correa (59:57):
Mr. Wiegmann, my last 30 seconds.
Mr. Wiegmann (59:59):
That's what we're here for, Congressman. There's a senate bill. There's a couple of house bills. All of them in two different degrees would provide additional authority to the states, both at a minimum to do detection only and then on a pilot program mitigation as well.
Mr. Correa (01:00:13):
Beyond those bills, do you see any-
Mr. Wiegmann (01:00:15):
So that's what we're here for.
Mr. Correa (01:00:16):
Beyond those bills, any other authorities that are needed to be vested in the locals to do their job.
Mr. Wiegmann (01:00:22):
I think those bills are where we should focus-
Mr. Correa (01:00:23):
At this time?
Mr. Wiegmann (01:00:24):
… and coming up with something that will work.
Mr. Correa (01:00:27):
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm out of time. I yield.
Mr. Pfluger (01:00:31):
Gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins (01:00:35):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
(01:00:40)
It's been referenced that there are federal laws against intercepting aircraft or intercepting communication signals and it's been cited today regarding absence of a specific federal law authorizing local law enforcement to use existing technologies to mitigate against an unmanned aerial system threat or a drone threat. Let me say that, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the 10th Amendment already extends such rights to the sovereign states. And let me say that the current law, the current federal law that authorizes specific federal law enforcement agencies to use existing and emerging technologies to mitigate against unmanned aerial systems, yes, that authorizes those specific federal agencies to deploy that technology, but in no way does the current law prohibit the rights of the sovereign state to authorize their own state and local law enforcement to use existing technologies and emerging technologies in a law enforcement capacity.
(01:02:04)
Mr. Wiegmann, is it against the law for one American to strike another American? Yes, it is. It's not a trick question. Is that against the law?
Mr. Wiegmann (01:02:16):
Obviously depends in the context. It could be self-defense, but-
Mr. Higgins (01:02:19):
Of course. There's a general law against that. Is it allowed for a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to detain you or arrest you, is it allowed for him to strike you in order to affect that arrest? Yes, of course he can. Is there a law against me crashing my car into yours purposefully? Yes, there is. But Mr. Jones, are you familiar with the PIT maneuver? Of course. Law enforcement has been using this for decades. We use our vehicle to crash into a suspect vehicle in a particular manner reflective of our training in order to affect the arrest. We're using a current training standards and the technology of our vehicle that we have deployed to affect that arrest. That's not a vehicle crash. It's a law enforcement action that's broadly known. Everyone knows it's against a law for one American to shoot another one, but a law enforcement officer, in order to affect arrest, if he needs to escalate to lethal force, we know a law enforcement officer has that authorization through federal and state laws.
(01:03:42)
So yes, there's plenty of laws. You guys love to cite these laws that exist that we cannot intercept an aircraft. We understand that. But if intercepting the aircraft is a law enforcement action, which using existing technology
Mr. Higgins (01:04:00):
… need to mitigate against an unmanned aerial threat. Mr. Chairman, these technologies exist, and absolutely our local and state law enforcement entities should have access to the same technologies that we seem to be very protectively reserving for only select federal agencies. So Mr. Jones, you had stated earlier, good sir, and thank you for wearing the badge my brother, you had stated earlier that yes, you're deploying these systems, but please clarify for America that there are great restrictions on actually deploying the technology to land a drone. You're using the technology primarily to track criminal drones, but you're not using that technology primarily to land drones, which is what the technology does. Am I correct in that assessment or not, Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones (01:05:06):
Well, both are true. We are using technology to track the drones. We are also using technology and electronic means to intercept and land the drone at a place of our discretion.
Mr. Higgins (01:05:17):
And give us the numbers by percentage. If you track a hundred drones, how many are you landing?
Mr. Jones (01:05:24):
Well, like I stated earlier, for FY '24, Southwest border, we actually landed 60 of them, mitigated 60 of those aircraft.
Mr. Higgins (01:05:32):
60 of the 45,000 that you encountered. Well, there you go. That's what I'm saying. You're using the technology to track, but you're not using the technology to fully mitigate. So this is what we've been talking about for a year, Mr. Chairman. This technology, by 10th Amendment right, belongs to the sovereign states and they should be allowed to fully deploy it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Chairman Pfluger (01:06:01):
Gentleman's time has expired. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gonzales.
Mr. Gonzales (01:06:06):
Thank you, Chairman. And sometimes I feel like I'm in the twilight zone up here. Month after month people come before us, they testify, and you don't get a lot of answers. And it's concerning. It's frustrating. You're telling me we don't know what the hell these drones are in New Jersey are? Is that correct?
Mr. Wheeler (01:06:28):
That's right.
Mr. Gonzales (01:06:29):
That's crazy. I mean, that's crazy. That's madness that we don't know what these drones are. Mr. Jones, you're telling me that 90%, 95% of these drones along the US-Mexico border, we can't interact because they're not in US territory?
Mr. Jones (01:06:48):
That is correct. A large proportion of them stay in foreign airspace.
Mr. Gonzales (01:06:52):
I'll tell you what, there are a lot of Americans that are very frustrated right now, that are essentially questioning where are my taxpayer dollars going? This DOGE craze that's kind of starting to take hold, this is very real. I mean, this is going to come. People are going to have to come before the carpet and they're going to have to explain every single line item. What do you do here? What does this get? And so let me ask a very specific question. Mr. Wheeler, how much of the FBI budget goes towards counter-UAS?
Mr. Wheeler (01:07:21):
So the technical part of operational budget that I have within the critical incident response groups, just less than 500,000.
Mr. Gonzales (01:07:30):
500,000? That's nothing. Why is it so low?
Mr. Wheeler (01:07:36):
Well, I don't-
Mr. Gonzales (01:07:37):
And no wonder we don't know what the hell is going on. 500,000.
Mr. Wheeler (01:07:41):
So that number doesn't capture the FBI Newark investigation, for example. The budget allocation for what we're doing investigatively is not captured in that number. But for the technology we use and the way we deploy it, just under 500,000.
Mr. Gonzales (01:08:01):
We want to help you. I mean, this is a committee, the chairman's putting this together because we want to know these topics. The American people deserve to know the truth on this, and we also deserve to have actions on it. And if it's a budget issue, no problem. But it's also what is our money getting us? Clearly not a whole lot, and something needs to change though. I'm trying to figure out what that something is. It's just, month after month, it's the same old, same old. From a CBP standpoint, Mr. Jones, do you know what the current budget of CBP is for counter-UAS?
Mr. Jones (01:08:36):
I can tell you that direct appropriations for counter-UAS was zero last year.
Mr. Gonzales (01:08:41):
Zero. So…
Mr. Jones (01:08:43):
CBP took it out of Hyde and we will continue to take it out of Hyde. Now, I can't tell you exactly what that number is. I have a general ballpark, but we can discuss that. I provide that as a get back to you.
Mr. Gonzales (01:08:54):
Another committee that I sit on is Appropriations. So I see a lot of things through the lens of dollars and cents. If you're putting zero on the board, you're probably not going to get a lot of success, and it's not fair. A lot of people talk about the border. I represent the border, nearly half of this southern border. I've been out there with these agents in the middle of nowhere that are essentially alone and unafraid, making do with what they have. It's not fair to them, and ultimately it's not fair to us, to have them combat against some of these drones that are happening with a zero budget. I mean, it's just madness. So I guess I have other line of questioning, but I don't want to embarrass anyone. I would just say I would be very interested in partnering up and figuring out what we need to do in order to answer some of these questions.
(01:09:43)
What resources do you need? The technology's already out there. Drones, this isn't new. Drones are a hundred years old. This isn't state-of-the-art… I mean, drones are old technology. The fact that we don't know what's flying in our airspace is only the tip of the iceberg what's to come. We have to fix this, and I want to partner up to fix this. Part of that is finding out the proper resources you need, training, authorities. I get the authorities piece, but it's a cradle-to-grave type of situation. The answer can't be we don't know. And the answer can't be zero. I mean, we got to do better than that. And if we don't, I suspect not good things will happen. So thank you gentlemen for coming before us and testifying. I look forward to partnering with all your agencies. I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger (01:10:31):
Gentleman yields. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. D'Esposito.
Mr. D'Esposito (01:10:35):
Thank you, Chairman. And I sort of feel the same way as my good friend Mr. Gonzales. This is like déjà vu. We've been talking about this for a long time and seems to be not getting much answers. I mean, the chairman and I visited New York City probably close to two years ago. We met with the leadership in the NYPD, was probably one of the most rapidly growing drone use in the country. And my vision on jurisdiction of taking down drones may be different from others here. But first I think it's important to quickly focus on stuff back at home. I mean, these drones over New York and New Jersey flying over critical infrastructure, flying over some of… Whether it's the Verrazzano Bridge or others, I have to agree with my colleagues, the fact that we continue to say that we don't know what they are, we don't know what they're doing, I mean, the American people are looking at us and they think that we're lying to them because they think, how could you possibly not have answers to drones flying over some of the most critical airspace in the country?
(01:11:47)
So I mean, if we're expecting the American people to believe in the information that we're giving them, I think we do need to do better. And that's none of your fault. I mean, the fact that there is only a… Was it a half a million dollars in drone expenditures appropriations? I mean, that's absolutely insane, and I hope that it's something that my colleagues work on. But as many have already pointed out, drones continue to rapidly advance and become more readily available. Along with the expansion, threats from drones being used by bad actors have only increased, as all of you have mentioned. Right now, counter-UAS authorities are restricted from local law enforcement agencies, leaving it largely in the hands of federal agencies. So Mr. Wiegmann or Mr. Wheeler, very simple questions. Do federal agencies have the ability to assist local law enforcement agencies with their counter-UAS capabilities everywhere and every time it's needed?
Mr. Wiegmann (01:12:50):
Not today. That's what we're seeking from the Congress.
Mr. D'Esposito (01:12:52):
Yep.
Mr. Wheeler (01:12:54):
That's absolutely correct.
Mr. D'Esposito (01:12:56):
Are there events in places that would benefit from counter-UAS capabilities that federal agencies are simply not able to cover?
Mr. Wiegmann (01:13:04):
Absolutely there are.
Mr. Wheeler (01:13:05):
Yes.
Mr. D'Esposito (01:13:06):
In your submitted statement, you both said, "We need to empower state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies across the country, which are primarily responsible for keeping our citizens safe at the local level, to take the steps needed to protect their communities from the emergency threat." This past year, right in my district, in the middle of my district in Nassau County, we hosted the 2024 International Cricket World Cup, including the India-Pakistan match. While there were drone-related threats from ISIS ahead of the tournament, the federal government was only able to assist with their counter-UAS capabilities for a small portion of the tournament. What is the current impact of local law enforcement not having these authorities? And I'll leave that to any of you.
Mr. Wheeler (01:13:50):
Well, I think that's the main thing is the capacity. We need more capacity to be able to do the mission, and we strongly support state and local jurisdictions having that capacity and the authority and the ability to help.
Mr. D'Esposito (01:14:03):
And I think what's… I'm sorry, Mr. Wiegmann, I didn't mean to interrupt.
Mr. Wiegmann (01:14:06):
No, that's right. And just to answer your question also, Congressman Gonzales, as well. I mean, I think all of us on the panel share your view that we need to do more and more resources. If we do get the authorities, we will certainly need more resources even if state and locals are doing it, that will require training and additional work and approval on our end. So more resources, more authorities, those are all things that we would support.
Mr. D'Esposito (01:14:25):
And I think it's important to point down and to spread the message because I think there's a lot of false information being spread about law enforcement agencies trying to say that, well, they don't want this added enforcement. They don't want to take on this responsibility. I mean, we had a hearing in this room just hours ago where the commissioner of the Nassau County Police Department, Patrick Ryder, was here, and he has been advocating in his position as commissioner, as his position as a member of the major city chiefs, that this is something that local law enforcement agencies, not only do they need it, they want it. And I think that we have the opportunity throughout this country to make sure that law enforcement agencies, there is some sort of consolidation.
(01:15:12)
There are many law enforcement agencies that border one another that could help each other deal with this… I'll call it a burden, but this added burden. But they're willing to do it. Why? Because it makes sure that people can be kept safe. We can make sure that in instances like the World Cup back in my district, or as Mr. Jimenez was talking about the summer games in Miami, I mean, to depend on the federal government and the federal government is telling us, "Well, we can only help you some of the time even when you have threats from ISIS," I mean, that's a huge problem. And it's one that we need to address not only here today, but moving forward. And Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but thank you for continuing to bring this to light.
Chairman Pfluger (01:15:56):
Gentleman's time has expired. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Pfluger (01:16:00):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. I got an article right here, Mystery Drones Spotted over New York, New Jersey Prompt Calls For Federal Investigation. I believe this was Breitbart News. I want to start with you, Mr. Wheeler from the FBI. What can you tell us about what you guys do know?
Mr. Wheeler (01:16:23):
So the public reports and what we have from eyewitness sightings, some of those very credible police personnel and others are what we describe as unidentified drones. We do not know the particular specifics of what those drones are. Some are described as being slightly larger than a commercial available drone, fixed wing, as well as rotary. We have helped analyze with our partners' video and pictures of what those look like, would've been submitted. Part of that is these over 3,000 tips from the public and to look at that. But as I previously stated, we don't know the people responsible behind that, and that's what we're working on.
Mr. Pfluger (01:17:20):
Yeah. What did you say the FBI was spending on counter drone?
Mr. Wheeler (01:17:25):
My budget would specifically include the technology that we use.
Mr. Pfluger (01:17:30):
Is it 500,000?
Mr. Wheeler (01:17:30):
It's 500,000.
Mr. Pfluger (01:17:35):
That doesn't seem nearly adequate. Why do you feel like there isn't a push within the FBI to keep up with modern warfare and modern threats?
Mr. Wheeler (01:17:45):
So we're-
Mr. Pfluger (01:17:47):
What is the budget for the FBI right now?
Mr. Wheeler (01:17:51):
Roughly 11 billion.
Mr. Pfluger (01:17:53):
Okay. Why do you think as warfare changes, and as you know, Sir, warfare is changing drastically right now overseas, especially with Ukraine and Russia and the development of drone technology. Why isn't the FBI taking this threat more seriously? And that's obviously reflected by the budget that you guys have assigned to counter drone technology.
Mr. Wheeler (01:18:18):
I have a limited capability that is embedded within our emerging threats unit for surveillance issues. That allocation of resources, that research, that operational deployment of our capability is what we have today. I would imagine that this would grow over time.
Mr. Pfluger (01:18:46):
What do you think that some of these terrorist cells that might be in the country right now, or maybe even outside of our borders, what do you think that they're looking at when they see a hearing like this and they see that you guys still, after almost a month, don't know who these drones are? What do you think that they're thinking?
Mr. Wheeler (01:19:08):
So I would be measured in how we speak about our capability and what our limitations and capacity is. However, I'll say to you that it's not as good as I wish it was, and we'll continue to work to make it better.
Mr. Pfluger (01:19:25):
Yeah, well, when you're only spending $500,000 a year, it's probably not going to be very good, is it?
Mr. Wheeler (01:19:31):
The only thing I would say about that is that this is an enterprise-wide problem, it's not just a technological problem that most of that $11 billion budget for the FBI gets after threats to Americans, this being one of them. And the way we apply resources, personnel, operational, all of that to include technology to get after a threat that would threaten American lives, I don't think that $500,000 for the technology part of it adequately captures our commitment to protecting Americans.
Mr. Pfluger (01:20:11):
I want to shift real quick because you guys have been talking about using electronic warfare to counter some of these drones. What about drones that aren't susceptible to counter warfare like your fiber optic drones? What are you guys doing about those? I'll start with you, Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones (01:20:29):
So all options are on the table right now. We are exploring kinetic options, compliment the electronic.
Mr. Pfluger (01:20:39):
You can buy those right now and they're really not that expensive. You aware of that, Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones (01:20:44):
I'm aware there's a lot of different technologies out there. We have experimented with some that have been very successful.
Mr. Pfluger (01:20:50):
Yep. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger (01:20:54):
Gentleman yields. The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Malliotakis, is recognized.
Ms. Malliotakis (01:20:59):
Thank you, Chairman Pfluger. Thank you all for being here today. I just want to follow up on what my colleague asked regarding what happened in New York and New Jersey. These drones, unmanned aircrafts have also flown over my district. A number of constituents have seen them over a power plant in Brooklyn. They were coming over the Verrazzano Bridge, and I will remind everyone or explain to everyone here that Verrazzano Bridge connects Staten Island and Brooklyn, and on the Staten Island side you have Fort Wadsworth, which is a US Coast Guard Sector New York base. And then in the Brooklyn side, right on the other side of Verrazzano Bridge, you have Fort Hamilton, which is a US Army installation. And so it is very concerning to me that we have these objects. We are not sure if they're drones or unmanned aircrafts, but they are flying over sensitive infrastructure and facilities.
(01:21:51)
And the fact that we don't know what they are or who's behind them or what they're doing is very concerning to me, particularly in a post- Chinese-spy-balloon world. Okay. The fact that this administration allowed for a Chinese spy balloon to go across the country over multiple military installations is very concerning. And that we could potentially be having this happen again, it's astounding to me that this is even happening without any type of intervention. You say it's no known threat, but is there still a possibility of there being a threat? At the end of the day, that's what my constituents want to know.
Mr. Wheeler (01:22:31):
Yes, I am cognizant, and we all are in the FBI, of what this threat can look like. Any way across the spectrum of sophisticated state actors, adversaries that want to hurt us, all the way through counterterrorism matters, cyber, WMD, criminal, all the way down to a nuisance drone that could cause harm. So that's the wide spectrum that could concerns me every day. The-
Ms. Malliotakis (01:23:04):
Okay. You want to finish your sentence?
Mr. Wheeler (01:23:07):
I would just mention it concerns me that we don't know the answer to your question yet.
Ms. Malliotakis (01:23:10):
Yes. And are you working with the Pentagon, with FAA, with DHS, with your partners to try to identify this? Because I don't put it all on just the FBI. I think this is… I mean, what is Homeland Security doing? Do you have any idea?
Mr. Wheeler (01:23:25):
I wouldn't speak for another department, but I will say that the way we do business is extremely collaborative in the interagency and especially with our state and local partners.
Ms. Malliotakis (01:23:36):
So who is taking the lead here on this particular issue to identify these drones and aircrafts?
Mr. Wheeler (01:23:41):
Well, we have an investigation open predicated on a idea that there's unsafe operation in the airspace, which is a federal violation that we have some jurisdiction for. But it would help us know sort of what lane this falls in when we know the people that are responsible and what this is all about, to your point earlier. And we're actively investigating and would like to answer those questions, but I don't have a better answer.
Ms. Malliotakis (01:24:14):
What if they were carrying chemical weapons or something? We just don't… I mean, this could be a much worse conversation we could be having right now because these things have been flying all over New York, New Jersey, over military installations. I don't know. I don't know what's going on there, but these agencies need to figure it out and try to get to the bottom of what's going on. I think it's very concerning. Is there a possibility if… Hopefully it is not a threat, is it a possibility it would fall under this System Assessment and Validation of Emergency Responders program, the SAVER Program? This is a program under Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology where they're testing various technology for search and rescue disaster response, and it could be part of the law enforcement assessment. You think that's a possibility? Because my army base doesn't know about it. My NYPD doesn't know about it. So I guess my question is why wouldn't the local authorities know if this was part of a testing of security technologies for first responders?
Mr. Wheeler (01:25:17):
I don't know that to be the case, and I couldn't really comment on that.
Ms. Malliotakis (01:25:21):
Okay. Well, just again, I would love to speak to you offline at some point and maybe share some information with you, but I would really just urge if you could speak to your colleagues and counterparts in these other departments because we need to get to the bottom of what's going on here. And if it is something that is not nefarious and is one of part of these public safety applications that are being tested, they need to coordinate with the local authorities so my guys in New York, NYPD, they know that it's not a threat.
Mr. Wheeler (01:25:49):
I would agree.
Ms. Malliotakis (01:25:50):
All right, thank you.
Chairman Pfluger (01:25:53):
Gentlelady yields. This will be the last questioning for the first panel. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith (01:26:01):
Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman… Chairmen, both of you, for allowing me to sit in on this hearing. I've been in Congress 44 years and I have lost track of the number of times when we seemingly did not adequately assess a threat. I had one of my service members from the Marines in the barracks in Lebanon when that terrible, horrible deed was committed by Iran. Actually, after we got hit in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 by Al-Qaeda, I chaired all the hearings. We had the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff come and testify as Admiral Crowe. And they kept saying, everyone, no one thought that Al-Qaeda would hit there. Maybe in the Middle East, but not there.
(01:26:50)
I wrote a bill called the Embassy Security Act. It was signed into law. I added it to an appropriations bill, big thick bill. But it was all about setbacks and Mylar on the Windows, a lot of good things, and it did mitigate, I think, some of the concerns there. But we always seem to miss something, and I'm very concerned that we're missing something here. I've raised the issue, as has my colleagues, Malliotakis and others in New Jersey and New York, about these drone sightings. So last night I was on the beach in Island State Park in Ocean County with the sheriff.
(01:27:23)
He has been working it every single night. He's got his own tethered drones chronicling. One of his officers, two nights ago, saw 50 drones come in off the ocean right there. So he thought maybe they'll replicate it. They didn't, but we thought it was a possibility. Then last night we had a number of other people there, including a commanding officer from the Coast Guard who said that one of their 47-foot motor lifeboats was followed by between 12 and 30 of these drones as they went through the water. Followed, right behind them. And I said, "What's the rules of engagement?" I mean, you do it if you're fighting against a narco trafficker or something. And they said, "We don't know. We don't have any."
(01:28:08)
So I did reach out to the commanding officer at the joint base, which is also in my district, and talked to him, had a very good conversation, Colonel Anthony Smith, Joint Base Fort Dix-Maguire, in the 87th Air Base Wing today. And I said, "I know you have the capability. You've put out press releases to identify and bring down drones. Why can't you deploy them at least to the ocean? Bring one of these down, find out who's doing it. They have the capability." He said, "We don't have the authority, only within the parameters of our base." Well, there's a national interest here. Our jets fly over the ocean all the time for training, so that perimeter is larger. So I did write Secretary Lloyd Austin asking that that capability that may be sitting in a closet somewhere, I know they use it all the time, but bring it out. And I'm not saying you got to share it with the sheriffs. It'd be nice. Just do it yourself in the interest of the American public.
(01:29:09)
So I would ask if you would, echo that request. I mean, DOD's got the capability and maybe Homeland Security does as well. When we had a Zoom meeting with Secretary Mayorkas, our governor put it together and I appreciated that. But I asked them, "Why can't we just track where they go to?" Seemingly they're going out to sea, to something, a ship. We don't know for sure. But they came in off the ocean. So the question really is, can't we just get DOD to share? In my first term, DOD and VA did a great thing. The DOD/VA sharing agreement for healthcare capabilities. It was fantastic.
(01:29:48)
Why can't the DOD share this with Homeland Security, with FBI and others so that you can go out and find out who they are? Maybe it's China. I chair the China Commission, and I've had 115 hearings on it. I'm barred from going there now, and I'm on their hit list. Xi Jinping is a monster. Look what Putin's doing. They're all capable of doing horrible things to our people, and now they're threatening my good friend and colleague from New York, and of course New Jersey, big time. Let's go get that DOD capability and find out and put to rest the question, who is it? We can bring one down tomorrow. Your thoughts.
Mr. Wheeler (01:30:30):
Sir, I just say I share your concern. I share a lot of frustration and I'm more than willing to continue working with Department of Defense to try to get better.
Mr. Smith (01:30:39):
Again, if they don't have the authority, they can do it on an emergency basis. Just send that capability out to the ocean, to the beach, because they're coming in every day. Figure out which one it is and bring them down, and then retrieve it and find out what's going on. As my good friend Congresswoman Malliotakis said, the thing with the balloon was mind-boggling. Over our bases, and we didn't see that that was a threat? Well, this, I think, is a very serious threat, and so please, if you could get DOD to share that capability. Maybe Homeland has it. I don't know. Maybe you have it somewhere, but I know DOD has it. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Chairman Pfluger (01:31:24):
Gentleman's time has expired. I thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony, for being here today, and for the members and the questions. We will now dismiss this first panel. Take a brief two to three minute recess while we arrange for the second panel of witnesses. The committee will come to order. I'm pleased to have the second distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this very important topic, and I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise your right hand. You solemnly swear that the testimony you'll give before the Committee on Homeland Security of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Thank you. May be seated. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. I'd now like to formally introduce our second panel. Mr. Jeffrey Baumgartner serves as the vice president for National Security and Resilience at Berkshire Hathaway Energy. And Dr. Paul Schwennesen serves as the co-director of the Global Strategy Decisions Group, also my classmate from the United States Air Force Academy class of 2000. Thank you for being here, and we will now recognize Mr. Baumgartner for your opening statement of five minutes.
Mr. Baumgartner (01:35:18):
Chairman, ranking members, and members of the subcommittees, thank you for inviting me to testify. My name is Jeffrey Baumgartner, and I serve as the vice president of National Security and Resilience Policy at Berkshire Hathaway Energy. Today I want to discuss how unmanned aerial systems threaten critical infrastructure. Berkshire Hathaway Energy businesses provide reliable, secure, low-cost energy to more than 13 million customers in the US, Great Britain, and Canada. Our commitment to our customers requires us to secure our infrastructure from all threats, including those posed by unmanned aerial systems. Critical infrastructure is the backbone of our economy and security, yet energy sector infrastructure and the transportation,
Mr. Baumgartner (01:36:00):
Transportation, communications and water sector infrastructure we rely on face increasing threats from UAS and the stakes for ensuring resilience and security could not be higher. In recent years, UAS technology has become more accessible, affordable, and advanced. While these innovations offer immense potential, like enabling faster damage assessments of energy infrastructure, they also empower malicious actors. Adversaries can use UAS to surveil facilities, deliver hazardous payloads, disrupt operations, and even conduct cyber intrusions. The Department of Homeland Security's 2025 Homeland Threat Assessments highlights UAS as a persistent and growing risk to critical infrastructure. This warning isn't hypothetical.
(01:36:46)
Last month, federal agents arrested an individual planning to use a UAS to attack an electric substation. I hope we can proactively address the UAS threat before a significant incident occurs. Despite the pervasiveness of the threat, existing federal laws and regulations have not kept pace with the rapid proliferation of UAS technology. Current frameworks primarily address safety and airspace management, but lack robust provisions to counter malicious UAS activities. This leaves critical infrastructure companies vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated threats. To address these risks, we must modernize our defenses while balancing security measures with civil liberties. A comprehensive strategy that incorporates technology innovation, appropriate legal frameworks and public-private collaboration is essential. I hope we can prioritize the following actions. Number one, grant critical infrastructure companies limited authority to deploy advanced detection and counter UAS technologies. Investments in cutting-edge counter UAS systems. We'll ensure we can address current and emerging threats effectively. Two, identify formal mechanisms for sharing actionable information about UAS threats and enable law enforcement at all levels with the tools and legal authorities to address UAS threats effectively. The third is advanced research and development.
(01:38:12)
Collaborative R&D will improve the ability to neutralize UAS threats without collateral damage. The fourth and final, develop a comprehensive strategy to align regulatory, technological and operational efforts at federal, state, and local levels, while addressing privacy concerns and establishing clear legal parameters for UAS operations. The private sector owns most of the critical infrastructure that provides key services, but protecting these assets is a collaborative effort. The National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience rightly emphasizes this partnership. However, existing counter UAS authorities for DHS and the Department of Justice are set to expire soon.
(01:38:59)
Failing to renew and expand current authorities risk leaving critical infrastructure defenseless against the evolving UAS threat. The window of opportunity to address these challenges is closing. By modernizing our defenses, updating our legal frameworks, and fostering collaboration, we can safeguard critical infrastructure, protect public safety, and maintain our leadership in security and innovation. We are ready to work alongside this committee, a coalition of critical infrastructure companies and relevant stakeholders to effectively protect our critical services against the evolving UAS threat. Thank you for holding this hearing and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Pfluger (01:39:39):
Thank you. Mr. Baumgartner. The chair now recognizes Dr. Paul Schwennesen for his opening statement.
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:39:44):
Thank you. Chairman Pfluger and [inaudible 01:39:47] ranking members Magaziner and Xanadar, distinguished members of the subcommittees. [inaudible 01:39:54] homeland from unmanned aerial systems. So I've rearranged my remarks busily in the back, hoping to give you guys something a little more tangible to work with so that we're not just repeating and risking the constant repetition of the problem. I think we acknowledge the problem. We have a real train wreck coming. I think it goes a little bit unsaid. I think we lack a lot of the technical know-how on how to deal with this, on how to assess and neutralize these threats. But there is somebody who does know, and that's the Ukrainians. Having recently observed firsthand the astonishing evolution in drone operations in Ukrainian occupied Kursk, I think the message for me at least, has finally sunk home.
(01:40:35)
Unmanned systems are not just an iteration, they're indeed a revolution in the application of lethal force. The world's most advanced weapons and tactics are being developed and deployed at scale in the Ukraine-Russian front at remarkably low cost and without central direction. And these facts hold radical implications for the next major shooting war between great powers. We need to learn from the Ukrainians. The United States is rapidly losing its strategic military advantage in this new technical environment. There can be little doubt that China, North Korea, Iran, and other emergent powers are eagerly sending observers and technicians to the front lines in occupied Ukraine to very carefully note the revolution in weapons delivery to adopt it into doctrines which seek to invert the military strengths of their larger, better equipped, better trained western geopolitical adversaries.
(01:41:25)
We need to learn from Ukraine. In short, the rules of the armed race have been fundamentally rewritten to favor small, cheap, easily mastered weapons systems. More important still, these disproportionate advantages are not a one-time effect. They amplify in a positive feedback loop through each iteration cycle. New tech gets better exponentially faster and is deployed far more quickly than legacy countermeasures. In Ukraine, the source of this immense innovation reservoir is the highly adaptable, highly diffused emerging engineering base of Ukrainian technicians. Uncountable tech workers routinely work full days in their civilian capacity, then leave their jobs to go work in pop-up tech facilities until late at night. The whole country is on deck.
(01:42:13)
They have created an ecosystem of invention, a web only loosely coordinated through the administrative defense. The advances in hardware and software they produce are channeled into a robust system of decentralized training facilities. And in less than three weeks, an FPV drone operator can be mission ready. Operators with no previous battlefield experience have been credited with as many as 1500 confirmed kills. The disproportionality is vast. This is perhaps the main takeaway in a total war peer-to-peer scenario. If technology allows one side of a conflict to impose extraordinary damage on the exquisite, expensive, difficult to master weapon systems of their adversary and can do so at a fraction of the cost expended by their enemy, it doesn't require an economist to see where that leads.
(01:42:59)
It is easy to be a critic, but I'm convinced the United States and its NATO allies have a very narrow window of opportunity to address this major shift in comparative advantage. Current operations in Ukraine have shown what a scrappy innovative force can do to a large, hide-bound military machine. It would be well to take note. So some of the scenarios looking forward. I think the most likely is that the US will fall behind the leading edge of UAS development and deployment and will only start to respond in the aftermath of a crisis. And we're seeing some of that already in New Jersey. We don't need a Pearl Harbor or a 9/11 to wake us up. We're already awake. We need to deal with this now.
(01:43:38)
So the best case is possibly conceivably that we can avoid this kind of depressing scenario through a well-orchestrated demonstration. Historical examples such as the sinking of the Ostfriesland Air Force, people know this well. Show that it is sometimes possible to break entrenched paradigms by publicly demonstrating the current system's vulnerabilities. When understood by the right audiences, these demonstrations can shift doctrine, development and tactical training in new and constructive ways, preferably before the lessons are learned the hard way. We need to learn from Ukraine. It's time to get a task force to mop up information, go out there, sponge this stuff up, and learn from what they're doing and learn this information from in-theater and get up to speed as soon as possible. Thank you.
Mr. Pfluger (01:44:25):
Thank you Dr. Schwennesen. The chair will note that we had a third expert on the panel, Mrs. Cathy Lanier, from the National Football League. Unfortunately unable to join today. However, the chair asked unanimous consent to enter Ms. Lanier's testimony into the record. Without objection, so ordered. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning as we did prior. Dr. Schwennesen, I'd like to focus on something here. Policy versus technology. What is our issue right now? Is it not enough technology? Is it not keeping up with the technology? As you mentioned, maybe we're being outmaneuvered in a lot of cases by the Russians and the Ukrainians may have some information that we can learn from. Or is it a policy issue here as we protect the homeland or is it both?
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:45:21):
I do think it's both. I think it's a combination of the two. I think we have created a policy thicket of bureaucracy that basically stifles the innovation space. I do think we have a technical know-how problem, or at least we know for a fact that Ukrainians have a technical know-how solution. And I think if we're able to reduce some of the bureaucratic barriers to innovation, allow people to tinker and experiment and learn at the operational military level. This needs to happen yesterday. We can't do the same old business of doing a 2.5 year request for proposal and wait for things to come back. We just can't do this business as usual. We do not have that time.
Mr. Pfluger (01:46:04):
As we sit here, you listen to the testimony. We currently have UAS's flying over New Jersey. We heard from Mr. Smith in New Jersey that they were flying over Coast Guard vessels last night. How is this possible? Why are we not responding? What do we need to do and what actions need to be taken?
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:46:22):
That's a very difficult one to answer. Of course, I can't speak for them, but I have a suspicion that people are frozen with fear of what would happen in an administrative situation, which they took action and they were punished for doing so. That they shot down a drone, God forbid, and the debris hit somebody's house and now all of a sudden they're on front page news. And so people are acting out a sense of self-restraint here, which is being promoted by our policy environment.
Mr. Pfluger (01:46:51):
So when it comes to technology, we need to focus on our offensive technology, lessons learned in the Ukrainian conflict where they're leveraging UAS systems everywhere. We need to focus on our counter UAS technology and our policy needs to improve in order to counter it and then give the authorities that we need while protecting privacy of citizens here.
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:47:12):
I would say so. Absolutely.
Mr. Pfluger (01:47:13):
I'll come back to you in a second. Mr. Baumgartner, what's the most catastrophic event in the energy industry and critical infrastructure that we need to be thinking about and planning for to prevent?
Mr. Baumgartner (01:47:27):
I mean, luckily we haven't seen a significant incident. I think from an imagination perspective, certainly something with a payload like the gentleman from Tennessee who was planning an incident to drop a payload into a substation, you could imagine that at a larger scale and impacting or identifying more critical infrastructure from generation to substations or even on the pipeline side, a liquid natural gas import-export facility.
Mr. Pfluger (01:48:00):
So my district, the Permian Basin, 6 million barrels a day needs to be protected and the authorities in some cases, as you recommended in your testimony, should be delegated to private companies in some cases to both identify and also mitigate if needed.
Mr. Baumgartner (01:48:16):
I think that energy infrastructure in your district should be considered to be protected. Now how that gets to a place where we can do that as the private sector, there are probably steps to get there. We have great relationships with local, state, federal law enforcement and are happy to take an intermediary step to work with them to ensure that we understand the technology, the appropriate technology is in place and we can implement that technology in a future state.
Mr. Pfluger (01:48:51):
Thank you. Dr. Schwennesen, we'll go back to the services for a second, and the race for technology. Let's focus on the Air Force, our alma mater, the Air Force Academy. How would you characterize the responses that we're seeing out of DOD, specifically the Air Force? Are they doing it fast? Is it neat in its approach or is it just average?
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:49:17):
Right. I think it is below average and gives me no pleasure to say that, but I think we are not taking it seriously enough. Again, it is as if everyone sees the train coming, everyone agrees the train is coming, and yet no one is taking any steps to get out of its way. Everyone is assuming that somebody else is doing it and there's just no sense of urgency or coherent activity to address this issue.
(01:49:43)
And again, that's easy for me to say. It's easy for me to throw spears from the sidelines, but I do think that one of the things we can do is leverage our very good relationships we have with Ukraine. We've given them a lot of resources and they're quite willing and eager to give us something back in return for it. We should be mopping that information up right now. We should be sending people there right now.
Mr. Pfluger (01:50:05):
Thank you very much. My time's expired. I recognize the ranking member for his question.
Mr. Magaziner (01:50:10):
Thank you, Chairman, and thank you both. Dr. Schwennesen, I want to begin by commending you and thanking you for your assistance to the Ukrainians. I have to remind unfortunately, some of my colleagues from time to time that Vladimir Putin is not our friend. That the cause of the Ukrainians is the cause of freedom and democracy and that Russia continues to pose a threat not just to Ukraine, but to American interests all over the world. And so I just want to thank you for the work that you're doing over there because that is the front line of freedom today.
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:50:45):
Thank you.
Mr. Magaziner (01:50:46):
I was interested in your written testimony when you expressed some skepticism in the effectiveness of signal jamming technology to mitigate risks from UAS on the battlefield. I was wondering if you could expand on that. Why are you sort of skeptical about the effectiveness or the promise of signal jamming in other counter UAS technology on the battlefield and also writ large?
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:51:12):
Sure. I claim no engineering expertise in drone warfare, but all I can do is say what I've seen. Which is that in the world's most intense EW battle space, which is the Ukrainian-Russian front at the moment. It is an electronic warfare chaos. And so what people used to think about the ability to jam drones, which is what some of the speakers we had here are talking about, which is two years old. Which at this point is effectively a century old, obsolete information. Jamming doesn't work the way we think it does, and there are so many new developing technologies on countering the counters.
(01:51:54)
They've already gone multiple layers ahead of us. At this point, they're doing AI, pixel lock technology that doesn't have any RF frequency whatsoever. They're doing ambush technology where they're not needing to have any kind of communication between operator and drone. So again, I don't know the specifics beyond what I've just seen the tip of the iceberg, which is that the jamming solution is not a one-size-fits-all. That's the silver bullet. It might be a piece of a suite, but that's only a piece.
Mr. Magaziner (01:52:26):
And I recognize that you've thought about this in sort of the DOD space more perhaps than homeland domestic law enforcement, etc. But I imagine the lessons are transferable. What do we need to do specifically in order to go from being laggards to leaders on this? You referenced procurement issues and kind of speeding that up. You referenced bringing a spirit of, I guess inventiveness and innovation, but are there other specific things? I mean, is there training that we should be looking at deploying across the federal government? Is there some kind of specific workaround to procurement rules that you would recommend? What are the nuts and bolts of what we should be doing in order to take back the advantage?
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:53:14):
I do think Yankee ingenuity is one of our comparative strengths and we need to take advantage of it. And one of the ways to do that, this is not an especially sexy solution, and so I say that with apologies in advance. But I think one example of an idea is to, at the DOD level, get drones down to the absolute operational level of units so they can begin to tinker. As Elon Musk says, move fast and break things. You need to learn on the fly.
(01:53:48)
You need to learn in the trenches how these things are operated. It isn't enough to do this from a centrally, managed top-down approach in which we're going to go through this entire typical cycle and then deliver the tool to the warfighter wrapped with a ribbon. It doesn't work that way anymore. We have to give it to them and let them develop it on the fly.
Mr. Magaziner (01:54:10):
Empower the people on the front lines to innovate. That makes sense. Mr. Baumgartner, I apologize, I only have a minute left, but I wanted to explore this importance of the cooperation between private industry and particularly state and local law enforcement. What are the best practices there that you've noticed, and are there things that we can do to support those kinds of collaborations?
Mr. Baumgartner (01:54:31):
Well, we work very hard to establish and maintain those relationships in all the states and localities that we serve. I think it does become about manpower an hour spent in doing that collaboration, and so there are certainly challenges to maintaining that, but I think fusion centers are a great opportunity to engage in a wide variety of state and local efforts at one location. I think there are other similar opportunities, like in our sector we have the electricity information sharing and analysis center that also convenes those state and local partners in a regional fashion, and we're able to effectively have those conversations and maintain those relationships in that forum as well.
Mr. Magaziner (01:55:28):
Thank you both.
Mr. Gimenez (01:55:30):
Thank you ranking member, and I recognize myself for five minutes. And I'm not going to take five minutes, but Mr. Schwennesen, I totally agree with you that we have a problem here in the United States in dealing with these systems not only for warfare, but also for protecting the homeland. I would think that part of the problem is that you got $500,000 in the FBI. I'm sure you have $500,000 in some other agency, and you got all these agencies working on the same issue, and then it's not really centralized. There's no planning, etc. Maybe airports are trying to do their thing and the FBI is trying to do their thing and customs and border protection trying to do their thing. Would it be beneficial to try to put this all together and just focus on the unmanned aerial system threat in the homeland?
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:56:20):
I have to say I lean that way. I hate to beat a dead horse here, but the Ukrainians have once again shown some ways to deal with this. They have stood up their entire separate new force, very much like the Marine Corps or the Air Force. They've set up the unmanned aerial systems service in the Ukrainian Department of Defense in order to do precisely that. In order to address this entire new sector of technology and how it's to be developed and applied.
Mr. Gimenez (01:56:48):
Probably one of the advantages that the Ukrainians had is that they had no air force basically, and so by necessity, they needed to come up with something different that actually combated the threat. We have an Air Force, and unfortunately what happens is that you have this resistance to change and UAS, unmanned systems, etc, are a threat to the people that fly the planes. And so we do need to look at this in an entirely different way. And so not only on the DOD side where we do need to have the private sector innovate, and the RFP should be, "Hey, I want to sink Chinese ships." And just simple as that. If you ask DOD to do that, they'll come up with an aircraft carrier that costs 10 billion and all these systems.
(01:57:42)
The Ukrainians are sinking Russian ships in the Black Sea with little boats with maybe five or 600 pounds of TNT on them. A whole bunch of them can't possibly take them all out and basically boom. No submarine because that's the other thing we'd look at, but maybe we need to have these really expensive submarines with torpedoes and stuff, the old way of fighting war. We need to look at the new way of fighting war, but here it's homeland security. Look, I'm convinced that we're going to have a problem. We'll wake up when something happens because that's always what we do and we should be waking up right now.
(01:58:17)
And so one of the things maybe that we should be looking at is how do we centralize a homeland security kind of focus on unmanned systems and how we protect all our infrastructure, airports, the energy system, our electricity, our grid, all that is vulnerable. And so that's all I have to say and I'll yield my time back and I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. D'Esposito.
Mr. D'Esposito (01:58:45):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Schwennesen, I know it was discussed earlier and I wish some others on the other side were here to listen because sometimes when we talk about Russia, China and Iran we're referred to as fear-mongers, but the proliferation of drone technology from foreign adversaries like Russia, like China, like Iran, has impacted conflicts across the globe. What is the risk of such technology being transferred or replicated by domestic actors in the United States or by transnational criminal organizations across our borders? And how can we disrupt the supply chain?
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:59:26):
Well, the risk is 100%. I mean, if it hasn't happened already, I'm sure it has, but if it hasn't, it's about-
Mr. D'Esposito (01:59:32):
It definitely has, right?
Dr. Paul Schwennesen (01:59:35):
How do we mitigate it is again, this is the elephant in the room, and I think the only way to mitigate these kinds of threats is to out innovate the threat itself. This is something that we've been traditionally good at. It's something we have the technical know-how and the capacity to do, but right now we have not opened the gates. We have not gotten our juices flowing, as I say, to address these threats and out-innovate the threat.
Mr. D'Esposito (02:00:03):
Thank you. I know we have to go vote, so I'm going to make this quick. But Mr. Baumgartner, just last month, a Tennessee man was arrested for plotting to use a drone carrying an explosive to destroy a Nashville power substation. We know that there have been additional incidents, suspicious drone activity near substations. And I think this is critically important, especially in the time that we're in, where there is this big push for alternate energy sources, whether it's battery storage, whether it's wind storage, without really doing the work to make sure that we can protect these assets. In addition to cyber concerns, what physical security risks do drones pose to energy sector assets?
Mr. Baumgartner (02:00:45):
A great question. I think payloads are obviously, as witnessed in the Tennessee case, but you could simply ram a drone into some of our infrastructure, and we do take a defense-in-depth approach and try to add shielding and obfuscate certain targets. But on top of that, you could also see a situation, and we've seen published cases where they've actually used drones to enable a cyber intrusion as well.
Mr. D'Esposito (02:01:19):
Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez (02:01:21):
Thank you gentleman from New York. I thank all the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rules 7D, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.